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Preface to the Digital Edition 2007
The  innoatie, productie and humane Volo Kalmar and Uddealla 
plants, with arious concepts of group work, were closed in 1994 and 1993 
respectiely. Times were changing. Unemployment was rising; unions were 
focussing more on job creation and employment than on quality of work. 
Globalization put pressure on homogenization of production processes. 
Volo got a new top management, after Pehr G. Gyllenhammar who had 
conceied the new factories in cooperation with unions. The bestselling book 
‘Lean production’ (Womack et al) articulated and reinforced the ideology 
that there is just one best way and that no iable alternaties exist.
Today the Kalmar plant is rented as a warehouse, and for ICT produc-
tion. In the Uddealla plant Pininfarina with 800–900 employees produces 
a Volo conertible using a product flow assembly system. In the other half 
of the plant Volo Bus is welding space frames.
But ideas of competitie and human-centred forms of industrial produc-
tion are still alie and they are practiced in arious sectors. The Volo 
Kalmar and Uddealla production concepts are still used, by academics and 
practitioners alike, as reference points and as reminders of the possibility 
of alternaties with quality in both work and products. 
The print editions of Enriching  Production were quickly sold out. In 
January 2007, as a result of the centre-right government’s decision to close 
Arbetslivsinstitutet/ Swedish National Institute for Working Life, we are 
organizing our archies and we found discs with the book. As there is still a 
demand we decided to prepare a digital edition, with no changes in the text, 
except this preface. Many thanks to Lena Karlsson for digital editing. 
Enriching Production was followed by a workshop and a special issue 
on ‘Good work and productivity’, in Economic and Industrial Democracy, 
Vol. 19, No 1, 1998. 
An indication of the topicality is a recent interiew with Pehr G. Gyllen-
hammar in LO-tidningen, the journal of the Swedish Trade Union Con-
federation (Sept. 15, 2006). Gyllenhammar expresses an understanding 
for strikes in industry after 1968, and he states that ‘companies must use 
the full potential of the employees, and the competitie adantage of good 
education, professional skills and an advanced form or work organization’. 
The basic idea is the same as when the Kalmar plant was planned 30 years 
ago, Gyllenhammar says: ‘Why should it be so damned boring to assemble 
a car, when eerybody loes to repair and tinker about with the same car 
in their spare time? It should be the other way around, delight and pride in 
producing the car.’
Stockholm in January 2007
Åke Sandberg 
Preface
The background to this book is the closure of Volvo’s car assembly plant 
in Uddevalla in western Sweden. The fate of the plant, being a symbol for 
human-centred production, was debated by policy-makers and researchers 
around the world. The Swedish Institute for Work Life Research decided 
that the experiences of the plant should be gathered in a book with an in-
ternational and comparative perspective.
Cecilia Runnström has assisted me in the editorial work, and her work 
has been important for the realization of this book project. Fern Scott 
edited the English of all the chapters; also Aina Godenius and Ann-Britt 
Hellmark contributed here. Gary Newman and Axel Henriksson prepared 
the camera-ready copy. At the Institute director Anders L. Johansson and 
prof. Casten von Otter supported our work on the book during the whole 
process, and Iris Frank and Gudrun Hagberg helped with administrative 
tasks. Thank you all.
Postscript. January 1995
As this book was on its way to the printers, Volvo announced its intention 
to develop convertible and coupe versions of its 850 model in cooperation 
with the British TWR and to produce them in the Uddevalla plant, applying 
its unique production concept. This is good news; the Uddevalla concept 
of teams assembling whole cars may be further developed and get a chance 
to show its potential in car production which, as suggested in this book, is 
increasingly consumer oriented. 
On the other hand, for production in longer series at the Swedish Tors-
landa plant and at the Belgian Gent plant, Volvo has made the choice of 
another production concept: preassembly of modules (often with long job 
cycles) to be finally assembled on a line with a high degree of automation. 
As researchers argued in the debate, Volvo in fact not only made a reduction 
in capacity, but a strategic choice of production concept basically different 
from that of Uddevalla. But with the Uddevalla plant again as a point of 
reference, possibilities grow of developing human-oriented and productive 
production concepts, ‘enriching production’, also adapted for production 
in long series.
There is not, as the authors on ‘lean production’ want us to believe, one 
single best work organization model. In the changing realities of industrial 
production, Uddevalla’s ‘enriching production’ remains an important con-
tribution to future developments. 
Åke Sandberg
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The book and its authors
This book discusses a pathbreaking effort to unite good jobs with produc-
tivity in industry – Volvo’s innovative Uddevalla car assembly plant where 
competent workers in groups built complete cars during a short period of 
four years.
The assembly line was not only broken, it was totally abandoned and the 
groups all worked in parallel independently of each other. The skilled work-
ers were supported by advanced computer technology to guide the vehicles 
transporting components to the groups. Each car produced was destined 
to one specified customer. The plant started operation in 1989 and three 
years later the decision was made to close it down – together with the older 
Kalmar plant, the pioneer in breaking with line production. The authors of 
the book, a wide range of distinguished scholars of the field, analyze this 
experience in an international and comparative perspective.
Enriching production
The double goal of good jobs and productivity is the essence of what we 
want to call enriching production. Production that is enriching to work and 
workers and to investors and owners.
Lean production can never be the ultimate goal and form for human pro-
ductive activity. Some ‘fat’ is needed to make the workplace a decent place 
for human activity, a place where you can unfold as a human being.
The concept of enriching production has grown out of work with this book. 
The study of Volvo’s Uddevalla plant, visits to the most advanced Japanese 
plants and discussions with colleagues, managers and trade unionists at 
home and abroad helped shaping the contours of a necessary alternative to 
the lean production concept.
We do not, like the authors of The Machine that Changed the World pretend 
that we have the solution for all types of production in all countries. But we 
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think we have a contribution to make to those interested in the possibility 
of high quality jobs, that are at the same time productive.
The chapters of the book and the authors
Below follows a short presentation of each chapter and of the authors.
The introductory chapter by Åke Sandberg, associate professor at Insti-
tutet för arbetslivsforskning (the Swedish Institute for Work Life Research), 
gives a background. Its focus is the Uddevalla plant – its rise and fall. The 
plant is put into an international comparative perspective. No one questions 
the uniqueness of the human side of the plant. Becoming also very produc-
tive, it was an example of enriching production in a double sense.
Part I
Kajsa Ellegård, associate professor at the Department of Human and Eco-
nomic Geography at Göteborg University describes the development of 
the Uddevalla plant from the first ideas of conventional line assembly, to 
qualified workers building whole cars in a completely parallelized produc-
tion. She followed and took part in the whole design and implementation 
process.
Tomas Engström and Lars Medbo played a major role in the design of 
the Uddevalla production concept. Engström is the associate professor 
and Medbo licenciate at the Department of transportation and logistics at 
Chalmers tekniska högskola in Göteborg (Chalmers University of Technol-
ogy). They describe the ideas behind whole car assembly, the assembly- 
and human-oriented language to understand the functions of the car and 
the advanced logistics that make this model of car-building a radical step 
beyond Fordism.
Lennart Nilsson, associate professor at the Department of Education, 
Göteborg University, took part in the process of development of the Ud-
devalla concept focusing on holistic learning. His commitment is strong, 
and this is reflected in his chapter where he discusses the successful use of 
holistic learning principles in order to design the whole production process 
in Uddevalla. He also tries to understand why the potential of this concept 
was not fully realized and why the plant was closed.
Thomas Sandberg, associate professor at the Department of Business 
Administration, Uppsala University, tells the story of Volvo’s Kalmar plant, 
from the 1970’s until the 1990’s. He focusses on recent developments. As-
sembly workers were involved in change processes. There was a focus on 
quality. By replacing the original carriers – one for each car – with so called 
taxi-carriers, dock assembly could be reintroduced with richer work content. 
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Indirect tasks like quality control and repair work have been integrated with 
assembly tasks.
Part II
Christian Berggren, researcher at the Institutet för arbetslivsforskning (the 
Swedish Institute for Work Life Research), and professor of industrial man-
agement at Linköping University, analyzes the impressive performance of 
the Uddevalla plant not only when it comes to assembly hours, but especially 
regarding customized cars with very short delivery time. Berggren criticizes 
Volvo’s official justification of the closure and demonstrates the weaknesses 
of its calculation of cost savings.
Henrik Blomgren and Bo Karlson, doctoral student and PhD in engineer-
ing respectively, at the Department of industrial economics and manage-
ment at the Kungliga tekniska högskolan (Royal Institute of Technology) 
in Stockholm give an illustrative example of the potential of the Uddevalla 
plant when it comes to product design and industrial engineering. Interaction 
between engineers and car builders with a high competence level may create 
exceptional conditions for a holistically oriented improvement process.
Colin Clipson, Jesper Steen, Anders Törnqvist and Peter Ullmark are 
all architects focussing on workplace design. Clipson is professor at the 
Architecture and planning research laboratory, University of Michigan, 
Ann Arbor, Törnqvist associate professor at the Department of industrial 
planning at Chalmers tekniska högskola in Göteborg (Chalmers University 
of Technology) and Steen and Ullmark associate professors at Industrial 
planning at the Kungliga tekniska högskolan (Royal Institute of Technol-
ogy) and Steen and Ullmark associate professors at Industrial planning at 
the Kungliga tekniska högskolan (Royal Institute of Technology) in Stock-
holm. They analyze the design and layout of Volvo’s Uddevalla plant. The 
relation between physical layout and the possibility for ‘good jobs’ and for 
flexibility in the organization of work is discussed.
Paul S. Adler and Robert E. Cole, professor of management, University of 
Southern California and professor of business administration and sociology, 
University of California, Berkley respectively, compare Volvo’s Uddevalla 
plant and the Toyota-GM joint venture Nummi from the point of view of 
organizational learning. They argue that Nummis version of Lean production 
is superior to Uddevalla’s human-centred model when it comes to productiv-
ity and quality and that the quality of work life at Nummi is acceptable.
Bob Hancké and Saul Rubinstein compare the Uddevalla plant to GM’s 
Saturn plant. They ask the question: How far can technological and organi-
zational innovations go in ‘insular settings’, and what role does the wider 
corporate and industrial relations structure play in such innovation proc-
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esses? They conclude that good economic performance of innovative plants 
is not enough to secure their future. Both authors are doctoral candidates at 
MIT, Hancké is a research fellow at Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozial-
forschung (the Science center Berlin for Social Research) and Rubinstein 
at the International Motor Vehicle Program.
Ulrich Jürgens, professor at Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozial-for-
schung (the Science Center Berlin for Social Research), analyzes the recent 
German discussion about group work, human-centred production and lean 
production. In several plants stationary long cycle work was combined with 
modified line production, but basically the Uddevalla concept of whole-car 
assembly was seen as a linear extension of the job cycle rather than as a 
paradigmatic shift. Lately Uddevala’s closure has helped shift the balance 
towards Japan-oriented concepts.
Part III
Paul Thompson and Terry Wallace, discuss Volvo bus and truck production 
in the UK. They emphasize a ‘market rules’ perspective with a tendency 
towards line assembly for standard vehicles and dock assembly for special 
vehicles. This creates a repertoire of work organisation practices within the 
company. The authors see parallels between closures in Sweden and the UK. 
Thompson is professor of management at the Business Studies Department, 
Edinburgh University and Wallace is lecturer in Human Resource Manage-
ment at Leeds Metropolitan University.
Rik Huys and Geert Van Hootegem, researcher and assistant respectively, 
at the Department of sociology of labour and organization, Katholieke 
Universiteit (Catholic University), Leuven, analyze recent improvements 
at the Belgian Gent factory – during many years regarded as Volvo’s ‘best 
practice’ car plant. Team work with integration of certain control and repair 
tasks and at the same time short job cycles are current tendencies.
Ben Dankbaar, PhD and research director for the programme of ‘Tech-
nology, work and organization’ at MERIT, Limburg University, Maastricht, 
analyzes the stages in development of the Born plant, now a joint venture 
between the Dutch state, Volvo and Mitsubishi, the latter two now devel-
oping a common medium size car. Will the Mitsubishi variant of Japanese 
production concepts dominate or has Volvo still – after Uddevalla – a con-
tribution to make?
L. Anders Sandberg, assistant professor at the Faculty of Environmental 
Studies, York University, discusses Volvo’s assembly plant in Nova Scotia. 
He describes Nova Scotia as a peripheral region in Canada and sees the plant 
in light of concessions extended to Volvo; concessions are also expected 
from the work force, which is reflected in the work organization.
x
Hing Ai Yun, senior lecturer, Department of Sociology, National Uni-
versity of Singapore, discusses Volvo’s presence in Malaysia. Like other 
foreign car producers Volvo established itself there because of different 
types of restrictions on car imports. She describes this background and the 
organization of work.
Michel Freyssenet, directeur de recherche at CNRS, IRESCO-CSU, 
Paris and GERPISA international network, discusses group work especially 
around automated segments of production and has later generalized this ap-
proach with substantial influence of Japanese concepts, keeping shortcycle, 
standardized tasks.
Karel Williams, Colin Haslam  and Sukhdev Johal discuss the politics and 
business economics behind the alliance and planned merger (now disolved) 
between Volvo and Renault. They give a Machiavellian interpretation. With 
internationalization of corporations they see, in concluding, risks for social 
dumping with the more generous social settlements like the Scandinavian 
welfare states being defeated by less ambitious welfare systems. Karel Wil-
liams is reader at the Department of Accounting, University of Manchester, 
Colin Haslam and Sukhdev Johal is reader and lecturer respectively, at the 
Business policy section, University of East London.
Part IV
Norbert Altmann, professor at the Institut für Sozialwissenschaftliche For-
schung in München (Institute for Social Research) in an overview article 
describes, analyzes and criticizes social aspects of Japanese production 
concepts. His point of departure is The Machine that Changed the World 
and its neglect of consequences of lean production for employees and for the 
society as a whole and for individual enterprises and their productivity.
Dan Jonsson, associate professor at the Department of sociology, Göte-
borg University gives a methodological criticism of the best-selling book 
on lean production, The Machine that Changed the World. He reconstructs 
a casual model that makes explicit the ideas in the book that he analyzes, 
and he points at the weaknesses in the logical structure and the empirical 
validity.
Koichi Shimizu, professor of economics at the University of Okayama, has 
as a basic thesis that in the mid 1990s, when it appears that ‘lean production’ 
is being adopted by all automobile producers, Toyota has been reorganizing 
the very production system upon which ‘lean production’ is based. He sees 
a tendency towards humanization of work at Toyota. The background was 
recruitment problems and ‘the crisis of work’ but the tendency continues in 
spite of the recent recession.
Terje Grønning, lecturer, Institute of East European and Oriental Studies, 
University of Oslo, wrote his PhD thesis on the social organization of pro-
xi
duction at Toyota and NUMMI while at the Sociology Department of Ritsu-
meikan University, Kyoto. His chapter focusses upon recent developments 
of the production system of Toyota and especially personnel administration 
practices such as subjective personnel assessment and wage systems.
Paul Lillrank, studied quality control in Japan while a researcher at 
the Science University of Tokyo. He is now an affiliated professor at the 
European Institute of Japanese Studies at the Stockholm School of Eco-
nomics. His chapter tries to discern present tendencies towards post-lean 
management with more ‘worker-friendly’ work environment combined with 
automation.
Peter Auer, senior research fellow and head of project at the Wissen-
schaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (the Science Center Berlin for 
Social Research), looks at the micro-macro relation in lean production. He 
sees a risk that lean production in industry, with little room for social aspects, 
may lead to overwhealming pressures on state-financed social welfare. 
Corporate level lean production should perhaps allow for some fat in the 
production and be accompanied by macro level demand side politics.
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The Uddevalla experience in perspective
Åke Sandberg
The focus of this book is the rise and fall of Volvo’s Uddevalla plant on 
Sweden’s west coast – a unique achievement in the history of car produc-
tion and industrial production more generally. This pioneering example of 
social and technological innovation is discussed against the background 
of other Volvo establishments as well as international developments in car 
manufacturing. The Uddevalla plant was unique in its combination of good 
jobs and productivity. We would like to regard the plant as an example of 
‘enriching production’, enriching to both work and workers and to investors 
and owners, benefitting by its productivity.
The Uddevalla plant was closed in 1993 after only four years of operation. 
The plant was outstanding in its human-centredness and the quality of work 
with groups building whole cars based on theories of holistic human learn-
ing. The plant also introduced advanced computer technology in logistics 
and planning in order to supply the teams with the components they needed 
to build a specific car in an efficient way. The plant was perhaps the most 
advanced in a long Scandinavian tradition of job redesign – often seen as a 
European alternative to Toyotism and lean production.
Although the focus here is on the Uddevalla plant, Volvo’s Kalmar plant, 
created in the beginning of the 1970s deserves attention as well as a pioneer 
when it comes to breaking up the assembly line. It was closed in June 1994.
Toyotism – the end of history?
Does the closing of these two unique industrial design efforts signify the 
end of the road to a human and productive alternative in industrial produc-
tion? An alternative that has been the focus of discussions in Swedish and 
German car production. Will we now see the dominance of lean production 
as the new ‘best way’ after Taylorism? Is Toyotism the end of history of 
industrial production?
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2This volume shows that a broad array of solutions and alternatives exist, 
and that the Uddevalla concept is one of the more remarkable among them. 
Not only are there cross country and cross company variations, but there 
are variations within companies and within countries as well. Volvo truck 
and car plants differ between countries like Sweden, Belgium and the UK, 
and within Sweden the same Volvo car was assembled in three plants with 
different production concepts. Toyota differs from Nissan. Although one 
can discern a more coherent concept or strategy within Toyota than within 
Volvo, the new Toyota plant in Kyushu island is different from the old ones. 
A similar kind of variation is true for other companies and countries.
The closing down of Uddevalla thus does not mean that only one way 
remains. With this book I hope we are able to show that Toyotism or ‘lean 
production’ as presented in the bestseller The Machine that Changed the 
World by Womack, Jones and Rose (1991), is not, as they seem to claim, 
the only possible industrial organization of the future.
Internationally, not least in the German case discussed by Ulrich Jürgens 
in his contribution, the impact of The Machine that Changed the World, and 
of Japanese production concepts is strong in the first half of the 1990s. In 
German car industry there was a relatively strong influence of Volvo’s pro-
duction concepts in the 1970s and 1980s. German work reformers how-ever 
did not accept the Uddevalla concept of stationary whole-car assembly, nor 
the idea of a qualitative difference between short cycle line assembly and 
group whole-car assembly with a several hours work cycle. Rather work 
reform was seen as a linear growth of work content both in subassembly of 
parts besides the line, and to a lesser extent along the line. Today we see a 
re-appraisal of the assembly line and a tendency to roll-back cycle times. 
Yet, according to Jürgens, there seems to be a belief in longer job cycles 
than the traditional short cycles.
German car industry is trying to integrate lean production features with 
human-centred features such as group autonomy. Pressure from Japanese 
solutions and competitors is tough. But national and historical preconditions 
of an economic, political and social character like type of product, indus-
trial relations, labour markets (employment and qualification levels) and 
corporate and union strategy will influence the way workplaces transform 
(Turner and Auer, 1994).
Human-centred production is not at the end of the road but it will have to 
be transformed to include ‘lean’ elements to enhance productivity. Although 
productivity at Uddevalla was high by Swedish and European standards, 
it was not high enough compared to Japanese factories. Scandinavian and 
German work reform must now learn from Toyotism and lean production to 
focus even more on productivity while maintaining its human-centredness. 
International industrial relations and cooperation across borders concern-
ing social conditions of work will probably be important in determining the 
weight of human aspects in future industrial production.
The fate of Volvo’s Uddevalla plant, its development and closure – situ-
ated in an international and comparative perspective – has a lot to teach 
us about those decisive issues. It presents us with a possible and radical 
alternative to lean production, an alternative that will be among remain in 
the focus in the future.
A view of Uddevalla
One episode that I myself experienced during a visit to Volvo’s Uddevalla 
plant in the spring of 1993 demonstrates clearly the advanced customer 
orientation of the Uddevalla production model. Far from being disturbed by 
an ‘intrusive observer’, the members of an assembly team casually asked if 
I was a customer wanting to take part in the team’s assembly of my car.
What I continued to observe at the plant further demonstrated the human 
orientation of the work being done. In a typical example, a group of nine 
workers assembled a car from beginning to end. They conferred with each 
other while working, resulting in the completion of the entire car before 
the morning coffee break. This team like all others in the plant had no su-
pervisor. And the first level manager of this and the seven other teams in 
the product workshop, was on vacation; the groups could clearly manage 
their own work.
The closure decision
However Volvo was in economic difficulties and had too much capacity 
for the actual demand. In November of 1992, the Volvo board decided 
to close its car assembly plants in Kalmar and Uddevalla. Uddevalla was 
closed half a year later, and Kalmar followed suit in 1994. The plants had 
been heralded worldwide as symbols of a productive and human-oriented 
alternative in industrial management and work organization. Kalmar was the 
first car assembly plant to break up the traditional pattern of assembly line 
production. In Uddevalla the line was completely abolished with parallel 
groups assemblying whole cars.
Mercedes-Benz director Edzard Reuter, expressed astonishment at the 
decision to close what he considered to be ‘the most modern factories you 
have in Sweden’. Mercedes new Rastatt plant is partially built on principles 
similar to those of Uddevalla (Svenska Dagbladet, Nov. 6, 1992). A line 
with moving assembly platforms is combined with stationary workplaces 
for modular production with work cycles of up to two hours (Jürgens1).
However, Peter Wickens, the personnel director of Nissan UK, regarded 
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the closure of the Swedish plants as an indication of the triumph of ‘lean 
production’ (Wickens 1993). To Peter Cressey (1993:89), who coordinates 
researcher networks on participation and work within the EC, the demise of 
the two plants represents ‘potentially a seismic shift in the reference points 
that determine how to create the conditions for efficient production and 
collaborative social and design processes. In the car industry for instance, 
the choice has been between old fashioned Fordism, its newer variant “lean 
production” and the sociotechnical approach represented by these two 
plants.’ Japan’s industrial sociologists gathered for an annual conference 
in Fukuoka in 1992, were studying the Uddevalla plant, as an alternative to 
Japanese industrial organization.
The Kalmar and Uddevalla plants have been used widely as models in 
academic courses on job design. They have also served as reference points 
and examples in trade union programmes and training in many countries. 
Unions within Renault, the alliance partner of Volvo until the autumn of 
1993, are but one example.
Disappointment concerning the closure decision seemed to be felt in many 
quarters. This was shown in the public debate that resulted in Sweden. This 
book is an attempt to contribute to preserving the experiences gained from 
Uddevalla, in terms of the innovations made in both human and industrial 
fronts2.
In this first chapter I will introduce the reader to the Uddevalla experi-
ence and its background. In doing so, I will refer to other chapters, while 
con-tributing my own understanding of this experience, based on interviews 
and visits to Uddevalla, Renault and to some Japanese plants.
I intend to show that the closure of Kalmar and Uddevalla was not an 
inevitable outcome of the performance of these plants. In terms of produc-
tivity and quality they were on the same level as, and according to some 
evaluations they even out-performed Volvo’s main Swedish assembly plant 
in Torslanda, Gothenburg. However they were small and perhaps diverging 
elements in a wider long-term production strategy within the Volvo-Renault 
alliance still in development at that time. The decision seems to be based 
not on local performance but on a global production strategy.
The design of the Uddevalla plant
The process of designing the Uddevalla plant began in 1985. In 1989 the 
factory was opened, as the result of a long process of active cooperation 
between Volvo management and engineers, unions (both local and national) 
and researchers. This was a pet project of the socially and humanistically 
oriented general manager of Volvo, Pehr G. Gyllenhammar. The academics 
provided a long research tradition of parallelization of production and of 
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long cycle-time work, as a way of achieving high productivity, quality and 
flexibility. Volvo’s top management and the unions stressed quality of work 
as a high value and also as a way to secure recruitment of competent workers 
to assure productivity. An important background to the whole project was 
the labour market situation in Sweden at the time with almost full employ-
ment which meant recruitment problems for industry.
A visitor to Uddevalla, during its time of operation, would immediately 
note that production was on a relatively small scale. There is one central 
building and two clover-leaf structures with three plus three smaller build-
ings. The central building contains materials and components. Each leaf in 
the clover is built for one product workshop consisting of eight production 
groups with seven to ten workers in each; each group builds whole cars.
The Uddevalla model is similar to that of ‘lean production’ in its efforts to 
achieve customer orientation, quick delivery, as well as worker involvement 
and learning. However, the means to achieve the ends are different. What was 
so special about the Uddevalla plant, one could ask. This will be discussed 
in detail, in chapters written by some of the researchers that were involved 
in the design of the plant, of what they call ‘reflective production’ (see El-
legård, Engström and Medbo, and Nilsson; also Ellegård et al., 1992).
From a production design research point of view, two problems in highly 
parallelized production had to be solved. Traditionally, it was presumed that 
the learning capacity of assembly workers is no more than a few minutes 
of work content. In contrast to this principle of additive learning, holistic 
learning clearly argues that if the entire working activity is meaningful, then 
the capacity to learn during work is very high (Nilsson, 1985). A training 
workshop in Uddevalla had begun operation in 1986 which uniquely insti-
gated the theoretical principles for holistic learning and parallel production 
technology into practice.
Learning capacity is also related to a second problem, which is how to 
supply materials in this type of production. In experimental workshops, 
products were disassembled and analyzed, making it possible to develop a 
formal representation and language with information about components that 
were organized according to the functions of the car (like doors and trim). 
This was done in a way that was meaningful and efficient in the long-cycle 
assembly work. These studies formed the basis of the sophisticated computer 
software which controlled materials supplied to each team while building 
a specific car (see Engström and Medbo).
From 700 workers on a line to 9 in a group
The development of the Uddevalla plant was a long process. It grew from 
the original idea of a factory where each of approximately 700 persons 
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contributed their task in a job cycle of two minutes, to the final idea of a 
factory where 48 small, parallel stationary teams assemble whole cars with 
a job cycle of around two hours (Ellegård describes this trajectory). The low 
horizontal division of labour, corresponded to a decentralized organization. 
It addressed issues such as quality, production technology, personnel, and 
tools, each type of issue handled by a team member with special training and 
with a rotating role as team representative. Eight teams of approximately 
80 workers comprised a product shop with a shop manager as the first level 
in the hierarchy. Each team member could hold a maximum of two of the 
above specialities concurrently, thereby dispersing competence as well as 
salary, as workers received extra pay for the special functions, including 
team representative, that they held. This sophisticated design is far from the 
neocraftmanship nostalgia that Womack et al., (1991, p. 101) refer to.
Why did the Uddevalla design process result in this radical solution (El-
legård)? In the mid 1980s Volvo needed to expand its production capacity 
although the labour market was tight. The Metal workers’ union wanted to try 
out their ideas of ‘good work’. The experiences of the Kalmar plant were good 
in terms of productivity, but also image and publicity. Therefore a proposal to 
unite productivity and ‘good work’, was in line with the Volvo trajectory, as 
were efforts to further develop union and management cooperation.
More broadly stated, by the 1970s industry was already experiencing 
recruitment problems; absenteeism and turnover soared and wildcat strikes 
were common. Volvo responded by building its Kalmar factory. In the 1980s 
Uddevalla was built with a similar labour market background. At the same 
time, assembly of more complex customized vehicles made dependence on 
the workforce stronger. Product- and production-driven upmarket change 
was probably a more important factor than previously in the 1970s. Ever 
since their programme ‘New factories’ around 1970 the Swedish Employ-
ers’ Confederation (SAF) had a network furthering group work as part of a 
strategy of ‘coordinated independence’, that is decentralization to product 
workshops and profit centres under central management control. During 
the 1980s however, the union side, especially the Metal workers’ union 
developed their own proactive ideas on the ‘good jobs’ implying ‘ladders of 
development’ for job content and wages at the same time. This was also part 
of an effort to get some union control over wage determination processes that 
employers tried to decentralize as much as possible, keeping unions out.
The Volvo trajectory
Before returning to Uddevalla, its performance and its closure, a short 
sketch will be made of the Volvo trajectory of development of alternatives 
to line production based on Berggren’s (1993a) study of the company. This 
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will provide a background and situate Uddevalla in the company context. 
There is also a chapter by Thomas Sandberg on Volvo’s Kalmar plant, but 
unfortunately we were not able to include a separate chapter on the Tors-
landa plant.
Volvo plants are characterized by a diversity of both technical and organ-
izational concepts. This variety reflects both market conditions for different 
product lines and social and labour market conditions in countries where 
Volvo production is located.
Transformations of work organization were more encompassing in Volvo 
than were those in Saab, the other Swedish car-maker which faced similar 
market conditions. Berggren ascribes this partially to the ‘Volvo culture’ 
with long time CEO, and later board chairman Pehr G. Gyllenhammar’s 
interest in new production concepts; the close cooperation with the trade 
unions; and the openmindedness among Volvo engineers, although there 
were those both in management and unions that were in favour of traditional 
production concepts. However the Volvo culture was not the decisive fac-
tor. Social conditions in different countries lead to different solutions and 
Berggren concludes: There is no ‘Volvoism’.
In Sweden we find the following conditions: Union membership was high. 
The high employment levels of the 1970s remained in the 1980’s, with an 
unemployment level mostly below 3 percent. Labour force participation was 
high. Wage differences were small, and the social benefit system was uni-
form across the labour market. Therefore, tough working conditions could 
not be compensated for with higher wages, or attractive social benefits. Such 
social and labour market characteristics together may be seen as ‘selective 
disadvantages’ for production (Porter, 1990).
Furthermore, the product strategy of the Swedish auto producers was to 
move towards demanding upmarket product segments. Product variation 
increased and the dependence on foreign sales contributed to the need for 
adaptation to different customer demands.
Sweden faced combined pressures from the product market and the la-
bour market which forced companies to be innovative in human-centred 
directions, especially in labour-intensive assembly. (Berggren 1993a; see 
also Streek, 1987 and Sandberg et al., 1992). Flexible quality production 
demands a stable workforce, and a high employment level made it difficult 
to recruit and keep workers for Taylorized jobs. Volvo trucks for example, 
followed different production strategies. In Belgium with an abundant 
labour supply (an unemployment level of around 10 percent in the Gent 
region) and a lower level of job security, Volvo invested in assembly lines 
for simpler products. Whereas in Sweden, with a more demanding labour 
force, Volvo invested in flexible, holistic forms of production of complex 
and customized vehicles.
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If we now move to the examples of the Volvo trajectory in Sweden we find 
that although Kalmar and Uddevalla were the symbols of the Volvo trajec-
tory of alternatives to the assembly line, some of Volvo’s human-centred 
solutions have survived in its engine and truck plants.3
In Volvo’s Kalmar car assembly plant, established in 1974, twenty teams 
worked with objects transported on automaticaly guided vehicles (AGVs), in 
a series connected flow divided by buffers. There were four to five stations 
in a team area, where the object could move from station to station. But 
the team could also perform its work on stationary carriers at ‘docks’. The 
restriction was however, that the sequence of objects had to be maintained 
which created stress for the workers or disorder in production, whenever 
an object was removed from the central flow. With more model options the 
problems grew. Management’s focus towards the mid-1980s had changed 
from employee motivation to using the elastic technical system to rationalize 
and raise work intensity. Gradually Kalmar became Volvo’s best Swedish car 
plant, in terms of assembly hours and quality. In the beginning of the 1990s 
there was a revival of long job cycles and dock assembly in new forms, based 
upon new so called taxi-carriers, replacing the centrally controlled AGVs.
Volvo’s truck plant in Tuve outside Gothenburg was opened in 1981. It 
was built as a compromise between line and integrated assembly in groups. 
There were buffers between groups which gave them some control over work 
pace. More important than the production design changes were, however, the 
organizational changes. Groups could influence everyday decisions, such as 
the distribution of tasks and short leave periods, and a rotating role as group 
representative replaced foremen and quality inspectors. With higher output 
and a more complex product programme, buffers tended, like in Kalmar, to 
be transformed into workplaces. The series link created quality problems 
as groups had to release unfinished vehicles. As a result personnel turnover 
soared. Management strengthened shop-floor supervision and at the same 
time, started a two-step dock assembly for the most complex products. – The 
ways in which the introduction of dock assembly in Volvo truck and bus 
plants abroad depends on market conditions, is a theme in the contribution 
by Paul Thompson and Terry Wallace.
At the Torslanda volume car plant in Gothenburg, inaugurated in 1964, 
Volvo tried different strategies over the years to improve productivity and 
motivation. These strategies included attitude campaigns, organizational 
experiments and mechanization, which were all based on continued line 
manufacturing and all proved insufficient. In 1986, a reorganization project 
returned to an earlier idea of gradually replacing the assembly line with a 
more flexible transport system between workshops. This meant producing 
parts of a car with group work and varying degrees of parallelization, thus 
combining line and dock principles. This created problems with the flow, 
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such as those in the cases above. In 1989, a new project proposed the in-
stalla-tion of three shops for building whole cars similar to the Uddevalla 
concept. At the same time line assembly was to continue for the majority 
of the cars. An initial whole car shop was soon abandoned as it represented 
an alien body in what may be called a predominantly Fordist culture. The 
plant swung back to more traditional solutions. (On Torslanda compared to 
Uddevalla see also Granath, 1991.)
Volvo has announced that an Uddevalla type production facility of a lim-
ited scale is being installed in the Torslanda plant for production of special 
cars like ambulances and police cars. For these types of vehicles, the Ud-
devalla production system has proven to be drastically more efficient than 
line production. In Uddevalla, police cars were built from scratch using 
fewer man hours than were needed in Gothenburg to strip a standard car and 
convert it into a police car. To the number of hours in the Gothenburg case, 
should be added the hours for first assemblying the standard car.
We have seen several examples of efforts to replace, partially and gradu-
ally, line production with more holistic alternatives. We have also seen 
different problems for such combined solutions and occasionally a return 
to conventional solutions. It remains to be seen whether the gradual trans-
formation of the lines in Torslanda that is now on its way will overcome 
these types of problems. The transformation includes more developed prea-
ssembly, ergonomics and automation.
In contrast to the situation in Torslanda around 1990, the Uddevalla project 
after two years of work came up with an alternative to line production. The 
solution was, as we have seen, a fortyeight-fold parallelization, with each 
team making a complete car. Assembly jobs were based on the different 
functions of the car (like doors, drive line, interior), rather than on balanc-
ing of time along a line. A language was developed with proper meaningful 
names in order to facilitate assembly of different variants, learning and 
communication. Part numbers like 25792, 22367 and 15178 were replaced 
by correct names like brake cylinder, brake leads and brake pedal.
Uddevalla performance
A look at the performance of the Uddevalla plant itself will make it difficult 
to understand the closing-down.4 Comparing measures of productivity for 
Torslanda and Uddevalla gives the following picture. (The Volvo plant in 
Gent had better performance than the Swedish plants.)
Assembly-time in Torslanda in October 1992 was 42 hours per car and in 
Uddevalla 32.8 work-hours, to which 6 hours of white-collar work should 
be added. Productivity measures like these are difficult to compare, but 
indicate that Uddevalla and Torslanda were roughly on the same level. One 
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indication of the potential of the Uddevalla production system is the fact 
that several workers assembled whole cars in less than 20 hours. One of 
the workers there managed to build a whole car in just 10 hours, plus a few 
hours for materials handling etc. (Metallarbetaren, 1993).
The quality of the cars assembled at Uddevalla was at least as high as 
that of Gothenburg, both measured as number of defects per car (6 versus 
7 respectively) and according to the internationally renowned J. D. Powers 
customer survey. Kalmar’s quality however, was the best among the three 
Swedish plants.
In the autumn of 1992, Uddevalla’s total lead time for delivery, from the 
individual customer order, was down to four weeks, and a further reduction 
down to two weeks was planned for the first half year of 1993. Customers 
could make changes in the specification as late as three days before assem-
bly. One explanation for this flexibility was Uddevalla’s highly parallelized 
production system, which provides no balancing problems and no need for 
a fixed product mix. Customized production and short lead times, means 
higher sales prices and virtually no cost for finished car stock.
Uddevalla needed less investments in tools and equipment than did the 
Gothenburg plant. For example, due to long job cycles the number of jigs 
needed is reduced, as one operator finishes a whole task rather than the task 
being divided among several workers, each one needing one jig.
Model changes in Uddevalla needed less time and less costs in tools and 
training than did the Gothenburg plant. The explanation is low-tech simple 
tools and the workers’ high competence level, which facilitates the rapid 
learning of new tasks.
The new design principles allow reductions in both space requirements 
and technical production support to the work groups (see Engström and 
Medbo). Furthermore, Uddevalla assemblers discovered design problems 
that neither assemblers nor process engineers at Torslanda were aware of 
(Blomgren and Karlson), thus providing a potential for a more active role 
for assemblers in the area of product development (also Ellegård).
Organizational learning
The overview of the Uddevalla plant’s performance presents a positive 
picture. However, not all observers agree. The possibilities of organiza-
tional learning and continued development of performance in Uddevalla is 
questioned in the chapter by Robert Cole and Paul Adler. Basically, Adler 
and Cole argue that ‘lean production’ is the way to maximize organizational 
learning. Work tasks are specialized and standardized gesture-by-gesture, 
then strictly and identically implemented in the whole organization. This 
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standardization, is combined with worker involvement in the definition and 
improvement of the standard work procedures.
Adler and Cole write that one cannot systematically improve what has 
not been standardized. They challenge the German-Scandinavian ‘human-
centred’ model, which implies that organizational learning is best served by 
long work cycles in teams with a high degree of autonomy. Using data from 
the International Motor Vehicle Programme (IMVP, which was summarized 
by Womack et al., 1991), they argue that Uddevalla assembly hours were 
somewhat lower than the average for European luxury producers, but far 
higher than Japanese luxury producers’ average. Although Uddevalla’s per-
formance during the last year drastically improved, they doubt that mecha-
nisms of improvement across the work groups were really put in place. They 
admit that an enormous improvement and ‘crisis learning’ took place, but 
they are not certain whether that learning could have continued. Adler and 
Cole found better performance rates in terms of assembly hours and product 
quality in the Toyota-GM joint venture, Nummi, than in Uddevalla.
Both Christian Berggren and Kajsa Ellegård in their contributions, as well 
as Uddevalla managers interviewed in the spring of 1993 admit there had 
been productivity problems in Uddevalla. They all emphasize, however, 
that much changed during Uddevalla’s last year of operation. Although the 
primary goal for Uddevalla, during the first couple of years, was to develop 
functioning working procedures whereby each team would develop and 
utilize its own working model, at a later stage one was able to focus on the 
organization as a whole.
Changes were occurring on the managerial level to facilitate communica-
tion and learning in the whole organization and to focus management’s atten-
tion on the total production process. Initially, the new plant manager flattened 
the hierarchy so that teams communicated directly with shop managers, who 
made up the bulk of the new management committee of the plant. The result 
was a flat organization with only three levels: worker, product shop manager, 
plant manager. Secondly, the plant manager planned to relocate all managers 
from the central office building to facilities close to the production process. 
The aesthetically elegant and symmetrical plant layout, with an office build-
ing radically separated from the workshops, may in fact have contributed to 
keeping integration of different personnel groups at a low level. It may also 
have prolonged the separation between conventional management and in-
novative shopfloor practices (see Clipson et al.). The closing-down decision 
prevented the implementation of this second step.
The first step, that of a flatter organization, was carried through. Shop 
managers began learning more about assembly, while other production 
engineers split their time between working in the teams and communicat-
ing with other teams. A Kaizen programme was successfully introduced 
11
(Kaizen is the Japanese word for continuous improvement). As a result, 
team members visited other product shops to learn how they solved specific 
assembly problems. Consultants from the Kaizen institute, remarked on the 
extra ordinary willingness to rationalize at Uddevalla.
Ellegård and Berggren stress the radical and promising organizational 
changes, which took place during the last few months of operation in 
Uddevalla. They conclude that there were great possibilities for further 
organizational learning and that Uddevalla demonstrated the initiation of a 
promising learning curve.
Futhermore Lennart Nilsson is convinced of the productive potential of 
the Uddevalla concept. He strongly argues that after a succesful period of 
application of the principles of ‘holistic learning’ the return to more conven-
tional ideas of ‘additive learning’ had a negative effect for the development 
of competence as well as for productivity. But during the last year he sees 
a renewed application of ‘holistic learning principles’ and a constructive 
development of the organization.
These positive views of Uddevalla’s potential contrasts with Adler and 
Cole’s doubt that performance would have continued to improve at the ‘cri-
sis learning’ rate, much less at an accelerated learning rate. Adler and Cole 
pondered at the limits to organizational learning, and if they were intrinsic 
to the Uddevalla model or were external. They conclude: ‘What we do know, 
and what we can all agree upon, is that it was a tragedy that the plant was 
closed and these questions will remain unanswered’.
If we draw the preliminary conclusion that Nummi was and would for 
some time remain a more efficient plant in terms of assembly hours, there 
are other relevant aspects to be included in a more complete comparision.
Beyond assembly hours
Beyond assembly hours, one should consider the commercial benefits of 
Uddevalla’s quick delivery of the precise specifications requested by the 
dealer and customer. This results in a substantially higher sales price than 
for cars produced in more conventional plants according to prognoses of 
customer demand, like the Torslanda plant.
Considering human work, skills and autonomy, these aspects further point 
in favour of Uddevalla. Cole and Adler do conclude that Uddevalla provides 
more scope for the development of workers’ human potential, but they situ-
ate Nummi’s quality of work within the ‘acceptable range’. However, in a 
plant of Nummi’s type, although workers participate in Kaizen activities, 
the line exerts a strict control over the individuals’ work procedures and 
work intensity.
The Uddevalla plant was, as already indicated, after only three years of 
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operation, at least on the same performance level as the more traditional 
plant in Gothenburg. The Kalmar plant – which would merit a book of its 
own – was even better, after drastic improvements in the 1990s.
Why then was Uddevalla closed? Volvo’s official answer is low sales, 
losses and overcapacity. Therefore, they saw a need for capacity reduc-
tions. Volvo certainly had an overcapacity problem and preferred closing 
the smaller and uncomplete5 plants in Kalmar and Uddevalla, concentrating 
production to the larger Torslanda plant in Gothenburg. Closing smaller 
branch plants is a standard solution in overcapacity situations as Karel Wil-
liams and his colleagues underline (Williams et al.). There may thus have 
been good structural economic and policy reasons for closing Uddevalla 
and Kalmar. But to explain why these factories were closed and not others, 
Volvo presented a cost calculation, which under closer scrutiny does not 
support their claims. Practically all cost items in the calculation have been 
questioned. Figures much more in favour of Uddevalla (and even more so 
Kalmar), were presented in the public Swedish debate. For example Volvo 
regarded the transportation of bodies from Gothenburg to Uddevalla as 
an extra cost, but the debate showed that total costs for transportation of 
components were lower for Uddevalla than for Gothenburg.6 The revenues 
projected considering Uddevalla’s potential for reduced bureaucracy and 
indirect costs, contributions to design, as well as customization, smaller 
stocks and higher prices all contribute to further challenging the calculation. 
There is therefore reason to doubt whether Volvo’s calculations show the 
actual reasons behind the closure.
One aspect that was not raised in the calculations has to do with the issue 
of control. The productivity and learning in the Uddevalla concept, depend-
ent to a large degree on the individuals and groups, could not be easily con-
trolled by management. Whereas the Japanese concepts, as Ulrich Jürgens 
emphasizes in his contribution, seem to offer the possibility of a uniform 
and continuous process of improvement, one which is easier to control by 
management. As mentioned above however, during the very last months at 
Uddevalla there were efforts to secure more of plant-wide learning, and this 
could in turn have strengthened overall management control.
Perhaps to understand the closure one must look also to organizational 
politics and dominating ideas within Volvo.7
Organizational politics
One explanation of the decision to close Kalmar and Uddevalla, could be 
the ‘battle of ideas’ between traditionalists and innovators at Volvo. As 
early as 1989, one manager on Volvo Group level said that the ‘Uddevalla 
experiment’ was connected with Sweden’s tight labour market and that if 
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Volvo moved its production to the Baltic States or to Southeast Asia, then 
the probable model would be Taylorism (Hammarén, 1989).
Over the years, the Volvo Group management and P. G. Gyllenhammar 
supported Uddevalla, but at the same time more conventional solutions were 
allowed to live on in other Volvo plants. Uddevalla played an innovative role. 
By many it was however regarded as an experiment to be closed in tougher 
times. Even within the Uddevalla project group, there were technicians 
with a more traditional view (see Ellegård). Similar examples of struggles 
between Volvo managers representing different production concepts could 
bee seen in other parts of Volvo, such as the Skövde and Vara plants within 
the engine division. At a new engine plant in Skövde, sociotechnical solu-
tions with group work, long work cycles and buffers were introduced. A 
follow-up study, seven years later, showed little sociotechnical renewal after 
the first year and signs of regression, as a few key personnel left and their 
replacements were frequently traditionalists trained in a different environ-
ment (Forslin, 1992).
Turning now towards the trade union side, one union reason for scepti-
cism towards Uddevalla may have been that in contrast to MTM-based 
wages in line assembly, group work of the Uddevalla type could lead to 
an uncontrolled intensification of work, as well as a loss of trade union 
influence on the relation between wages and work performed.8 Torslanda 
and Gothenburg has the numerical advantage. It is also the ‘cradle’ of the 
company. In economically bad times, the Gothenburg unions had a need to 
defend the jobs remaining in Gothenburg.
In this context, it is interesting to compare Uddevalla and GM’s Saturn 
plant, in terms of differences (such as type of car built) and similarities. As 
Hancké and Rubinstein explain in their chapter, both plants are relatively 
small operations in large corporations, and they are innovative and differ-
ent. To understand the closing down of Uddevalla, they conclude, one has 
to regard the politics of both management and the union. Uddevalla did not 
have a winning coalition that backed it, but was dependent upon a parent 
corporation’s willingness to pump money into its development. Further-
more, the Uddevalla local unions were dependent upon the Volvo Group 
level unions, in regard to access to strategic decision making bodies.
Renault and Volvo
As key decisions were made within Volvo, Renault was the partner in an 
alliance with Volvo aimed at close cooperation and finally merger, so it is 
relevant to look at the production organization at Renault and its possible 
influence on developments within Volvo. The relevance for the decisions 
that were made remains although the alliance was later dissolved. Also a 
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discussion of Renault is of interest, as an example of a major European car 
manufacturer and of Volvo’s competitive market environment.
Within the sphere of work organization, those within Volvo opposing 
the Kalmar-Uddevalla trajectory are likely to have been strengthened by Re-
nault’s entry onto the scene. Interviewing Renault managers and consultants 
in the spring of 1993, one Renault manager expressed what he regarded as 
a common view, that although Uddevalla was seen as advanced in terms of 
work organization, Volvo’s economic difficulties may be related to some of 
her plant’s new production concepts and low volumes. In a similar vein, a 
consultant’s report for the French government was very critical of the set-up 
in Kalmar and Uddevalla and concluded that their ‘production model has 
reached its limits, and has no place in today’s competitive context’ (SRI, 
1992). Thus, cooperation with Renault may have contributed to the decision 
to close these plants.
Discussing work organization philosophies with Renault representatives, 
they often distinguished between Taylorism, Scandinavian-type sociotech-
nical solutions and Toyota inspired production systems. As in many other 
countries, labour market pressure during the 1970s forced Renault to try so-
ciotechnical experiments with substantial changes in division of labour and 
hierarchical relations. As Michel Freyssenet discusses in his contribution, 
such changes that endanger division of labour and assembly line production 
were disputed and often discontinued, but later group work was accepted 
by Renault management ‘as soon as it was conceptually separated from a 
fundamental threat to flow-like production in the form of assembly lines or 
automated production lines’.
At the same time, ambitions of job enrichment and skill development 
continued and was maintained as one of the bases for an agreement that 
was concluded in 1989 between Renault and five trade unions, of which 
CFDT was the largest.
These unions represented a weak majority among employees. The com-
munist oriented CGT, which represented just below fifty percent did not sign 
the ‘Accord a vivre’. The agreement specified that work should be organized 
in Unités Elementaires de Travail (UET), elementary work units, comprising 
10–20 workers under one supervisor responsible for their performance. It 
should be possible to identify the product of the UET and its principal ‘sup-
pliers’ and ‘clients’ upstream and downstream within the production flow 
of the factory.9 The idea is that the group members should be multi-skilled, 
including such tasks as quality control, maintenance, problem solving etc. 
Yet, the work should remain based on assembly line technology. The CGT 
is critical towards the UET and the way they were introduced. Other unions 
raise the criticism regarding a risk that the UET become administrative 
units whose performance is controlled, but that little really happens when 
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it comes to work organization10. Whereas Renault unions regarded the Ud-
devalla production organization with great interest, personnel management 
of Renault, according to Michel Freyssenet’s contribution, see the assembly 
line work as inevitable for economic reasons, but they emphasise that the 
nature of the line is changed due to subassembly besides the line and auto-
mation of heavy operations.
It is obvious that there is a basic difference between Renault’s UETs and 
the work done at Uddevalla. Although both pride themselves in group work 
and worker competence, the asssembly line with short job cycles versus 
parallelization and whole-car assembly are expressions of fundamentally 
different philosophies. Another basic difference is the emphasis on produc-
tion workers’ careers in Renault versus development of competence and 
wages while remaining on the same job in the group in Uddevalla11. The 
need for interplant comparisons and the possibilities of moving production 
between units, that the alliance with Renault may have brought about, may 
have put pressure on the smaller Volvo to adapt its production technology 
and work organization. As further evidenced during the collapse of the alli-
ance it was as a case of two production cultures colliding (see also Williams 
et al., Williams and Haslam, 1993 and Rickhamre, 1993).
The plant and its environment
Pioneers often face high costs of entry, as well as opposition to their ideas. 
Volvo cars have developed a plurality of different production concepts, 
which has meant substantial costs for research and for industrial engineering 
and production preparation. The overwhelming majority of car factories in 
the world are based on line production, which has allowed for a far reach-
ing standardization of production technology. This makes development and 
use of alternatives costly, especially for a small company. The degree of 
congruence between an organization and its wider environment is thus cru-
cial in the assessment of the innovative organization’s future (Hancké and 
Rubinstein). This is true for Uddevalla within Volvo and for Saturn within 
GM. It was also true for Volvo, in relation to Renault and still for Volvo in 
relation to the car industry in general.12
The consequences of the alliance and planned merger with Renault may, 
in summary, be regarded in two perspectives. First, there may be good 
policy reasons, at least in the short and medium term, to close plants like 
Uddevalla and Kalmar that differ fundamentally in philosphy and layout 
from other Volvo and especially Renault assembly plants. Coordination of 
production networks and also ideological coherence, may be easier with a 
more streamlined set-up of plants. The second aspect is, as we have seen, 
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organizational politics, representing the struggle between different dominat-
ing ideas within the organization.
The reduction of volume, and for that reason antagonism between work-
places in the Volvo group, together with a change in management of the 
company and the entrance of Renault, could be seen as releasing factors 
for the shift in balance between opposing dominating ideas.13 An important 
background factor for the decision to close Uddevalla, is the suddenly high 
unemployment level in Sweden. This made the need for good jobs weaker. 
‘Crisis consciousness’ was at a peak in Sweden in the autumn 1992, with 
an interest rate from the Bank of Sweden as high as 500 % and with ‘crisis 
agreements’ between government and opposition.
Uddevalla managers interviewed in the spring of 1993, were certain that 
it was a strategic mistake to close this plant, particularly due to its unique 
qualities in customer orientation, cooperation between design and produc-
tion, and worker competence and motivation. Volvo representatives in the 
public debate, however maintained that the closure of Kalmar and Uddevalla 
was purely due to capacity reduction and not a strategic choice of produc-
tion concepts14.
Corporate level support and commitment to the bold new plant and to its 
potential in terms of market aspects and human aspects were neither strong 
nor sustainable enough to allow this potential to develop and to be transferred 
to other parts of the company. In contrast, GM’s Saturn plant, at least initially 
(Hancké and Rubinstein), had a strong support from corporate levels as a 
model for future production organization and industrial relations. A new car 
was developed to be produced in the new plant and the company proudly 
advertised the car referring to its human production mode. Volvo kept a 
low profile for the Uddevalla plant and no special vehicle was developed 
uniquely adapted to its assembly system. Without a corporate vision and 
positive strategy and support, excellent performance was not enough for the 
Uddevalla plant to prove it had a place on a crisis struck car market.
Trade union role
What has been the role of the trade unions? The newspaper of the Uddevalla 
region, Bohuslänningen, wrote of the protests of the unions in Uddevalla and 
the excellent performance development of the Uddevalla plant. In contrast 
the national business media spread a message inspired by Womack et al., of 
Uddevalla as a ‘nightmare factory’, and information from Volvo about dras-
tically improved performance at the Gothenburg plant. The Volvo Group 
union organizations in Gothenburg and the national trade union organiza-
tions were quiet. The national Swedish Metal Workers’ Union issued little 
public support of the plant, the creation of which was partially dependent 
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on its support in earlier critical stages. The union’s silence contrasts with 
its pioneering and longstanding commitment to what it calls ‘the good jobs’ 
and ‘solidaristic work policy’. The national union seemed to have difficulty 
in finding a role for itself in this situation of overcapacity, closure and 
conflict of interest between plants, and referred to the Gothenburg Volvo 
Group level union as the legitimate actor15. The latter union was already in 
a difficult position, as many auto jobs had already been lost in Gothenburg. 
(On the problematic union role see Berggren and Hancké and Rubinstein, 
and Sandberg, 1994.)
There seems to be a need for reexamining the mechanisms necessary 
for implementing a ‘solidaristic work policy’ and to work out the relations 
between different workplaces and union levels in this respect. This is a 
genuine dilemma for a democratic organization with elected bodies on 
several levels. Perhaps the national union could have engaged in the public 
debate emphasizing the unique qualities of the two plants as well as their 
symbolic value, at the same time as they allowed the workplace and group 
level unions (each one supported by their own consultants), to weigh dif-
ferent aspects against each other and make the final judgment.
We have thus far discussed the Uddevalla plant considering the Volvo 
trajectory in Sweden on the one hand, and the European car industry with 
a focus on the former alliance partner Renault, on the other hand. It is now 
time to widen the perspective to the Volvo car factories abroad covered in 
this book.
Volvo abroad
Although we have pointed to the existence of a specific Volvo trajectory with 
factories developing different alternatives to line assembly (many of them 
based on parallelization and advanced team work), we have concluded that 
there is no ‘Volvoism’, except for an unusual degree of pluralism, adapting 
to contingencies. This conclusion is underlined below in the overview of the 
cases of Volvo in the the Netherlands, UK, Belgium, Canada and Malaysia 
presented in chapters in this volume.
Between 1972 and 1975 Volvo was a minority owner of the car plant 
Born in the Netherlands. Between 1975 and 1981 however, it became the 
majority owner of this plant. Although Kalmar was opened in 1974, none 
of the Kalmar ideas were transferred to Born. Ben Dankbaar in his chapter 
concludes that: ‘… apparently there was little or no expectation that the new 
concepts would contribute to productivity in a situation where absenteeism 
and personnel turnover were less of a problem’. Later, from 1986 on, how-
ever, some experiments with longer job cycles were carried out. A few AGVs 
were introduced and there were some try-outs where complete bodies were 
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assembled by a small team. In both cases necessary changes in layout and 
equipment were considered too expensive to justify more general changes. 
Apart from these experiments, work cycles have been and continue to be 
between 30 and 60 seconds.
In addition to the labour market conditions emphasized in the Born case, 
the product market is one more factor to explain Volvo’s choice of production 
concept and work design in different contexts. Thompson and Wallace, in 
their discussion of bus and truck production in the UK, regard the repertoire 
and choice of production concepts as a mirror of the company’s strategic 
response to shifting market conditions.16 Given different circumstances, the 
repertoire may act as a resource for actors striving for different solutions. 
Within Volvo there is a plurality of concepts including some of the most 
advanced alternatives to assembly line production. These are then realized 
depending on the market conditions.
With the Belgian Gent factory in 1965, Volvo got closer to the EEC market. 
The plant, today, is based on assembly line technology. There are carriers in 
some sections of the line, but there is no dock assembly. In the mid 1970s, 
there was an experiment with workers assembling complete engines, with a 
cycle-time of 30 minutes. However this ‘island’ in the plant came to an end. 
Workers felt socially cut off from the production line and unions were not 
pleased with the experiment. The Uddevalla plant, in Belgian car industry 
as in the Dutch case, was looked upon as an answer to a Swedish problem 
of absenteeism, high educational level and low unemployment.
To increase flexibility, the Gent plant began implementing so called 
VEC-teams (Volvo Europe Car teams) in 1989, Rik Huys and Geert Van 
Hootegem report in their contribution. In the VEC teams, 8–12 workers are 
headed by one team leader, not chosen by the team members. Work stations 
are unchanged (with 86 seconds job cycle time), but workers must know 
at least three jobs for possible rotation. Additional team tasks concern-
ing quality, maintenance and materials handling, are taken on by a team 
member, the position rotating among team members. An evalutation of the 
new team system will have to look at the extent to which operator jobs are 
significantly enriched or to which extent, the new tasks are mainly executed 
by the team leader.
Writing the history of Volvo’s plant in Nova Scotia, Canada, Anders 
Sandberg concludes that Volvo did not bring ‘a little bit of Sweden’ to 
Nova Scotia. ‘Instead, the company quickly adopted to and exploited the 
peripheral conditions of its new location.’ Concessions were extended to 
Volvo and it is suggested that these consessions were also reflected in the 
work organization and the labour climate of the plant. Although some tilt-
stations and also robotics were introduced Anders Sandberg uses the term 
‘despotic Taylorism’ (see Adler and Cole) to characterize the plant. There 
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are several reasons why workers still stay: wages are relatively high and 
so is unemployment.
The Swedish Motor Assemblies Sendirian Berhad (SMA) in Malaysia, is 
a joint venture between AB Volvo and their local distributors and the first 
car assembly plant in Malaysia, established in 1966. Jobs are routinized 
with tight hierarchical supervision. The background to such establishments, 
explains Hing Ai Yun, was high import tariffs and other restrictions on 
car imports. Later a national car project with strong state ownership made 
conditions difficult for other car assemblers, so production diminished also 
for the SMA.
The future: lean production, automation  
and human-centred production
Looking just at Volvo plants we found different production models under 
different market conditions. In Japan today we find not only the very big 
plants but also smaller ones, like for example Takada Kogyo Co. presented 
below, producing short series of cars for very specific customer segments.
We will also find that lean production is not monolithic. Solving the 
problems of lean production when it comes to vulnerability of production 
and perhaps most of all the ‘crisis of labour’ and recruitment problems we 
find, not least within Toyota, tendencies towards humanization of work in 
the newer plants; in the background there is now criticism from Japanese 
auto unions. Also continued automation is at present not a self-evident solu-
tion; Toyota’s newest plant has a lower automation level than the preceding 
one.
Lean production with tough working conditons for a reduced number of 
workers is usually discussed only on the micro, company level. If applied 
in workplaces in general, there may be important macro consequences with 
a very heavy burden placed on the public sector, which already has fiscal 
problems.
Together the above factors seem to contribute to a growing importance 
for human-centred production, and we will discuss them more in detail in 
the following sections.
Takada Kogyo Co
Turning thus to Japanese experiences we will first consider a tendency of the 
Japanese product market, towards far-reaching customization of production. 
We take an extreme example, of the production of very small lots of so called 
‘recreational cars’ with a fashionable design for narrowly defined customer 
segments. Although Uddevalla was not intended for this type of production 
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and indeed produced longer series of cars, the example, though it may seem 
marginal, may serve as an illustration of Uddevalla’s potential.
Subcontractors have in cases like these, absorbed production technology 
and management know-how from their parent companies and embarked on 
design and assembly of finished products. They produce several car models 
at a time. An example, is the Takada Kogyo Co. plant in Yokohama, within 
the Nissan network17. There are 1000 full-time, permanent workers and 
around 300 short term employed. Takada Kogyo started as a pressing and 
stamping company which now design its own car models with fashionable 
bodies. They buy chassis, engines and transmissions from major car compa-
nies, especially their parent company. Development time is short, down to 
one year. As an example, Subaru Vivio Ttop, is planned for a total volume 
of only 3000 cars, with a production of 18 cars a day, on a final assembly 
line with a job cycle of about 25 minutes. Other car models, may have a 
volume of one to two thousand per month, like Nissan Figaro. For profitable 
assembly-line production at Takada, a volume for each model of at least 400 
cars per month is generally needed. For small volumes of special cars like 
ambulances, bridal cars etc., a handicraft-like mode of production is used.
The Uddevalla mode of production could perhaps provide a produc-
tive application for the type of assembly taking place at Takada replacing 
what is now short line production as well as the handicraft-like production 
method. The Uddevalla model, through its flexibility and the competence 
of the workers, enhances market contacts both at the design and the sales 
stages, and has a potential of efficiently producing cars with a high degree 
of customization18.
Lean production and work in Japan
Most discussions about industrial organization in the beginning of the 1990s, 
refer to the Japanese experiences and the book The Machine that Changed 
the World, by Womack et al. (1991). Dan Jonsson makes a methodologi-
cal critique of this book in his chapter. The book has aroused an immense 
interest and debate mostly about productivity aspects, with little emphasis 
on the consequences for the employees and for society19. Norbert Altmann 
in his chapter considers the latter issues. He points to some negative aspects 
of Japanese forms of production, such as: segmentation of the workforce; 
polyvalence (meaning broader skills but not higher); a division of labour in 
the Kaizen process (with special teams doing the qualified Kaizen work); 
personnel assessment systems with a high degree of subjectivity; a ratio of 
2:1 in wages between core manufacturing workers in large companies and 
female marginal workers20; virtually unrestricted duration and flexibility of 
working hours; and no role for unions in work design. Altmann comments 
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that these aspects imply that Japanese forms of work organizaton do not 
succeed in allowing labour to unfold to its fullest capacity, so there may be 
a potential for further productivity growth.
Recent developments and pressures towards change in Toyotism and more 
generally in lean management systems, are discussed in this volume by 
Shimizu, Grønning and Lillrank. They all, to different degrees, talk about hu-
manization of the production systems within Toyota against the background 
of what Shimizu calls a ‘crisis of work’ around 1990. In its newest plants, 
Tahara IV and Kyushu, Toyota focusses on work environment to a greater 
extent than before. Toyota manager Tadaaki Jagawa said: ‘Maybe we made a 
mistake in designing such gloomy factories’ (Financial Times, Feb 2, 1992). 
Moving production to the southern island Kyushu is in itself an expression 
for recruitment problems in central Japan. The long distance transportation, 
overnight by ship, of most components from central Japan means a break 
with the ‘just-in-time’ principle (JIT). Furthermore, the congestion of roads 
has contributed to the need for storing components, contrary to the JIT phi-
losophy. More fundamental is perhaps the breaking up of assembly lines 
into mini-lines with more autonomy for workers and teams.
In Toyota Kyushu there is a new shift system adapted to female workers, 
who at the time of my visit in May of 1993 constituted 70 out of 900 manual 
workers. As to the working environment, air conditioning is advanced and 
noise level relatively low. The cars move on platforms, the height of which 
is adjustable, which allows for a more comfortable working posture. There 
are 11 assembly lines with a buffer of a few cars between each. Each line 
with about 40 workers per shift has 3 foremen. For the 11 lines there are 8 
pro-duction managers and 2 section managers. The shorter lines are meant 
to enhance visibility of the product as well as worker autonomy and respon-
sibility. They are also meant to reduce stress. The stress referred to is not 
the one related to intense repetitive work, but rather, to the fact that small 
disturbances may stop the whole factory. With buffers the workers may in 
a more relaxed way stop a part of a line. The job cycle was reported to be 
66 seconds.
In Nissans Kyushu plant, platforms carrying the cars have been intro-
duced. They are coupled to each other like a train. But if a platform was 
stopped the platforms in front could continue and only those coming after 
were stopped. Depending on volume, the job cycle time was 1–2 minutes. 
When asked about work organization, a Nissan union representative had no 
issues to bring up, but mentioned the importance of air conditioning and 
worker welfare.
Moving to Kyushu and being ‘nice to people’, as the Toyota slogan goes, 
may be a contribution to the remedy of recruitment problems in the 1990s. 
Important changes are taking place in ergonomics and physical work en-
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vironment, but there is no questioning of the line technology and of work 
organization with short job cycles and detailed supervision. The propor-
tion of supvervisors and managers is high when compared with Uddevalla 
and Saturn (Hancké and Rubinstein). Another recent development, is the 
emphasis on white collar rationalization directing lean principles towards 
office bureaucracies. In a more long term perspective automation of simple 
manual work has been seen as a solution (Lillrank).
In the new Kyushu plants brighter factories and cafeterias, shorter lines 
with buffers between them, carriers and better ergonomics, are found, with 
production design ideas somewhat reminiscent of Volvo’s Kalmar plant 
from the 1970s. However, there seems to be little interest in more radical 
concepts of work and technology like those found at Uddevalla.
There is a new attitude towards automation in the Toyota Kyushu plant 
where one starts at a relatively low automation level. The automation level 
is lower than in Tahara IV, where even the marriage between chassi and 
engine is fully automated. It is also lower than in Nissan’s Kyushu plant. 
The reason given for the lower level, is the cost of automation. Perhaps, 
then in the medium term, automation may not be the solution to possible 
labour market resistance to car industry work.
Japanese Auto Workers’ criticism
Challenges to lean production come not only from the labour market but also 
from the product market. Customers may not be willing to pay for the wide 
variety and for short model cycles. There are tendencies, especially in Nis-
san, for model cycles to become longer and the number of variants fewer.
This and other critical aspects of Japanese car production can be found 
in the programme ‘Japanese automobile industry in the future’, prepared 
by the Confederation of Japan Automobile Workers’ Unions (JAW, 1992). 
One main thesis is that Japanese auto industry has been able to maintain 
high levels of production and sales, but at the price of ‘tripple sufferings’: 
exhausting the employees resulting in labour shortage, low profitability and 
being bashed from abroad.
In a similar way representatives of the Japan Council of Metal Workers’ 
Unions (IMF-JC), discussed the well known ‘3 M’s’: Muda (non-value-
added, waste), Muri (overburden) and Mura (unevenness in capacity utiliza-
tion). They said Muda and Mura are well known and discussed in the West, 
but one sometimes forgets Muri, which means pushing a person or a machine 
too far. Preventing Muri, could be a union task (interview in May, 1993).
Due to labour shortage and low profits, there is according to JAW, a ten-
dency among part manufacturers to decline orders. This may threaten the 
‘just-in-time’ method, although the present recession may ease the labour 
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market somewhat. After 1995, a decline in the supply of young workers is 
predicted. The long working hours are criticized abroad as an expression 
of unfair competition.
The JAW also criticize a central aspect of Japanese management:
Under the pretext of sharing a common destiny, which is pleasing to the 
ear, companies do seem to have been too demanding of their workers. 
Companies and their employees have turned inwards into the confines 
of the company. This has created a gap between company and society. … 
The sense of ‘family’ is supported by devotion of each member, which 
sometimes requires self-sacrifice. … What is needed now is … making 
the self-realization of employees through their work go hand-in-hand 
with healthy corporate development. (JAW, 1992:21–22).
Although not explicitly stated this seems to be a criticism of the Japanese 
team concept. As Peter Wickens (1993), of Nissan UK writes, such team 
work is not about certain organizational structures or leaving sequential 
manufacturing. Rather according to Wickens:
A team begins with a group of individuals whose individual contribu-
tions are recognized and valued and who are motivated to work in the 
same direction to achieve clear, understood and stretching goals for 
which they are accountable. The best teams come with positive leader-
ship and tough goals.
I have referred extensively to the JAW programme because issues of this 
type, particularly Japanese union perspectives, are completely absent from 
the work of Womack et al.
Work, technology and management
Returning to production technology, organization of work and management, 
the role of job content remains a key aspect. In the sociotechnical, or hu-
man-centred tradition, long work cycles and work group autonomy is seen as 
an important value of its own, contributing to good jobs for human beings. 
It is also seen as a new productive concept, both as a way of motivating 
workers and as a way of avoiding the engineering losses that follow with 
short cycle line production. In Scandinavia, with Uddevalla as an important 
example, and in Germany, this work organization is coupled to a relatively 
strong union influence on job design.
The Japanese lean model combines short cycle jobs, standardized detailed 
work procedures applied to the whole organization, and worker involvment 
in rethinking and improving these same procedures. Lillrank in this volume 
discusses this informal mixing of rule following and participation in im-
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provement efforts. Wickens (1993, p. 87) argues that: ‘job satisfaction can 
arise from performing the short, repetitive cycle well, achieving high levels 
of productivity and quality, and at the same time being involved in changes 
to the process and a range of other tasks’. According to Cole and Adler, 
such a system is part of the essence of Nummi’s version of lean production. 
They say that it contributes not only to world class performance, but also 
to a moderately high level of worker motivation. They call this system a 
’learning bureaucracy’. That may be a good description, but from a European 
human-centred perspective, I think that their term ’Democratic Taylorism’ 
could be seen as problematic. Even in the case of Uddevalla, with its richer 
work content and worker influence, both in day-to-day management and via 
union influence in the design process, there is seldom talk of democracy.
On the other hand, one should not deny the satisfaction of working in a 
’learning bureaucracy’, which through a long process of improvement, is 
functioning very smoothly and delivering high quality products. One can 
imagine, however, that such a system will remain stable only if the general 
organizational principles are taken as given. Possibly more critical learning 
in wider circles may contribute to workers questioning basic principles of 
industrial organization – such as additive learning and sequential flow – as 
a logical consequence of trying to find the primary causes of the dysfunc-
tions of sequential line production (as empasized by Freyssenet). In spite 
of Kaizen, detailed division of labour and direct control might, in such a 
perspective, stand out as neither democratic nor learning. The continuity 
from traditional ‘despotic’ Taylorism is strong and changes due to Kaizen 
are sometimes exaggerated. This may partially be explained by the fact that 
production workers are often involved only in low level Kaizen activities, 
whereas more qualified Kaizen acitivities are taken care of by special Kaizen 
teams or by more qualified workers, maintenance workers or supervisors. 
There is a division of labour in the Kaizen activities.
As early as in the 1950s Robert Blauner summarizing American research 
on auto work, emphasized the role of technology in determining the char-
acter of work. Later, in the sociotechnical tradition Emery and Thorsrund 
stressed job design. Womack, Jones and Rose (1991) emphasize the role 
of management in determining work. They argue that with lean produc-
tion, the same technology results in different work. This is similar to Cole 
and Adler’s thoughts on worker participation in improvements of standard 
procedures, which would contribute to making Nummi’s Taylorism seem 
‘democratic’.
Expressing what could be seen as either pure contempt or ignorance of 
the socio-technical tradition, Womack et al. (1991, p. 102) comment upon 
Uddevalla in the following way: ‘simply bolting and screwing together a 
large number of parts in a long cycle rather than a small number in a short 
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cycle is a very limited form of job enrichment’. Based on a 5 plant survey 
of how workers perceived working conditions, Berggren (1993a), is able to 
refute this point of view. He demonstrates a close connection between techni-
cal-organizational design and working conditions. The results are clearcut: 
‘The further from traditional line assembly a plant moves, the better the 
outcomes in terms of variation, prospects for personal growth, the taking of 
responsibility, and the opportunity to use ones skills’, and the lower the level 
of physical strain and severe fatigue after work. In all fragmented assembly, 
production workers expressed a strong desire for more variety and integrated 
tasks. Holistic, long-cycle assembly, thus, turns out to be something else 
than simply ‘screwing together a large number of parts’.
Uddevalla’s ‘enriching production’ is fundamentally different from Tay-
lorism and Toyotism, from human, technical and market points of view. In 
assembly, lean production like Taylorism means repetitive, standardized short 
cycle jobs. To this comes ‘team work’ with some rotation and supplementary 
tasks like inspection and minor repair work as well as contributing to refine-
ment of the standardized procedures.21 Human-centered work of Uddevalla’s 
type is very different in that it abolishes the line and presents a total paral-
lelization of production which allows for advanced customer orientation, 
interaction between workers and designers, as well as worker autonomy and 
long work cycles in assembly. It tries with reasonable success to integrate 
work, technology and management in a learning, non-alienating process.
Lean production and society
So far we have focussed on the consequences of lean production for work 
and workers. A broad and widely spread application of lean production 
would also have major consequences on the societal level. There is an im-
portant micro-macro dimension in lean production. Analyzing this dimen-
sion, Peter Auer in his contribution argues that, although lean production 
may be a remedy for individual companies, it may create deterioration of 
the economic and social climate in general. In a lean cost-cutting world, 
social responsibility for companies will be impossible, and the whole social 
burden will be placed on the public sector. Massive job shedding may take 
place and remaining jobs may not be enough to finance an advanced welfare 
state. In summary, Auer argues that if lean production is widely introduced 
the macro-economic consequences may threaten even the fundaments of 
the economy itself. In an isolated supply side micro-economic view, high 
wages are cost factors that will affect competitiveness and destroy jobs. In 
a demand side macro-view, high wages spur demand and creates jobs. It 
might be necessary to achieve a combined supply/demand and micro/macro 
policy with an optimum level of leanness.
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‘Competition and free trade does not simply expose technical inefficien-
cies which could and should be rectified by virtuous management efforts to 
improve productivity’. It is also ‘a misfortune which undermines the more 
generous social settlements’ writes Williams et al., in their chapter, and they 
hold the opinion that a prime task for the European Community ‘should be 
to put a floor under destructive competition between social settlements’. In 
a highly competitive world, a high standard of social protection and humane 
work may not be possible in one country. This type of policy needs interna-
tional cooperation setting minimum standards of social and environmental 
protection. A developed socio-economic logic may become an advantage 
for Europe, whereas for Japan, some of the social aspects and new demands 
are perhaps its achilles heel (Auer).
Some of these conclusions are supported by the the JAW report, men-
tioned above. The report finds that Japanese auto manufacturers engage in 
‘excessive competition’, because of too frequent model changes, and too 
much diversification in models and parts. Such costs could be reduced to 
the advantage of investments in new technology, such as environmental 
protection, and also an ‘appropriate valuation of the workforce’ (JAW, 
1992, p. 23). ‘To expand overseas markets based on a domestic structure of 
excessive competition is the same thing as to export excessive competition. 
Before we criticize political intervention in economic activities, we should 
realize that the market is not almighty’ (p. 19). In a postcript the advisor of 
JAW, professor Shimada, writes: ‘Competition for the sake of competition 
has dominated, and everything was sacrificed, including wages, working 
hours, profits, subcontractors, dealers, the lives of Japanese workers, and 
employment opportunities of workers abroad’ (p. 33).
Lean production has its limits. Profits of Japanese car producers are low. 
Customers may not be willing to pay the cost for the many variants and quick 
model changes. Young people are beginning to reject work in car plants due 
to long and tough working hours. There are risks of job shedding that may 
create social tensions and destroy the basis for social welfare and cohesion. 
On the micro level, it is necessary and possible to go beyond the onesided 
focus on the leanest possible production of a Japanese type. At the same 
time it is necessary to develop the Scandinavian-German ‘human-centred 
model’ of work so that productive performance comes more into focus. The 
fierce international competition will regulate or monitor that the productivity 
aspect is not neglected. To secure human work and decent social standards, 
international political and trade union cooperation may give a basis for a 
supplementary macro demand side policy. Also a policy is needed that will 
supplement the product market driven development of still leaner pro-duc-
tion with a social-policy and labour market driven further development of 
human-centred production, including its productivity potential. An interest-
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ing sign is that in May of 1993, representatives from the Japan Council of 
Metal Workers’ Unions, IMF-JC, and the German IG Metall Union met in 
Tokyo, to a first comparative seminar discussing living and working condi-
tions, wages and production systems.
With such international cooperation growing, we may see new production 
concepts going beyond lean production and making use of experiences of 
the Volvo Uddevalla system of reflective production. ‘Enriching production’ 
may become a real possibility.
Notes
 1. References here and below with no year after the name of the author refer to 
chapters in this volume.
 2. Articles by researchers, unions and management on Volvo and the closure of 
Uddevalla were published in several main newspapers during the spring of 1993. 
An important article posing questions to management, shareholders, politicians 
and unions was written in the leading Stockholm daily Dagens Nyheter, April 
6, 1993,  by Elsie Charron, Kajsa Ellegård, Michel Freyssenet, Bob Hancké, 
Ulrich Jürgens, Rianne Mahon, Lennart Nilsson, Åke Sandberg, Jesper Steen, 
Peter Ullmark and Karel Williams. During the spring of 1994 debate continued 
in connection with the closure of the Kalmar plant.
 3. This was emphasized by Hammarström, 1993, of the SIF (Swedish Union of 
Clerical and Technical Employees in Industry) in the debate on the closing of 
Uddevalla and Kalmar. The engine plants in Vara and Skövde are important 
examples, as well as the truck plant in Tuve near Gothenburg.
 4. For a detailed analysis see the contribution in this book by Berggren and also 
Ellegård, and Engström and Medbo. See also Berggren’s (1993b) evaluation 
report and articles by Sandberg 1993 a, b and c. 
 5. The Uddevalla plant, like Kalmar, was an assembly plant. Painted bodies were 
brought there from Gothenburg.  
 6. This is just an example of the weaknesses of the calculation, discussed more 
in detail in Berggren’s contribution.
 7. The following sections is a development of arguments in earlier articles, Sandberg 
1993 a, b and c which were based on an original article in Dagens Nyheter  Feb 
4, 1993; see also Berggren, Ellegård and Hancké and Rubinstein in this book.
 8. Developing such a new integrated system of work organization and wages does 
not only apply to Uddevalla, but is an important strategic problem for unions 
trying to find an answer to modern post- or neo-Taylorist rationalization strate-
gies. There is a need for a ‘new historical compromise’ on rationalization and 
wages replacing or supplementing Taylorism and piece rate systems. LO, the 
Swedish Confederation of Trade Unions, is among those trying to find and 
answer to this challange. See also Metall, 1992, and note 11 below. 
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 9. See a recent book on total quality management by Pierre Jocou (1992), the 
influential director of quality at Renault. 
10. These opinions may be compared to experiences from the German auto industry 
where the concepts of most auto producers express expectations that group 
work will contribute to higher flexibility and performance of the workforce. 
But, judging from the collective agreements, introduction of group work will 
not be accompanied by substantial competence development (Ramge 1993). 
Similar aspects are discussed regarding so called VEC-teams in Volvo-Gent 
(see Huys and Hootegem).
11. The Metal workers’ union in a recent publication (Metall, 1992:39), makes 
some important conceptual distinctions. Career means that some individuals 
(but not all), may move to another job given an unchanged work organization. 
Multiskilling means that a person learns to perform tasks within another job, 
which may be open to all, but the work organization remains unchanged. Job 
development, the preferred solution, means that all individuals have the pos-
sibility to gradually learn and perform new tasks within a broadly defined job. 
The detailed division of labour in the old work organization is changed (See 
also Sandberg 1994).
12. This conclusion on the company management level may also be compared to 
the difficulties concerning organizational innovations survival within one plant 
partially organized according to traditional principles (see the discussion on the 
Volvo trajectory above). 
13. The discussion of dominating ideas and releasing factors owes much to Albert 
Danielsson (see Samtal om ledarskap, ledning och ledare, 1986).
14. See article by Volvo Car CEO Lennart Jeansson in Dagens Nyheter, April 13, 
1993. Jeansson wrote: ‘It is worth pointing out once more - the decision to close 
the plants in Kalmar and Uddevalla is a necessary decision in terms of capacity 
and  adaptation to prevailing conditions and not, as many seem to believe, an 
evaluation of different production methods’ (author’s translation).
15. See P.O. Bergström (1993), of the Swedish Metal Workers’ Union.
16. Comparing job redesign at Volvo in Sweden and British Leyland, Pontusson, 
1990, finds the explanation mainly in differing labour market conditions.
17. Professor Masayoshi Ikeda, Chuo University, generously shared with me his 
knowledge and experiences of this type of small lot production.  He arranged a 
study visit at Takada Kokyo Co. in Yokohama, where managing director Shoshin 
Migita and his staff gave us valuable information. See also a paper by Ikeda 
(without date).
18. As we will see below, some of the tendencies in Japan of fashion oriented design 
and quick model changes have been criticized for environmental and safety 
reasons by Japanese unions.
19. See however e.g. Williams and Haslam, 1992, Berggren et al., 1991 on Japanese 
transplants in the US, and an overview article by Unterweger, 1992.
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20. Between the years 1981 and 1989, the yearly cash earnings of employees in small 
manufacturing enterprises (4–9 employees), was between 43 and 45 percent of 
those earnings in enterprises with more than 1,000 employees. In 1990, female 
employee earnings was about 60 percent of those of the male counterparts. 
(Matsuba, 1993).
21. Stephen Wood (1993) summarizes much of the discussion of fordism and the 
Japanese management model, and conludes that the latter may be regarded as 
neo-Fordist rather than post-Fordist: Workers participate in continuous im-
provement, but from Fordism management´s right to design work remains intact, 
as well as work study, assembly lines, mass production and mass marketing.
Interviews and plant visits during the spring of 1993
• Volvo, Uddevalla and Kalmar: managers, car assemblers and trade 
unionists
• Renault headquarters: managers and trade unionists; plant visits
• Japan: plant visits to Toyota Tahara and Toyota Kyushu, Nissan Kyushu 
and Takada Kogyo in Yokohama, including meetings with plant manag-
ers and at Nissan, a union representative.
Interviews with representatives for Japan Council of Metal Workers’ Unions 
(IMF-JC) and the Federation Of All Toyota Workers’ Unions within the 
Confederation of Japan Automobile Workers’ Unions (JAW), Tokyo.
The visits to the above and other plants in Japan were organized by Mats 
Brusæus and Keisuke Kurihara at the Swedish Embassy and by Ryu Suzuki 
of the Social Research Institute of Japan. Ryu Suzuki and Kyoko Kodera 
from Chuo University acted as translators during visits and interviews.
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Part I
Volvo’s innovative  
Uddevalla and Kalmar plants
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The creation of a new production system at 
the Volvo automobile assembly plant  
in Uddevalla, Sweden
Kajsa Ellegård
Some comments will be made on the creation of the new production system, 
which we, as researchers, have named the ‘Reflective Production System’ 
(1). It was created when Volvo, in the late 1980s, planned a new automobile 
factory in Uddevalla (2).
Some fundamental questions for the understanding of this creative process 
will be put forth. The point of departure is that the ‘Reflective Production 
System’ relies on a set of assumptions that differs in nature from those as-
sumptions which support the production system in plants whith an assembly 
line. Also, some characteristics of the product flow pattern of the ‘reflective 
production system’ in the Uddevalla factory will be briefly de-scribed, as 
well as the work organization and the necessary prerequisites for it. These 
are extended competence in car building, parallelized assembly work sta-
tions and a steadily ongoing process of change and improvement.
1. What is new?
This question can be answered by taking the role of a first time visitor to 
the Uddevalla factory: The first impression concerns the visible part of the 
work environment, which is very light and spacious.
This does not differ so much from any other modern factory, though other 
things appear that do differ from what can be seen in other car plants:
• it is quiet,
• the cars being assembled stand still, side by side, during the assembly,
• people are working together in small groups and they communicate 
frequently,
• nothing seems to go on in a hurry,
• the car stands at the same place for a long period of time, equalling 
several hours,
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• and the factory is small compared to most other car plants.
The next impression concerns the technical equipment:
• that is the absence of an assembly line. The flow of cars is instead 
extremely parallelized in the product shops,
• sets of materials are individually packed for each body (small details and 
larger components are placed in a strict order on shelves and stands). 
The car body and its sets of materials are sent to the assembly area by 
automatic guided vehicles,
• automatic guided vehicles are also used to transport the complete cars 
from the product shop,
• the car remains at the same place during its entire assembly,
• people are moving around the body, performing their different tasks in 
the assembly work while the car stands still,
• the same persons do all their work in a small assembly area,
• many hand machines are in use, but there are a few big, complex ma-
chines.
Another impression is that it is very hard to discover the production pace. 
It is not immediately visible due to the absence of an assembly line and due 
to the long work cycles. When there are no short work cycles, the degree of 
repetitivity is very low. The same task is thus performed by the same worker 
only a few times a day.
A first time visitor is not immediately aware of the fundamental structure 
of organization of the assembly process. However, once discussed with 
the people working there, much can be learned. It is difficult, however, to 
interpret the impressions from such discussions when using a set of mental 
tools applicable for analysis of a traditional line factory.
Thus, a first conclusion now can be drawn. The real innovation is the way 
in which human learning and human knowledge is used as a starting point 
for developing new principles of production techniques. One of the most 
im-portant technical principles concerns the handling of materials when the 
body stands still during the assembly (3). The materials handling is arranged 
so as to facilitate the assembly work, by taking into account the ways in 
which people think and perform in a natural way.
Human knowledge, i.e. personal knowledge and ability of the individual 
worker, is a fundamental underlying prerequisite for the production tech-
nique developed in the Uddevalla factory. The total body of knowledge 
of assembly work is distributed among the people and utilized in a quite 
different manner from other car factories. More knowledge is demanded 
from each individual in the teams. The workers themselves exercise control 
over the totality of assembly work, including work pace. They have an in-
ner view of the process, and when they have the complete set of materials 
39
for assembling one car they can perform their work very efficiently. This 
makes the ‘Reflective Production System’ very flexible and resistant to 
such distur-bances that in traditional productions sites would cause severe 
problems (4).
The main reason for the need of extended individual competence was the 
demand for effiency and profitability. Extended competence allows for an 
overview for the individuals, which is necessary for their understanding 
of the assembly process. Once an understanding is achieved it becomes 
possible for the individuals to trace new and better ways to perform. This 
leads to increased efficiency, higher productivity and profitability. Thus, 
the combination of competence and a technical system built to meet human 
abilities, generates goal achievement.
2. Why did this new production system develop?
In the mid 80s Volvo needed to expand its production capacity. The demand 
for Volvo cars increased steadily during the first part of the 80s, whereby 
existing plants could not meet this demand without great changes. At the 
same time, work in industry was not correlated with positive values among 
people in the work force in Sweden, and the car plants were mere symbols 
for monotonous work on seemingly endless assembly lines. Concurrently, 
the labour market in Sweden was very hot during the mid 80s, with an 
unemployment rate of only about 2 percent. Hence, it was hard to find 
people willing to work in traditional industries in general and automobile 
industries in particular. The metal workers union in Sweden had for several 
years argued and worked for the creation of ‘good work’ for its members. 
The national metal union in Stockholm, as well as the local Volvo metal 
union in Gothenburg, found the plans for a Volvo plant in Uddevalla to be 
an opportunity to put into practice the ‘good work’ philosophy. Others, 
however, in Gothenburg saw the plans as a threat to the jobs for the metal 
union’s members in the old plant in Torslanda, Gothenburg.
Volvo wanted to be able to recruit good workers to its automobile plants in 
order to produce quality cars in an efficient and flexible production system. 
Since the experiences from the Kalmar plant (an innovative plant of its time) 
were good, not only concerning production results but also because it led 
to positive publicity all over the world, the company wanted to make a new 
effort to create something extra.
Volvo raised the goals for the Uddevalla plant which aimed at the creation 
of a profitable and flexible factory, with high total productivity, the best qual-
ity and where at the same time the people felt that they had a good job. Also, 
the cooperation between the company and the unions were meant to develop 
further during the planning of the factory in Uddevalla. Therefore, it was 
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important that all union representatives were favourable towards the creation 
of a good working environment in the factory. This meant something very 
different from short cycle work tasks on an assembly line. The unions were 
represented in the planning group from the very beginning of the project.
One person in the management staff of the Volvo company, was fasci-
nated by the concept of ‘holistic learning’ and ‘natural work’ presented at a 
seminar by a researcher from the University of Gothenburg. As a result of 
this interest the researcher was engaged in the planning of the Uddevalla 
factory from the start.
Volvo had for many years made experiments with new production layouts 
and flows, both in truck and car production on a small scale. Some of these 
experiments had shown very good results, even better than expected. There 
was, however, no obvious answer to the question: Why is it so good? The 
leading production technician from these experiments, a ‘free thinker’ in the 
company, was also involved in the planning process of the Uddevalla factory 
from the very start. He also utilized his contacts with researchers in the field 
of alternatives to line production at the Chalmers Technical University in 
Gothenburg. They knew, theoretically, that it should be more efficient and 
profitable to replace the assembly line with a highly parallelized product 
flow. This would, as a consequence, improve the working environment. 
The theoretical statements were yet to be proven. Their involvement in the 
design process became deeper and deeper through the years.
Involved in the planning process were also a few production technicians 
of a more traditional school whom exerted great influence in the beginning 
of the planning period. This meant that there was an intellectual struggle 
between these two groups of technicians. Some steps in this struggle will be 
indicated below by showing the changing plans from the planning group.
There were several circumstances present that worked in favour of the 
development of the new ‘Reflective Production System’. Most important 
was the unique opportunity to combine the different spheres of knowledge 
and experience from the Volvo car company on the one hand, and from 
researchers, on the other. This was a necessary precondition and without 
it, the result would probably not have been successful, in spite of the other 
favourable circumstances. Some of the more important of those other fac-
tors were:
• Various parties within Volvo were in agreement as to the direction of the 
project and were thus in fact able to strengthen each others arguments 
in the daily work.
• The leader of the planning group handled new ideas in a way that 
favoured the new ideas favouring good working environment. New 
suggestions were not laid aside solely for lack of time, but were ac-
cepted even though they involved extra efforts in securing the approval 
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of the parties involved. For example, the first suggested layout for the 
assembly shop was laid aside because it lacked renewal. It was more 
or less a copy of the ten year older Kalmar factory. The majority of the 
planning group, the company executives and the union representatives, 
all envisioned something better than that.
• The close cooperation between the representatives from the four differ-
ent unions and the creation of a new role for themselves were of dicisive 
importance (5). They were able to leave the role of ‘demanders’ making 
claims and instead take the position of ‘suggestion-makers’.
• The entire planning group was seated in the same office, and all mem-
bers, including the union representatives, worked full-time with the 
planning process. This geographical proximity made it easier to develop 
and try new design proposals, as discussions constantly could be started 
and all members of the planning group were easily involved.
• The negotiations concerning pollutants were protracted. This was im-
portant since the delay led to cancellation of the body and paint shops. 
Thus, an assembly shop only was eventually built. This cancellation at 
least had one short term positive and one long-term negative effect. The 
positive effect was that the planning group could concentrate on mak-
ing something new in the assembly shop. Until the decision to proceed 
with the planning of an assembly shop only was made, the resistance to 
change concerning new ideas had been greatest in the subgroup planning 
the assembly shop. Now all forces were concentrated on that spot. The 
negative effect, the decision in autumn of 1992 to close the Uddevalla 
factory, was due in part to the lack of the body and paint shops.
3. How did the new ‘Reflective Production System’ evolve?
3.1 The trajectory for goal attainment – a descriptive model
The evolution of the ‘Reflective Production System’ followed a nonlinear 
trajectory over time. The initial goal of the planning group was to create a 
profitable factory. Whereby, the concrete goals were: high flexibility, high 
productivity and best quality, together with employee satisfaction. The goals 
remained the same during the entire planning process, as their attainment 
steadily improved. The planning process went more and more in the direc-
tion of a ‘competence intensive’ factory.
When the ‘Reflective Production System’ in the Uddevalla factory was de-
veloped, there was an interdependence between industry and research. Step 
by step the theoretical statements were tested in the factory. The stepwise 
development occurred, due to the strong resistance from many ‘traditional-
ists’, both on different levels in the company and within the unions.
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Thus, during the developmental process the theoretical and practical levels 
were closely linked to each other as theoretical statements were practically 
tested and worked out. For example, an educational workshop was started 
in the spring of 1986, even before the final decision to build the factory. 
In the educational workshop, the first 20 car builders were on Volvo’s pay-
roll. Together the researchers and some skilled workers from other Volvo 
factories, transformed the theoretical principles for technology and learn-
ing into the small educational work shop, where it was applied. This test 
showed that the principles were correct, even when confronted with real 
world conditions. It also showed that it was possible to learn how to build a 
car with long work cycles, when the materials were exposed in such a way 
that the assembly was facilitated. In fact, the car builders quickly learned 
how to build at least one quarter of a car. After some months many of them 
were able to build half a of car, some of them could build three quarters of 
a car and eventually there were some who could build the whole car alone. 
Therefore, this intensive competence growth proved to be achievable, when 
the new principles for learning and for grouping and exposing the materials 
were practised.
Using a descriptive model to give an overview of the creative planning 
process, the planning of the Uddevalla assembly plant can be seen as a trajec-
tory. The trajectory, shown in figure 1, moves from the first idea presented, 
where each one of about 700 persons performed individual work tasks of 
about two minutes long in duration. The final idea shows a factory where 
small, independent parallel teams, with about seven to ten members, as-
semble the whole car themselves. The time duration of the individual work 
tasks were now a couple of hours.
Below, the steps of the trajectory are described one by one. The steps 
show how the new production and learning principles were integrated in 
the thinking of the planning group. In the beginning, the ideas were simply 
beautiful words, which seemed to be unattainable goals, but in the end they 
were realized. It is clear that the development was slow when compared to 
a traditional planning process, but on the other hand, it was very creative 
and successful.
3.2 May 1985 – quite a traditional layout: ‘Not good enough’
In May of 1985, half a year after the initial meeting, the planning group had 
to present a layout for a complete automobile plant which include a body 
shop, a paint shop and an assembly shop. The group presented a sketch of 
a factory layout which emphasized the goals for the factory.
The assembly shop, however, remained quite traditional. For example, in 
this layout the product flow in the assembly shop was more or less similar 
to that in the Volvo Kalmar assembly plant. There were two minute work 
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Figure 1. Illustration of the trajectory describing the movements of the Volvo 
trajectory (line V), during the planning process of the Uddevalla plant. The 
model has a time dimension and a dimension of production mode. The end 
points of the horizontal dimension is the idea of automatized assembly on 
a large scale on one hand and the idea of ‘craftmans like’ assembly on large 
scale, on the other. The position of the planning in January of 1988, is shown 
by the angle touching the line NOW: January, 1988. The trajectory shows 
clearly the steps in the planning process that are described in more detail 
in the text. The first layout for the Uddevalla plant would have meant that 
about 700 persons should have assembled each car together. The layout in 
January of 1988 meant that 8 persons made one car.
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cycles in a serial flow, which were meant to be changed into a partly parallel 
flow later on. Whereby 700 persons together should have the competence 
to build a car with opportunities for the assemblers to learn about 10 work 
cycles, of approximately 20 minutes of work.
Many members in the planning group, among them the union representa-
tives, did not find this layout corresponding to the goals set up. It was im-
portant to reach an agreement, as one of the goals set up for the Uddevalla 
factory was that the planning process itself should improve the cooperation 
between the company and the unions. The unions refused to acknowledge 
this traditional layout as something better than existing other factories. 
The top management at Volvo were of the same opinion. This layout was 
rejected at a planning meeting. A new layout, in better accordance with the 
initial goals set up for the factory was sought. Furthermore, environmental 
pollution emissions had to be considered.
3.3 December 1985 – the start of something really new
Half a year later, in December of 1985, the planning group had worked out a 
new layout. The general ideas of smaller organizational units, parallel work 
stations and extended work cycles were integrated in the layout. According 
to this layout, the assembly plant should be divided into eight series-linked 
product shops. In each product shop one eigth of the car should be assembled, 
and each product shop was to be an independent unit in the organization. 
Within the eight product shops, the work stations were to be parallel. This 
meant that all assembly work performed in each product shop (i.e., one eigth 
of the car) should be done on one single station per car. See figure 2.
The car should stand still in a ‘dock-station’ during the assembly, with 
pairs of assemblers doing all assembly work at each parallel station. Not 
only assembly work should be performed in the product shops, but also, 
much of the materials handling. The materials handling should be performed 
on an-other floor of the building. The work tasks would thus become more 
varied. Whereby, each employee would be responsible not only for assembly, 
but also for materials handling related to the assembly task at hand. This 
meant that the work cycle for every assembler should increase to about 
15–20 minutes on every car (6). Thus, this layout presented to the steering 
commitee in December of 1985, presented something really new.
The assembly plant was meant to be located in and upon the big shipyard 
dock. It would become very expensive to control the level of moisture in 
the ship yard dock. The planning group still did not recieve an answer from 
the authorities, concerning the negotiations regarding polluting emissions 
from the factory. These circumstances resulted in the steering commitee’s 
request for a less expensive layout: one which made use of pre-existing 
buildings on the ship yard land area, and did not use the dock.
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<Figure 2, Page 45, Part I, Ellegård>
Figure 2. The second layout was something new (December, 1985). The 
car should pass one work station in each one of eight seriesl inked product 
shops. On each of these stations (the stations within the product shop were 
parallel), all work was to be performed by a pair of car builders, who also 
were responsible for their own materials handling.
At the end of one year of planning an acceptable layout was not yet found. 
Negotiations regarding emissions also slowed the process. The result was 
an oportunity for a unique type of factory, previous unknown to the auto-
mobile industry.
3.4 Putting the assembly line into history
This opportunity was felt, ‘in the air’ by the project leader. He set up a 
small sub-group, with a couple of free-thinking technicians and one union 
representative. Together they produced a layout based on the two main ideas 
from the researchers.
One of them favoured parallel product flow and a materials handling ac-
cording to the flow. Which meant that the material to be handled were ‘car-
related’ and not primarily related to a geographical area in the factory. The 
other idea focused on the human’s ability to learn huge work tasks when an 
overview of the production process and understanding of it as a whole are 
emphasized. This occurs when one has control over the working order and 
working pace, as well as finding meaning in the work. It had already been 
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<Figure 3, Page 46, Part I, Ellegård>
Figure 3. The shape of the Uddevalla plant at the final decision to start 
building the plant. Six parallel product shops (no 1. to 6. in the figure), two 
test shops (no 7. and 8.) and one rust protection shop (no 9.), and one central 
shop for material handling.
theoretically shown that, the smallest content of a work task in car assembly 
that fills these criterias is approximately one quarter of a car. These were 
the basic starting points for the subgroup.
An important result from the subgroup work was that the small, independ-
ent organizational units, the product shops, were proposed not be linked in a 
serial flow. On the contrary they should be independent of each other. This 
meant that they should be parallel, and thus that whole cars should be built 
in each one of them. This was manifested by the location of the buildings, as 
one separate house was to be built for every product shop. This was a radical 
change compared to the earlier layouts put up by the planning group.
3.5 June 1986 – The buildings support the idea of parallel product shops
These ideas were identified by the rest of the planning group as interesting 
and progressive, and they were involved in the further development. One 
point, however made some persons anxious. That was the lack of opportu-
nities to return to a serial flow – if the new production system should not 
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work. In the final layout given to the steering commitee in June of 1986, the 
independent product shops were placed corner to corner in two three-clover 
leaf configurations. See figure 3. In that way, it was possible, but expensive, 
to return from the highly parallel flow to a serial flow of a more traditional 
kind. All materials handling means, in a car factory relying on the principles 
of reflective production, preparation of individual sets of materials for each 
individual car. These were to be performed in an existing building from 
the ship yard era. This meant that there was a physical separation between 
material preparation and assembly.
Some months before the decision was made to build an assembly factory 
according to this layout, it was also decided that no body or paint shop 
should be built. The main reason was that there still was no answer from 
the authorities regarding the negotiations about the permitted level of pol-
lution emissions. Another reason was that the cost of the paint shop was 
very high.
3.6 The educational work shop – testing the theoretical statements
All creative efforts were now concentrated to plan an assembly plant well 
meeting the goals. The researchers in technology and educational science 
had already given their view of how to do this. Theoretically, it was shown 
that the time use for assemblying a car should be much shorter in a highly 
parallel product flow, than in a serial flow (7). Theoretically it was also shown 
that learning was facilitated (much more effective) if it contributed to the 
understanding of the car as a whole and which had meaning to the learner 
(8). The big question remained if these theoretical truths correspond to what 
would appear in the real world, when the principles were put into practice.
This question was answered when the educational workshop was started 
in spring of 1986. The first 20 carbuilders were deeply involved in planning 
and equipage of the educational workshop. Work methods were tried, as they 
learned the work content of at least one quarter of a cars assembly. Not one 
of these carbuilders had worked in the automobile industry before.
In the educational workshop the carbuilders then proved that it was pos-
sible to learn very quickly, how to assemble one quarter of a car, and to 
assemble it with high quality. There were two main reasons for this. The 
first, is that all materials to each individual car were placed in prepared 
sets on stands defined for that car only. The second, is that the materials 
on the stands were grouped and arranged in such a way that the assembly 
work was facilitated.
Some months later, all car builders mastered one quarter of a car, many of 
them half the car and others still had achieved three quarters of a car. Some 
time later, in the educational workshop, one or two car builders were able 
to build the whole car themselves.
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When the decision was made to build an assembly plant in Uddevalla, 
the planning group knew that they would succeed if they kept the build-
ings, equipment and learning according to the principles. In June of 1986, 
the final decision to build the Uddevalla factory was made, after which no 
substantial changes were made in respect to buildings, but there were great 
changes in the product shop layout. This process was constantly fed with 
arguments based on experiences from the educational workshop. In it, new 
ideas and improvements were tried out. The competence to build a whole 
complete car was, step by step, geographically concentrated.
<Figure 4, Page 48, Part I, Ellegård>
Figure 4. Product flow through one of the six product shops (the other ones 
were intended to be the same), the layout in June of 1986. Whole cars in 
product shop, one car is made by 80 persons. The four quarters of the car 
(I. Leads, II. Decor, III. Drive line and IV. Interior), define the content of 
the work in each team zone (that is in 1/4 of the product shop. Two teams 
constitute each team zone.
3.7 Whole cars in a product shop: one car is made by 80 persons
In each of the six parallel product shops whole cars should be built, ac-
cording to the layout presented in June of 1986. In each product shop, the 
total assembly work was divided into the four quarters of the car, and each 
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quarter was to be built in a separate area (9). The four separate areas were 
series linked and called ‘team-zones’. That meant that; one quarter of the 
product shop was equipped for assemblying the first quarter of the car, leads 
(electricity and water and other fluids), the next quarter for decor (ceiling, 
windows etc), the third quarter for the drive line (engine, gear etc) and the 
final quarter for the interior (chairs, steering wheel etc). See figure 4. These 
four areas in the product shop were labled ‘team-zones’, and there were two 
teams in each of them. This constituted approximately 80 employees in a 
product shop with four team zones.
The work stations within the separate series linked team-zones were par-
allel. A pair of workers did all the assembly (one quarter of a car) on one 
station and when they had finished their quarter they sent the car to the next 
team-zone, where the next quarter of the car was to be assembled. When 
the whole car was ready, it had passed through all four team-zones, and one 
work station within each team zone.
3.8 Whole cars in a team-zone: one car is made by about 20 persons
In January of 1987, the planning group realized that the production ar-
ranged according to the June 1986 plan, still gave only a limited overview 
of the assembly to the workers. They had no immediate feedback as to the 
consequenses of their work. Why not then, concentrate the assembly work 
and build the complete car in a team-zone, i.e., in one quarter of the product 
shop? None of the buildings were equipped as yet, so this change was not 
expensive. The planning group decided to follow the idea, and thus there 
were four parallel team zones in each product shop. In each team zone about 
20 persons assembled the whole car. See figure 5. Their parallel work stations 
were equipped for each quarter of the car. The area in the building was a 
decisive restriction. However, when this layout was related to the produc-
tion volume required, it was clear that it would not meet the requirements 
of 40,000 cars per year, in one shift.
3.9 Whole cars in the team I:  
One car is made by 8 persons on two work stations
Because of the restricted area, it was now necessary to use even less space 
to reach the production volume required. This could only be done by geo-
graphically concentrating work tasks even further. The results showed that a 
car should be built on two stations only, with half the car assembled at each 
station. The first three product shops in the Uddevalla factory were equipped 
according to this layout. See figure 6. When production ceased in 1993, the 
production pattern still was the same in these three product shops.
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3.10 Ergonomic arguments for efficiency
If a work task is easily performed, it also can be effectively performed, 
though much can be related to mental efforts. Variations in the work tasks 
are good for the human body and mind. Such questions were dicussed in 
the planning group and the group pointed out that one central component 
in work is related to ergonomics. The planning group made great efforts 
to improve the ergonomics at work in the Uddevalla plant. Less repetitive 
work tasks (i.e., long work tasks of about two hours), is one result. When 
you repeat the same task only four times a day, your body does not get worn 
out as quickly as if you have to repeat the same task more than 200 times a 
day. Another effort was the development of hand machines adapted to the 
hand size of women (10).
<Figure 5, Page 50, Part I, Ellegård>
Figure 5. Product flow through one of the team zones in the layout from 
January of 1987.Whole cars in team zone, one car is made by 20 persons. 
This layout is principially the same as the previous one, but the scale is 
changed and now four parallel team zones make complete cars in each 
product shop.
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The ergonomic argument also was relevant for the way the assembly tasks 
are performed. In ordinary assembly work, only 20 percent of the work in 
the tasks are performed standing in an upright position. The remaining 80 
percent of the work, is performed bent or standing with hands above the 
head. The ergonomics of assembly work was improved in the first three 
product shops in Uddevalla, but further improvements were still possible 
to achieve.
It was clearly demonstrated that when ergonomics are improved, accord-
ing to the principles of reflective production, the result is not only a ‘good 
work’ for the employees, but also a more efficient production performance 
in the plant.
3.11 Whole cars in the team II:  
One car is made by 8 persons on one station
A small group of carbuilders had the opportunity to develop a completely 
new ergonomic and at least as efficient, way of performing the assembly 
work. They worked together with a health care engineer. The way to build 
cars that they developed involved still another change in the basic layout 
of the product shop, as the complete car now could be assembled at only 
one station. That station should be equipped with a ‘tilt’, which made it 
possible not only to lift the car body, but also to turn it 90 degrees in both 
directions. This made it possible to perform the work tasks more efficiently 
and lowered the risk for personal injuries. Thus, the three product shops that 
were to be started after 1989, now were equipped according to this way of 
building cars. Therefore the Uddevalla factory continued to be innovative 
even after production started in 1989.
This layout did not only result in better ergonomics, it also allowed a 
greater flexibility concerning how the assembly work could be performed. 
In this later layout, each team remanined the same size as before (about eight 
members), and could easily divide itself into subgroups. Where one pair of 
individuals could master the whole car, they could form one subgroup, use 
one of the tilt-stations, and build cars themselves. At the same time the other 
members of the team, forming another subgroup, assemble the cars accord-
ing to their competence and following another work distribution rule.
3.12 A comparative perspective on the result of the planning process
Now it is possible to place a developmental perspective within the planning 
process and compare the two different types of assembly work.
I. A complete car is assembled at one station, by a team of about eight 
persons.
II. A complete car is assembled at about 200 series linked stations by 700 
persons.
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There are some obvious conclusions to be drawn from this comparision.
Firstly, the workers individual competense must be greater in the first case, 
as the capability to build a whole car is spread over only eight persons. In the 
second case, the same competence is divided by 700 individuals. Secondly, 
the possibility to achieve an overview of the assembly is much greater in 
the first case, as the car stands in the area of the same team during the entire 
assembly. Thus feedback is facilitated if any problems occur that are related 
to the assembly done earlier.
<Figure 6, Page 52, Part I, Ellegård>
Figure 6. The layout of the complete Uddevalla plant from which the lay-
out of one product shop is focused in which the layout of a team’s area is 
presented in detail (January, 1988). The team has four work stations at its 
disposal, but only two of them, one lift station and one tiltstation, are used 
for an individual car. A pair of car builders work on one tilt-station and they 
build half the car, then the car is moved over to one of the two lift-stations 
in the team’s area, where another pair of workers build the other half of 
the car.
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4. Which were the results achieved by the new plant?
The results achieved by the new plant can be focused upon from different 
perspectives. Due to the closure of the factory in Uddevalla, only short 
term effects could be observed, though there are several indications of fa-
vourable long term potential as well. Focus will be put on competence and 
organisation, firstly on the results in the short run and secondly the long 
run potentials.
4.1 The performance of the Uddevalla plant: Competence
Work content
In most assembly plants there are short cycle work tasks of about one to 
two minutes in duration. One such cycle is called a ‘balance’. ‘Multiskilled’ 
workers on an assembly line are responsible for up to ten ‘balances’, which 
means that they have a good command of about 20 minutes of assembly work. 
In these plants, the assembly line controls the pace and work is measured by 
the number of minutes, and not by its content related to the total assembly 
of a car. In the Uddevalla plant, all workers knew how to assemble at least 
one quarter of a car, which means that all workers controlled the assembly 
of at least one ‘assembly-functional group of materials’. One quarter of a 
car equals about two hours of work. One point in a ‘reflective production 
system’, is that work content is superior to time. Other competence derived 
fundaments are the understanding of a meaningful whole, overview over 
the work object and tasks of the work day. Also, that control over the work 
distribution and pace in the teams is essential for a successful result. All 
this means that quality is what matters most, time and volume are mere 
restrictions.
Flexibility at work
In the Uddevalla factory there was a great flexibility concerning competence 
and work performance. It was possible, although it was not common, for 
teams to form subgroups. It was easier in the newer product shops, those 
who were equipped according to the ergonomic/efficiency idea, where the 
car was completed on one work station, than in the three older product shops 
where the car was assembled on two different work stations. As indicated 
above it was possible for two persons to assemble the whole car, if they had 
the appropriate competence.
In addition, when the Uddevalla factory closed down, approximately 25 
persons mastered the assembling of a complete car, with high quality and 
within the full production pace. In fact they could control the same work 
content that is distributed over hundreds of persons in an assembly line fac-
tory. In such a comparative perspective, the results in Uddevalla reveal that 
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the basic competence equals the compentence of at least 60 workers taken 
together in a plant with an assembly line.
Improving competence
Improving competence is a fundmental task in industry. In the beginning of 
the Uddevalla factory’s production, there were problems other than those 
which appear in a factory with a serial product flow. The unusual parallel 
flow pattern in Uddevalla caused some problems in the beginning. First, 
there were some problems related to the independence between the parallel 
teams in the product shops, making the diffusion of improvements diffi-
cult. Second, there were problems related to the independence between the 
parallel product shops, each of them eager to create a productive milieu by 
itself.
There were also problems caused by the high level of dependence between 
the material shops and the product shops as they were linked to each other in 
a serial flow. The problems that appeared between the teams and between the 
product shops respectively, were mainly caused by the absence of a smooth 
information flow. Two measures were taken which led to success. One of 
them, was to flatten the organization in the plant, so that the product shop 
leaders, all were put into the leading group of the factory (only three levels 
in the plant). This gave the product shop and the material shop leaders better 
insights into each others working conditions and bottle neck problems. The 
second measure, aimed at improving the diffusion of experiences and new 
and better ways to arrange the assembly work. Here, the production techni-
cians were decentralized into the product shops, where their work time was 
divided between two tasks. One, was to do their production technical work 
in the office and to keep in touch with and spread improvements to the other 
parts of the entire factory. The other work task to be performed by the tech-
nicians, was to work with the teams in their product shop, in the assembly 
work. This made them more skilled in the various assembly tasks and made 
them think in ‘real categories’ rather than in ‘administrative categories’. In 
this way, a process of very rapid and well structured improvements in the 
entire factory was started. Some good results were yielded immediately and 
the probability of more seemed likely to come.
Employment strategy
The employment strategy used was closely related to the principles of com-
petence growth and competence utilization. The strategy was also meant to 
lead to a reduction in sick leave and an increase in teamwork. The person-
nel in the Uddevalla factory were brought together in several ways. There 
were about 40 percent women, a blend of ages, and in the beginning Volvo 
looked for former shipyard workers. The goal was to employ 25 per-cent of 
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the employees of the age of 25 years and younger, 50 percent between 25 
and 45 years and another 25 percent over 45 years of age, and 40 percent 
were to be women. Each team was composed so that both sexes and more 
than one age group were represented. The aim was to make use of the fact 
that people are different and that they have different positive and negative 
qualities. The sick leave was lower than in other factories in the Swedish 
auto industry, but not as low as many persons had hoped, during the plan-
ning phase.
Flat organization
The objective was to form a flat organization in the Uddevalla factory. In 
the beginning there were four levels in the organizational scheme; plant 
manager, production leader, product shop leaders and teams. During the 
last year of the life of the factory, there were only three levels namely, plant 
manager, product shop leaders and teams. Therefore, the flow of informa-
tion between the top manager and the shop floor was very rapid, compared 
to any other assembly plant.
In the product shops, the teams were put in focus. There were eight teams 
in every product shop. In the teams there were two kinds of tasks to be met by 
the team members. The most important one was car building, as there would 
be no plant without production. All team members thus were car builders. 
There were also complementary specialist taks to be mastered by the teams. 
Team members who had expressed interest in performing specialist tasks, 
were taught to perfom these taks. The tasks were for example, personnel 
issues (information, recruitment and planned days off), as well as mainte-
nance and teaching. There was also a role as team leader, who per-formed 
most of the work tasks done by foremen in traditional factories. The team 
leader was appointed by the team members and the product shop leader 
together. The team leader role was rotated among the team members, who 
had aquired the relevant competence and skills required for the role. The 
team leader as well as the other specialists of each team were all involved 
in the car building during most of the working day.
As indicated above, each product shop had a production technician, who 
was the most skilled specialist in technical aspects related to the product 
shop. The technician was also responsible for spreading technical as well as 
organizational improvements, to all teams in the product shop and to his/her 
collegues, as well as to the production technicians in the other product shops. 
To succeed and keep his or her own practical knowledge in car building up 
to date, the technicians worked in the teams for a portion of every week.
The wage system was created to increase according to additional com-
petence. There was also a basic wage, dependent on the time worked at the 
job and the individual skills in basic car building. Extra pay for increased 
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competence in car building was added per hour for every additional quarter of 
the car mastered in assembly. In addition to this, there was extra amount for 
each specialist competence (personnel, technician, maintenance and teach-
ing), and for the team leader competence. Then there was also a bonus system 
(measured on quality and quantity), based on the team performance.
Comments on quality, production volume, productivity and model changes
The quality index followed a positive curve from 1988 (before the opening 
of the factory), up till the closure of the plant. The highest quality ratings 
occurred during the spring of 1993, the period when people knew that they 
would be unemployed within some months.
Due to the falling sales figures for Volvo during the period when the 
Uddevalla factory was fully trimmed in, the production volume never 
reached the total capacity level. But, the figures in the production plans 
were achieved.
The productivity showed a positive development. In the autumn of 1992, 
before the decision to close the factory was made, the productivity figures 
for some weeks was far better in the Uddevalla plant than in the old Tors-
landa plant.
The Uddevalla factory was the most successful in changing from one 
year model to the next. The same results appear whether you compare time 
or costs for the changes. The Uddevalla factory made the fastest changes, 
three years in a row and the factory also made the changes to the lowest 
cost per car. This is due to the high competence level and the low level of 
mechanization.
4.2 Potentials of ‘Reflective Production Systems’ indicated by the Ud-
devalla plant
Some long-term potentials, derived from the ‘Reflective Production Sys-
tem’, were fit for use in Uddevalla during the last half year, before the de-
cision to close down the factory. Revolutionary steps were taken in relation 
to the market. First, the factory only produced cars that were already sold. 
No stock cars at all were being produced in the Uddevalla factory during this 
period. Second, a number of customers were invited to follow the production 
of the car they had bought. This procedure was favourable for Volvo. Where 
else in the world could a customer follow the birth of his own car, and get an 
overview over the process? It was also favourable to the customer to recieve 
the personal touch, which strengthened the incentives for the teams to make 
superior quality. It was also favourable to the team, who have personal rela-
tions with a customer which made the job still more stimulating.
The production planning in the factory was a factor of flexibility and right 
time delivery. The customer could make changes in his order to the factory, 
57
for example orders for new special options, and this resulted in negligtible 
delays. Changes in orders did not cause the replanning of the entire produc-
tion program, or to put the changed car at the end of the production program. 
Any of these actions would cause delays in delivery. Thus, the production 
planning could be used as a tool for flexibility, and it made it easier to pro-
duce cars exactly adapted to the demand of the customers.
Another long term potential concerns the relation between production and 
preproduction, which is a field of increasing importance in the automobile 
industry. The Uddevalla factory had unique possibilities to use the complex 
and skilled knowledge of all its competent team members in order to im-
prove products as well as, tools and processes. This potentiality becomes 
clear only to those who adopt the thinking behind the ‘Reflective Production 
System’. Others, will not be able to recognize it. They will think rather that 
the ‘Reflective Production System’ is at best, a local Swedish improvement 
in production for social purposes. It indeed was true that the social factors 
worked in favour of the Uddevalla factory, but it also proved to be a good 
investment for high productivity, effectivity and flexibility.
5. Concluding remarks on reflective production
In this paper the presentation of the principles of the new ‘Reflective Pro-
duction System’ is not made in a theoretical way. Instead, there has been a 
concrete description of the long and adventurous way in which it was devel-
oped and utilized. Some of its problems and advantages were demonstrated. 
The importance of competence was emphasized, based on holistic learning 
in combination with a production technology adjusted to the ways in which 
individuals think, learn and act in industrial work. The paper will be closed 
with two examples, showing the necessity to think in new ways if a company 
wants to lead the way into the future of the automobile industry.
The majority of those within the Volvo company in Gothenburg were not 
motivated by the principles underlying the ‘Reflective Production System’. 
During the entire history of the Uddevalla plant there had been a struggle 
both within the company, and within the unions, a struggle much like that 
between different religious groups or actors. The basic problem is that the 
two ways of reasoning (the serial flow on an assembly line compared to the 
parallel flow in production teams in the Uddevalla plant), may very well 
use the same set of measures for evaluation, but they lean on fundamentally 
different basic assumptions. If the evaluations reveal that the results from 
the old factory and the new factory are equally good, then the fundamental 
assumptions behind these could be of decisive importance in the final con-
clusion about how to act.
A person who does not accept the principles underlying the ‘Reflective 
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Production System’ realized in the Uddevalla plant, of course can not see its 
immanent potentials, since the ‘Reflective Production System’ as a whole 
contradicts his basic assumptions. These potentials, however, are immedi-
ately clear to a person convinced of the correctness of the basic principles 
of the Uddevalla factory.
Finally, I will recall an interesting remark made in the spring of 1993, 
by one openminded first time visitor to the Uddevalla factory. During the 
visit, one of the car builders, who had the competence to build the whole 
car himself, asked his work mates to cover his eyes with a scarf. He then 
asked the visitor to get anything from the material stands in the team area. 
The visitor chose after a while a small thing and gave it to the car builder 
who said, after having felt the thing over with his fingers: ‘This was easy! 
Get me to the engine’. And there he placed the thing in its right position, 
still with his eyes covered. Then the visitor exclaimed: ‘Is it hocus pocus? 
Or is it that easy?’
Notes
 1. There is a detailed description in Swedish of the principles behind the production 
system in Ellegård, Engström, Johansson, Medbo and Nilsson, 1992, Reflektiv 
produktion. Industriell verksamhet i förändring, and a shorter description in 
English in Ellegård, Engström och Nilsson (1989), Reforming industrial work 
– Principles and Realities in the planning of Volvo’s car assembly plant in Ud-
devalla.
 2. Uddevalla is a town located on the Swedish west coast, some 90 km north of 
Gothenburg where Volvo’s oldest factory is located. The decision to locate the 
factory in Uddevalla was strongly influenced by the fact that the state owned 
shipyard there was closed down in 1984 and more than 2,000 people were 
unemployed.
 3. Somewhere between 1,800 and 2,400 objects make up each single car.
 4. This holds true for example, concerning high sick leave or materials missing, 
even if such a problem occurs only at one single station on the assembly line.
 5. There were one blue collar union and three white collar unions involved.
 6. This work cycle duration corresponds to the demands from the metal workers 
union set up in the spring of 1985.
 7. See for example Engström and Medbo,1990, and Wild,1975, and Ellegård, 
Engström, Johansson, Medbo and Nilsson,1992.
 8. See Nilsson, 1985, and Ellegård, Engström, Johansson, Medbo and Nilsson, 
1992.
 9. The four quarters were labeled: 1. Leads, 2. Decor, 3. Drive line and 4. Inte-
rior.
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10. In the Uddevalla factory, at least 40 percent of the work force were female.
11. Not more than two team members assemble the same car at the same time. Each 
team has four work stations at its disposal.
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Production system design – a brief  
summary of some Swedish design efforts
Tomas Engström and Lars Medbo
1. Introduction
Production system design traditionally includes aspects connected to the 
materials flow patterns inside the factory. Therefore, the design process of 
the production system includes, for example, problem areas such as work 
place design, layout planning, materials flow analysis, etc.
For example, concerning the manufacturing of components using ex-
pensive production equipment, the design process will focus, among other 
things, on the utilization of the individual machines, as well as, introducing 
methods such as group technology, mechanization of the materials handling 
between the machines, etc. If, on the other hand, components are assembled 
into complete products, as is the case in the final assembly of vehicles, it 
becomes important to better utilize the human being in order to reduce the 
required manpower. The design process will, therefore, focus on: balancing 
methods, ‘just-in-time techniques’, etc.
The system design of production systems for final assembly, has in many 
cases, consisted of a process of refining the existing production systems, 
i.e. the traditional assembly line, rather than implementing non-traditional 
production principles. This is due to the risks involved as well as intellectual 
barriers to some extent (Granath, 1991).
We argue that today there exists an empirically tested coherent theory 
of how to design non-traditional production systems for final assembly of 
large products, such as yachts, trucks, buses and automobiles. However, this 
theory has not been fully recognized and communicated at an international 
level. In most cases, this is probably due to the fact that Swedish efforts are 
generally considered and presented as social experiments, assumed to be 
isolated from important technical dimensions, like materials flow pattern, 
materials feeding techniques, etc.
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2. A brief history
At the beginning of the 1970’s, the most radical changes in assembly work 
took place within the manufacturing of trucks. A very similar production 
system was used at Volvo in Sweden in the small Volvo Arendal work shop 
and at British Leyland in the United Kingdom (Blackler and Brown, 1978). 
In British Leyland’s production system, a group of 12 workers assembled 
complete trucks.
The Arendal workshop proved to have a superior productivity and product 
quality. At that time there was no valid theoretical explanation for this phe-
nomenon. A general theoretical analysis had been performed in the Volvo Car 
Corporation (Rosengren, 1981), but these were not generally recognized. 
This production system was in many aspects identical to the one introduced 
by the Volvo Truck Corporation several years later, that of a parallel flow 
with integrated sub-assembly, characterized by unpaced high-autonomy, 
collective work. The parallelized flow means that the flow of products is 
parallel instead of in a series, as is the case with the traditional assembly 
line, thus increasing the cycle time (the amount of time required to complete 
one work task in repetitive work).
<Figure 1, Page 62, Part I, Engström>
Figure 1. The Saab-Scania body shop in Trollhättan was changed from se-
rial flow to parallel flow, thus increasing the productivity and the technical 
autonomy. Paradoxically, it became possible to simultaneously combine 
efficiency and humanized work (Karlsson, 1979). The organization was 
reformed to suit the technical preconditions determined by the changed 
technical dimensions.
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The most prominent example of an alternative production system was imple-
mented during the mid-1970s in the Saab-Scania body shop in Trollhättan. 
Note that in a body shop the work consists of grinding and welding on the 
naked automobile body. Thus, one does not need to supply a large number 
of components, as is the case in final assembly. Therefore, the most crucial 
research task was to develop methods for supplying materials to parallelized 
flow production systems.
In theory and in a number of case studies, it later proved to be both 
practical and economically viable to supply materials to large products in 
parallelized flow. This was achieved by using kitting of the materials and 
a combination of decentralized and centralized materials stores (Engström 
and Karlsson, 1982; Engström, 1983).
Although this possibility existed, the traditional materials feeding tech-
niques (methods used to supply the components needed for the assembly 
work) and the need to use both the traditional assembly line and the alterna-
tives simultaneously in the same plant, led to the development and imple-
mentation of the so-called ‘mini-lines’ at Saab Scania in Trollhättan.
This was a serial flow production system with intermediate buffers, inte-
grated sub-assembly stations and the possibility to continuously regulate the 
pace of the line. Thus, it was possible to use traditional materials feeding 
techniques. These ‘mini-lines’ appear to be similar to those implemented in 
the Japanese factories at Kyushu and Tahara almost ten years later.
The Volvo Uddevalla final assembly plant wich ran between 1987–93, was 
the latest full-scale example of a practical application of the design theories 
of non-traditional production systems. In fact, the Uddevalla plant provided 
the last key elements needed to complete the theory and its application.
While the ‘mini-lines’ were a compromise, concerning the materials feed-
ing techniques, among other things, the Uddevalla plant, on the other hand, 
was an example of an inverted design process. By turning the design process 
the other way around, i.e., starting the design process from scratch, some 
of the generally accepted traditional design criteria were transformed into 
methods. For example, long cycle time and parallelization were methods 
used for achieving high productivity and quality, as well as flexibility. Long 
cycle time was not considered as a goal in itself.
The original phrasing of the research area during the 1970’s, as a materials 
feeding restriction against parallelization, originated in dialogues with rep-
resentatives from the automotive industry. This was somewhat misleading 
but relevant during the early period. The components needed for a single 
product were perceived to be far too many, thus requiring far too much 
space provided the materials were to be exposed on a work station using 
traditional materials feeding techniques.
It was therefore assumed to be impossible to supply the components 
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needed for complete automobile assembly on a work station. This was 
partly due to the fact that the all-embracing information system in the Volvo 
corporation deformed the product perception emanating from the design-
ers’ product structure. This also implyed an enormous amount of product 
variants. (The product structure is the way information on the product is 
organized in the information system by using numerical, alphabetical and 
verbal codes in a hierarchy).
During the design of the Uddevalla plant these assumptions proved to 
be false. Although extensive analyses of the real product and its traditional 
representations in the information system had been carried out, further 
analyses as described below was required.
Another critical restriction towards parallelization during the 1970s was 
learning. How could it be possible to learn the tasks in an extended cycle 
without prolonged training? The generally accepted assumption, according 
to traditional learning theory (Argote, 1990; Wright, 1936), was that the 
shorter the cycle time, the shorter the learning process and the more ef-
ficient the work.
3. The design method used for  
the Volvo Uddevalla final assembly plant
During the 1970s and 1980s, automobiles and trucks were assumed to be 
difficult to understand from an assembly point of view. In retrospect, this 
assumption was incorrect. It is now clear that the product structure used 
today by most Swedish automotive manufacturers, leads both researchers 
and practitioners to erroneous conclusions.
This explains why the efforts of researchers, despite comprehensive em-
pirical and theoretical analyses, did not achieve penetration in the largest 
industrial systems during the 1970s. It did not matter if one knew how to 
do it – it had to be proven and explained using the nomenclatures familiar 
to the practitioners. Hence, methods such as disassembly of complete prod-
ucts, the use of prototypes of materials handling equipment, prototypes of 
information systems using computer print-outs, etc., were used. In fact, it 
proved necessary to use a large experimental work shop for the six-year 
period between 1985–91.
The shop was filled with automobiles and trucks in various stages of 
disassembly, as well as equipment for the manufacturing of prototypes of 
materials handling equipment. The facilities also included full computer-
ized support connected to the centralized data banks at the Volvo Truck and 
Car Corporations.
It was necessary to disassemble products, since we needed to understand 
the real products as well as the corresponding computerized formalization 
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and different documents published by the design department or the central 
process engineering department. This was a time-consuming and mentally 
trying process, because of the inconsistent and often poor quality data.
We were able to translate the product structure and information received 
from the design and manufacturing engineering departments into a final 
assembly-oriented product structure. The method used was to compare 
computer print-outs and actual components, and to modify the structure in 
accordance with the disassembly and assembly work.
The guiding principle for long cycle-time assembly work, is that there 
must be conformity between the work perception on the shop floor itself, 
the materials display on the work station and the description of the work. 
This implies that in long cycle-time assembly work, the description of the 
product and the work needs to be based on a final assemblyoriented product 
structure.
The final assembly-oriented product structure used in the Volvo Uddevalla 
assembly plant comprised five main so-called ‘final assembly functional 
groups’. These were simultaneously verbal and visual ‘maps’. They de-
scribed the product and the assembly work in a way that maintained stable 
relations between the description of a specific automobile and all possible 
individual product variants.
The distinguishable functional groups were: 0. Doors; 1. Leads for elec-
tricity, air and water; 2. Drive line; 3. Sealing and decor; and 4. Interior. 
This division was designed to categorize the components so that the groups 
of materials, both individually and in interrelation, formed contexts and 
were distinguishable from each other. For example, that a component was 
to be used in the assembly of the interior, was clear not only from a single 
component but also from the other components being related to a group of 
materials assigned a descriptive name, which also belonged to a multi-level 
verbal, visual and spatial assembly-oriented product structure.
<Figure 2, Page 65, Part I, Engström>
Figure 2. The final assembly-oriented product structure on an aggregated 
level where each distinguishable functional group corresponds to 1/4 of an 
assembly work on an automobile.
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Although some workers in Uddevalla did assemble complete automobiles 
single-handedly, the most practical way was to organize the work in pairs 
of workers, using a cycle time of 100 minutes or more. This was dependent 
upon the specific competence and choice of intra-group work patterns.
<Figure 3, Page 66, Part I, Engström>
Figure 3. Schematization of the difference in complexity between different 
intra-group work patterns. The experiences from Uddevalla indicate that ef-
ficient work groups performing long cycle-time automobile assembly ought 
to contain five to nine operators and consist of sub-groups of two operators. 
These operators should be supported by one or two alternating individuals 
co-ordinating several subgroups, building subassemblies in close proximity 
and performing general services, such as checking material, cleaning, etc.
The base for the technical concept of the now defunct Volvo Uddevalla plant 
was the increased efficiency demonstrated as a result of parallelization and 
the result of the elimination of inefficiencies, as illustrated in figure 3 (Wild, 
1975; Engström, Lundberg and Medbo, 1993).
According to our observations, interviews and video recordings, the 
assembly performance of fully run-in work groups assembling complete 
automobiles in Uddevalla was 14–16 percent better (equal 10–12 hours) 
than the time calculated by the industrial engineers, using time and motion 
studies. These performance results should not, however, be mixed up with 
or compared to Volvo’s official data wich reported an assembly time of 32 
hours in November of 1992, since this figure refers to all blue-collar workers 
in the plant, including materials handling, maintenance, etc.
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 Serial flow Parallel flow
 Theoretical Observed Theoretical  Observed
Balance loss (%) 5 30 1 5 
Division of labour loss (%) 6 25 4 15 
System loss (%) 25 80 5 20 
‘Work inefficiency’ (%) 35 135 10 40
Total need of manpower (%) 136 236 110 140
Figure 4. Theoretical and observed inefficiencies for serial and parallel 
flows. The figures show that the parallel flow is obviously the most efficient 
one. The observed data are derived from several of our studies of Swedish 
automotive manufacturers, while the theoretical losses have been calculated. 
The losses are expressed in relation to the so-called ‘necessary work’ time 
equivalent to 100%, which is the work time required for one operator to 
carry out all the work under ideal conditions. The ‘necessary work’ needed 
is defined by the product design. Only the time from the point when the 
worker has the component in position for assembly until the component 
has been fitted, is included. The figures in the table above clearly show the 
superior performance of the parallel flow production system (140% contra 
236% total need of manpower). These figures are more correct than the of-
ficial assembly times published by Volvo, proclaiming the productivity of 
different Swedish production systems to be equal.
One design criterion behind this production system was that human capa-
bilities and needs, as well as market demands should be the starting point 
for the design of technical and administrative preconditions, the common 
denominator being the product itself.
The parallel flow and the extended cycle time used, called for pre-struc-
turing the information and materials needed to facilitate the assembly work. 
This pre-structuring demanded non-traditional materials feeding techniques. 
Therefore, the materials were supplied as kits in kitting fixtures containing 
materials for the individual product, combined with advanced information 
systems. The systems were contingent on a precise verbal network comple-
mentary to, for example, the part numbers traditionally used by automotive 
manufacturers. This means, among other things, that every component is 
designated a name indicating its function, assembly position on the vehi-
cle, etc. In fact, the information system in Uddevalla even included locally 
defined nick-names of certain characteristic components.
The complete product constituted a whole that formed the basis for the 
structuring of the assembly and materials handling work. This was made pos-
sible by the product being described in detail by the design department. 
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<Figure 5, Page 68, Part I, Engström>
Figure 5. Schematization of the flow pattern in Volvo’s final assembly plant 
in Uddevalla. We have illustrated the intra-group work pattern used in work 
shops 4–6 (the blocks in the upper part of the figure). Note that these work 
shops are not identical to work shops 1–3. In 4–6 the body is standing still 
at one internal work station during the whole assembly, while in 1–3 it is 
moved once. There are also other dissimilarities with regard to the location 
of the subassembly stations, assembly tools, etc. The labour-intensive sub-
assemblies, such as doors, engine and instrument panel, were integrated into 
the work groups. The aim was to increase the internal assembly-active buffer, 
e.g., the amount of work time available but not always used. The difference 
in layout was due to the work shops being put into operation successively 
(thus avoiding the difficulty of co-ordinating and training the whole work 
force at the same time). The experiences gained from the work shops in 
operation could be applied to the design of work shops completed later.
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The long cycle-time assembly work can, in itself, be said to verify the pre-
structuring of information and materials performed in advance. This method 
ensures that the products assembled are in accordance with the product 
design specification, which has proved not to be the case in traditional 
production systems.
This type of work and information structuring is possible, through the 
fact that the components included in an automobile are related to each other 
and to the symmetries that exist or arise in the vehicle during the assembly 
process. The components are related to each other due to the causal con-
nections, assembly sequence, as well as the variations in the total flora of 
product variants, forming long chains with a varying degree of self-explana-
tion during the assembly. This becomes evident if one compares different 
product variants to each other, or if one understands the functions of the 
subsystems in the vehicles.
When the automobile stands still during the assembly process, as was the 
case in Uddevalla, these relations become obvious. Using specially designed 
materials feeding techniques it is, for example, possible to achieve a rela-
tionship between the components fitted and the one to be fitted. It is also 
possible to exploit the vehicle’s organic as well as generic characteristics, 
thus constituting ‘holistic learning’ as opposed to ‘atomistic learning’. In 
‘atomistic learning’, the starting point is fragmented work tasks. In ‘holis-
tic learning’, on the other hand, the individual focuses on the message or 
idea being communicated. Such an individual is said to have a ‘holistic ap-
proach’. For example when viewing the learning aids as a whole, in which 
the parts are seen in relation to this whole (Marton, 1986; Marton Hounsell 
and Entwistle, 1986)
When a traditional assembly line is used, it is obvious that the movement 
of the automobile body through the plant determines the nature of the work. 
In the Uddevalla plant, however, the work was characterized by the intra-
group work pattern. To the untrained eye, this work does not seem efficient 
since nothing appears to happen. On the assembly line, on the other hand, 
the work pace is more obvious. The nature of the design of the technical 
and administrative preconditions in the production systems advocated here, 
ought to be such that the individual and the work groups have to become 
increasingly skilled. Increased knowledge has to pay off in the form of 
extended technical and administrative autonomy, both at individual and 
group levels.
Such extended autonomy was not fully achieved in the Uddevalla plant. 
Among other things, the development of a ‘bureaucratic’ production plan-
ning and scheduling system was not suited to the shop floor characteristics. 
However, a new concept for planning and scheduling was developed before 
the shutdown, but not in time to be implemented.
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4. The Uddevalla production principles
The inverted design process of the Volvo Uddevalla plant generated five 
new production principles, methods for achieving high productivity, quality, 
as well as, flexibility:
1. Parallel flow pattern and autonomous group work. In fact this was an 
organic flow pattern characterized by successively decreased mecha-
nization, increased parallelization and maintained or expanded sorting 
capacity from the beginning of the process to the finished product. The 
work group members carried out assembly work on several products 
simultaneously. It seldom occurred though that more than two workers 
were working on the same product at a time. Thus it was possible to vary 
method and pace, depending on how the work proceeded. This was also 
independent of the work status and variation of other work groups.
2. Prestructured materials feeding to individual products. The larger 
components with their obvious positions in the product were brought 
to the place of assembly in kitting fixtures. On the kitting fixtures were 
also a number of plastic boxes containing medium-sized components 
as well as plastic bags containing small components (Johansson, 1989; 
Johansson and Johansson, 1990). These plastic bags contained the small 
components needed for every automobile. There was a large number of 
these small components and they represented the greatest share of the 
assembly time. Through this arrangement, a considerable reduction in 
materials-handling time was achieved. Moreover, this way of feeding 
materials served in itself as a learning aid and work instruction.
3. Naturally grouped assembly work. This presupposes that the tradi-
tional disintegration is broken and professional skills are created (the 
characteristics of a skill are: natural rhythm, holistic view, functional 
grouping and result orientation). The skills involve a number of tasks 
being combined in work functions (Nilsson, 1981; Ellegård, Engström 
and Nilsson, 1991). In practice, this means that the natural relation-
ships between materials display, administrative work description and 
the method of working are preserved. This in turn has led to the devel-
opment on the shop floor of a professional terminology and concepts 
which draw on the design work to a greater extent than usual.
4. A final assembly-oriented product structure. This leads to more efficient 
information handling, where the product and the work derive from an 
assembly-oriented product structure and where they are described us-
ing a number of predefined interrelated ‘charts’. The naturally grouped 
assembly work was supported and formalized by an information system 
which is capable of breaking down the product into its smallest com-
ponents and relating this information to the long cycle-time assembly 
work.
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5. Materials and production control based on the principle that products 
that are similar for assembly purposes are also principally similar. This 
is so when it comes to materials handling and product descriptions in-
cluding work instructions, so-called assembly variants. This meant less 
need for replanning and also a materials consumption sequence, which 
was more consistent with the planned sequence. It also led to reduced 
buffer volumes, better just-in-time efficiency and a reduced number of 
variants in the final assembly. However, as previously indicated, this 
type of production control was never introduced, due to the decision to 
close down the factory.
The application of these production principles had the following nonobvi-
ous, or initially accepted effects:
• Reduced space requirements including buffer volumes compared to 
traditional line assembly. This was due to few products being placed in 
intermediate buffers between different production phases and to reduced 
need for transport areas. This was the case as most automobiles in the 
product workshops were ‘assembly active’, i.e., subjected to assembly 
work. Despite the resulting space increase due to the under-utilization of 
operator positions around the product, more efficient work was achieved 
as a whole. Or put another way, if the flow is parallelized, the space is 
increased because the larger work stations are more than compensated 
for by the reduction of the buffer volumes needed for technical reasons 
between work groups placed in a series (Engström, 1993).
• Reduced need for expensive tools compared to traditional line assembly 
for several reasons: (1) the degree of mechanization was lowered on 
account of greater work content and less complicated tools; (2) fewer 
tools with a fixture function were required, as the assembly workers in 
the work group commanded the whole tolerance chain and were capable 
of fixing the component, adjusting its position and finally fitting it to 
the required torque; (3) expensive production equipment was utilized 
jointly by several work-groups, and (4) glued components were fitted 
using small fixtures with low pressure allowed to be applied for a longer 
period. This was in contrast to short cycle work and products that move 
from work station to work station, implying that glueing requires high 
pressure and a short application period.
• The efficient information handling led to a speeding up of the time and 
resources needed to implement a change of model and to effect change 
orders. In this respect, the Uddevalla plant also proved superior to 
Volvo’s other automobile plants.
• Successively reduced need for technical production support (production 
engineering and supervisory functions) to the work groups.
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• Flexible work scheduling, which led to shorter lead-times than in tra-
ditional production systems. It has in practice only become possible 
to manufacture automobiles which have already been sold to the cus-
tomer.
• The difficult, time-consuming or complex product variants could be 
manufactured at the same time as more common variants, without gen-
erating disturbances in the production system. It was possible to start 
building certain product variants, try-outs, as the introduction of new 
variants did not require extensive work by the worker or the industrial 
engineers.
5. Conclusion
Finally, we conclude with one important fact concerning the Volvo Uddeval-
la plant, namely, that the unique production principles used led to superior 
performance due to reduced inefficiencies. This has confirmed the relevance 
and validity of the theoretical and empirical frames of reference, as well as 
of the extensive research and development background only touched upon 
in this article. The technical dimension formed the vital preconditions for 
advanced work organization on the shop floor, as well as for flexible manu-
facturing, including the organization of white-collar work. This potential 
was unfortunately not fully realized during the plant’s short lifespan.
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The Uddevalla plant:
Why did it succeed with a holistic approach  
and why did it come to an end?
Lennart Nilsson
This paper will ask and answer the question: how did Volvo succeed in devel-
oping a new concept for production and learning at its Uddevalla plant?
The answer lies in the unique combination and arrangement of the fol-
low-ing factors:
a) The ways in which the materials (components) were handled through 
a new and unique grouping strategy.
b) The replacement of line-assembly by parallellized work places, where 
the assembly work is carried out by a few people at each work place.
c) The arrangement of the assembly work in accordance with new organic 
and holistic descriptions within learning strategies which support the 
integration of physical (manual) and mental capabilities needed to carry 
out the total assembly work.
The story of Volvo’s Uddevalla plant is a story of how it was, and still is 
possible to create a realistic alternative to main-stream industrial work, not 
only for the automobile industry, but also for working life at large.
Let me explain, as one of those who provided input into the renewal of 
work with car assembly. As stated above, points a and c are the results 
of research on human learning, particularly within vocational learning (Nils-
son, 1992c), while point b refers to how materials and working processes are 
carried out. With these three points in mind, we have developed strategies 
for organic and holistic descriptions (Engström & Nilsson, 1992).
A basic presentation will be made in this paper. For further discussions 
regarding point b and the reasons behind the change from line-assembly 
systems to parallellized work stations and the efficiency of this system see 
Engström, 1992a and 1992b.
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The beginning
The Volvo Uddevalla plant was expected to be innovative in that it would 
make car production more efficient and at the same time provide human 
conditions for industrial workers. The primary objective of the project 
management, one which was supported by Volvo general management, was 
that the technical equipment should be adjusted to the workers and their 
growing capabilities (skills).
It was also agreed that Uddevalla should be a work place for women and 
men of varying ages, as a mixed workforce should be viewed as an asset. 
New learning and technical strategies should be developed. This was the 
standpoint in 1985 when the story began.
However, nobody at Volvo could answer the question of how to bring 
about this innovation. The management therefore sought external help from 
scientists who had knowledge of practical applications. It is a long standing 
practice of Volvo to seek external help in order to innovate.
The Volvo board and the project group for the Uddevalla plant considered 
the experiences of the Volvo Kalmar plant as a model to develop from. But 
this view gradually became problematic as the new Uddevalla plant became 
qualitatively different from the Kalmar plant.
As an external consultant, I was asked how long can a time-cycle be for 
the workers? I had as a researcher and teacher in the field of vocational 
learning for 20 years, never been asked such a question as the main issue of 
concern. Why this type of question? Gradually I realized that this question 
was the key to understanding the way of thinking of most people at the new 
plant. The starting point for them was time and not content.
The question I was asked could not possibly be answered because the 
answer depends on what people do. I suggested that they view the problem 
differently, in terms of content and context, and I also understood that the 
way of thinking of many people in the planning group was a reflection of 
the thinking in traditional assembly-line production.
The Kalmar plant assembly work at that time consisted of just an addition 
of five to seven minute short-time cycles from standard line production. 
This addition resulted in a work cycle of 20 to 30 minutes. Now the Volvo 
people were considering the possibility of adding some other small pieces 
of work in order to create a longer work cycle.
What they didn’t understand at that time was that in doing so they restricted 
themselves to an additive and reductionist way of thinking. Although this 
approach is also valid, it is not conductive to the creation of something 
new and more efficient than the existing systems. There are alternative ap-
proaches and I suggested another way to think and act from a holistic model 
which focuses on content and the context from the workers’ point of view. 
In my opinion, the change from time to content as the focus for renewal 
77
of assembly and material handling work is the most important qualitative 
change needed for innovation.
As a result some people changed their minds while others returned to the 
Torslanda traditional plant. Many people behaved as mental prisoners of 
the line-system. This was a reality that later created a lot of problems for 
the Volvo Uddevalla plant.
However, some leaders of the planning group wanted to create what they 
called ‘natural work’, as a contrast to the traditional conditions related to 
line-production. They had difficulties in expressing what they meant by this 
term, as it was really an umbrella term for all those who wanted a change 
from line-production.
Because of this ambiguity I was asked to explain the meaning of this term, 
‘natural work’, and to define criteria for the kind of activities such work may 
comprise. ‘Natural work’ I characterised (Nilsson, 1985) as the following:
1. The worker is in control of the work performed during the day, and 
usually, over longer periods of time.
2. The work in its entirety should be surveyable.
3. The work is meaningful from the workers’ point of view and is not 
predetermined by time factors.
4. The transfer of knowledge takes place principally from one worker-
generation to the next generation within the profession.
The main point here is that the work content and qualities are superior to 
the administrative division of working time into small pieces, which is the 
way assembly work has been carried out during the last 70 years.
This fundamental view in natural work, as I have defined it, made it pos-
sible to deal with the content in assembly work from a qualitatively new 
approach, an organic and holistic approach. This approach differs from the 
mechanistic additive approach and its applications of scientific manage-
ment. This change of orientation to support ‘natural work’ had a great im-
pact on renewal. It has become possible and interesting to talk about what 
supports human learning. Gradually during the spring of 1986, a strategy 
for learning that supports the human being in mastering the complexity of 
materials handling and assembly work, was developed in the planning group 
with my help as an external consultant.
The strategy can be summarised by the following six points:
1. Learning must be established in work with real products, for example 
on cars produced for the market place.
2. Learning must be organised to allow the product and work processes 
to be surveyed by the learner/worker.
3. Learning must comprise the work in its entirety or at least functional 
wholes of the work content.
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4. Administrative division of working time should be replaced by an or-
ganically functional work content.
5. Vocational competence in terms of knowledge and skills must be trans-
ferred from the professionally skilled to trainees.
6. The learning process should include tempo training with maintained 
quality of work performance.
The total car assembly process was the starting point of the learning process. 
The car was the means. But the means also resulted in a real product pro-
duced for the market. By using the product as a tool in the learning process 
it was possible to avoid the otherwise customary division of learn-ing into 
small, additive, and defined steps. Now the learner could see the meaning 
of his learning and was able to survey his work.
Using the results of the organic and holistic descriptions of the assembly 
process and the materials handling, it became possible to implement a gener-
ative and organic approach to learning. This approach and the descriptions 
of the car as an organic structure enabled creating the competence needed to 
master the great number of components and tools that were used in combina-
tion with different demands on precision within the assembly work.
Learning must comprise the work in its entirety and the learner and the 
worker must be able to survey the work, as well as to have autonomous con-
trol over the process and tools with which to assess quality. The holistic view 
and its corresponding demands means that different emotional, manual, and 
intellectual demands will be placed both on the individual and on the groups 
of people working together. The learning process must, therefore, be oriented 
towards the development of the individual’s competence, as well as towards 
optimal co-operation within the teams. It is the collective results of the team 
that are crucial to the attainment of the desired production quality and pro-
ductivity (here and below used as a measure of the output per time unit)
In the learning of the ‘enlarged’ assembly process the car (i.e., the body 
and its components) is always the means as well as the result, or end, of the 
process; but it is not the goal. That is, it is the competence that is the goal. The 
competence will be used to attain the desired quality and productivity.
To create the competence needed to master long-cycle work, such as 
expanded assembly work, it is necessary to develop an ‘inner monologue’. 
This inner monologue should co-ordinate the relationship between ‘the work 
of the hand’ and ‘the work of the mind’. The aim in developing an inner 
monologue is to link these processes at the individual level, as it refers to 
a mental orientation in the form of self-reflection and thoughts in relation 
to aspects of work, both before and during the actual work. This is a fun-
damental point in the development of learning strategies for the creation of 
a vocational identity.
In order to encourage the development of inner monologues, as an external 
79
consultant I had to formulate questions in relation to the different phases 
of the expanded assembly work. The character of these questions are, from 
a learning point of view, an important determining factor for the kinds of 
knowledge the trainee will aquire.
Vocational identity for the growing group of car builders includes: The 
ability to relate ones’ own knowledge and experience to questions relating 
to materials (components and structuring of the work), choice of tools, 
demands on precision, work patterns as well as general assembly skills and 
ergonomic aspects of work, and also how to inspect the work and make 
adjustments. By following these steps a new profession was developed.
The questions were also part of the mutual relations between those learning 
and those in a ‘teaching’ position during the learning process. Obviously the 
expanded assembly work places different qualitative demands both on the 
individual and on the working teams than is the case for short-cycle work.
By making use of all aspects of human capabilities – emotional, moti-
vational, manual, and intellectual – it is possible to break away from the 
traditional division between manual and intellectual tasks and between 
‘blue’ and ‘white’ collar tasks. This also means a change of power and 
control of production, as well as of the inner functioning of the plant and 
the company.
The development of an inner monologue is a primary factor in the creation 
of a vocational identity in the centuries – old Western European handicraft 
tradition, which is also applicable in the ‘New World’ in the aftermath of 
the Taylorist phase of the industrial era (Nilsson, 1992a and b).
The new organic and holistic perspective for materials 
handling and assembly work
An organic and holistic viewpoint percieves the variations between different 
aspects and things in the world as an asset. In the case of materials handling 
and assembly work this means that one makes use of the variation between 
components, in terms of size, shape, colour, weight, and fragility, as impor-
tant factors for the creation of memory images and for discrimination in order 
to organise groups. Any kind of grouping is made for a specific purpose; 
in this case, the purpose is to facilitate the mastering of the complex tasks 
resulting from the use of many different components.
In order to reduce the complexity produced by the amount of components 
involved, the existing mechanistic way of dealing with this problem has 
been to replace the natural variations by codes suited to computer systems, 
but not to the unique capabilities of human beings. Herein lies the problem. 
Choosing the components is not in itself difficult, nor is the assembly work 
in terms of knowledge, materials, and structuring of the assembly. What is 
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Figure 1. Model of the different phases in the expanded assembly work.
Source: Nilsson 1994:c, p. 40
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difficult is the use of mechanistic descriptions not related to the ways human 
beings create orientation, groupings, context-relations, and survey the work. 
All this can be looked at as ‘tools’ human beings use to master complexity 
and achieve a professional identity.
The objective is to create descriptions which facilitate for human beings 
to work by means of a natural mental approach, perceiving components as 
meaningful wholes from the viewpoint of assembly and the workers’ own 
apprehensions and/or experiences. This was the challenge that was taken on 
by researchers from two scientific disciplines, engineering and vocational 
learning, and gradually also with active contributions from workers at the 
Volvo Uddevalla plant with support from the management. The way we 
worked together was very successful and made it possible to create new ways 
of handling materials from ‘input’ to the completed car. Our co-operation 
also created new ways of describing the assembly and new guidelines for 
the assembly work itself.
In this context it is important to remember that when the Volvo Uddevalla 
plant was set up nobody had any knowledge of how to organize the flow of 
materials so as to suit an assembly process in which the car (body) remained 
in the same position (the work place) throughout the assembly process.
The way that was chosen was to group the materials according to assem-
bly function relationships, meaning that components belonging together 
in relation to assembly were arranged into groups by their characteristics, 
such as size, weight, shape, colour, and fragility. The components belong-
ing to one assembly functional group (‘family’) were also related to a main 
assembly functional group (‘kin’). This made it possible to view the cars 
as they passed along the assembly process from the material grouping to 
the finished assembled car. In this way the process could be viewed as an 
organic process instead of as a mechanistic addition of parts.
Descriptions which take into account the natural variations in colour, 
shape, size, fragility and relate them to the components’ names, ‘families’, 
and ‘kin’, as well as to surveyable patterns and contexts, vitalize the men-
tal, emotional and physical life of the assembly workers. The mechanistic, 
descriptive, primarily numerical orientation which dominates car assembly 
work limits the opportunities to enhance the competence of the workers 
and is an impediment for the development of professional learning. In this 
context it is also important to realize that the mechanistic description has 
other purposes than the organic, holistic description.
The mechanistic description is organized so as to view the product from 
within the existing work organisation. It is also possible to apply it from a 
sales perspective. With such a perspective the final result, the car, can be 
viewed as the total sum of all component parts and the ‘whole’ is reduced 
to a numerical code.
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But from the workers’ point of view the mechanistic description is impos-
sible to work with. When one works in long cycles of 1.5 hours or more 
and one is developing a professional identity, the work content is large and 
entails correspondingly many responsibilities. Furthermore it is necessary 
to be able to survey the total work and to obtain support in terms of a de-
scription of the context in the space and time orientation.
It is also necessary to have access to descriptions that make it possible to 
obtain information on different precision levels. This last point is extremely 
important both during the learning process and as a reference in the long 
term in order to support quality and productivity.
The main point here is that the mechanistic descriptions had too limited 
applications. But the organic and holistic descriptions have the possibility of 
being used both as a tool for assembly work, materials handling, construc-
tion, and for sales; in short, a multidimensional usefulness.
Without grouping materials in relation to the car it would not have been 
possible to create an alternative to line assembly or to create parallellized 
workplaces. The materials were now related to ‘the body’. The body remains 
stationary during the assembly work. This technical innovation was made 
possible thanks to the new description. All this work was carried out by 
Tomas Engström and co-workers. Gradually the system was adjusted by the 
experiences of the Volvo Uddevalla plant with assistance from the workers 
and technicians at the plant. A lot of the new description was naturally used 
in the integrated learning and development processes at the plant.
Some notes on the processes of creating competence
It is possible to distinguish three different phases during this period of 
about six years:
The first phase was very constructive. The work content was at the same 
time approximately one quarter of the total assembly time of the car. After 
a certain time period the worker would continue to the next quarter stage 
of assembly work, and so on, in order to obtain a good understanding of the 
total assembly process. Following this, the worker would choose which of 
the four stages to become more professional and specialized in, in terms of 
quality and productivity.
The main point here is that the learning content was greater than the work 
content after learning. This strategy ensured co-operation between the dif-
ferent phases of the production of the car.
External consultants (Engström and Nilsson) helped the workers to create 
illustrations, to group materials and tools and to implement general learning 
strategies. All efforts were organised so as to support a holistic view of the 
work and the competence to master a greater part of the total work.
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Those who had learned the techniques became ‘instructors’ for novice 
workers. This was much like the comprehensive training of the old appren-
tice-journeymen relationship in the guild system. However, nobody spent 
the entire working day in the teaching position. The short time between 
being in the learning position and in the teaching position made it possible 
to remember what was important from the learners’ point of view. It cre-
ated a willingness to explain how to do the assembly work and and why. 
We then worked on improving the ‘inner monologue’ as a tool for creating 
a professional identity.
During the first phase the workers’ competence increased dramatically as 
realistic plans were carried out for future developments. This phase was the 
most successful I have seen during twenty years as a researcher and teacher 
in the vocational field. During this phase the learning followed the strategy 
developed during the spring of 1986.
The second phase began with an additive view of learning and assembly 
work. Technicians from the Volvo Torslanda plant took control over produc-
tion and learning. They created an administrative division between parts of 
the assembly work. The total assembly work was looked upon as consisting 
of seven to nine parts. Every person who worked with assembly had to learn 
his or her part. As a consequence very few had the competence to help other 
workers due to a lack of competence outside their own working area. Many 
of the problems previously encountered in line production reappeared.
The competence achieved during this period by the new recruits did not 
reach the level achieved by those who had come during the first phase. Nor 
did the production of the cars reach the expected level. This was not due to 
a failure of the learning strategies for the plant. It was a consequence of the 
fact that the people who had the power over production and learning at that 
time did not use the strategies created to build competencies.
All the resulting problems which occurred during this phase were pre-
dicted by the external consultant, but those in power were not interested 
in listening and acting in order to reduce the problems needed to reach the 
efficiency of the new production and learning concepts.
During this phase another extremely important event occurred. At this 
time the discussion at Volvo was whether the traditional Volvo Torslanda 
plant should be reorganised in the direction of the Uddevalla plant or if it 
should be organised in relation to lean production and become something 
like a ‘Toyota-city’. The problems at the Uddevalla plant contributed to the 
fact that few wanted to create an ‘Uddevalla model’ at Torslanda.
The actions from those in power over production and learning at the Ud-
devalla plant during this phase contributed to the dissolution of the plant 
some years later. After some time many of them left for the Torslanda 
plant.
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During the third phase which was to become the last, a very constructive 
renewal of learning and organisation of production was started. Now the new 
management tried to return to the original learning concept and to minimize 
the negative effects of the previous administrative division.
The quality and the productivity increased to a very good level. For the 
last 1.5 years the amount of hours required for the production of cars de-
creased. A very constructive situation existed in the autumn of 1992 when 
Volvo decided to close the plant.
There had been a dramatic increase in the efficiency at the Uddevalla plant 
during the spring of 1992, until the decision to close reached the plant. This 
efficiency had possibly been achieved 2–3 years earlier if those in charge 
at the time had followed the strategies developed to create competences for 
long-cycle assembly work.
The main feature of the new production and learning concept is thus that 
workers have the competence and responsibility over a rather large part of 
the assembly process of the car.
All the criteria that one had expected the plant to meet were fulfilled:
1. The efficiency in car production was very good regarding work quality, 
productivity and flexibility.
2. It had achieved dignity in terms of professional identity and human 
conditions for its workers.
3. The technical equipment had been adjusted to the workers and their 
growing competence.
4. It was a working place for both men and women of varying ages.
5. It had a very low rate of absenteeism and turnover.
6. New learning strategies to support long-cycle assembly work, new 
organic and holistic descriptions for materials handling and assembly 
work as well as, new technical strategies for parallellized work places 
had been developed.
However, the total capacity of the concept was never realised at the Ud-
devalla plant. For example, the plant did not work in close relation to the 
consumer which would have reduced the total costs and created qualitatively 
new relations to the market.
The arguments from Volvo for closing the Uddevalla plant
The closing of the Uddevalla plant is officially based on two arguments. The 
first is based on the argument that the three different plants for assembly 
work in Sweden, Torslanda, Uddevalla and Kalmar, were seen as equal in 
terms of efficiency. This is untrue.
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The second argument was that the costs of production at the Uddevalla 
plant was seen as much higher than the costs at the Torslands plant. This 
is also untrue. The official economic description is not correct. Both these 
publicly made arguments for closing the Uddevalla plant are based on false 
assumptions.
Volvo opted to close the two new and future oriented plants. The closure 
of Uddevalla (spring 1993) and Kalmar (spring 1994) took place during a 
very unstable economic period for both Volvo and Sweden.
Volvo opted to continue with the old and big Torslanda plant in order to 
create a plant with centralised complete production. The decreased sales of 
cars supported the reasons to close the other plants. The alternative was to 
drastically decrease the production of cars during this period, while pre-
serving the plants.
If the lack of competence among some of the leaders at the Uddevalla 
plant had not been allowed to influence the production and learning proc-
esses during a certain time, the Uddevalla concept would have displayed its 
multifactored strength at an earlier time. Most probably, as a result of this, 
it would have won over the stepwise change of traditionalism from Taylor 
via Ford and MTM to large-scale industrial plants with a lean-production 
orientation. This is the tragedy of the Swedish Volvo plants.
The concepts for production and learning developed as a consequence 
of the intentions of the Uddevalla plant, by the researchers involved in the 
work called ‘reflective production’ has survived and will become a model 
for working life in the future. Unfortunately the Volvo Uddevalla plant in 
its tragic premature closure will not be able to demonstrate the success of 
this model.
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Volvo Kalmar – twice a pioneer
Thomas Sandberg
In 1974, Volvo’s new Kalmar plant became the first assembly plant in the 
world to break with the Fordist concept. With a new work organization 
and production layout, which attracted tremendous international attention, 
Kalmar in a few years became Volvo’s best assembly plant. Yet there were 
many built-in weaknesses in the Kalmar concept.
Towards the end of the 1980s several processes of change began, which 
promoted even further development of the original concept. In turn, as well 
as this lead to dramatic economy improvements as well as in terms of work-
ing conditions. Once again, Kalmar in many aspects became Volvo’s best 
assembly plant. In spite of this, and although its production was needed, 
Volvo closed down the Kalmar plant in 1994.
1. The original Kalmar concept
1.1 The breakthrough of a new work organization and production layout
Behind the design of the new plant was the ambition to avoid the troubles, 
that beset the Torslanda plant in Gothenburg, by improving working con-
ditions and thus reducing absenteeism and employee turnover. Instead of 
taking job fragmentation and predetermination even further, the organization 
strategy in Kalmar aimed at independent assembly teams, each assembling a 
(functional) part of the car. The work content was 15–40 minutes long both 
along the line, where assemblers followed the car between various stations, 
and in the docks, which were a kind of side track (cf Agurén et al, 1976; 
Agurén et al, 1984; Berggren, 1993a, pp 119–29; Sandberg, 1982, ch 11 for 
further information on the original Kalmar concept).
To achieve this, a substantial renewal of the production strategy was 
required. The clover-shaped, two-levelled building contributed in creating 
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‘the small factory within the big’ in as much as each department had its 
own, relatively separate area with its own entrance and personnel space. As 
a replacement for the assembly line an autocarrier was developed, i.e. an 
individually moving, centrally controlled low platform following magnetic 
tracks in the floor throughout the factory. Between the departments were 
buffers in order to create a certain independence. The autocarrier was not 
only a means of transport, but also the platform on which the assemblers 
did their job. In that way they could begin assembling ahead of a station or 
in the incoming buffer, thereby gaining a time buffer and increasing their 
autonomy. In some departments assembly was done in docks, which made it 
possible to move the car from the line and assemble on stationary objects.
During the 1960s Torslanda was increasingly manned with employees 
who held a weak position on the labour market. The localization of a new 
plant in Kalmar can be seen as a continuation of that personnel strategy. 
The Kalmar area is a region with a relatively weak labour market, making 
it a bit of a green site. At the same time, the aim to improve work content 
to achieve a greater work satisfaction meant a modification of the purely 
instrumental relation between employees and company.
The Kalmar plant did not imply any new orientation concerning the busi-
ness strategy, e.g. regarding product programs or customer relations. The 
new plant was simply a capacity enhancement.
1.2 Structures and actors behind the new concept
With the new assembly plant, Volvo appeared internationally as a pioneer, 
and not only within the automobile industry. Compared to other Swedish 
companies, however, Volvo Kalmar did not emerge very early. Saab’s new 
engine plant in Södertälje, which began in 1972, also overturned traditional 
organization and production strategies. In other areas of industry there 
were many companies which began reorientation as early as the late 1960s. 
Around 1970 these experiments grew to many hundreds, not only in the 
industrial but also in the public and service sector (cf Sandberg, 1982, chs 
9–11 for further information on the Swedish situation).
The background of the extensive attempts in work organization were the 
increasingly serious problems facing companies during the1960s as a result 
of the rapid rationalization, carrying job fragmentation and predetermination 
to its extreme. The economic consequences of the production problems be-
came manifested in balance and system losses, long lead times, high capital 
investment, and insufficient flexibility. It also became evident in work force 
behaviour as the traditional groups of industrial workers no longer accepted 
the increasingly monotonous wear-out jobs and, thanks to the welfare de-
velopment and the decreasing unemployment, received other alternatives. 
Companies then started to employ new groups. The female employment rate 
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increased, regional migration expanded and labour immigration increased 
drastically in the 1960s.
At Volvo, the situation was even worse. Work studies were intense, a 
new version of MTM was brought forward. The new Torslanda plant, ini-
tially used in 1964, was at the height of this development. Five years later, 
personnel problems in Gothenburg were so serious that manning the plant 
was difficult. There were departments without any Swedish employee. Nor 
were there any remaining Finnish immigrants. The danger of the situation 
was underlined by a number of wildcat strikes in 1969–71. Few other com-
panies had such serious personnel problems. The fact that the management 
in view of all this did not rebuild Torslanda indicates how dominating the 
Fordist concept was.
Despite the experiments in other companies, growing research and an 
intensive public debate, it was far from obvious that the new plant in Ka-
lmar was to differ from all other plants. The first project plan was rather 
conventional. Progress was made only after Volvo’s new president P G Gyl-
lenhammar in 1971 replaced the project group and gave the project work 
a new direction. He played a central role in the emergence of the Kalmar 
concept by being a connection between, on one hand, insights about the 
problems of industrial production and their possible solutions, and on the 
other hand, the resources and competence that existed at Volvo.
His starting point was the necessity of being able to offer people decent 
working conditions: ‘Thus, in order to satisfy justified demands for work sat-
isfaction, production technology and work organization need to be changed 
without impeding economic growth.’ The ‘most important change(was) a 
shift from individual, monotonous work to work in a group.’ As the perhaps 
most critical factor he considered a replacement for the assembly line (Gyl-
lenhammar, 1973, pp 102–3,106; cf also Gyllenhammar, 1977).
A first evaluation of the Kalmar plant in 1976 showed that production 
efficiency was in line with Torslanda and that many of the intended improve-
ments of working conditions had been reached. Another evaluation from 
1984 showed clear improvements in assembly time per car (which now 
was 25% lower than Torslanda), level of quality, efficiency, and assembly 
costs. At the same time working conditions had changed in various ways, 
e.g. work intensity had increased, and some ergonomic problems had been 
adjusted (Agurén et al, 1976; Agurén et al, 1984).
2. An unused potential in the original Kalmar concept
In the beginning, Kalmar was met by huge expectations, which were to a 
large extent redeemed. However, the limitations and contradictions in the 
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organization and production strategies prevented full use of the potential 
of the original concept.
Production layout has been singled out as a key factor. To increase the 
assemblers’ work content and autonomy some of the assembly was done in 
the docks next to the line. Since the carriers remained tied to a serial flow 
controlled by a central computer, with demand for a strict sequential order, 
dock assembly did not give assemblers or the working team the desired 
autonomy. The comparatively long work cycle in the dock also made it dif-
ficult to know whether you were on schedule when the carrier would start 
moving and thus the work had to be finished. The increasingly complex 
material supply, caused by the growing number of variants, also made use 
of the docks difficult. After subsequent restrictions the docks were abolished 
in 1984 (to reenter the scene some years later).
Another vital part was the individually moving carriers. However, their 
flexibility compared to an assembly line, for several reasons, could not be 
made full use of. They were indeed individually controllable, but control 
was central, a circumstance which furthermore was augmented during the 
first years. As a result the buffers between team areas never functioned as 
intended. This was further strengthened by the construction of the buffers, 
which made it difficult to correct the sequence between carriers which had 
shifted positions within a team area.
Thus, different parts of the production strategy limited the autonomy of 
assemblers and work teams. But the organization strategy also had features 
limiting the possibilities of assemblers and work teams to independently 
plan, carry out, and evaluate their work. The assembly task in itself had a 
substantially larger content than at a traditional assembly line, but in other 
aspects work organization of the Kalmar plant was rather conventional. In 
each work team there were several indirect positions, where no job rotation 
between group members took place. The hierarchy within the work team 
corresponded to the situation in the factory as a whole, since managers only 
to a small extent delegated responsibility and authority.
The latter also lead to changes being initiated and pursued from the top, 
usually with lack of commitment and interest. Thus, until the second half 
of the 1980s, no further development of the original Kalmar concept took 
place. On the contrary, some of the original ideas, which had proven no to 
work well, were abolished. The changes that took place were traditional cost 
rationalizations, limited measures mainly focused on production technology. 
Yet the Kalmar plant performed well. In the 1984 evaluation of the first ten 
years was stated that ‘the Volvo Kalmar plant is a technically, socially, and 
economically effective production unit.’ (Agurén et al, 1984, p 13)
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3. After 15 years a radical renewal of the Kalmar concept 
began
Even though the Kalmar plant in the mid-80s was successful, there were 
several challenges, first internal and later external. When these challenges 
were faced, rather fumbling at first but gradually more and more systematic, 
much of the weaknesses in the original concept were overcome in a series 
of developmental steps. We shall examine this development briefly and 
proceed to study it in greater detail in three parts of the plant. The section 
is based on field studies in Kalmar 1993/94.
3.1 Many processes of change in the last years
Changes in the product line and production volume naturally took place 
during what was to become the last years of the Kalmar plant. Worth not-
ing is the shift to the 760 model in 1987 and on to the 960 model in 1990, 
two steps towards an increasingly qualified product and, greater work and 
material content. Also remarkable is the introduction of the 940 model in 
the fall of 1992, which reached world class quality half a year later.
More interesting in this context are the projects which gradually joined in 
one single powerful process, focused on developing the production process: 
in the early 1988 team area development was initiated, towards the end of 
1989 Dialogue followed, and in 1991 came KLE.
When team area development started in 1988 the work force had grown 
during a couple of years while at the same time the labour market was becom-
ing more and more overheated. To the Kalmar plant this meant a significant 
rise in absenteeism and employee turnover. The Kalmar concept proved 
inadequate to handle the personnel problems. The main focus for the team 
area development was to enrich the assemblers’ work content with many 
of the side tasks which constituted separate positions: materials handling, 
control and adjustment, instruction, some tasks concerning production engi-
neering, as well as, some maintenance work. As a first step three team areas 
participated in the project, but other areas also carried out part of it.
During 1989 team area development transformed into the Dialogue 
project, which was announced in the Volvo Group in 1985 but not applied 
in Kalmar. The purpose was to increase employee involvement and commit-
ment in work. Attitude surveys, to get opinions on what had to be tackled, 
was one tool. At first not much happened, and decision-making was once 
again centralized in connection with the problems caused by the introduc-
tion to the 960 model. In 1991 development was accelerated, no doubt 
influenced by the increasingly critical situation of Volvo Car Corporation. 
A new strategy for Volvo’s Swedish car production was formulated, and a 
committee was appointed to analyse plant structure (that committee in the 
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fall of 1992 suggested the closing down of Kalmar and Uddevalla). The 
principal goal of the new strategy was that the three Swedish assembly units 
in the summer of 1993 were to be on the peak in Europe, thus matching the 
Volvo assembly plant in Gent, Belgium.
From 1991 the Dialogue project, under the name of process development, 
came to be a new and very powerful way to promote change. The aim was to 
free, focus and sustain the commitment of all co-workers, in order to continu-
ously be able to improve and expand operation towards customer-oriented 
goals of strategic importance. The basis was trust and faith in the capability 
and will of the assembly workers to assume responsibility for developing 
their part of the operation. The organization was flattened and a substantial 
delegation of authority took place. Operation was divided into 80 groups, 
2–3 in each team area. The groups each with its own measurable goals, 
prepared operational plans which were then carried out and followed up. In 
the most active team area 60 changes were made in a year; in the plant as a 
whole the number was 900. This process of change engaged the personnel 
at large and resulted in a great number of modifications which developed 
the operation from an economic as well as human standpoint.
The undertaking of changes were aimed at improving the process, or the 
flow. This way of proceeding, directed at the flow, was well in line with the 
customer-oriented strategy which Volvo’s Swedish car producers adhered 
to since 1991 when the KLE quality strategy (Quality, Delivery precision, 
Economy) was launched. The focus on quality, i.e., a spirit of ‘doing it right 
the first time’, resulted in dramatic improvements in quality and largely as 
a consequence of this, in delivery precision (‘create flexible systems free 
from interference’) and economy (‘a complete overhaul of the structure and 
resources of the production system’).
Through a number of circumstances these projects reinforced each other 
in a positive circle, while at the same time they benefited from and contrib-
uted to the basic idea of Kalmar: independent work teams with committed 
and skilled assemblers. The new customer- and quality-focused business 
strategy required the kind of organization strategy employed at Kalmar, also 
strengthening it through its demand for responsibility and competence in 
individual work. The same was true for the new way of undertaking changes. 
Furthermore, the new business strategy focused the change process in a 
direction which turned out to be a winner: quality. This fruitful interchange 
between business, organization, and change strategy in turn made possible 
a thorough development of the production strategy.
In the following sections we will examine the changes in three team ar-
eas since 1987. To a large extent, the changes are part of the processes just 
mentioned, but there are other factors behind them as well.
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Before that, however, it should be stated that all these changes in the 
Kalmar plant together resulted in large economic improvements. In the 
beginning of 1993, the company reported that in about two years quality 
had improved by 40%, lead time by 25%, and assembly time by 30%. The 
chapter by Christian Berggren mainly considers Uddevalla but also states 
that Kalmar was the most competitive plant. In his more detailed report 
(Berggren, 1993b) not only the good results concerning assembly time and 
quality are apparent, but also how far Kalmar reached regarding flexibility 
when shifting to new models, collaboration with production engineering, 
customer orientation, and cooperation with suppliers.
Kalmar’s final touch was when the plant in 1993 shared the first position 
in J. D. Powers’ initial quality study of the customers’ appreciation of the 
1993 940 model.
3.2 Development of the organization strategy
When Kalmar in 1987 was to begin assembling the 760 model, the plant had 
to be expanded since the new model had a larger material and work content. 
One of the new departments was team area 4/5. Several (parts of) functions 
were assembled there: brake pipes, booster, ABS unit, pedal arrangement, 
climat unit, cable harness etc. Brake pipes, booster and climat unit were 
pre-assembled (as were some minor components).
The production strategy was, in all important aspects, the original one in 
the Kalmar concept. Assembly was done on carriers, successively moving 
through the department between the incoming buffer of four and the outgo-
ing buffer of three carriers. Control was centralized and speed dependent 
on production volume. The components were stored along the line. This 
production strategy was constant during the period with the exception of a 
remake of the materials handling.
The organization strategy, on the other hand, underwent stepwise altera-
tions. When the department started in 1987 the direct assembly was very 
conventionally organized, and hardly reached the original intentions. Along 
the line were twelve stations, each manned by two persons assembling at the 
car’s left and right side, respectively. Station time was around four minutes, 
after which the car proceeded to the next station. Besides the pre-assembly 
there was materials handling, instruction, and controls/adjustments along 
the line. All three were operated by two persons not involved in any job 
rotation. The department was headed by a foreman.
After a few months, work content were prolonged by letting the assemblers 
follow the same car between stations. In this way, balancing losses were 
reduced and the autonomy of the assemblers increased. In 1989 the work 
cycle had expanded to about 30 minutes.
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The team area development project, when it started in 1988, affected 
team area 4/5 mainly by bringing the indirect positions into job rotation. 
The persons who had formerly been assigned these tasks began, somewhat 
resistantly, to work about half their time on the line. At the same time many of 
the assemblers were educated for materials handling, instruction, or control 
and adjustment. Also, a group leader position was created, designed partly 
to replace the production leader, who in turn received wider responsibilities 
when the production manager at the next level was removed.
In team area 4/5 changes continued, outlined by the Dialogue project and 
then the process development. First, assembly was broadened to incorporate 
the whole line in the department; assemblers still worked two and two. The 
deciding step was taken in 1992 when each assembler began to assemble the 
department’s part of the car by himself, with a work content of approximately 
65 minutes (variations in models and variants not accounted for). Through 
the shift to a long line, balance losses were eliminated. The shift to one as-
sembler per car meant that the system losses and irritation, caused by the 
two assemblers seldom working at the same pace, disappeared. Every day 
six hours of assembly on the line was followed by two hours of pre-assembly 
(the latter with rotation between three major tasks).
Simultaneously with the shift to one assembler/car, the designated station 
for control and adjustment was abolished. Each assembler assumed respon-
sibility for leaving a satisfactory work, and time for this was assigned in 
the balance. As a result, defect frequency decreased by 90% and the crew 
could be reduced without causing a higher work pace.
In parallel with these steps the indirect positions were fully integrated into 
the rotation order. 13 of the employees, meaning roughly half of them, took 
turns in being group leader, instructor and materials handler during half a 
week to a week with two–three weeks in-between (each individual rotated 
on just one of these three positions).
Thus, within the frame of the existing production strategy, a far-reaching 
development of the organization strategy took place stepwise. Work content 
increased radically, as did autonomy. A prerequisite for this was a notable 
increase in competence. There was no longer the often irritating depend-
ence on a co-worker, and the collective responsibility for the production 
was significantly larger. Another aspect was that balance and system losses 
were reduced, and, hence, productivity increased. The quality level rose 
dramatically, which contributed to crew cuts not only in this particular team 
area, but also in the final control and adjustment areas of the plant.
If Kalmar had been allowed to continue, there were ready-made plans 
within the team area on how to further develop the processes in the area. 
The number one goal was to have the car immobilized in a dock during 
assembly. The shift to dock assembly would take place in connection with 
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the 1974 carriers being replaced by ‘taxicarriers’. In the investment plan 
this was scheduled for 1995/96. It is likely that simultaneously several team 
areas would have been joined, meaning increased work content. Furthermore 
there were plans to take over most of the production engineering work, as 
well as some supplier and perhaps also customer contacts.
3.3 A new production strategy needed to further develop the organization 
strategy
The first thing that took place once the body had been lifted to the second 
floor was removing the doors. While the body on its carrier went through 
the entire upper level loop, the doors were assembled to be remounted on 
the car before it went down to the marriage point. The door assembly was 
divided into left and right door assembly. Also the first thorough electric 
function inspection belonged to team area 17/40.
Whereas the doors were removed and remounted on the line as was the 
electric function inspection, doors were assembled off the line. The separate 
door assembly meant a freedom in the choice of production layout, relative 
to the rest of the factory. From the start this resulted in a more conventional 
layout for the door assembly than for the departments along the line. The 
doors were transported from station to station by a conveyor. Work content 
was limited to 3–4 minutes, job injuries were noticeable, and balance and 
system losses great. In order to tackle these drawbacks work organization 
was changed, so that assemblers went from station to station, thereby as-
sembling the whole door. However, job injuries (and losses) continued on 
a high level. The new work mode added a dependence on the pace of the 
co-workers and consequently an irritation in the group. In addition to the 
direct work there was materials handling, instruction, and control/adjust-
ment, positions which continuously were held by the same persons.
The already strong incitements for a change were markedly enhanced 
when absenteeism and personnel turnover rose sharply during 1988 and 
1989. As the Dialogue project was launched in the plant in the course of 
1989 it gave the door assembly unit a possibility to develop a new produc-
tion layout and work organization. In a first step there was in 1990 a shift 
from the old serial grouping along a line to a parallel grouping in individual 
docks (this concerned only the door assembly in itself, not the removing 
and remounting). When the doors had been taken off, they were collected 
four and four on carriages, placed in an incoming buffer. There they were 
gradually picked up by the assembly workers, who also picked up the mate-
rial that was to be assembled. Assembly took place in a newly constructed 
fixture, where it was possible to raise, lower, and also tilt the door. From 
an ergonomic point of view this was a major step forward in production 
technology. To get the material and assemble the four doors took around 
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60 minutes. The doors were then left in an outgoing buffer, waiting to be 
remounted on the car.
Through the shift to individual assembly in parallel stations the depend-
ence between the assemblers, and thus the system losses and irritation, was 
eliminated. Even more important was that the new conditions did not cause 
one single new job injury. On the contrary, assemblers who had previously 
been injured could be rehabilitated and returned to work.
In 1992 the time had come for the next step, which meant that the indirect 
tasks were distributed so that all employees in the team area could take part 
in them. The designated positions for control and adjustment were abolished 
since each assembler was to do his own quality checks. Some of the materi-
als handling, as has already been seen, was assigned to those assembling 
the doors. The rest of the materials handling, the instruction job, and the 
new group leader position were rotated. However, not everyone wanted to 
participate in this rotation, despite persuasion attempts.
To the door assembly, the new production layout was a necessary condition 
to the new way of organizing the assembly work and thus to the improved 
working conditions; the new production technology also had an important 
role. In the second step, only the organization strategy changed. Taken to-
gether, these measures lead to reduced losses and, hence, increased produc-
tivity, a defect frequency reduction of more than 80%, and increased work 
content and autonomy whereas physical and mental stress were reduced 
enough to eliminate job injuries.
Still, there was plenty left to develop further, had the Kalmar plant not 
been closed in 1994. The team area was divided into three groups, where 
the first assembled the right doors, the second the left doors, and the third 
removed and remounted the doors as well as handled the electric function 
inspection. Only as an exception did the employees rotate between these 
three groups. A next step could have been shifting to two groups, both remov-
ing, remounting and assembling the doors. The small number of assemblers 
who shifted between the reversed assembly of right and left doors could, 
presumably, also have shifted between these two groups.
3.4 A radically new production strategy, which also made possible a new 
organization strategy
After the bodies had descended from the upper level they were, in the same 
step, married to the chassis. This was the start of an extensive work to join 
the various parts of the driveline to the components which had been as-
sembled on the upper level. The singe biggest project during the last years 
of the Kalmar plant took place in this area and a total amount of 30 million 
SEK was invested.
When Kalmar started in 1974, the assemblers installed the driveline to a 
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large extent working above the head under a special ‘high carrier’. Such a 
work position is extremely demanding. Muscular strain and injuries soon 
became a big problem. The situation did not improve much by a shift from 
fixed station balances of 3–5 minutes to the assemblers following the high 
carrier from station to station, meaning a work cycle of 15–20 minutes. The 
already problematic situation got much worse in 1987, when ‘unsuccess-
ful constructions increased the frequency of operations uncomfortable or 
damaging to the human body ’. Job injuries became more numerous, and 
the combination of poor working conditions and a more overheated labour 
market made absenteeism and employee turnover rise further and forced 
the radical transformation that was made in 1990.
The change of the driveline instalment process consisted of a number of 
important components. In terms of production layout there was a shift from 
serially grouped stations, where assembly was done on a moving object, 
to nine double docks grouped in parallel, where the objects were not mov-
ing (a tenth dock was used for instruction and in case of job injuries). The 
outgoing buffer was placed next to the line, similar to docks. This made it 
possible to change and restore the car sequence in a simple way. A central 
material inventory for the whole area was arranged, where the assemblers 
picked the material themselves. The role of centralized production control 
in the area was reduced. The production technology changed through the 
addition of a taxi carrier, which transported the cars from the marriage point 
to the docks, and from there to the outgoing buffer. A tilting equipment for 
dock assembly was presented. Work organization developed inasmuch as 
the assemblers worked two and two in the docks, each pair not depending 
on any other. The indirect work was divided among the assemblers (a few 
years later than had been planned).
The change must be regarded as a big success. The new production layout 
eliminated not only a large part of the traditional balance losses, but also 
those which were the result of the increasing number of car and engine vari-
ants. Owing to that, the crew could be reduced. The new production layout, 
the new buffers, and the new carriers, all in combination with the new work 
organization, meant a greater flexibility and thus a better ability to handle 
both disruptions and changes in the production.
For the assemblers work content increased markedly. The assembly cycle 
lasted about an hour. To this must be added materials handling, control and 
adjustment, pre-assembly, some maintenance work as well as some pro-
duction engineering. Autonomy increased, not only due to the larger work 
content, but also to the independence between the docks, the more flexible 
equipment, and the less centralized production control. All this required 
substantially more competence, and the need for education was underesti-
mated in the beginning of the project.
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The most notable consequence was the strong reduction in physical and 
mental stress. The shift from work above the head on a moving object to 
assembly on a stationary object with tilting possibilities was revolutiona-ry, 
and job injuries almost disappeared entirely.
4. The new Kalmar concept in comparison to new Japa-
nese assembly plants
From the very beginning the Kalmar plant was a break from the Fordist 
tradition. Despite the built-in weaknesses in the Kalmar concept, Kalmar 
rapidly established itself as Volvo’s foremost assembly plant. In 1987/88 
began what was to become a powerful renewal and development of the 
original concept. At the time of the close-down in 1994, Kalmar appeared 
as a factory of international calibre.
These improvements were a fact in the fall of 1992, when Volvo decided to 
close the factory. Kalmar had reached even further accomplishments when it 
was time to close in summer 1994. Furthermore, at that time, Volvo’s sales 
had increased so rapidly since the end of 1993 that the Kalmar plant would 
have been needed to manage the deliveries.
In connection with the continued renewal of Volvo Car Corporation’s 
only remaining assembly unit in Sweden, the Torslanda plant in Gothenburg 
(which has a very traditional layout and organization), the Japanese produc-
tion philosophy seems to be a model to the management, probably much 
due to the cooperation with Mitsubishi in the joint plant in the Netherlands. 
Should the closing of Kalmar (and Uddevalla) be seen as a sign that the 
triumph of the Japanese car producers has provided the traditionalists in 
the management of Volvo Car Corporation (and the metal workers’ union 
in Torslanda) with the deciding argument to get rid of assembly concepts 
that were never really accepted?
Interesting enough, scientists (Nomura, 1993; Shinoda, 1993; Berggren, 
1993c) have pointed out the connection points between Volvo Kalmar and 
the new assembly plants in Kyushu and Tahara, which Toyota has put into 
operation in the 1990s. These new units differ in many ways from Toyota’s 
older plants and, hence, also from the picture sketched in the well-noted MIT 
study (Womack et al, 1990. There would be much to say about that picture 
and about what is said of Kalmar and Uddevalla, but I refrain).
A striking similarity is that behind Toyota’s new approach in the newest 
plants was the increasing resentment of the workers to accept the more and 
more impoverished and strongly predetermined tasks; exactly the same 
situation that 20 years earlier made Volvo launch a new concept. The goal 
of the Kalmar plant was that the employees should be able to find ‘meaning 
and satisfaction in their work… without neglecting efficiency and economic 
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results…’ (Gyllenhammar cited in Agurén et al, 1976,pp 5–6; Agurén et al, 
1984, p 18). To achieve this, work was organized in independent work teams. 
However, the organization around these teams remained rather traditional. 
In a paradoxical way, the focus on work organization seems to have counter-
acted its purpose. Things didn’t get moving until around 1990, when work 
organization was no longer viewed as an isolated goal in itself, but was put 
in relation to the development of the whole operation.
In several team areas a radical development of the work organization took 
place. Work cycles in the assembly task itself expanded to around an hour. 
Indirect tasks such as materials supply, quality control and adjustment, was 
merged with the assembly work. Job rotation between the extended balances 
was also enhanced. Production and personnel planning were, to a large 
extent, delegated to the groups as was part of production engineering. All 
this required a considerable competence growth among all employees. The 
development during the last years can be seen as another breakthrough for 
an economically and socially better work organization.
When it comes to organization strategy none of Toyota’s new factories 
come even close to the original Kalmar concept. In the assembly work along 
the line, work content is limited to one or a few minutes, to be compared 
with the 15–40 minutes which Kalmar had from the beginning, and which 
in the last years became around an hour in large parts of the factory. The 
indirect work off the line does not compensate for the job fragmentation 
along the line. The functional and hierarchical differentiation in the other 
parts of the Japanese plants is taken much further, which partly can be 
explained by the fact that they are so much larger. Taking Uddevalla into 
consideration, it must be said to represent another step ahead compared to 
Kalmar, since the assemblers were able to assemble the entire car (although 
only a minority did so).
In terms of production layout, Kyushu and Tahara resemble the original 
Kalmar concept through their serial flow divided by buffers. However, in 
the last years development in Kalmar proceeded further inasmuch as parts 
of the factory were equipped with taxi carriers. In connection with this dock 
assembly returned, this time with (still) more work content. In these areas 
production control was decentralized and the buffers placed next to the line, 
so that it was possible to use them to restore the sequence between the cars, 
when this for various reasons was disrupted within a team area. Together 
these measures meant a parallelization of the assembly within each team 
area, a step which was also taken by door and engine pre-assembly. The 
result was greater work content, autonomy, efficiency, and flexibility. In 
terms of production layout, Uddevalla once again represents a step ahead 
by its complete parallelization, which made possible assembly not only on 
non-moving objects but on entire cars.
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Toyota’s ambition to develop ergonomically better equipment for han-
dling, assembly, and transports, also resembles the corresponding strive at 
the start of the Kalmar plant and the big push in that direction during the 
last years. The latter also resulted in that areas earlier under heavy stress 
did not cause any new job injuries.
The strive towards a greater work content at the start of the Kalmar plant 
differed from the Fordist personnel strategy. The increasing involvement 
and commitment in the last years meant a continuing reorientation. Here, 
again, Toyota’s strategy in the new plants resembles the original Kalmar 
concept. There are, however, no similarities regarding relations between 
employees and the company outside of working hours, even though Toyota 
now seems to put less emphasis on this condition, so distinctive to the 
Japanese labour market.
What has just been said can largely also be applied to the change strategy, 
which in Kalmar was traditional up to the last years, when possibilities 
for a much wider participation from many of the employees were created. 
Without the compulsion, which seems to be connected with the Japanese 
use of ‘kaizen’, Kalmar got very far in terms of constant improvements. In 
this respect, Toyota also seems to have reduced the pressure on employees 
to participate.
Such a short comparison with Toyota’s Kyushu and Tahara plants could 
easily be misleading. To make up for that, I would like to point out that 
there is much indication of the superiority of the Japanese plants concerning 
the development of constructions easy to assemble, the successive automa-
tion of parts of the assembly, and generally the finding of new solutions in 
production engineering.
Volvo’s now resigned president P. G. Gyllenhammar (1991, s 238–42) does 
not perceive a contradiction between the Kalmar plant and lean production. 
With special regard to the competition with the Japanese car industry he 
says that ‘the production philosophy which has grown out of the Kalmar 
concept is not a disadvantage’.
The influences between Japan and Volvo form a paradoxical pattern. 
Whereas Toyota’s latest factories show notable similarities with the concept 
that Volvo developed in Kalmar in the 1970s, what Volvo now is introducing 
in Torslanda resembles the concept that Toyota stood for during the 1980s. 
The Volvo management does not seem to understand that the Kalmar plant in 
many ways had gone much further in the direction Toyota now is headed.
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Part II
The performance  
of the Uddevalla plant  
in a comparative perspective
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The fate of the branch plants  
– performance versus power
Christian Berggren
Volvo has become a byword for advanced thinking in work design, in 
new forms of production, in collaborative implementation, in worker 
participation and satisfaction … When practitioners, be they manage-
ment, trade union or academic have to give shape to possible new fu-
tures, alternatives to Taylorism or examples of best practice then it is to 
the plants such as Vara, Kalmar and later Uddevalla that they turn.
Peter Cressey (1993), Kalmar and Uddevalla: The demise of Volvo as 
a European Icon.
Kalmar and Uddevalla are the best known symbols of the Volvo trajectory 
in production design and work organization in the 1970s and 1980s. This 
chapter will evaluate their performance, scrutinize the official justification 
of the closure decision and discuss factors more fundamental in this context 
than assembly hours – product policy and organizational power. Finally, 
the experience of Uddevalla will be analysed in the context of learning. 
Developments at the plant are confronted with the recurring notion that 
standardized and highly fragmented job structures are a precondition for 
organizational learning in labour-intensive production.1
The Kalmar plant, which began production in 1974, represented the first 
important step in the search for viable alternatives to the assembly line and 
its Taylorized jobs. Its most noticeable innovation was the individually 
controlled carriers, which replaced the mechanically paced conveyor belt. 
The total assembly was divided into twenty different sections, and within 
some of these sections, it was possible to dock the carriers into parallel 
stations, thus increasing the work cycle to 20–30 minutes. With the help of 
buffers between adjacent sections, workers had some opportunity to vary 
their work pace independently of the main flow. In addition, the carrier tech-
nology made ergonomic changes possible, through so-called tilting of the 
car bodies. One of the purposes of the plant design and division of the line 
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into distinct sections was to foster in responsibility and team spirit. Kalmar 
was a small operation, with a capacity of 30,000 cars per year per shift; but 
Volvo planned to build another factory of the same type in the United States 
with the capacity to make 100,000 cars a year. Three years after Kalmar 
started production, Volvo’s profits fell drastically. As a result, plans for the 
U.S. plant were shelved and the climate within Volvo became much more 
conservative. By this time, Kalmar had been broken in with disappointing 
results. Workers appreciated the team-based work organization, the possibil-
ity of varying the work pace, and the physical work environment. However, 
assembly time per vehicle was the same as at the main plant, Torslanda in 
Gothenburg, and adjustment work was as extensive. As a result of Volvo’s 
problems in the late 1970s, a comprehensive rationalization programme 
was launched at Kalmar. In 1984, ten years after the factory had opened, 
Kalmar’s performance was much better. Assembly hours per car were 25 
per cent lower than at Torslanda (a difference which has since persisted), 
quality was high, and overhead costs were very competitive. 
A short time after this evaluation the planning of the Uddevalla plant 
started. Unemployment was again very low in Sweden (less than 3 per cent) 
and automakers had a lot of difficulties in recruiting and keeping workers 
in traditional industrial jobs. At the same time, the increased demands for 
flexibility and high quality made firms dependent on a stable and committed 
workforce. Creating new production systems adapted to human demands 
was seen as a strategic necessity for coping with personnel problems during 
the 1990s. In this situation, the influence of the unions in the companies’ 
planning and investment decisions also increased. The result was the bold 
new design of the Uddevalla plant, a radical continuation of the process 
started 15 years earlier.
Workers’ utopia or neo-craft cul-de-sac?
The plant immediately aroused a lot of international interest and soon 
became the host of impressed visitors. Some very influential automotive 
researchers were deeply suspicious, however. In the book The Machine That 
Changed The World Womack, Roos and Jones from Massachusetts Institute 
of Technology (1990:101) disparaged both Kalmar and Uddevalla as ‘neo-
craft nostalgia’, arguing that ‘… productivity of the Uddevalla system is 
almost certain to be uncompetitive even with mass production, much less 
lean production’. In an interview in The New York Times (July 7, 1991) 
Womack’s criticism was even more trenchant, asserting that ‘Uddevalla is 
not in the ballpark … It’s not even in the outer parking lot of the stadium. 
Frankly it’s a dead horse’. 
The decision to close the two plants raises an important question. Was 
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the Volvo trajectory a cul-de-sac, a temporary adjustment to an ‘abnormal’ 
labour market (no unemployment, strong unions, comprehensive social 
welfare), easily dispensed of in these Swedish times of capitalist normali-
zation? Were the two innovative assembly plants just noble experiments, 
doomed to fail in the competition of the 1990s? The answer is no. In terms 
of productive and commercial performance Uddevalla displayed a remark-
able potential and in terms of engineering competence and quality Kalmar 
was an irrefutable success, certainly one of the European auto plants with 
the best quality record. This chapter will focus on Uddevalla, the most 
controversial of the two plants, but I will also summarize Kalmar’s achieve-
ments. In October 1992, Uddevalla was thoroughly evaluated against the 
line assembly plant Torslanda in Gothenburg. By this time, the Uddevalla 
plant had only been in operation for three years, but nonetheless, matched 
the Gothenburg plant’s productivity, surpassed its quality and emerged as 
Volvo’ internal benchmark in terms of market responsiveness and customer 
orientation. Let me first summarize the achievements of the plant, before 
they are presented in detail.
1. Productivity: A 50 per cent improvement 1990–1992. 
After a slow start Uddevalla took off and in 1991 reached the level of 
the Gothenburg mass-production plant. From the last quarter of 1990 to 
the last quarter of 1992 Uddevalla cut the assembly time at an average 
rate of one hour per month. 
2. Quality: A clear edge in customer satisfaction.
In the early 1990s, both Gothenburg and Uddevalla improved their 
quality records considerably, but according to American customer 
evaluations, surveyed by J D Power, Uddevalla was clearly ahead of 
Gothenburg. In the autumn of 1992, the rate of improvement was par-
ticularly rapid at Uddevalla.
3. High flexibility:50 per cent lower tool and training costs at the annual 
model changes.
At Uddevalla, flexible production design and highly skilled teams ren-
dered the yearly model conversions much easier than at line assembly 
plants. For the three years 1990-1992 this resulted in very substantial 
cost savings in both tools and training. The time required to return to 
normal productivity after an annual model change was half the time 
needed on the lines at the Gothenburg plant. 
4. Combining customer order assembly and short delivery times.
In the autumn of 1992, Uddevalla started building all cars for Europe 
according to customer orders only. As a result, dealers could offer cus-
tomers individually specified cars within 4 weeks, instead of persuading 
buyers to accept prespecified ‘plan cars’. The total lead-time was cut 
from two months in 1991 to one month in 1992, and further reductions 
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were planned for 1993. The savings in finished product stock equaled 
the value of the entire assembly time! Moreover, since ‘plan cars’ must 
be heavily discounted in flat markets, every custom ordered car also 
implied a significant commercial savings. Many of these points fly in 
the face of conventional wisdom, so let me explain them somewhat 
more carefully. 
Rapid productivity improvement
One of the most widespread performance indicators in car production is 
assembly hours, in spite of the fact that assembly only represents a minor 
fraction of total manufacturing costs. During its first year of operation final 
assembly time per car at Uddevalla averaged 70 hours, including materials 
handling, maintenance and other indirect activities, not including salaried 
positions. This high level was anticipated, however, since the plant focused 
on training new teams, expanding its product range and bringing new as-
sembly shops on stream. Late in 1990 Uddevalla started to improve rapidly. 
The last quarter of that year the plant scored 59 hours/car, and from then 
on assembly time per car was reduced by one hour every month on aver-
age. The second half of October 1992 the figure was down to 36 hours! 
(It must be noted that this and subsequent figures are not comparable with 
the assembly time that MIT researcher John Krafcik and his colleagues 
calculated at various car plants. The aim of the MIT study was to compare 
data across plants and countries. Thus they only registered a standardized 
sub-sample of assembly activities at each plant and did not compute total 
assembly times.)
According to the MIT-study, Uddevalla would never reach the productivity 
of a line plant. Nevertheless, in mid-1991 Uddevalla’s performance equalled 
Gothenburg’s assembly line. Admittedly, at this time the Gothenburg plant 
was not very productive in European terms, a main reason being the drastic 
decline in Volvo’s sales and volumes. As a result, the plant was operating on 
a very low capacity level. Inspired by Japanese methods, a new management 
eliminated the overstaffing and launched a comprehensive productivity pro-
gramme, that strongly focussed on process quality. As a result, Gothenburg 
overtook Uddevalla in early 1992, but in the second half of that year, Ud-
devalla accelerated. In the month prior to the shut-down decision, the two 
plants competed neck-to-neck, but Uddevalla had a steeper learning curve. 
Interestingly, within Uddevalla there were no significant differences be-
tween assembly teams working in long cycles (1.5 hours) and teams working 
in very long cycles (3.5 hours). Shorter cycle times were somewhat easier 
to learn, but the assembly task in these teams required a more elaborate 
form of group interaction. In fact, one of the most consistently productive 
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units was a mini-group of two female assemblers who, working as a pair 
produced one car per day on regular basis.
Uddevalla had abundant potential for further rapid improvement. None of 
its managers doubted that the plant could reach the target of 25 hours per 
car in the middle of 1993. In fact, most were absolutely confident that Ud-
devalla would beat the line plants in straightforward productivity terms. If 
they were correct in their assumptions, Uddevalla’s critics would obviously 
be proven wrong. I will return to the issue of productivity performance and 
organizational learning later in this chapter. 
A quality edge
Quality is the second general performance measure of Volvo’s assembly 
operations. In 1991, Volvo’s three assembly plants in Sweden were roughly 
equal. Kalmar was the first plant to introduce and train all operators in a 
rigourous system for quality assurance, from error detection, problem analy-
sis and application of countermeasures, to follow up. Originally, Volvo had 
expected Uddevalla’s highly skilled and motivated teams to attain superior 
quality more or less automatically. Only in 1992, a new plant management 
started to approach quality in the same rigorous way as Kalmar. New forms of 
team-based self-inspection was introduced, for example that workers should 
always check each other’s work when shifting positions within the teams. 
The result was a marked enhancement of the plant’s quality performance. 
According to surveys carried out by J D Power for the model year of 1992, 
Uddevalla built cars of the 900-model had 124 complaints per 100 vehicles 
within ninety days of purchase, whereas Gothenburg cars scored 144. The 
average for European cars in the United States was 158 for this year. During 
1992, Volvo improved its quality ratings markedly. When the figures for 
the model year of 1993 were released from J D Power, Volvo had advanced 
more than any other automaker. The 940-model improved from 132 to 87 
complaints – with the the two small-scale plants, Uddevalla and Kalmar, 
improving most rapidly of all. 
Superior flexibility in changing models
High flexibility was a third import advantage of Uddevalla’s parallel team 
assembly and broad worker competence. One indication was the low effort 
needed to introduce annual model changes at the plant. The three model 
changes between 1990–1992 were introduced at lower costs per car, between 
25% and 50%, compared with the Gothenburg plant. Uddevalla needed less 
investment in tools and training, and returned to normal productivity in 
only half the time Torslanda did after a model change. Normally, Volvo’s 
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annual changes are quite insignificant. That was the case in 1992. That year 
the best Uddevalla teams needed to build only 2–3 cars (approximately one 
day) before resuming 95 per cent of the normal production pace. The least 
efficient teams needed 5–6 cars, or two days. One of the advantages of the 
parallel team system was that support staff could concentrate solely on help-
ing those teams that were in most need. On the line at the Gothenburg plant, 
there is normally one day’s gap between the old and new annual models. 
During that time industrial engineers and subforemen relocate materials, 
adjust equipment and provide new tools. Assembly workers are informed 
about the changes, but seldom participate very actively. By contrast, the 
assembly teams at Uddevalla themselves implemented the changes, they 
studied the new instructions and rearranged their workplaces. The system 
of materials provision, the kits, were by themselves an important means to 
help assemblers learn the new annual model. 
The head of the plant’s industrial engineering department emphatically 
stressed: 
It’s a myth that our parallel and long-cycled assembly requires more 
tools and longer time for training when changes are introduced. Our cost 
for training and preparing people for new models has been only half that 
of the Gothenburg plant. The main reason is the enormous competence 
and skills of the assembly workers and materials handlers.
Parallel assembly at Uddevalla meant that cars were built in many places 
simultaneously. Before the plant came on stream, it was generally expected 
that this would result in considerably higher tool costs. An evaluation of the 
model changes between 1990–92 showed that the opposite was true. One 
reason was the plant’s deliberate low-tech strategy for the assembly process. 
Simple, flexible tools were substituted for complex dedicated equipment. 
As a result, existing tools could be modified instead of replaced when a 
new model year commenced. At Volvo’s other plants, process engineers 
had always accepted the product designers assembly specifications. At Ud-
devalla, engineers required designers to standardize and modify technical 
requirements in order to minimize the need for extra tools. In that way the 
annual model change became a much more interactive process than it used 
to be, resulting in considerable cost savings. 
A car dealer’s dream:  
customized assembly, short delivery times
In Volvo, as in many other car companies, efforts to improve efficiency and 
productivity have focussed on the industrial system, the components supply, 
and above all, the assembly hours. Much less attention has been devoted to 
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the efficiency in the commercial and distributional systems. The MIT book 
The Machine That Changed The World is a good example of this narrow 
production focus. The book abounds in assembly hour statistics from vari-
ous plants, but there is not one statistic which compares lead times from 
customer order to delivery between different manufacturers. At Uddevalla, 
there was an early awareness of the importance of fostering close contacts 
with the market. Volvo’s system for plant evaluation, however, concentrated 
narrowly on parameters such as assembly hours and quality indices. In the 
company’s strongly departmentalized organization, production was strictly 
separated from product design and marketing. Uddevalla had to focus on 
improving its assembly performance, and nothing else. In 1991, though, 
when productivity had reached the Gothenburg standard, it was possible to 
widen the focus. A large sample of cars was selected for a detailed study 
of lead times, which revealed that if a customer ordered a particular car, 
the average time from order to delivery in Sweden was two months, with a 
range from one to four months. Many factors served to increase the delivery 
times: the rigid planning system, the functional specialization with high bar-
riers between production and marketing divisions, and the complex product 
structure with its high option content. At this time, only 20 per cent of Ud-
devalla’s volume was custom-ordered. The overwhelming majority of the 
cars were assembled according to the company’s central scheduling system. 
For these plan cars total cycle time was even worse – on average they took 
twelve weeks after production to be sold and delivered. The depressed auto 
market, where dealers had to work hard to get the cars moving, contributed 
to the excessive lead times. This situation made it all the more important 
for Volvo to overhaul its ordering and delivery system.
Uddevalla took the lead and established direct communication with all 
Swedish dealers. The plant also pioneered direct deliveries from the factory 
to selected dealers. Soon Volvo’s car plants in Gothenburg and Ghent also 
started to reorganize their relations with dealers and to compress delivery 
times. Beginning on October 1, 1992, Uddevalla took another and most 
important step. The plant abandoned the central scheduling system that 
specified the car mix seven weeks prior to production. Instead Uddevalla 
started to assemble all cars for the Swedish market on customer orders 
only. One month later this principle was extended to the whole European 
market. Uddevalla told dealers in Europe that the plant would not promise 
any specific delivery times for cars that had been scheduled by the central 
planning system, on the basis of market forecasts. By contrast, they would 
guarantee delivery within four weeks of any custom-ordered car. Basically, 
Volvo Uddevalla now did the same as Toyota rather unsuccessfully had 
tried to initiate ten years earlier, when its sales subsidiary was merged with 
the manufacturing arm, and direct links between sales people and factory 
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scheduling was established. Uddevalla planners had to do an enormous 
amount of manual rescheduling to adapt materials supply and production 
planning to the customer orders, but did so happily since the response from 
European importers was overwhelming. 
The customer orientation at Uddevalla built on the strength of its flexible 
production system. To remain productive, the many parallel teams and mate-
rials handlers did not need any specific sequencing of cars with different op-
tion contents (for example, every second car a turbo, every third an automatic 
transmission, every fourth a 16-valve engine, etc.). Rather, the introduction 
of customer order-planning provided an additional motivational advantage 
for the teams. Now the teams knew that the cars were not to be stored in a 
warehouse somewhere, but delivered directly to individual customers. The 
plant took a pride in taking on difficult requests. Once, for example, the 
plant received an enquiry from a journalist living in Britain. He was going 
to Stockholm in one week and wanted a car with highly unusual equipment 
to be delivered at the time of his arrival. The marketing department in 
Gothenburg considered the request impossible, but Uddevalla and the local 
dealer managed to get the car ready in less than one week. By contrast to 
Gothenburg, such requests were not seen as ‘disturbances’ but as inspiring 
challenges by white collar staff as well as assembly workers.
In 1991, when the programme to compress lead times started, 20 per cent 
of the assembled cars were custom-ordered and the rest were plan cars. In 
November 1992, on the eve of the shutdown decision, 70 per cent of the cars 
were specified by individual customers. The corresponding figure at Volvo 
Gothenburg was 35 per cent. In one year, Uddevalla had reduced the total 
lead time by half, from 60 to 30 days. The plan was to cut it by half again, 
to 14 days, in the next few years. The move to custom-order assembly was 
Uddevalla’s single most important economic contribution. By ceasing to 
build cars scheduled by the central planning system, the plant reduced the 
time from factory to customer by ten weeks (from twelve to two weeks) and 
further improvements were in the pipeline. With an estimated capital cost 
of 100 kronor per car and day, this saving matched the total cost of final 
assembly (35 hours times 200 kronor an hour)! Moreover, in the depressed 
market of the early 1990s, Volvo dealers normally had to grant customers 
a discount of 3000–4000 kronor on every ‘plan car’. By contrast, custom-
ordered cars could be sold at the full price. 
All in all, the change to customer ordered assembly with short delivery 
times, represented cost savings of a magnitude unparalleled by any pro-
gramme directed at reducing assembly hours, the favourite object of media 
interest and managerial effort. The beauty of Uddevalla’s production system 
was its ability to offer customer order assembly and short delivery times 
without compromising productivity and quality. To quote one of its manag-
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ers: ‘This plant was poised to become the most efficient plant for customer 
order assembly in the world!’
Uddevalla’s aggressive move to custom-order assembly forced the Gothen-
burg plant to rethink its traditional ways of relating to the market. Since 
October 1992, significant progress has been made in Gothenburg, increasing 
the share of customer ordered cars of the plant’s output. In a truly custom-
ized system, however, work load will be very uneven. A stream of highly 
specified and labour intensive cars might be succeeded in unpredictable 
ways by cars which have a low option content. Such variations is difficult 
to accept at a conventional plant, lean or not. In order to maintain a steady 
work flow on the long assembly lines, it is vital to sequence and even out 
production. Thus, it is very difficult for the Gothenburg plant to accomplish 
a complete custom-order assembly in the way Uddevalla did, without seri-
ously impeding productivity and jeopardizing its targets for reduction of 
assembly hours.
The difference between Uddevalla and Gothenburg did not only pertain to 
the degree, but also to the span of customization. When planners at Torslanda 
started to customize its production schedules, they were content to compress 
the time elapsed from the reception of the order to the shipment to the dealer. 
For car buyers, and for the company’s cash flow, however, it is the total cycle 
time, from customer order to customer delivery that makes a difference. In 
contrast to Torslanda, Uddevalla set out to measure, monitor and integrate 
this total process. Most Volvo cars are sold with a lot of ‘extras’, for ex-
ample radios, telephones, tow hooks, etc., that are installed by the dealers. 
That helps them keep workshops busy and provides an additional revenue 
stream. To customers, though, this division of labour between plants and 
dealers means high costs, less reliable quality and extra delays. Uddevalla’s 
flexible assembly would have no problem producing fully equipped cars, 
including all features traditionally handled by dealers. Such an integration 
would result in substantial advantages: lower installation cost, reduced 
handling and warehousing, higher and more consistent quality, shorter lead 
times. For example, it is much more efficient to mount a tow hook, includ-
ing necessary wire connections, when the car is being assembled, than it 
is to do it after-wards when several components must first be dismantled. 
This dismantling entails the risk of damaging other components, and qual-
ity procedures in dealer shops are seldom of the same calibre as the factory 
standards. According to a preliminary study, Uddevalla could install the tow 
hook in a third of the time taken by the dealer shops, and the reduction of 
the lead time was equally impressive. Beginning in mid-1993, Uddevalla’s 
market and delivery planners had advanced plans to integrate almost all of 
this traditional dealer installations in the factory process, and as a result be 
able to produce cars that could be delivered directly to the customers. At 
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Torslanda, there were no such plans – for good reasons. Its assembly lines 
could not cope with additional variation.
A noble experiment that did not fail
In 1989, management had viewed Uddevalla as a strategic investment to 
meet the demanding labour market of the 1990s. Three years later these 
considerations were forgotten. Sweden was in deep recession and unem-
ployment on a sharp rise. In the midst of down-sizing, Volvo had no need 
to recruit new workers and no problems with labour turnover, not even in 
Gothenburg. Uddevalla’s achievements in humanizing assembly work, in 
constructing new tools and developing new forms of work, did not play any 
role for the Volvo managers who decided to lay the plant idle. Unfortunately, 
that testifies to a very short-term perspective in the present Volvo leadership. 
When the economy picks up again Uddevalla’s new design and organiza-
tion would have been very competitive in terms of personnel costs. At the 
Gothenburg plant, on the other hand, the current labour stability is decep-
tive. According to 30 years of experience, labour turnover at this plant will 
rise as soon as unemployment falls. This will not only increase personnel 
costs, but also jeopardize the future of the programmes for continuous pro-
ductivity and quality improvement at the plant. The enhanced performance 
at Gothenburg remains fragile, since none of the fundamental problems of 
assembly work have been solved. 
In the Swedish debate, Uddevalla’s performance has been established 
beyond doubt. The plant was not a noble experiment that failed. Quite the 
contrary, it was a fundamentally viable model. During the autumn of 1992, 
a new plant management and managerial structure resulted in an accelerated 
pace of improvements. If the plant had been allowed to operate another year, 
it would have been very difficult to close it. 
When the plant began operation, it was greeted with high expectations 
as well as strong apprehensions. Some of the expectations were not real-
ized, but in most cases, the results were beyond all expectations. In Table 
1, expectations/apprehensions are summarized and compared with the real 
outcomes.
Kalmar – the number 1 plant 
All three Swedish plants improved rapidly from 1990 to 1992. Compared 
with Gothenburg, Uddevalla had a clear edge, but Kalmar was the most 
competitive. The plant had been in operation since 1974 and had been able to 
fine-tune its technical system, develop a high level of technical competence 
and a genuinely participative management. In 1989, a broad programme for 
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continuous process improvement was launched. When the new 900-model 
was introduced the following year, there were so many problems that man-
agement retreated to a traditional command-and-control mood, declared 
a state of emergency and centralized all decision-making. Soon Kalmar 
was back on track, however, and by 1993 the programme had become very 
effective. There were teams for process improvement at all levels in the 
organization, including the management committee. The teams themselves 
were responsible for setting their own targets, design and implement action 
plans, evaluate the results, and take corrective actions. In two years some 
teams reduced the number of defects from one per car to 0.02 per car. From 
early 1991 to early 1993, the plant reduced the average number of defects per 
car by 50 per cent. The corresponding improvement rate in Gothenburg was 
25 per cent. According to J D Power’s statistics for the year model of 1993, 
Kalmar cars of the 940-model reported only 54 complaints per 100 cars. 
That was close to the Lexus level (the figures are not exactly comparable, 
since Lexus owners are presumably more demanding and picky). 940-cars 
from Gothenburg scored 90 complaints per 100 automobiles.
Kalmar’s high in-process quality resulted in superior productivity, too. 
The plant produced both the 940-model and the highly specified 960-model. 
No separate assembly figures for the two models have been released, but ac-
cording to informed estimates, Kalmar needed 5 assembly hours less for the 
940-model than Gothenburg. Another advantage of Kalmar was the technical 
competence of its engineers and operators and their ability to cooperate with 
product engineers from Volvo’s design departments in a very productive way. 
The central Gothenburg department that was responsible for preparing new 
models for manufacturing, collaborated with all Volvo’s assembly plants, 
Gothenburg, Uddevalla, Kalmar as well as Ghent (Belgium) and Halifax 
(Canada). According to engineers at this department, Kalmar was the best 
of these five plants, by all measures. A representative comment is the fol-
lowing quote (from interviews in April 1993):
Kalmar is superior. They are outstanding. Their entire attitude is quite 
wonderful. Nothing is impossible, only a bit difficult maybe. There is 
an atmosphere that is hard to describe. They always want to improve 
and become better. When we tested new complicated components last 
summer, everybody participated and supported us. Technicians, mainte-
nance people, operators, everybody displayed the same commitment.
Most of the factors listed above were recognized by top management (albeit 
too late). That only means that the initial question remains, now even more 
puzzling. Why did Volvo decide to shut such productive operations?
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Table 1. 
Volvo Uddevalla. Forecasts and results
Expectations / apprehensions Outcomes
It will never meet production On par with the line in Gothenburg  
targets. High efficiency requires  in 1991. 
an assembly line. 
20 minutes cycle time is the Whole car assemblers built complete 
absolute maximum for high  cars in 10 hours. 
productivity and quality
Impossible to sustain continu-  A dream plant for Kaizen. 
ous improvement because of the  An enormous response in the assem- 
lack of minute standardization. bly teams when given adequate  
 engineering support
Absenteeism much lower than Absenteeism lower than in  
at a conventional plant. Gothenburg but the difference not 
 very significant.
Very stable personnel. High labour turnover the first year.  
 In 1992 only 4 per cent, but then a  
 deep recession.
Superior quality because of high Unstable quality in the first years.  
motivation and effective feedback. World class quality also requires  
 rigorous routines and total manage- 
 ment commitment.
Expensive to change models  25 per cent less tooling cost per car  
since every team must have a  compared with Gothenburg.  
complete set of tools.
Expensive to change models  60 per cent less training cost per car 
since the long cycle times will  compared with Gothenburg.  
necessitate excessive training costs.
The spurious cost savings 
Volvo’s official answer referred to depressed markets, heavy losses and low 
capacity utilization. Indeed, the automaker was in deep trouble on its main 
markets. In only three years, from 1989 to 1992, Volvo’s total sales of large 
cars (the 200, 700/900 and the new 800 series) dropped by 30 per cent, from 
280,000 to 200,000. The Swedish market, Volvo’s second most important, 
virtually collapsed. Total automobile registrations plummeted from 344,000 
117
in 1988 to 155,000 in 1992, the worst figure in more than 30 years. 1993 
was projected to become even worse. For two years, the result was in the 
red. In 1992, the Group’s operating loss was approximately 300 million dol-
lars of which Volvo Car accounted for more than half. Management became 
preoccupied with immediate measures to reduce capacity and cut costs. In 
this situation of disastrous capacity utilization, Uddevalla’s and Kalmar’s 
character of being small and incomplete plants (only final assembly, no body 
or paint shops), was a fatal disadvantage. According to the official figure, 
presented in 1992, Volvo Car will save 350 million kronor (45 million dol-
lars) annually by consolidating its Swedish operations in Gothenburg. This 
figure has been seriously disputed, however, and for good reasons. I will 
look at the data in more detail before proceeding to a more important issue 
– corporate politics and power. 
First, 100 million kronor of the total 350 million is a fictitious capital 
saving, resulting from accounting transactions. Instead of annual deprecia-
tions, the investments at Uddevalla and Kalmar are written off at one stroke 
as part of the restructuring costs for the fiscal year 1992. This is of course 
not a real saving, but it is politically important for the new CEO, Sören 
Gyll, who was appointed in 1992. In this way he was able to demonstrate 
improvements and claim that he has turned the company around. 
Second, Volvo argues that the company will save 250 million kronor in op-
erating costs by closing down the two small plants. I will focus on Uddevalla 
here (The calculated savings of closing Kalmar, the most productive of all 
Swedish plants, are even more spurious). One of the entries on the company’s 
list of cost savings is the expected staff rationalization. By consolidating 
production in Gothenburg, all staff positions at Uddevalla are eliminated. 
In theory, costs are reduced by 30–35 million kronor. This estimation as-
sumes that there will be no increase in salaried positions in Gothenburg as 
a result of the added volume. Unfortunately, this presumption is impossible 
to check after the fact. There may be excess overheads in Gothenburg before 
the transferral, or new staff positions that are in fact volume-induced may 
be created under new names or motivated by model changes. 
Even more dubious are the ways in which the Gothenburg economists treat 
the anticipated costs in plant and equipment when the 900 series will be 
replaced by a new platform in 1997–98. This future investment in dedicated 
equipment is counted backwards, put on top of Uddevalla’s operating costs 
in 1992 and, hey presto, another 15 million kronor is saved by closing the 
plant now. The obvious counter-argument is of course that the plant could 
be operated for another five years, and then closed down in 1997 instead, 
without incurring any of these costs. 
Uddevalla is a pure final assembly plant. This structure was a decisive 
political disadvantage in the power game preceding the closure decision. 
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The fact that car bodies had to be shipped 100 kilometers from Gothenburg’s 
paint shop was cited as a very significant cost penalty for Uddevalla. In the 
first calculations it was estimated to be 25 million kronor per year. But if 
the total logistics of Uddevalla is analyzed, the costs are very close to those 
at the Gothenburg plant. The additional expense of shipping car bodies 
was to a large extent compensated for by less expensive deliveries of other 
parts, since Uddevalla was much closer than Gothenburg to several Swed-
ish suppliers of volume components, such as bumpers and seats. As soon as 
the new paint shop in Gothenburg had solved its breaking-in problems and 
could deliver bodies at an even pace, the cost difference would decrease 
even further. If Uddevalla was allowed to deliver one third of its volume 
direct to the dealers, its total logistical cost disadvantage compared with 
Gothenburg would only be between 4 and 7 million kronor per annum, less 
than 1 milion dollars. 
In this way, basically all of the entries on the list of calculated cost savings 
could be questioned. Closing the production warehouse in Uddevalla, for 
example, was expected to reduce costs by approximately 10 million kronor 
yearly. The assumption was that the production warehouse in Gothenburg 
would remain the same, but this was by no means proven. Further, this 
theoretical reduction is not compared with the very real reduction in finished 
product stock Uddevalla could achieve by building fully equipped custom 
made cars. That omission is symptomatic of the whole exercise. Only the 
costs and none of the revenues of operating Uddevalla or Kalmar are listed. 
Uddevalla’s capability to assemble specialty vehicles in a very efficient way 
was not mentioned, and Kalmar’s quality advantage was neutralized by the 
assumption that Gothenburg would be able to produce the same quality. 
The Uddevalla participants in the company’s study team presented a 
very different calculation. Accordingly, Volvo would save only 50 million 
kronor per annum by closing the plant. This exercise did not include any 
revenues because of the particular advantages of Uddevalla. Irrespective of 
the exact evaluation of individual items in these exercises it is clear that the 
operational savings of shutting the plant are insignificant. The plot thickens 
– why did Volvo make this decision?
An unholy labour-management alliance
Towards the end of the 1980s, when sales had already started to fall, Volvo 
expanded production capacity in Belgium and commissioned the new plant 
in Uddevalla. Theoretically the two plants in Ghent and Gothenburg alone 
have the capacity of producing 300,000 cars, which is 50 percent in excess 
of current sales. In 1992, the Volvo executive came under increasing pressure 
from the then company’s major shareholder, the French state-owned Renault 
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corporation. The Renault managers demanded that Volvo implement radical 
measures to stem the red ink and eliminate excess capacity. The Renault 
CEO, Louis Schweitzer, publicly criticized Volvo’s production structure 
in general and its small-scale plants in particular. Compared with Volvo’s 
option range, Renault’s best selling Clio is a much more standardized car 
concept, relying on tightly scheduled mass-production plants. Renault man-
agers could see no particular advantage in Uddevalla’s flexible capability 
of building highly individualized cars. The pressure from Renault boosted 
the position of a strong traditionalist faction within Volvo. Those manag-
ers strongly believed in economies of scale and had proposed the closure 
of the smaller Swedish plants years before. In the internecine struggle for 
survival between the Swedish plants, the powerful unions in Gothenburg 
sided decisively with this management faction to save local jobs, at the ex-
pense of the branch plants. From 1988, total employment at the Torslanda 
works had been reduced from 10,000 to 5,500 and its labour organizations 
were not prepared to take any more. Only a few years earlier the Swedish 
Metal Workers’ Union had been heavily involved in the development of the 
Uddevalla concept. The plant was seen as a model of labour-management 
cooperation and a proof that the Metal Workers’ demand for a fundamental 
renewal of manufacturing was not wishful thinking. At two consecutive 
congresses this was the main policy line, spelt out in several documents 
advocating a ‘Solidaristic work policy’ (see ‘Rewarding Work’, Stockholm 
1987). At the time of the show-down within Volvo all this union commitment 
came to naught. The Gothenburg unions were not interested in defending 
any innovative and humanized jobs, if they were not available to its own 
members in Gothenburg. The union consultant that was involved reported 
to the Gothenburg union and persuaded other local unions within the Volvo 
Group that Kalmar and Uddevalla had to be laid idle. At the decisive meet-
ing, the labour representatives on Volvo’s board supported the management 
decision to close Uddevalla and Kalmar!
Volvo’s president, P. G. Gyllenhammar, was conspicuously absent at the 
press conference announcing the decision. There were many indications that 
he opposed it. Historically he has played an important role as an advocate 
of ‘humanistic manufacturing’. His overall impact on Volvo was highly 
ambiguous, however. While promoting work reforms and decentralization of 
authority to the shop-floor his own management style became increasingly 
elitist and autocratic, thereby alienating the most able senior executives. 
As a result, Volvo’s top management team was weak in terms of industry 
experience and product expertise; there was a conspicuous absence of ‘car 
guys’ in the leading echelons. Gyllenhammar’s penchant for grand deals, 
acquisitions, mergers and far-flung diversification (to energy, drugs and food 
businesses), diverted managerial attention away from the core business and 
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created illusions that Volvo could survive without continuously up-grading 
process and product. Despite his lack of detailed knowledge of the auto 
business, Gyllenhammar repeatedly interfered with the sensitive product de-
velopment, adding extra delay to an already inefficient process. In 1992, his 
position had been seriously undermined because of a recent strategic failure, 
the aborted merger with a Swedish state-owned food company, Procordia. 
This gave the new CEO, Sören Gyll, a strong position. To Gyll, Volvo’s 
production structure was a matter of a very simple logic not warranting close 
examination; one big consolidated plant must be better than one big plant 
plus two small plants. When Gyll visited Uddevalla, shortly before the clos-
ing was announced, he was genuinely impressed by the plant’s productivity 
improvement, as well as its responsiveness to customer demands and dealer 
requests. But his conclusion was: ‘Thank you, you have done a damn good 
job. Now Gothenburg will have to do the same.’ That comment summarizes 
Uddevalla’s predicament. First the plant had to prove its performance and 
match Gothenburg beyond any doubt. Secondly, when Uddevalla took the 
lead and developed a number of innovative features, management took for 
granted that Gothenburg could do the same. 
The crucial problem: new plant, old cars
Volvo’s fundamental problem was not oversupply of capacity, but under-
supply of new models. The 850 model, introduced in Europe in 1991 and in 
the US one year later, is a high-performance family car that offers a number 
of new safety features. The problem was that Volvo needed ten years for 
the development process. After the introduction of the sedan, Volvo had 
to spend another two years to get the station wagon ready for the market. 
When General Motors launched its Saturn operation, this venture combined 
a green-field production site, an innovative manufacturing system, and 
most importantly, a brand new product line. By contrast, Uddevalla had to 
start with an eight year old product with no relief in sight for another eight 
years! (The 800 cars were built in Belgium). This mismatch sealed the fate 
of the plant.
Uddevalla and NUMMI:  
individual versus organizational learning?
After this overview of Uddevalla’s achievements and the reasons for the 
closure, let us now analyse its capacity for learning in more detail. Paul 
Adler and Robert Cole have argued that Uddevalla was not in ‘striking 
difference’ of the productivity of Toyota’s Californian joint-venture with 
General Motors, NUMMI (New United Motor Manufacturing Inc.). This 
alleged performance gap is attributed to the Swedish plant’s emphasis on 
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individual, as opposed to organizational, learning. Workers at Uddevalla, 
Adler/Cole contend, lacked both the motives and the mechanisms for focus-
ing and capturing ‘the kinds of microscopic kaizen opportunities that drive 
NUMMI performance’ (Adler and Cole 1993: 89). Now, if we want to ana-
lyse organizational learning, it is essential to distinguish between absolute 
performance and rate of improvement. Adler and Cole are quite correct when 
they report that the NUMMI plant consumes much less assembly hours to 
build a car than Uddevalla, or any other Volvo plant. The problem is the 
next step, their attempt to establish a direct link between this performance 
gap and the capabilities of organizational learning at the two plants. As 
emphasized by Williams et. al. (1992), it is very difficult to compare pro-
ductivity data between plants belonging to different companies, producing 
different products, using different component suppliers, etc.. The problem 
is not to establish the number of assembly hours required, the difficult task 
is to interpret the differences. In the case of NUMMI and Uddevalla, the 
performance gap is influenced by a number of factors outside the control 
of the final assembly process.
First, there is an important difference in product characteristics and prod-
uct manufacturability. NUMMI workers would certainly appear much less 
productive if they had to assemble Volvo cars. 
Second, the quality of the components supplied are by no means the same. 
This is not only true for external deliveries, but also for components supplied 
by previous processes within the company. For example, according to inter-
nal Volvo studies carried out in 1990, the precision of Volvo’s and Toyota’s 
body components differed in a highly significant way (Karlsson, 1991). This, 
of course, affected productivity in final assembly in a substantial way. 
Third, as Williams et. al. have demonstrated, capacity utilization must 
be included in any serious comparison of plant productivity. This factor is 
consistently overlooked by Womack et.al., and the same holds true for Adler 
and Cole. Since Uddevalla only utilized 50 per cent of its one-shift capacity 
in 1991–92, whereas NUMMI operated much closer to optimal efficiency, 
Volvo’s plant is again at a disadvantage. 
Fourth, the two plants are differently positioned on their respective 
learning curves. NUMMI adopted a mature, fine-tuned concept, developed 
for decades in Japan. Uddevalla on the other hand, had just established its 
learning curve for a qualitatively novel concept, and needed much more 
experience for synchronizing assembly design, materials control, worker 
training, management organization, information systems and so forth. 
For all these reasons, I will concentrate my discussion on Uddevalla’s rate 
of improvement, rather than its absolute productivity. Figure 1 illustrates 
productivity development at the plant from January to November 1992, as 
measured by worker hours per car. A look at this graph makes it difficult to 
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maintain that Uddevalla did not have a significant capacity for systematic, 
organizational learning. Moreover, the accelerated productivity progress 
in the autumn of 1992, was combined with a 20 per cent improvement in 
quality and with an almost complete conversion to custom-order assembly. 
In fact, the plant had never made as broad progress as it did during this 
period. The reason for this acceleration is very important and highlights a 
serious flaw in Adler &Cole’s analysis. They emphasis the importance of 
organizational learning, but analyse the organization of the two plants in a 
very simplistic way. Thus, under the heading ‘organizational design’ there 
is only a description of the assembly teams at Uddevalla. For students of 
management and administration, it should be obvious that plant manage-
ment and administrative hierarchies have some impact on productivity, and 
cannot be identified with shop-floor structures.
<Figure 1, Page 122, Part II, Berggren>
Figure 1
By focusing squarely on the shop floor level, Adler and Cole miss an im-
portant and paradoxical aspect of the Uddevalla story. The plant’s advanced 
structure of assembly teams co-existed for a long time with a basically 
traditional management apparatus, located in an office building, the de-
tached and secluded character of which was underscored by its architectural 
design. During the first years, the plant developed in spite of this anomaly, 
but in early 1992 there were clear signs of stagnation. The plant could not 
develop only on the strength of its team systems, a congenial plant organi-
zation and managerial structure was urgently needed. In mid-1992, after 
a difficult period of soul-searching, a different and very process-oriented 
organization was put into place, headed by a new plant manager. He had 
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previously been extremely successful in reorganizing the pilot plants be-
longing to Volvo’s development and product engineering departments. In 
Uddevalla’s new structure there was only two hierarchical levels, shop and 
plant management.
As before, the assembly and materials shops (on average comprising 70 
workers) were organized in teams with rotating, hourly team leaders. They 
communicated directly with the shop managers, who in turn made up the bulk 
of the plant’s new management committee. This participation of first-line 
managers in Uddevalla’s central governing body reflected the very strong 
emphasis on process and process development (including organizational 
learning!) in the new organizational design. For the new plant manager, the 
flattening of the hierarchy was only the first step. Next, he planned to empty 
the office building completely, and relocate all managers and administrative 
officers to facilities directly adjacent to the production process. 
‘Some of the functional heads did not believe me’, he admitted when 
interviewed about this plans, ‘but I intended to move first, and then the 
others would have no choice but to follow suit.’
A third aspect of this focus on the process was a series of initiatives to 
involve salaried employees in direct production activities in order to build an 
intimate knowledge of manufacturing problem across the plant. To gain first 
hand experience, the new managers of the assembly shops started to learn 
how to assemble, not complete cars (that was in most cases too daunting a 
task), but at least fairly complex sub-assemblies. The remaining industrial 
engineers, who had been relocated from the office to the assembly and 
materials shops, were expected to spend half of their time building cars in 
the assembly teams. To bridge the still existing gap between white and blue 
collar workers, the head of manufacturing assigned other managerial staff, 
such as accountants and systems analysts, to assist the teams for a shorter 
period (normally one week). Initially, this program encountered vehement 
opposition, but in the end the reactions were very positive. 
These initiatives were no cultural exercises but served well-defined pur-
poses, one of the most important being to develop, adopt and diffuse best 
practice methods plant-wide. Aggressive performance demands provided 
the impetus, the presence and participation of the support staff (engineers, 
etc.), the opportunity to elaborate and spread best-practice procedures 
swiftly. As a part of this drive there was a very successful introduction of a 
plant-wide Kaizen programme in the autumn of 1992. The advanced team 
structure turned out to be ideally suited for sustaining continuous improve-
ment activities. ‘Previously’, team members recalled during interviews in 
1993,‘we had only felt the pressure from management to reach our targets. 
Now, we really got the support, and did a lot of things, often small improve-
ments, we had never bothered to do before.’ 
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Adler and Cole quite correctly emphasize that both concepts, both NUM-
MI and Uddevalla, are capable of learning and evolution. Nonetheless, they 
tend to interpret their impressions from the 1991 visit to Sweden in a very 
static way, as the essence of the Uddevalla concept. 
‘At Uddevalla’, they write, ‘work teams were left to their own devices. 
In the very early days of Uddevalla, managers gave workers the procedure 
documents from the Torslanda plant. But these procedures were not very 
well designed … as a result, the Uddevalla workers quickly discarded them, 
and, along with them, the very idea of detailed methods and standards … 
this management philosophy sounds more like abandonment than empow-
erment.’ (Adler and Cole 1993:90). It is true that there was an interregnum 
at Uddevalla, when the traditional standards did not work and the new 
methods had not yet been developed. This interregnum was not an inherent 
feature of the Uddevalla concept, however. In fact, at the time when Adler 
and Cole visited the plant (mid-1991), this period was coming to a close, 
new pro-cedure documents had almost been completed and introduction in 
the assembly teams started. 
The problem of finding effective means for diffusing methods and prac-
tices from high-performance teams to lesser performing units, that is, 
organizational learning, had been a management preoccupation since the 
start of the plant. Thus, Adler and Cole are wrong when they argue that a 
‘a third assumption built into the Uddevalla approach… is that an increase 
in individual learning automatically leads to an increase in organizational 
learning. This is a fundamental fallacy’ (1993:92). Uddevalla had no 
problem in acknowledging the need for organizational learning, that was 
self-evident. The challenge was to organize it in effective and congenial 
ways. In 1991 and early 1992, the managerial answer was to strengthen 
the hierarchy and expand the role of the technical expertise. The new proc-
ess-driven organization represented a very different solution, combining 
radical decentralization, participative management and strong performance 
orientation. The Kaizen programme was one approach to develop and diffuse 
best-practices. To further increase the process of knowledge transfer, the 
plant manager envisioned a comprehensive system of personnel exchange, 
within and between assembly shops, and eventually between the assembly 
department and the materials handling. According to managers interviewed 
as part of my evaluation study, it was only in 1992, three years after its 
inauguration, that Uddevalla had acquired an overall organizational form 
that fitted the team structure and production design. As the plant’s former 
personnel head, a shop manager in the new organization, pointed out in an 
interview in April, 1993: 
We had to learn so many things from scratch, starting with a process of 
un-learning, getting rid of previous conceptions and behavior. Only in 
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September 1992 we found an organization suited to our production con-
cept. We also introduced a new programme for leadership development, 
which was essential for all shop managers, and the new management 
board. The first session of the programme took place in November, on 
the same day as the close-down decision was announced.
For all those interested in the development of competitive humanistic manu-
facturing, the shut-down of Uddevalla is a sad and disheartening event, but 
the evaluation of the plant’s performance is a consolation. This ‘experiment’ 
was not only a bold step in creating humane work, but a potential success in 
a wide range of performance measures. Rapidly improving productivity and 
quality was combined with superior flexibility, low cost tooling, unparal-
leled customer orientation and a unique responsiveness to market demands. 
Volvo has abdicated from its pioneering position, but the invaluable experi-
ence is there for anyone interested in making use of it. 
Note
1. Some of the arguments  have been presented elsewhere (see Berggren, 1993 a; 
Berggren and Rehder, 1993). These contributions were based on a preliminary 
evaluation, whereas this chapter draws on the comprehensive assessment of 
Uddevalla and Kalmar presented in September 1993 (Berggren, 1993b).
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Assembly skills, process engineering  
and engineering design
An example from the Volvo Uddevalla plant
Henrik Blomgren and Bo Karlson
Introduction
This article discusses the skills possessed by car assembly personnel. More 
specifically, it concentrates on skills which are valuable as input for design 
engineers during the product development process. 
We will argue that the skill of the assembly personnel in Uddevalla is 
valuable for the design engineers. This difference, inherent in the Uddevalla 
concept, provides a potential to improve the ease of assembly of the product, 
a potential which seems to be absent in a traditional assembly concept, like 
the one in the Torslanda plant.1
1. An example: the fuel pipe of model 7402
An example of the kind of feed-back that the assemblers in the group based 
assembly concept in Uddevalla were able to provide Engineering design, 
is a modification of the fuel system that was introduced on the 1992 model 
of three of the 740-versions. 
During production in the summer of 1991, the Uddevalla assemblers dis-
covered a problem, namely, that one of the fuel pipes after being assembled 
would touch the plastic fuel tank, with the risk of subsequently rubbing a 
hole in it. When the matter was investigated by the design engineers, it turned 
out that neither the assemblers, nor the process engineers at the Torslanda 
plant were aware of this danger. 
Both in Uddevalla and Torslanda, a few components were preassembled 
on the fuel tank before the whole unit was assembled in the car. Among 
these components was a short fuel pipe, which was later to be connected to 
a longer pipe which led the fuel from the tank to the engine. The longer pipe 
was assembled on the body of the car. The problem occurred when these 
two pipes were connected to each other. The coupling had to be securely 
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tightened in order to prevent leakage and the torque caused the short pipe to 
bend until it came to touch the surface of the tank. In order to avoid direct 
contact, the assemblers had to manually bend the pipe when the coupling 
had been tightened. This did not only mean that an additional operation had 
to be performed, but it also involved a risk for future cracks developing in 
the pipe. 
One of Uddevalla’s process engineers analysed the problem and worked 
out a temporary solution.3 The solution involved putting a rubber bushing 
around the pipe in order to prevent it from touching the tank. He sent the sug-
gestion to the department for engineering change planning in Gothenburg.4 
The problem was analysed, and among other things, the design engineers 
in Gothenburg contacted the assemblers in Torslanda. As was mentioned 
above, the answer they received was that they had not found a solution to 
the problem. Indeed, neither the process engineers, nor the assemblers had 
even discovered the problem. 
After some persuasion, the process engineer convinced the design en-
gineers from Gothenburg to visit the Uddevalla plant and investigate the 
problem on location. The problem was finally accepted and the proposed 
solution was immediately introduced on the remaining cars to be produced 
as 1991 models, that is, on both the vehicles assembled in Uddevalla and in 
Torslanda. For the 1992 model, the design of the coupling between the fuel 
pipes was modified and the problem was permanently solved.
Why was this problem discovered in Uddevalla but not in Torslanda? Due 
to the way the assembly work was organised and the division of individual 
tasks, it was considerably more likely to be discovered in Uddevalla than 
in Torslanda. In Uddevalla, one single person assembled the preassembled 
fuel tank in the car, assembled the fuel pipe to the body, and connected and 
tightened the coupling between the two pipes. This assembler immediately 
noticed what happened to the pipe on the fuel tank when the coupling was 
tightened. In Torslanda, the assembly process was divided into three separate 
tasks, performed by three different assemblers. One person preassembled 
the pipe on the tank. A second person assembled the fuel pipe to the body 
of the car; while a third person assembled the tank in the car and tightened 
the coupling between the two pipes. These operations were carried out at 
different stations of the assembly line and the third person did not notice 
what happened when the pipes were tightened. Indeed, he/she was not even 
instructed or encouraged to check the result of tasks carried out at other 
stations.5
It should be made clear that the intention here is not to argue that this 
problem might never have been discovered by an assembler at the Torslanda 
plant.6 The main point is instead that it was discovered in Uddevalla and not 
in Torslanda (or in any other plant). Since we will focus on the potential of 
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the Uddevalla system, this example provides a platform for a deeper dis-
cussion on the links between different assembly concepts and the product 
development process.
2. The need for design for assembly
The concepts of ‘Design for assembly’ (DFA) and ‘Design for manufactur-
ing’ (DFM) have been widely discussed during the past years.7 Scholars 
as well as practitioners, seem to agree, that it is important and sometimes 
even crucial, that products are designed in a way that make them easy and 
inexpensive to assemble. 
Fundamentally, much of the discussion about how to design products 
which are easy to assemble is framed as a question of managing interfaces, 
most commonly between the functions where the product is designed and the 
functions where it is manufactured and assembled. These interfaces are usu-
ally assumed to coincide with organisational boundaries between functional 
units, in our case engineering design (Gothenburg), process engineering (at 
Gothenburg, Uddevalla and Torslanda), process engineering (Uddevalla and 
Torslanda), and assembly (Uddevalla and Torslanda).
Now, let us return to the question raised earlier about why it is important 
to design a product, in this case a car, which is easy to assemble. According 
to Williams & Haslam (1992), as little as 15 per cent or less of the labour 
input in a car is accounted for by the three final manufacturing steps: weld-
ing, painting, and final assembly. Consequently, even less is accounted for 
by final assembly. Why, then is it interesting to put efforts into designing a 
car which is easy to assemble?
Clark & Fujimoto (1991), have shown that ‘manufacturing productivity’ 
correlates to both ‘development productivity’ and to short development lead 
times. In other words, a company which is strong in manufacturing and as-
sembly also tends to develop cars cheaply and rapidly. Studies at Volvo Car 
(Nermo, 1990; Karlson, 1992), and elsewhere (Aniander & Blomgren, 1989; 
Karlson, 1989, 1993:b), have demonstrated that late engineering changes 
can be very costly, that is, for example if the car can be designed correctly 
from the beginning, both time and effort will be saved. To return to the 
example, if the potential problem with the fuel pipe had been discovered 
during the design stage, it would have been cheaper to correct and it would 
have created less of a disturbance for the parties involved. 
3. Engineering design at Volvo Car
The most common way, at Volvo Car and in general, to develop a product 
which is easy to assemble, is to find ways to feed back knowledge about the 
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assembly process to the design engineers during the product development 
process. This knowledge is traditionally provided by process engineering 
and sometimes, actually rarely according to our experience, from assem-
bly personnel directly. However, the example shows that there is, in the 
Uddevalla system, a potential to provide the design engineers with better 
feed-back directly from the assemblers.
The normal feed-back channel when an assembler discovers a way to 
improve the product design is to request an engineering change. As was il-
lustrated in the fuel pipe example, this process is formalized, which means 
that the assembler, most commonly through his superior, sends the request to 
the plant’s department for process engineering. The request is then analysed 
and transmitted to a department in Gothenburg (engineering change plan-
ning) were the request is administered. Through this function, the engineering 
design department, the process engineers located in Gothenburg, styling and 
other manufacturing plants etc., become involved in the process of change. 
The request is checked from a number of perspectives, not least by other plants 
where the same vehicle is produced. An engineering change has to be accepted 
by all the parties involved, before it is implemented (see figure 1).
Figure 1. Formal communication channels at Volvo car
This mode of coordination is mainly used ‘after the fact’, for example, to 
correct errors, to improve the product design, or to improve the assembly 
process. Of course, many activities are also carried out during the process 
of developing a new product. Normally however, the assemblers do not take 
part at these early stages.
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During the product development process at Volvo Car, special groups are 
created to facilitate the coordination of the various functional specialists 
involved in developing the different systems of the car.8 These multi-func-
tional groups are usually managed by the head of the engineering design 
department responsible for the system in question. The group meets regularly 
during the development process and usually consists of personnel from en-
gineering design, styling, procurement, process engineering, and assembly. 
The assembly plants are usually represented by one of the process engineers 
located in Gothenburg, not by an assembler or a process engineer from one 
of the plants. Before a new component or system can be released, it has to 
be approved by the departments involved.
Every new car and yearly model of an older car is produced in at least one 
try-out-run in the plant where it is going to be assembled. In Uddevalla, one 
experienced assembler from each assembly group is selected to participate in 
a ‘pre-try-out-run’ of the new model, after which they actively participate in 
working out the assembly instructions to be used by their colleagues when 
full scale production begins. At the Torslanda plant, a similar role is played 
by half a dozen experienced assemblers who represent the whole line. The 
difference is that the Uddevalla assemblers have more experience in working 
with the complete vehicle than their colleagues in Torslanda.
During the try-out-run, the assemblers are expected to point out those 
components which are difficult, or indeed, impossible to assemble. This is 
however, really the first time that they are given the opportunity to provide 
constructive feed-back on the product design.
The conflicting demands made from all the specialised functions involved 
in designing a car are probably especially accentuated when two different 
assembly concepts are used side by side in the same company, like in the 
Uddevalla and Torslanda plants. Most certainly, the demands on the design 
put forward by the different assembly plants differ from each other. What 
is efficient in Uddevalla might not be efficient in Torslanda. The issue is 
further complicated by the difference in relative importance between the 
plants. Since the Uddevalla plant was much smaller than the Torslanda plant, 
one might expect that the demands put forward by the personnel at Torslanda 
would carry more weight. To fully utilize a particular assembly concept, the 
car should be designed with that in mind. In Volvo’s case, this would have 
been a crucial challenge in order to fully utilize the Uddevalla concept.
4. Assembly work and skills: 
 differences between Uddevalla and Torslanda
It might seem obvious that the type of work experience a person possesses, 
mirrors the task he or she is performing.9 Different tasks give different ex-
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periences and hence different skills. This, however, highlights a problem. 
With different experiences, based on performing different tasks, different 
perceptions of which problems are important and how these should be solved 
are formed. In other words, different perspectives are developed.10 A design 
engineer for example, views the world as composed of design problems 
while, the assembler views it as assembly problems. Karlson (1993:a), 
discusses among other things, differences in skills, status, and focus of the 
work between a design engineer and a process engineer at Volvo Car. We 
might even go as far as to say that they have developed different languages. 
This is the fundamental reason why it is important for design engineers to 
learn from the skills of the assemblers. 
When saying that it is important that the design engineers cooperate with 
the assembly personnel, it is implicitly assumed that the right to identify 
and formulate the problems, at least in part, is moved from the designers to 
the assemblers. This is of course, not a trivial problem and if this privilege 
was moved, assuming that it would be possible, conflicts most certainly 
would arise.
The simple fact that different types of work, results in different types of 
experiences poses an interesting question. The assembly work at the Ud-
devalla plant is unique in the sense that, the individual assemblers work 
with whole vehicles, or at least with large parts of the vehicles. As the fuel 
pipe example shows, the assemblers in Uddevalla possess skills which their 
colleagues in Gothenburg lack. However, it probably would be assuming 
too much to say that they possess all the skills that the ‘part vehicle as-
semblers’ possess. 
The following ‘theoretical’ example illustrates that assemblers who per-
form different tasks can provide different feed-back to engineering design. 
It is ‘theoretical’ in the sense that, it is designed in order to illustrate the 
differences in skills between the assemblers in Uddevalla and the assemblers 
in Torslanda. Of course, this is not to say that it is unrealistic.
Let us imagine two assemblers, one in Torslanda and one in Uddevalla. 
Both of whom assembles a specific component in the car, for example, a 
door or the dashboard. The Torslanda assembler repeats his or her specific 
task, approximately 100 times every day, since this is the only task he or 
she performs. The colleague in Uddevalla performs the task only six times 
every day because this task is only a small part of assembling the whole 
vehicle. It is probably very disturbing for the Torslanda assembler if, let us 
say, six different types of screws are needed to assemble the component, 
since this involves changing screwdriver or bit hundreds of times every 
day. The assembler in Uddevalla repeats the same task so seldom that he or 
she probably is more inclined to accept that half a dozen different screws 
are needed for that particular component. At the same time, an assembler 
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in Uddevalla is able to notice how many different types of screws are used 
in the whole vehicle. This is impossible for an assembler at the line in 
Torslanda. In order to get this information, every single assembly station 
has to be analysed.
To sum up, the example shows that the information that can be provided 
to the design engineers from the assemblers in the two plants, is likely to be 
different. In Torslanda, the assembler focuses on specific details of the ve-
hicle whereas, the Uddevalla assembler focuses on the vehicle as a whole.
5. Conclusions
There is a difference between the assembly concepts in Uddevalla and 
Torslanda, which creates a difference in the skills that the assemblers in 
the two plants possess. More specifically, the fuel pipe example shows that 
the Uddevalla assemblers discovered a problem that their colleagues in 
Torslanda did not, and they were able to provide engineering design with 
information to correct it. Thus, both the ease of assembly and the function 
of the car were improved. 
Our example indicates that some of the tasks traditionally performed by 
process engineers were performed by the assemblers in the Uddevalla plant. 
For example they actively worked with finding ways to improve the assem-
bly process. This task is mainly performed by process engineers in Torslanda, 
which partly explains why this problem was discovered in Uddevalla but 
not in Torslanda. The focus of this article was on the skills possessed by 
assemblers. It seems clear however, that the two assembly concepts create 
a need for process engineers with two different sets of skills. 
The fuel pipe example, indicates that the information that assemblers can 
provide to engineering design is important. In this case, the information 
was provided ‘after the fact’, that is, when regular assembly was running 
in Uddevalla. An interesting topic is whether it also means that information 
from the assemblers is valuable to engineering design during the product 
development process and if this varies between different assembly concepts. 
We believe that this is the case. We also believe that this potential, inherent 
in the Uddevalla concept, never was fully realized.
A longer version of this article is published in a series of papers at the 
Department of Industrial Economics & Management, Royal Institute of 
Technology, Stockholm October, 1993.
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Notes
1 . The article does not describe, neither Volvo Car, nor the Uddevalla plant in 
detail.  Volvo and the Swedish automotive industry have been described in de-
tail in Berggren (1990). The development of the Uddevalla plant is thoroughly 
discussed in Ellegård (1989).
2 . Model 740, the cheaper of the two cars in the 700 family, was introduced in 
1984.  The 700 family was gradually replaced by the more expensive 900 family 
and model 1992 was the last 740 model produced.  In 1991, 47,800 740s were 
produced of which 3,000 were assembled in Uddevalla, 1,000 in Torslanda 
(Gothenburg), and 41,400 in Gent (Belgium).  The rest were assembled in 
Halifax (Canada), Indonesia, and Malaysia.  In the same year, the total amount 
of cars assembled in Uddevalla was 19,100, in Torslanda 73 ,900, and in Gent 
69,500.  (Source:  Official statistics provided by Volvo´s Information depart-
ment.)
3 . There are two kinds of process engineers at Volvo Car, one group located at 
the head-quarters in Gothenburg and one group located at each of the assem-
bly plants.  These groups are organisationally as well as physically separated. 
The process engineers in Gothenburg are responsible for making sure that new 
components and systems are easy to manufacture and assemble.  They cooperate 
extensively with the design engineers.  The process engineers at the plants, usu-
ally a relatively small number, are responsible for manufacturing and assembly 
equipment, production planning and methods, and to some extent to make sure 
that the components and systems can be easily and cheaply manufactured and 
assembled.
4 . This is an administrative function which, among other things, handles the ad-
ministrative work involved in making design changes.
5 . The fuel pipe example deals with Uddevalla and Torslanda.  However, since 
the majority of the 740s produced in 1991 were assembled in Gent, it should 
be pointed out that this specific problem was not discovered in Gent either. 
Indeed, when the process engineers in Gent were asked to comment on the 
suggestion from Uddevalla, they gave the same answer as the process engineers 
at Torslanda.  Consequently, the same argument can be made for the plant in 
Gent, even though this has not been specifically investigated.
6 . This is actually an example of a philosophical issue, discussed for example by 
the philosopher Karl Popper.
7 . See for example, Womack, Jones & Roos (1990), Clark & Fujimoto (1991), and 
Susman (1992). It is also worth noting that the discussion is not new.  An example 
of a much older discussion of the same topic is found in Hesselman (1948).  The 
author, a very successful  Swedish engineer, writes about the improvement of 
the Diesel engine during the first decades of this century.  On many occasions 
in the book, he points out the importance of designing the product so that it is 
easy and cheap to manufacture.
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 8 . So called ‘Process groups’ or ‘Beredningsgrupper’ in using Volvo terminol-
ogy.
 9 . This is thoroughly discussed by Göranzon (1992).
10 . The concept of perspectives is thoroughly discussed in Danielsson (1983).
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Building for new production concepts
Colin Clipson, Jesper Steen, Anders Törnqvist & Peter Ullmark
The Kalmar and Uddevalla buildings have been used consciously and effec-
tively as symbols of Volvo’s new production concepts. Pictures showing the 
distinct hexagon form of Kalmar and the clover-leaf pavilions in Uddevalla 
have been spread over the world to illustrate Volvo’s ambitions. Now the 
pictures have been used again to convey the sad message that those pioneer 
industrial plants have been closed down.
What can we learn from these plants? Did the buildings as such contrib-
ute to the realization of new production concepts? What is the relationship 
between functional and symbolic values? How important are buildings in 
industrial production?
The language of buildings
Corporate buildings always tell us something about the company. Inten-
tionally or not, they reflect how the employer regards his employees and 
the work they do. Distinct architectural forms and durable materials also 
testify to the aesthetic and cultural ambitions of the client. Anonymous, 
budget-priced sheds make a corresponding statement in that respect. Usu-
ally architectural quality and intentional corporate symbolism are reserved 
for headquarters and other important office buildings. Expressing a positive 
and clear company philosophy in buildings for industrial production is not 
very common. And perhaps not very easy either.
When Gunter and Margaret Blase approached the young and prominent 
British architect Nicholas Grimshaw to design a factory for their family 
business, Igus GmBH, they described their company as a solar system; the 
centre of the company’s sphere of operation should be the client (the sun), 
while company departments (planets) should revolve directly around the 
clients. Department managers (moons) may be close to the department as the 
situation demands, and the managing director (comet) passes by everyone, 
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maintaining a close relationship with all. Grimshaw and Partners designed 
a skilfully crafted, refined product; a clear, square span of 33.75 meters in 
both directions with the roof suspended from vertical braced tubular masts. 
This flexible, interchangeable factory/office space does not give any clues 
to the expressed company philosophy. The task of translating the private 
culture of the enterprise, the public culture of the workplace and reconciling 
them with a responsibility to the rest of the synthetic and natural world is 
not an easy one. Perhaps the architect in reality had few options other than 
emphasizing the need for flexibility above all.
Were the Kalmar and Uddevalla factories too special?
In the Volvo case, the unusual forms of the Kalmar and the Uddevalla facto-
ries were specifically chosen to demonstrate that working methods in these 
buildings were unique. One reason for the unions to support the layout of the 
Uddevalla plant was reportedly that it made it impossible to reintroduce the 
mechanical assembly line. Everybody involved in the two projects seemed 
to agree that the new buildings were important for the realization of the 
production concepts.
Even without the complications of strong demands for flexibility, the best 
design for an industrial building is not obvious. Functional requirements 
can be met in several ways, there are choices regarding the proper symbolic 
expression of the building. There are sometimes difficult contradictory de-
mands to handle. When investing in a new production plant, there is the need 
on one hand to emphasize the benefits that a new, different and efficient 
design will give. This is necessary to justify the expenditure of time, money 
and energy that the change will require. On the other hand there must be in 
many cases a possibility to see the continuity between the old and the new 
in order to build consensus and team spirit. Everyone involved should have 
a chance to find support in the new design for his or her particular values 
and ambitions.
The current planning and design process, dominated by a technical 
rationality, has problems in handling these contradictions. The technical 
rationality, according to Schön (1983), separates planning from use, man-
agement from execution of work tasks, thinking from doing and theory from 
practice. A tacit assumption is that it is in fact possible to design systems 
that will work exactly as the designers, planners and systems engineers, 
have intended. But small attention is usually given to how future users will 
conceive the system and to the possibilities to use it in ways other than those 
planned for. Inevitable starting-up and running-in problems are witness to 
this. In some cases a lack of fit between goals and performance also gives 
the system unforeseen adaptability.
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In this perspective, flexibility could be used by the employees to find their 
own solutions and continue to develop the production system. Flexibility of 
the total production system could be a conscious corporate strategy, not only 
a way to handle uncertainty caused by technical advances and the vagaries 
of the market place. Buildings with a usually long-life and great degree of 
freedom as technical systems are a good illustration of how more robust 
artefacts can be designed. Some lessons could perhaps be learned from 
building design that could be applied to the general problems of designing 
organizations and large production systems.
The Kalmar and Uddevalla cases give unique possibilities to discuss this 
classic dilemma of efficiency in the short term versus adaptability in the 
long term. To what extent did the special building design of these plants 
successfully express, promote and establish the new production concepts? 
How did the buildings make ‘good work’ possible? In Uddevalla there was 
an effort to avoid rigid technical systems with heavy mechanical equipment, 
which would hamper future development. But was this effort matched by 
the final building design? Is there a risk that the design was too specialized, 
too tied functionally and symbolically to a particular production system to 
survive a changing corporate environment? Is a new type of design process 
needed?
Innovative form and production change  
in the Kalmar factory
The Kalmar factory was built in 1974 after a dramatic development proc-
ess. The recently appointed President Pehr G Gyllenhammar rejected the 
first plans. In just a few weeks a radically new alternative was developed 
by the ‘Ultra’ group.
According to this new, distinct vision, the factory was divided into small 
workshops with teams of 15–20 people taking care of 4–5 assembly stations 
along the line. Each team had their own foreman and their own entrance, 
lockerrooms and coffee lounges. The teams should function as small en-
terprises, competing with each other to improve productivity and quality. 
Automated carriers, controlled by a central computer system, permitted this 
kind of work organization as well as a more flexible layout.
This opened up new ways of organizing the building. The traditional 
rectangular hall was neither necessary nor appropriate. The demand for 
natural lighting along the assembly-lines, together with the large volume of 
assembly parts to be supplied, gave rise to the hexagonal form of the build-
ings. The hexagon affords greater area and circumference in relation to the 
distance to the centre, compared to a square or a rectangle. Two assembly 
levels wrapped around the central storage area, serviced by high reaching 
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<Figure 1, Page 140, Part II, Clipson (diapositive)>
Figure 1. The Volvo Kalmar factory
fork-lift trucks, produced a concentrated and efficient layout. As a form 
found in beehives and other natural phenomena, the hexagon strongly con-
veys an impression of busy work and efficient use of materials.
The assembly-team areas along the outer walls are both well-lit and hu-
man in scale. By means of the angled walls, with the office and service 
areas at the pivotal corner, the architect has succeeded in skilfully solving 
the con-flicting demands for both separation and contact between different 
work teams. (Fig 2) The service units projecting from the main face of the 
building con-tain the staff entrances, foremen’s offices, locker rooms and 
coffee lounges for each assembly team. They embody important features 
of the work organization.
The strong symbolic effect is obvious when looking at the often published 
aerial photos. But from a close range the building looks much like an ordin-
ary industrial building. The building volumes as such are bluntly planted on 
the vast, flat ground. A small fringe of greenery at the building perimeter is 
not quite enough to give a human scale to the important sector where building 
meets site. Taking his cue from Habermas’ distinction between purposeful 
rational action and symbolic interaction, the architectural critic Kenneth 
Frampton wrote in his analysis of the Volvo plants (1976):
The disproportion of emphasis accorded to these two forms of rationalisa-
tion in advanced industrial society finds its direct reflection in the built 
environment as a whole and while at Kalmar the team work-shop func-
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tions adequately for free discourse within the limited ground provided 
by the technostructure, the somewhat restricted personnel or coffee 
break rooms on the perimeter of the building, far from serving as avenue 
for symbolic interaction are clearly only intended to function, like the 
saunas in the wash-rooms, to restore the will to work. It is surely no 
accident that these rooms are inadequately represented in architectural 
terms, both inside and out, and that their windows open not to pleasure 
gardens but to the industrial amnesiac landscape of the megalo-politan 
strip, that no man’s land of boring commutation by automobile that 
even here Europe all too often serves to suspend the worker in time and 
space between the reality of industrial production and the compensatory 
pleasures of the suburban home.
According to Gerhard Goehle, the architect who planned and designed the 
factory together with the late Owe V. Svärd, there was originally no plan 
for a physical extension. Expansion was to take place by means of doubling 
the work shifts. In 1987, however, a steadily increasing number of parts 
to be assembled forced an extension by a fourth hexagon. It has also been 
difficult to keep team-areas within the length of each edge in the hexagon 
and the clear correspondence between work organization and physical form 
has been muddled.
As in all multi-faceted symmetrical buildings, orientation is something 
of a problem. The different team areas gain their individual identity from 
the parts being assembled – wheels, seats, dashboards. It should also be 
mentioned that some ground floor assembly-team areas for the preassembly 
of chassis parts are less well defined and have no contact with daylight. 
People working at Kalmar have witnessed that they often feel ‘just like a 
little cog in an anonymous machinery’. As Kenneth Frampton (1976) pointed 
out, the panoptic aspects of the production shed have been replaced by a 
computerized production system as a far more efficient control mechanism. 
Just as the small angular deviations of the exterior walls must ultimately 
add up to the exact hexagonal form, the flexible work cycle and the vary-
ing production buffers must also in the end produce a prescribed number 
of faultlessly assembled cars.
Saturn – an American example of sociotechnical production
In the United States, the Saturn company (now producing a highly success-
ful, high quality automobile), stands out as one example of an enterprise 
influenced from its very beginning by the Swedish sociotechnical model. In 
the 1980s, the dramatic business decline of General Motors forced its board 
and shareholders to plan a new and separate manufacturing and assembly 
organization, with a new approach to the planning of work organization, 
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a new car design, a new company name, and a location far away from the 
traditional core of automotive production: Detroit.
In many ways the Saturn operation and complex is an example of Ameri-
can pragmatism and know-how at its best. Early research and planning 
of the new enterprise closely followed the most successful production 
concepts from both Europe and Japan, as well as North America. Bench-
marking studies identified key companies and their production strategies: 
Toyota, Honda, Volvo, Mercedes, Ford, Nissan and so on. Working within 
the confines of a stifling bureaucracy and tradition, it is surprising that the 
Saturn concept of teams and semi-autonomous business groups pulled as 
far away from the parent company as it did. Not as far away as Uddevalla 
from Torslanda in Gothenburg, but nevertheless, a definite break with the 
tradition was made.
Early benchmarking studies by Saturn clearly document the influence of 
Volvo on Saturn’s development of self-directed teams, team centred work 
layouts, training, and team and group facilities. The plant itself is archi-
tecturally bland but configured with what Kenneth Frampton (1976) has 
called ‘compensatory spaces and amenities’: restaurants with access to the 
outdoors, a fitness centre, family centre. Set in a green-field rural site, the 
Springhill plant houses its diverse functions in a series of low profile blue, 
grey and terracotta sheds, well landscaped and almost out of sight to pass-
ing highway motorists; the absolute antithesis of the Ypsilanti or Sterling 
Heights assembly plants or the factories of the Rouge River in Detroit. Evi-
dently there has been a clear ambition to express the various socio-technical 
features of the production plant, training centres as well as compensatory 
spaces, and articulate its relations with the physical and social environment 
in a sensitive way. In these respects the Saturn complex seems to represent a 
development when compared with the compact and closed Kalmar factory, 
bluntly placed on a flat and tarmac-covered industrial site.
International star architect designed the Uddevalla plant
With the Uddevalla assembly plant, Volvo took a decisive step further in 
developing assembly methods. Compared with Kalmar the teams are smaller 
and more independent of each other and consequently, there has been less 
need to integrate the workshops into a single building.
Volvo’s decision to let American architect Romaldo Giurgola design the 
new Uddevalla factory had symbolic significance. Giurgola had designed 
the luxurious new headquarters for the Volvo group in Gothenburg a few 
years earlier. Volvo’s CEO, Pehr Gyllenhammar apparently wanted assem-
bly workers to enjoy an environment of comparable quality.
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In spite of architectural qualities still rare in industry, the result was open 
to critical discussion. The layout of the buildings clearly and elegantly 
displayed the new work organization with car building teams in separate 
production workshops. (Fig 2) The workshops provided a pleasant work 
environment but over time have proved to be somewhat too small. Because 
Figure 2. Master Plan of the Uddevalla Factory
<Figure 2, Page 143, Part II, Clipson>
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of the strong visual form, there seemed to be few possibilities for change 
and extension. Closer scrutiny revealed interesting but dubious architectural 
statements.
The symmetrical administrative building had a prominent central position, 
suggesting an Italian villa in the midst of surrounding agricultural buildings 
of larger and less elaborate volumes. The building could be seen as a potential 
meeting place for several actors involved in future automobile production, 
including customers, marketing experts and production employees, but at the 
time this strong expression of hierarchy seemed overstated. Production was 
in fact mainly controlled from Gothenburg. The interior of the administra-
tive building was much less pretentious than the exterior, almost egalitarian, 
with small, uniform office cubicles for all white-collar personnel, including 
the local manager. Of course, there was still real distance, physically and 
socially, between the local administration and the production. A computer-
ized production system made both distance and control possible.
Physical and organizational distance existed also between the assembly 
workshops and the materials centre in an existing, large L-shaped building, 
acting as a dark blue backdrop for the low workshops buildings. In the ma-
terials centre preassembly and kitting of parts for each car took place, a less 
demanding and more monotonous work than assembling at least one fourth 
of the car. Through the computer systems the assembly teams coordinated 
material flow, therefore making social contact between the two types of 
work-teams neither necessary nor facilitated.
In a recent evaluation of the Kalmar and Uddevalla plants by Berggren 
(1993), these critical observations have received striking confirmation. 
Berggren describes the radical organization changes initiated in Septem-
ber 1992 to further develop the potential of the new producation system. 
Middle management was reduced and engineers and top level managers 
worked directly with the teams out in the workshops, themselves trying 
their hand at assembly work for short periods. A final step, that of emptying 
the administration building completely and moving the management to the 
materials centre unfortunately was not made, because of the closing-down 
decision, but would have been the logical conclusion of a very promising 
development. The responsible manager, Peder Elison, remarked: ‘At first 
there was no big discussion, probably because some people thought I was 
not serious. But as soon as we had established an office in the materials 
centre I would have been the first to move out. And the others would have 
followed. I don’t understand how one could build a plant like this. Aesthet-
ics dominated completely over function.’
The formalistic layout of the Volvo Uddevalla plant led to further inequali-
ties. Many of the ‘combines’, apse-like protuberances, containing the office 
and recreation areas of the work teams, enjoyed a sea view, but because 
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of the symmetrical plan some teams looked out on parking lots and cliff 
walls. Landscaping did not improve the qualities of the site. In this harsh 
coastal climate the need is greater for protective mouldings and barriers 
than for flat lawns and straight lines of trees connecting the shore with the 
office entrance. No outdoor recreational spaces adjacent to the workshops 
were provided.
However, in view of later events a more important question is whether the 
formalistic, symmetrical plan could have made future changes and adapta-
tions more difficult, functionally and symbolically.
In search of the flexible factory
At present we work in a world where two forms of manufacturing are rivals 
– ‘where elements of Henry Ford production and Peter Faberge craftsman-
ship coexist’, as a writer in The Economist expressed it. Automation is 
driven further at the same time as dependence increases on the skills and 
personal responsibility of autonomous work-teams. Manufacturing facili-
ties must provide work environments that fulfil both human needs, the need 
for technical change and development of the work organization. The large, 
all-purpose production shed has serious problems from an environmental 
point of view, problems that are ominous in a situation where production 
is becom-ing increasingly dependant on workers’ skill, commitment and 
versatility. The tailor-made factory, formed around a specific production 
concept is not an alternative when fluctuating market demands and stiff 
competition make flexibility, automation and new forms of work organiza-
tion imperative.
It is clear that the turbulent economies and social climates of today (and 
tomorrow) can best be addressed through flexible organizational behav-
iors, supported by those tools and production facilities that are themselves 
adaptive to change and turbulent conditions. Kalmar and Uddevalla were 
designed to provide adaptive workplace conditions for the new ways of 
working developed at Volvo for more than twenty years. Over that period 
of time Volvo made steady, incremental departures from its traditional ways 
of assembling at Torslanda. Over an even longer period of time, Japanese 
companies were gradually/incrementally perfecting the just-in-time and lean 
production approach to manufacturing.
The spatial cultures of Kalmar and Uddevalla represent the two milestones 
in Volvo’s development of its flexible process of automobile production. In 
principle, both facilities provide the process, tools, materials handling and 
inventory systems to make other kinds of consumer products. In the case 
of Uddevalla, the vast sheds of the materials workshop and its computer 
system, the geographically separated product assembly workshops, each 
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with 80–100 skilled workers, provide small group assembly potentials that 
could be developed.
It may be that in its own way, Uddevalla is more adaptive to the demands 
of changing market forces than the parent company and its strategic plan-
ners and market researchers. Of the two facilities, perhaps Uddevalla offers 
more possibilities for production alternatives because of its more distributed, 
radiating plan, compared with Kalmar’s closed hexagons. On the other hand, 
Uddevalla’s site and ‘customized’ configuration places limitations on reuse 
as a traditional assembly plant. Pysical and social distances have also proved 
to be a disadvantage of the Uddevalla layout. It could be possible, however, 
to extend the potentials of production flexibility, not only to varied product 
lines, but also to occupancy by multiple owners and small companies or 
incubators. This is not the case with Kalmar, or some of the single umbrella 
or shed designs of the conventional production facility, despite the process 
line flexibility these may offer in their uninterrupted floor space.
In its relatively short life span, Uddevalla has demonstrated a new way of 
working, with the radical and primary objective of building the whole car. 
Earlier experimentation with team built subassemblies at Kalmar made the 
later development comprehensible and feasible. Yet one may aski, did the 
Volvo company go far enough in its own strategic thinking about the global 
marketplace and competition that it would face in the 1990s? Slow to react 
to the new product needs of the marketplace and slow to adapt to volatile 
business conditions, Volvo now finds itself reverting to a more traditional 
form of production. Why? A loss of corporate nerve? Powerful outside 
influence and events? A fear of having gone too far in its pioneering new 
ways of manufacturing?
Just how flexible and how broad in function the factory of the future must 
be, has been outlined by Chase and Garvin (1989) in their article The Serv-
ice Factory. Flexible factories offer flexible and changing services and are 
adaptive to new customers’ needs. These factories offer customers timely 
feedback on the manufacturing of new products; they produce prototypes 
rapidly, and involve customers in evaluating new products. Factories of 
the new kind often act as demonstration devices that promote new and 
more effective ways of making products, pulling potential customers into 
the factory and making them an important part of the process. This type of 
production facility can act as a laboratory for new ideas suggested by end 
users. Such a facility links up with the after market service and life of the 
product produced to make sure that changing needs are addressed.
3M Medical Electronics Systems Manufacturing Division is a current 
example of this type of factory. The 3M factory provides a full scale 
simulation complex and classrooms in the plant where surgical teams from 
hospitals around the country are invited to simulate and devise new types 
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of equipment for new procedures. 3M staff and customers codesign new 
products with medical professionals who take these new products back to 
the hospitals for trial. Staff and users watch and critique the codesigning 
from adjacent classrooms. 3M is a leader in adapting its manufacturing to 
meet its users’ needs.
The service factory of the future involves all employees in generating high 
quality products. As Peter Drucker has pointed out, knowledge work in the 
factory of the future will allow workers to interact in all stages of product 
development from the design concept to the servicing the product in use.
Did Kalmar and Uddevalla, as the most progressive components of the 
Volvo culture have this potential? Perhaps. But not without more progres-
sive product strategies and market know-how. Do such production cultures 
exist, or are they merely aspirations? According to Chase and Garvin (1989), 
many companies are on the way to realizing these potentials, namely Hewlett 
Packard, Allen Bradley and Caterpillar. It may well be that the most progres-
sive cultures for such development are not to be found in the auto-mobile 
industry at all. In a study of over 200 factories by the IBM Consulting Group, 
researchers rated factories according to the best available international 
standards for such criteria as product quality, logistics and manufacturing, 
lean production and state of the art tools and facilities. Those scoring over 
80% on the resulting scale were defined as world class. The best perform-
ing industries were those of electronics, information technologies and food 
manufacturing. The worst performers were those manufacturing automo-
biles and aerospace components.
There is little doubt that automobile industries around the world are at 
a critical stage in their evolution, of which the choices between modes of 
production, as well as the role of machines and the role of people are cen-
tral issues. Uddevalla is closed at the precise moment when the Japanese 
manufacturers are seriously reconsidering the culture of their way of work-
ing, and the negative effects this work culture is having on the attitudes of 
Japan’s younger generation.
Urban metaphors in factory design  
inspired by service industry buildings
In consequence with the trend toward more knowledge-based and custom-
ized production, it is no surprise that the first attempts to optimize social and 
technical needs were made in buildings for the service industries. Herman 
Hertzberger’s Centraal Beheer in the Hague, Holland, built in 1974, houses 
the thousand employees of an insurance business. A top lit central street 
runs through stacks of pyramidal decks, each floor connected by bridges. 
Top down lighting, open decks and staircases, combined with lush interior 
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Figure 3. Perspective drawing of SAAB-Scania assembly plant in Malmö
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vegetation of plants and trees, creates an indoor city with open air quality 
in the labyrinth of space. Perhaps its strongest break with the traditions of 
office and particularly the open plan office, was its sense of freedom to 
choose and move. The blend of work and social space were more reminiscent 
of an urban neighborhood than of a dedicated workspace.
Designed by Niels Torp in 1988, (though masterminded by the visionary 
SAS CEO Jan Carlzon) the SAS headquarters is one of the most wellknown 
examples of the workplace as urban form with its descending street lined 
with not only seven office floors, but cafés, cinema, shops, bank and swim-
ming pool, in short, all the amenities of city life. Finally, in the recently built 
London Ark at the Hammersmith flyover in London, by Ralph Erskine, a 
British architect, (domiciled in Sweden), the town metaphor is pronounced 
again. Rising layers of offices and meeting spaces wrap around a lofty, 
spectacular atrium with restaurants, meeting lounges and bridges.
The urban metaphors could also be found in a new assembly plant, built 
in Malmö, by the other Swedish automaker, SAAB Scania. Not long after 
the Volvo Uddevalla factory was built in 1988, SAAB made a similar move 
and took over parts of an abandoned shipyard site in central Malmö. A huge 
building used for welding iron plates into sections of ships was converted 
into a modern car assembly plant. Like the Uddevalla plant it too was 
closed down after an even shorter period of operation. But it is interesting 
to compare the two plants from other viewpoints as well.
The interior central street, 250 metres long, 20 metres wide and 12 metres 
high, is the indisputable centre of the SAAB building. (Fig 3) As such it 
is surprisingly successful, in receiving generous natural light from several 
directions. Inspired by modern office buildings, notably the SAS airline 
headquarters in Stockholm, this street nevertheless has a distinct industrial 
flavour through the heavy roof constructions and thick bundles of technical 
installations freely penetrating the open space.
Through this central street an overview of the total plant is possible. The 
main entrance is used by everyone. Walking among hundreds of people 
choosing routes on different levels to reach their work area, it is possible to 
get an understanding of how their tasks all contribute to the common goal, 
that of producing a certain number of quality cars. The recreation spaces are 
not definitely assigned to a certain production area as in the Volvo Uddevalla 
factory. One can choose different routes to several areas.
The SAAB Malmö and the Volvo Uddevalla factories can be seen to illus-
trate different principles, which can be used to overcome the lack of meeting 
places in the traditional factory building. The labels to describe them could 
be called ‘The Main Street’ and ‘The Family Flat’. In Uddevalla, Volvo chose 
‘The Family Flat’ solution, where a team of car builders formed a socially 
tightly knit unit with their own distinct spaces for work and rest. This gave 
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identity and strength within the ‘family’ but also a risk of strong pressure 
to conform within the group and aloofness towards other groups. One got 
the impression that in Uddevalla, the assembly workers were the ones who 
actually built the car. The material handlers performed a less qualified and 
more monotonous service function. Those who started working there might 
not have gotten the natural contact with the assembly work and a chance 
later to try their hand at other tasks.
SAAB did not go as far as Volvo in letting the workers build the whole 
car. But the work cycle became considerably longer than the customary 2–3 
minutes. Car builders and material handlers were part of a larger team and 
switched tasks to provide variety and broaden skills. The need for identity 
and contact was not met through a close-knit ‘family’ as in Volvo, but 
through the more varied social life of the factory street. But in spite of the 
large ‘urban’ scale, the public character of the SAAB street was limited. The 
foremen’s offices were obtrusively juxtaposed with the recreation spaces, 
contact with the exterior natural and urban environment was obscured.
Is it really necessary to choose between the SAAB and Volvo solutions? 
Might it not be possible to have both the larger integrated groups and the 
challenge of building the whole car? Another physical configuration of the 
Volvo plant was discussed at an earlier stage. The production workshops 
were then placed as ‘bubbles’ around the Materials Centre. Perhaps that idea 
could have been developed further so as to integrate assembly work and 
materials handling. It would seem that evaluations of alternatives and pos-
sibilities of this kind need more developed concepts and tools of analysis.
Analysis of spatial cultures
A retrospective view might suggest that in the transition and course of 
industrial events, automobile production facilities have had to deal with 
both the maturation of mass production and the emergence of new forms 
of customization of products and flexible manufacturing. Much of this 
development has been in the hands and minds of production designers and 
technical innovators. Exploration of more progressive building forms has 
primarily originated in other industries – electronics, computers and com-
munications.
Little research has been done on the dynamics of spatial cultures in 
workplaces. However, the work that has been done, by Hillier & Hanson 
(1984), Peponis (1985), and others, suggest that the design of space (e.g. 
for the factory) has strategic effects on the culture of workplaces. Some 
types of behavior are made possible, others impossible. Below the details 
of architectural styles and decorations there are spatial patterns established 
and controlled by the brief that the client gives the designer. It is aimed at 
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preserving existing patterns of power distribution and behavior (Markus 
1993). Research to date suggests that there are basic concepts used in space 
syntax analysis which may lead to a more general understanding of the social 
properties of layout and in fact offer a more reliable way of comparing one 
layout design with another. As yet there are really no quantitative techniques 
for evaluating and comparing the social effects of different spatial layouts. 
In contrast a great deal of work exists on the technical layout of machinery 
and the effects of such layouts on assembly cycle times, materials handling 
and other production engineering issues. Perhaps this methodological im-
balance as much as anything else, thwarts the attempts of the designer of 
interior space in factories to balance social with technical needs.
Concepts for a new design process
We have seen that in spite of strong architectural expression, which com-
municate both corporate ambition and new forms of work organization, 
both the Kalmar and Uddevalla factories suffer from weaknesses as build-
ing designs.
Physical demarcations, expressing autonomy for work teams, also help to 
structure the overall space and improve readability and understanding of the 
building as whole. But demarcations on the other hand can be excessive if 
they obfuscate coherencies and weaken the plant’s social integration. In spite 
of the relatively small size of the Kalmar factory, its regular and symmetrical 
form, the dominant materials storage in the central part of the building and 
the separate entrances for the work teams, orientation and overview in the 
building are difficult.
In Uddevalla, the lack of overall coherency, despite a superficial archi-
tectural symmetry and elegance, is even more prominent and seems to have 
kept social integration of different personnel groups at a minimum.
Other deficiencies common to both plants concern the poor adaptation 
to the site and difficulties to extend and change the factory buildings while 
keeping the distinctive visual form of the original layout. In retrospect, it 
is easy to find fault with the basic architectural concepts. One could search 
for other design solutions that would reconcile conflicting requirements 
better. However, extreme time constraints and insufficient awareness of 
the necessary phases of the design process seem to be the primary reasons 
för the difficulties.
First it should be recognized that time constraints as such are not always 
inimical to creative design. On the contrary, as knowledge of the different 
aspects of a design problem increases, new and radically different concepts 
may develop late in the decision process, even if the financial and organi-
zational constraints have tightened (Steen & Ullmark, 1992). The Kalmar 
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‘Ultra’ concept is an example of this. In spite of the short time, it seems that 
effective project management and a cooperative spirit between the parties 
involved ascertained that the basic requirements concerning the physical 
work environment were met, both in Kalmar and Uddevalla.
However, there seems to have been insufficient time and motivation for 
an important phase in the design process, where primary concepts and de-
tailed design work are consolidated into a final product. (Lundeqvist & Ul-
lmark, 1993) In an introductory conceptual phase, primary design concepts, 
sometimes expressed in powerful metaphors, help to build consensus and 
guide future work. In a second constituent phase, the detailed testing and 
resolution of conflicting requirements are worked out. Three outcomes of 
this phase are theoretically possible. If the interests behind the first primary 
concepts are strong, such as when using a skilful and influential architect 
or production engineer, these concepts prevail and other important require-
ments are modified or abandoned to fit in. In a second type of outcome, 
strong partial interests can deform the primary concepts to produce a bland 
compromise.
Examples of the third, successful type of outcome can often be found 
among old buildings, which through first-rate professional work and suf-
ficient time for careful design, have managed to stay remarkably beautiful, 
durable and useful over a long period oftime. For example, the Luma light 
bulb factory in Stockholm, designed by Arthur von Schmalensee and Eskil 
Sundahl in 1929–30, is a case in question. We interpret the success to be due 
to thorough functional analysis on one hand, which has given the building 
character and identity, and an endeavor for simplicity and elegance on the 
other hand. All important requirements have been met, while an extensive 
brief has passed through a process of consolidation. The form has been 
cultivated and clarified to a simple and distinct structure, which can be 
extended and used for other purposes also.
The repetitive, iterative character of the process must be emphasized. 
Each design passes through the conceptual, constituent and consolidatory 
phases several times. It is easy to neglect any of these three phases, each 
representing are important lessons to be learned. Architects often like to 
think that their primary concepts are new and unique instead of borrowed 
and assimilated from a vast repertoire of historical examples. In the second 
phase the involvement of a broad array of various interests and competencies 
is important. Technical experts, employees, community interests – must all 
be given a say. The complexity of this calls for a structured process, similar 
to the urban planning process, in which interaction takes place at different, 
wellchosen points in time, where the decision problems are sufficiently 
complex to stimulate creativity but not so entangled as to be unmanageable 
(Törnqvist, 1992).
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This interaction should be seen not only as a negotiation process with 
well-known alternative outcomes, but as a learning process, where creative 
and new solutions are possible (Clipson & Kornbluh, 1993) Recently new 
insights have been gained concerning how this enabling and learning process 
of interaction could be reinforced. Shared practical and sensory experiences 
of the concrete design object is important in order to facilitate understand-
ing through a common language. As Ehn (1988, 1992) and Granath (1991) 
have shown, even simple cardboard models of possible artefact designs are 
helpful to promote a common understanding.
The role of metaphors
Symbols express values, which make associations with history or with an 
industrial activity, for example, the adornment of the smoke chimney was 
seen as a sign of power. Symbols could be likened to words and simple 
phrases. To create richer language games a formal syntax and more complex 
metaphors are needed. A Greek temple or a Roman basilica are characterized 
not only by certain details but also by a syntax, which determines how to 
proportion and combine these details.
Metaphors are motifs and form-generating ideas capable of creating a clear 
Gestalt out of a complex aggregate, borrowed from nature or social situations 
– such as the factory as prison (Foucault, 1975), school or castle. The design 
of a complex building is often inspired by a combination of metaphors, for 
example when the Volvo Uddevalla plant brings reminiscences of both the 
former ship-building plant and an Italian manorial farm. Metaphors are more 
concrete and suggestive than verbal guidelines, but less precise than draw-
ings. They fulfil the contradictory roles of embodying the radically new and 
allowing room for old continuities and incremental future adaptations, both 
of which are important conditions for change in large organizations.
Metaphors play an important part in all three phases of the design proc-
ess. Primary concepts are often metaphors, facilitating interaction between 
vari-ous interests in the constituent phase. But in the third phase, a critical 
view of established metaphors is necessary and the generating of new ones 
should be encouraged. The extreme closedness and technical efficiency of 
the ‘beehive’ hexagon at Kalmar should have given rise to doubt concern-
ing its openness and ability to accommodate future production changes. 
The mixture of ship-yard sheds and Italian farm buildings, while visually 
effective may not be a robust or appropriate combination of metaphors. 
Genuine conflicts between strong opposing interests can not be hidden for 
long behind harmonious and symmetrical exteriors but should be expressed 
appropriately. Metaphors more related to the local surroundings, to the gen-
ius loci at both Kalmar and Uddevalla, probably would have been better. 
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Today the visually distinctive Volvo buildings now stand as graphic signs 
of a dynamic but unfortunately short period of technological, organizational 
and architectural development.
Conclusion
Much like the General Motors Saturn plant, the Volvo factories at Kalmar 
and Uddevalla have made their more progressive tendencies less irksome 
to the parent organization. The godchild as satellite producer may never 
rival the parent in size or product share without running the risk of more 
corporate control and limiting initiative. Uddevalla and Kalmar, despite 
their pioneering examples and productive value have fallen out of favour 
of the traditional parent, and therefore have been banished. A distinctive 
architectural design probably helped to promote and establish the pioneer 
spirit that made the plants successful in the short run. The designers also 
made use of the possibilities to create an excellent physical work environ-
ment with small-scale, well organized work team areas, amply provided with 
daylight and social spaces. But a planning process with too little attention 
to a collaborative choice of suitable design metaphors led to weaknesses 
in more subtle and long-term qualities. Although Uddevalla in particular 
seems to have adaptive possibilities for other production, one is tempted to 
think that the conspicuous form and strong symbolism of both the Kalmar 
and Uddevalla buildings contributed to the ostracism they suffered.
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Designed for learning:  
a tale of two auto plants
Paul S. Adler and Robert E. Cole
A consensus is emerging that the hallmark of tomorrow’s most effective 
organizations will be their capacity to learn. To survive in the competitive 
turbulence that is engulfing a growing number of industries, firms will 
need to pinpoint innovative practices rapidly, to communicate them to their 
employees and suppliers, and to stimulate further innovation.
However, there are two very different views on the organizational design 
most effective to support learning, particularly in more labor-intensive 
pro-duction of relatively standardized products.1 Proponents of the Japa-
nese-inspired ‘lean production model’, such as the MIT researchers who 
contributed to The Machine That Changed The World, argue that organiza-
tional learning will be maximized in a system based on specialized work 
tasks supplemented by modest doses of job rotation and great discipline in 
the definition and implementation of detailed work procedures.2 By con-
trast, European managers, union officials, and academics are engaged in a 
lively discussion on the possibility of a German-Scandinavian alternative.3 
Proponents of this ‘human-centered model’ argue that organizational adapt-
ability and learning is best served by greatly lengthened work cycles and a 
return to craft-like work forms that give teams substantial latitude in how 
they perform their tasks and authority over what have traditionally been 
higher-level management decisions.
Toyota is often credited with pioneering the key elements of the lean 
production model. In the United States, the best documented of Toyota’s 
plants is the Toyota General Motors (GM) joint venture, the New United 
Motor Manufacturing, Inc. (NUMMI) plant in California. Volvo’s Uddevalla 
plant exemplifies the human-centered alternative. It is one of Volvo’s most 
innovative plants, radically extending the long cycle and team autonomy 
concepts that shaped the famous Kalmar plant.4
In November 1992, Volvo announced that it would close the Uddevalla 
and Kalmar plants, but these plant closings should not close the debate over 
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the significance of their innovations. The two plants are not being shut down 
due to poor performance. In fact, Kalmar operated at productivity and quality 
levels higher than those at Volvo’s main Torslanda plant, and Uddevalla was 
already matching Torslanda in productivity. However, Volvo was operating 
at very low capacity utilization levels, and managers believed that shutting 
down the two smaller plants was an effective way to reduce total overhead. 
Although Volvo’s innovations in work organization will continue in some 
of its truck and component plants, the closing of these two plants will end 
a remarkable twenty-five year period in which Volvo’s efforts to humanize 
and democratize work inspired managers, union officials, and academics 
around the world. The concept of self-managing teams so popular in the 
United States today owes much to these two plants, as does the design of 
G.M.’s Saturn plant. Whether the advocates of work reorganization within 
Volvo will be able to refocus their efforts on reforming Volvo’s other facili-
ties remains to be seen. Whatever the case, there is much to be learned from 
the Kalmar and Uddevalla experience.
Between us, we have studied firsthand a number of Toyota’s Japanese 
plants, the NUMMI facility, and several Volvo facilities, including Ud-
devalla. In this article, we assess the relative merits of NUMMI and Ud-
devalla as organizations designed to support learning. In brief, we argue that 
although elements of the Uddevalla approach do indeed promise a higher 
potential for individual learning, NUMMI is the more effective model for 
encouraging organizational learning. The NUMMI model thus assures a 
higher growth rate for productivity and manufacturing quality. Proponents 
of the Uddevalla model argue that the NUMMI model’s purported techni-
cal strengths will be overshadowed by its lack of opportunities for personal 
development and that its regimentation will undercut worker motivation. 
We believe that this critique is misconceived and that the intense discipline 
created by NUMMI’s job design creates not only world class performance 
but also a highly motivating work environment.
First, we describe some of the key aspects of the two plants’ organizational 
designs. Then we compare their performance results and identify some 
technical factors that may contribute to these results. Finally, we closely 
examine the social factors and critique some popular misapprehensions 
about the sources of motivation and of organizational learning.
Comparing two organizational designs
NUMMI and Uddevalla are similar in several important respects. They are 
both truly committed to treating employees as their most important assets 
and to providing opportunities for employee growth. For both plants, gov-
ernance is accomplished by a relatively strong partnership between union 
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and management. They are also similar in the relatively strong partnership 
between union and management. Finally, they are both organized around 
production teams.
But the similarities give way to important differences when we examine 
the internal organization more closely. The NUMMI and Uddevalla produc-
tion teams are very different. At NUMMI, teams are composed of four or 
five workers under a team leader, and both team members and team leaders 
are hourly workers. Each team member performs a work cycle of about sixty 
seconds. In the final assembly department, the teams are linked in series, 
in the traditional ‘Fordist’ assembly line pattern. Toyota’s just-in-time in-
ventory system ensures that this interdependence is very taut. Teams take 
on responsibilities not normally the province of line workers in U.S. auto 
plants, in particular for quality assurance, preventive maintenance, and in-
ternal job rotation schedules. They also define work methods and standards, 
but must satisfy managers and engineers that these methods and standards 
are optimal and that they are implemented identically across workers and 
shifts. Although such worker involvement in defining methods violates 
Frederick Taylor’s principles of ‘scientific management’, the resulting job 
designs are very Tayloristic in their narrow scope and gesture-by-gesture 
regimentation.
At Uddevalla, the break with Taylorism and Fordism was deliberate and 
radical. The plant’s model evolved at a time when Volvo was experiencing 
a production capacity bottleneck in a protected market with no efficient 
Japanese competitors for its niche. In the mid-1980s, Volvo was selling eve-
rything it could make, and lack of productive capacity was the problem. The 
major constraint in breaking the capacity bottleneck was the tight Swedish 
labor market. The design of the Uddevalla plant was labor-market driven, 
not product-market driven. As one of the key managers involved in the plant 
design expressed it, ‘The problem we had was how could we make the plant 
attractive for Swedish workers to want to work in it.’
In the newly designed plant, each of eight production teams took full 
responsibility for assembling the vehicle from the subsystems up – a work 
cycle of about two hours. The plant abolished the assembly line, as the eight 
teams worked in parallel. The teams were larger, ten people as opposed to 
four or five at NUMMI. Because the work cycle was so long, Uddevalla 
teams paid much less attention than NUMMI’s teams to the detailed, ges-
ture-by-gesture standardization and instead focused on the more aggregated 
balance of tasks within the whole assembly cycle. Not only did Uddevalla 
teams decide job rotation schedules, they also selected their own hires and 
decided on their own overtime schedules. At NUMMI, union representatives 
and managers jointly select team leaders based on objective tests, whereas 
at Uddevalla, teams selected their own leaders and often rotated the role.
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Both organizations put great stock in worker training. NUMMI has in-
vested considerable time and effort in training workers in the principles and 
techniques of its production system, but it offers no pay premium for the 
accumulation of new skills. At Uddevalla, team members’ pay increased 
with the accumulation of proved expertise.
Comparing performance results
NUMMI took over the old GM plant in Fremont and hired about 85% of its 
workforce from the ranks of laid-off GM-Fremont workers. Pilot production 
began in December 1984, and by 1986, NUMMI was almost as productive 
as its sister Toyota plant in Takaoka and more productive than any other GM 
plant. Total hourly and salaried hours per vehicle averaged 20.8 at NUMMI 
in 1986, as opposed to 18.0 in Takaoka, 40.7 in the relatively comparable 
GM-Framingham plant, and 43.1 at the old GM-Fremont plant in 1978. In-
ventory levels averaged two days, which was significantly below U.S. auto 
industry averages, but still above the two hour level prevailing in Takaoka, 
primarily due to difficulties in running true just-in-time inventory with sup-
pliers from Japan and the U.S. Midwest.5
More recent data indicate that this extraordinary performance was not 
merely a honeymoon phenomenon. According to a J.D. Power and Associ-
ates study of the number of problems per 100 vehicles experienced by cus-
tomers within 90 days of purchase, NUMMI scored 116 in 1989, compared 
to an industry average of 148 for all cars sold in the United States. The 
number of problems went up in 1990 with the introduction of Geo Prizm 
and new domestic suppliers but then decreased to 93 in 1991 and to 83 in 
1992 (when the industry average was 125 for all cars sold in the United 
States and the average for Asian nameplates was 105; for U.S. nameplates, 
136; and for Europeans, 158).6
What of NUMMI’s quality of worklife? Here, too, the indicators are very 
impressive:
• Absenteeism has held steady at about 3 percent.
• Participation in the suggestion program had increased to over 90 per-
cent by 1991, and workers made over 10,000 suggestions that year, an 
average of about 5 suggestions per worker. The implementation rate for 
these suggestions was over 80 percent, which reflects as much or more 
on NUMMI’s policy of encouraging involvement as on the quality of 
the suggestions themselves.
• Internal surveys of worker attitudes showed that the overall proportion 
of people describing themselves as satisfied or very satisfied with their 
job at NUMMI had increased from 76 pecent in 1987 to 85 percent in 
1989 and to 90 percent in 1991
161
How does this compare with the Uddevalla plant? Unfortunately, the data 
here are sketchy:
• According to a New York Times article, it took fifty hours to assemble a 
vehicle at Uddevalla as opposed to an average of twenty-two hours for 
Japanese plants in the United States.7 When we visited the plant in the 
summer of 1991, the plant manager claimed that these data were old 
and that the plant had already reached the productivity of the Torslanda 
plant, which this Times article estimated at forty hours per vehicle. Even 
adjusting for the larger size of the vehicles produced at Uddevalla, the 
productivity differential would be substantial. (Unfortunately, we have 
no comparable quality data on Uddevalla’s output).
• Although absenteeism was half that of Volvo’s main plant at Torslanda, 
it was still very high: sick leave absences averaged about 12 percent in 
1990 and long-term disability about 10 percent for a total of about 22 
percent – compared to 3 percent absenteeism at NUMMI. Uddevalla 
workers benefited from much more generous sick leave provisions, and 
it is possible that NUMMI’s strictness on absenteeism does not allow 
workers sufficient flexibility to balance work- and non-worklife. It is 
nevertheless clear that Uddevalla’s worklife did not provide sufficient 
intrinsic satisfaction to overcome the long-standing Swedish tradition 
of high absenteeism rates.
• Turnover was high during Uddevalla’s startup because some workers 
without industrial work experience did not accommodate to the pres-
sures of the very demanding work in auto assembly. However, turnover 
had settled at about 6 percent by 1991. This figure is comparable to 
NUMMI’s, but turnover, like absenteeism, is influenced by many factors 
outside the plant’s control.
• More telling, perhaps, was a 1992 survey of worker satisfaction across 
Volvo’s plants, which revealed that Uddevalla scored in a similar range 
to the very traditional Torslanda plant. This was a big disappointment 
to management, which could only argue that it was the reflection of the 
workers’ high expectations. This argument has some merit, but such a 
score also suggests that craft-style production may have been idealized 
by Uddevalla’s designers and oversold as a cure to the ills of modern 
labor.
Perhaps we too have succumbed to this idealized view, because we think 
that Uddevalla, not NUMMI, would be the more desirable place to work. 
Uddevalla offered a much less regimented environment, more task variety, 
more autonomy, and a lot more team self-management. However, there is 
little doubt as to which production system is capable of delivering the great-
est efficiency and quality: it is NUMMI.8 In fact, one Volvo executive we 
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interviewed stated flatly that Uddevalla would not have been built under 
today’s circumstances, and it would be hard to find others at Volvo who 
would disagree. The context that produced Uddevalla has changed. The labor 
bottleneck has disappeared and efficient Japanese competitors are hurting 
Volvo in its export markets.
The question remains: Is the technical and economic superiority of the 
NUMMI system achieved at the expense of workers’ well-being?
Interpreting the results: Some methodological difficulties
Critics of the lean production system argue that it does not provide a viable 
model for production organization. Two variants of the criticism have been 
articulated:
One line of criticism argues that, in the lean system, workers are forced to 
work under excessive stress.9 As a result, their motivation to ensure world-
class quality and their participation in the kaizen (continuous improvement) 
process will eventually taper off, and the potential benefits of standardized, 
narrow jobs will be outweighed by the costs of worker disaffection. An 
alternative hypothesis assumes that workers will continue to participate in 
kaizen efforts frequently enough to ensure its productive superiority, but 
they do so out of fear of losing their jobs. Thus their bodies and minds are 
under excessive stress, and many workers will quit their jobs exhausted after 
a few years, leaving society to pay the costs of this premature depreciation 
of our human resources.
Some observers have presented prima facie evidence for one or other of 
these scenarios and jump to the conclusion that NUMMI’s production sys-
tem is just a new way of further intensifying work effort, a form of ‘ultra 
Taylorism’.10 Kamata’s description of his experience as a temporary worker 
in Toyota City in the early 1970s and Fucini’s description of the Mazda Flat 
Rock plant, for example, are cited as evidence supporting this characteri-
zation.11 Parker and Slaughter have compiled an impressive dossier on the 
stress experienced by workers in some ‘team concept’ plants.12
But it is not easy to draw strong conclusions from the anecdotal evidence 
available. Public debate and scholarly research both confront a number of 
big methodological challenges in sorting out the relative merits of the al-
ternative systems. First, many conceptions of the stressful, ergonomically 
unsound Japanese factory are based on old descriptions and images. In a 
recent systematic comparison of the Japanese and American auto industries, 
Richard Wokutch concluded that in spite of several significant weaknesses, 
safety and health conditions and practices in large Japanese auto firms 
were superior in many important respects to those in comparable American 
firms.13
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Second, not all Japanese plants and transplants are identical. We should 
not assume that a practice found at one can be extrapolated to all. We should 
not asume that ‘good practices’ at NUMMI are necessarily representative 
of all transplants or for that matter that they are even representative of all 
Toyota plants. A good case can be made that the Japanese have been forced 
to modify the harsher aspects of their production system to make them more 
compatible with the expectations of Western workers. In this article, we 
focus on the NUMMI version of the Japanese production model.
Third, problems observed at a plant at a given point in time may not be 
inherent in the underlying model. For example, Uddevalla experienced a 
high rate of turnover during its startup, but this was for reasons that are 
largely unrelated to the central debate. A fair assessment should assume that 
both approaches are capable of learning and evolution.
Fourth, it is important to avoid the frequent polemic device of shifting the 
point of comparison. From the workers’ perspective, production systems at 
Japanese transplants like NUMMI are far from ideal, but the ideal is a rather 
remote comparison point, and we need to use realistic comparison points to 
make reasonable assessments.
Finally, if the debate is over the merits of alternative production system 
designs, we should filter out as much as possible other, unrelated aspects of 
management. Some Japanese transplants, for example, have been criticized 
for discriminatory employment practices and for the difficult relations be-
tween U.S. managers and Japanese shadow managers.14 These management 
problems are often real and serious, but an alternative explanation is that 
these problems are symptomatic of Japanese firms’ inexperience in inter-
national operations.15 Some of these practices do indeed appear racist, but 
it is certainly racist to assume that they are inherent features of Japanese 
management.
Interpreting the results: Technical aspects
To what then is NUMMI’s productive superiority due? In particular, should 
this superiority be attributed to excessive stress imposed on workers? Our 
research suggests that the primary factor is NUMMI’s effort to constantly 
improve the details of the production process. Such constant improvement 
is the key to productivity and quality in a product as standardized as an 
automobile. This constant improvement effort creates a certain level of 
stress, but as the worker attitude surveys show, the level is not so high as 
to degenerate into strain and distress.
Workers at both NUMMI and Uddevalla were encouraged to seek out 
improvements. And to help them, both groups received feedback on their 
task performance over their respective work cycles. But Toyota’s stand-
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ardized work system makes this feedback far more effective in sustaining 
improvement. At NUMMI, the work cycle is about sixty seconds long, and 
the performance of that cycle is very standardized. Therefore, it is easy 
to identify problems, define improvement opportunities, and implement 
improved processes.
Uddevalla workers, too, had detailed information on their work cycle 
performance, but as this cycle was some two hours long, they had no way 
to track their task performance at a more detailed level. This problem was 
exacerbated by the craft model of work organization that encouraged Ud-
devalla workers to believe that they should have considerable latitude in 
how they performed each cycle.
Some proponents of the Uddevalla design principles argue that it offers 
a way around the line-balancing problems that limit the efficiency of tradi-
tional sequential assembly lines.16 But NUMMI effectively resolves those 
problems through a combination of modest doses of worker flexibility (far 
less extensive than Uddevalla’s) and aggressive efforts to reduce set-up 
times. The standardization of detailed work methods facilitate efforts to 
reduce set-up times. Moreover, as the variety of models produced in a given 
plant increases, it becomes increasingly difficult for workers to recall the 
right procedure for each job, and shorter cycle times with well-defined meth-
ods help assure quality. As a result, NUMMI’s assembly-line can handle a 
relatively broad range of product types with minimal disruption.
Could the semiautonomous work teams at Uddevalla have come to see 
shorter work cycles and formalized methods as a better way and adopted 
it autonomously? Although Uddevalla had a bonus system that encouraged 
work teams to improve performance continually, the teams had neither the 
focus on the kinds of microscopic kaizen opportunities that drive NUMMI 
performance (because of Uddevalla’s long work cycle) nor the tools to cap-
ture these opportunities (because they lacked standardized work processes). 
To the contrary, in fall 1991, we were informed that there were no detailed 
documentation available to workers describing how to perform each work 
task and specifying how long it should take. One of the Uddevalla workers 
we interviewed argued, ‘You don’t really need all that detail because you 
can feel it when the task isn’t going right, you can feel the sticking points 
yourself.’ But workers at Uddevalla had no mechanism for identifying, test-
ing, or diffusing the improvements that individual workers might make to 
eliminate these sticking points. The engineering staff from different work 
areas met to share new ideas. But without a well-documented, standardized 
process, it is hard to imagine how these people could have spotted improve-
ment opportunities or shared them across the teams. You cannot sustain 
continual improvement in the production of products as standardized as 
automobiles without clear and detailed methods and standards.
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Interpreting the results: Human aspects
The key points of contention in the debate over the human aspects of the 
competing models are work design and the broader plant governance proc-
ess. Let us compare NUMMI and Uddevalla on these two key dimensions.
NUMMI’s work organization follows what we have called the ‘democratic 
Taylorism’ model.17 As Frederick Taylor and modern industrial engineering 
practice recommend, jobs are specialized and work processes are standard-
ized to the extent justified by the repetitiveness of the production task. 
But unlike traditional ‘despotic Taylorism,’ NUMMI’s prescribed methods 
and standards are not designed to squeeze more work out of employees 
that management assumes are recalcitrant and irresponsible. Instead, these 
methods and standards are determined by work teams themselves: workers 
are taught how to time their own jobs with a stop watch, compare alterna-
tive procedures to determine the most efficient one, document the standard 
procedure to ensure that everyone can understand and implement it, and 
identify and propose improvements in that procedure. At any given time, 
the task of standardized work analysis might be delegated to a team leader 
or a team member, but everyone understands the analysis process and can 
participate in it.
At Uddevalla, work teams were left to their own devices. In the very 
early days of Uddevalla, managers gave workers the procedure documents 
from the Torslanda plant. But these procedures were not very well designed, 
as Torslanda is a traditional plant where workers play no role in defining 
procedures. As a result, the Uddevalla workers quickly discarded them, and 
along with them, the very idea of defining detailed methods and standards. 
In auto assembly operations, where competitiveness hinges so greatly on 
efficiency and manufacturing quality, this management philosophy sounds 
to us more like abandonment than empowerment.
There is one aspect of work design where we believe Uddevalla had the 
edge over NUMMI: Uddevalla’s ‘pay for knowledge’ system provided sub-
stantial incentives for workers to build a deeper and broader knowledge. 
The United Auto Workers (UAW) contract at NUMMI does not allow such 
individualized pay systems. But here NUMMI is behind the practices of 
Japanese assembly plants, which have an elaborate system of skill grades as 
well as individual merit evaluations.18 These evaluations (satei) have been 
characterized by critics as an essentially manipulative tool of management 
control.19 Indeed, in the absence of a strong union, such manipulative use 
seems likely, and there is indeed evidence of such use in Japan. But if man-
agement wants workers to contribute innovative ideas – to act as knowledge 
workers – then reward systems will need to be redesigned to look more 
like those used for knowledge workers, such as the skill-and-merit systems 
typically used to reward engineers.20 Clearly, if these systems are to be suc-
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cessful, they will need to be implemented with the careful attention to equity 
that managers usually show in dealing with knowledge workers.
The second key dimension of comparison is at the plant governance level. 
Uddevalla had a democratic form of plant governance in which the union 
played a strong role in shaping the plant’s design and operating policies.21 
NUMMI, too, has relatively democratic plant governance. The union ac-
tively participates in a broad range of policy decisions that were previously 
closely guarded management prerogatives. Union and management repre-
sentatives jointly investigate all problems; management has committed to 
advance consultation with the union on layoffs, schedule changes, and major 
investments; and management and the union jointly review any unusual or 
mitigating circumstances before employees are discharged or suspended. 
When workers objected to favoritism in the selection of team leaders, the 
union negotiated a selection process with an explicit set of criteria and a 
joint union-management selection committee.
Critics of NUMMI’s system argue that the absence of firm, explicit con-
tract language and the extent of informal, cooperative problem solving at 
NUMMI are symptomatic of a degeneration into ‘company unionism.’ We 
argue, to the contrary, that any democratization of plant governance inevita-
bly must draw the union into greater partnership, and the Local leadership’s 
effectiveness in repesenting worker interests in this new setting depends on 
management’s commitment to cooperation as well as on the Local leaders’ 
skills, the level of internal Local democracy, and the resources and guidance 
provided by the International. NUMMI’s record in these areas is certainly 
not flawless, but nevertheless justifies strong optimism.22
But the critics’ concerns can then be restated: Can the NUMMI model, 
with the corresponding UAW influence and involvement, be sustained? And 
can it diffuse to other parts of U.S. industry? The critics can advance two 
arguments for their skepticism. First, the pattern of industrial relations we 
observe in Japanese industry might suggest that ‘company unionism’ is the 
more ‘natural’ counterpart to the Japanese-style production system. Second, 
the current industrial relations climate in the United States and the prevail-
ing hostility to unions and to union-management cooperation put severe 
pressure on cooperation at NUMMI and create barriers to the diffusion of 
this cooperative model.
Our hopes for the future of the NUMMI model are based on the evidence 
suggesting that firms or regions that can sustain the more democratic vari-
ant of the lean model are well positioned to outcompete those that cannot. 
While the evidence for both sides of this debate is sketchy, we believe that 
it supports the argument that in the absence of strong, independent unions, 
the Japanese-style production system risks sliding into a despotic and less 
productive mode:
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• The institutionalization of strong worker ‘voice’ seems to contribute 
significantly to NUMMI’s world-class performance.23
• By contrast, in Toyota plants in Japan, worker voice is more muted and 
more often subordinated to corporate interests.24 This situation contrib-
utes to the maintenance of difficult working conditions reflected in poor 
ergonomics, excessive overtime, and stressful pressures, especially in 
small subcontract firms. These difficult working conditions relative to 
other industries make it difficult to recruit new workers, thus under-
mining the viability of the Japanese variant of the Toyota production 
system.25
• Strong worker voice is difficult to sustain in the absence of independ-
ent unions. In the United States, those nonunion plants that do afford 
workers a real voice often appear to do so as part of a union-avoidance 
strategy. Where these ‘progressive’ personnel policies are due instead 
to the genuine humanism of the plant manager, the resulting employee 
relations system is fragile since workers can easily conclude that their 
influence is only accepted at the discretion of management and within 
the limits circumscribed by management.
To summarize this section, then, if we ask whether NUMMI provides as much 
scope as Uddevalla for the development of workers’ human potential, our 
answer remains, unfortunately, no. But does it create an oppressive, alienat-
ing, stultifying wok enironment? The answer must be, emphatically, no.
If Uddevalla’s productivity and quality potential were close to NUM-
MI’s, then its human advantages would tip the scale in Uddevalla’s favor. A 
small gap in productivity and quality could be overcome easily by judicious 
public policy support. The available evidence suggests, however, that: (1) 
Uddevalla was not within striking difference of NUMMI’s productivity and 
quality, and (2) NUMMI’s quality of worklife, although not ideal, is in the 
‘acceptable’ range as far as workers are concerned. We conclude that Ud-
devalla, if it had survived, would have had to evolve in dramatically new 
directions in order to qualify as a viable option.
Challenging some underlying assumptions
The goal of Uddevalla’s work organization was to create a ‘new profes-
sion of car-builder’ based on ‘a model drawn from the system of craftsmen 
and guilds, with apprentices, journeymen and masters’.26 The assumption 
underlying this approach is that a work organization based on narrow tasks 
and detailed standards is intrinsically dehumanizing. We believe that the 
NUMMI case shows this assumption to be wrong. NUMMI’s approach to 
standardized work shows that Tayloristic efforts to define the technically 
optimal ‘one best way’ are not necessarily weapons used by management to 
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extract maximal effort from a recalcitrant workforce. In fact, there are three 
ways that the knowledge required to make improvements can be used: (1) 
by management, coercively forcing ever-higher levels of work intensity; (2) 
by workers, covertly using that knowledge to reduce their own work effort 
(back to the ‘soldiering’ observed by Taylor!); and (3) by the joint efforts 
of workers, managers, and engineers to fuel a continuous improvement of 
efficiency and quality without intensifying work beyond workers’ capaci-
ties. We believe that the NUMMI case demonstrates that the third option is 
possible. Practices in Japanese plants and in other ‘lean’ transplants prob-
ably vary considerably in this respect, but NUMMI shows that continuous 
improvement does not have to be based on an escalating appropriation of 
workers’ know-how.
The contrast between Uddevalla and NUMMI also leads us to challenge a 
second widely held assumption: that world-class performance can be based 
only on very high intrinsic work satisfaction. It would be wonderful if we 
lived in a world where every job could be an opportunity for Maslovian self-
actualization. But when products are fairly standard and mass-produced, 
and when automation is still not cheap enough to eliminate labour-intensive 
methods of production, then efficiency requires narrowly specialized job 
assignments and formalized standard methods – a form of work organiza-
tion that precludes the very high intrinsic work satisfaction that would, for 
example, stimulate workers to come in without pay on a day off to tackle a 
production problem. Is this equation merely the result of ‘corporate greed’ 
as some critics contend? We think not: any community that needs such 
standardized goods will object to paying the exorbitant costs associated 
with an inefficient and poor quality production organization.
As we have argued, the quality of worklife in such industries can be much 
improved by democratizing the work design process and business govern-
ance processes. Clearly these changes leave work in the category of ‘in-
strumental necessity’ rather than ‘self-actualization opportunity.’ NUMMI 
shows us, however, that even when work has a basically instrumental func-
tion for workers, it can be organized to sustain both a moderately high level 
of worker motivation and world-class performance.27
A third assumption built into the Uddevalla approach and one that un-
derlies much of Western industry is that an increase in individual learning 
automatically leads to an increase in organizational learning. This is a 
fundamental fallacy. The Japanese model does not take organizational learn-
ing as a given; managers consciously work to create policies and practices 
which facilitate it.28
Uddevalla designed an extremely impressive range of personal learning 
opportunities for its employees. Workers spent the first sixteen months 
developing basic skills, then progressively learned all of the jobs on their 
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teams until they could build the entire car themselves. Then they went on 
to develop teacher competence, team spokesperson competence, and skills 
in other managerial and engineering areas. But this emphasis on individual 
learning had no counterpart in organizational learning. Team autonomy and 
decision decentralization were Uddevalla’s central design objectives. As a 
consequence, little thought was given to how work groups might learn from 
one another to facilitate continuous improvement. Indeed, in an interview 
we conducted, the plant design project leader described how the planning 
team ignored the need for cross-group organizational learning:’We didn’t 
put much thought into how to learn from other groups. Our focus was on 
building jobs bigger – to lengthen and widen the job; that was what we 
were aiming for.’
In contrast, the Japanese production model explicitly focuses on strate-
gies for organizational learning. Standardization of work methods is a 
precondition for achieving this end – you cannot identify the sources of 
problems in a process you have not standardized. Standardization captures 
best practice and facilitates the diffusion of improvement ideas throughout 
the organization – you cannot diffuse what you have not standardized. And 
standardization stimulates improvement – every worker is now something 
of an industrial engineer. At NUMMI, the skill development strategies for 
individual workers are managed as a component of this process, rather than 
as a way of maximizing personal opportunities. As a result, training focuses 
on developing deeper knowledge, not only of the relatively narrow jobs 
but also of the logic of the production system, statistical process control, 
and problem-solving processes. Understanding a broader range of jobs 
– the focus of Uddevalla’s skill development approach – is recognized as 
an important stimulus to kaizen efforts, but this broadening of skills builds 
on, rather than replaces, the standardized work process and the deepening 
of skills. Our study of NUMMI suggests that management may not be suf-
ficiently attentive to the importance of planned skill broadening, but the 
sister Japanese plants systematically rotate workers through related depart-
ments over a period of years.
Conclusion
We have argued that NUMMI’s combination of technical-economic and 
quality-of-worklife strengths makes its production system the most ap-
propriate type for relatively repetitive, labor-intensive activities like auto 
assembly. It is worth asking whether this system will be undermined by the 
progressive automation of these activities, by changing worker expectations, 
and by the shift toward volatile markets, lower volumes, and greater product 
variety. Was Uddevalla simply ahead of its time?
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At first sight, the recent innovations at Nissan’s new Kyushu plant seem 
to support such speculation. In response to labor market conditions – a tight 
Japanese labor market, the difficulty of attracting workers to auto assembly, 
and the long-term projections of labor shortages – Nissan has eliminated the 
conveyer belt, has installed significantly more automation, and is using many 
of the ergonomic job designs that characterized Uddevalla.29 Indeed, Japa-
nese auto executives were among the most frequent visitors to Uddevalla.
But these new plant designs do not suggest that the Japanese are switching 
to an Uddevalla model. First, ergonomic work task designs are a distinguish-
ing feature not of the Swedish model but of enlightened management faced 
with tight labor markets. Second, the work cycle has remained short and 
very standardized. Third, with lower volumes and greater product variety, 
the natural learning curve effect is even less reliable, and these plants will 
therefore pursue even more aggressive standardized work efforts to ensure 
efficiency and quality.
The more appropriate lesson to draw is that both the lean production 
system and the Uddevalla alternative have extensive room to evolve and 
develop. If Uddevalla had survived, it would have had to evolve in dramati-
cally new ways to be competitive in productivity and quality. Whether it 
would have done so quickly enough and whether it would have retained its 
distinctive worker-oriented features is unclear.
In the case of the lean production system, we expect that it will evolve to be 
more employee-oriented. In Japanese plants, managers will need to adjust to 
the long-term prospects of labor shortage and to changes in workers’ expec-
tations as Japanese seek to enjoy more of the rewards of their extraordinary 
hard work. In Japanese production system plants outside Japan, the speed 
of this shift toward more employee orientation will depend on local factors. 
But the combination of standardized work and more democratic manage-
ment has proven potent at NUMMI in its ability to sustain both continuous 
improvement and worker morale. It might well represent the model for the 
next generation of labor-intensive, mass-production activities.
Our thanks to J.D. Power and Associates for permission to reproduce copy-
righted data. Their unauthorized reproduction is prohibited.
Reprinted from Sloan Management Review, spring 1993, pp 85–94, by 
permission of publisher. Copyright 1993 by the Sloan Management Review 
Ass. All rights reserved.
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Postscript: Uddevalla and the Japanese one more time
Christian Berggren begins his defense of Uddevalla1 and critique of the 
Japanese approach by dismissing productivity comparisons with some 
methodological disclaimers showing the difficulty of comparing different 
plants. To be sure, productivity comparisons are always difficult; we will 
return to the methodological issues below. It is clear, however, that the 
productivity advantage of the Japanese over European and American car 
producers in the late 1980s and early 1990s was of such a magnitude, as to 
allow them to take market share almost at will, were it not for protection-
ist barriers or self-imposed restraints to avoid protectionist barriers. This 
market test is decisive.
There is, however, something more to be said regarding the available 
research data. First, notwithstanding his methodological hesitations, Berg-
gren does himself offer some data in an effort to refute the claim by James 
Womack that: ‘Uddevalla is not in the ballpark’.2 Unfortunately, these data 
do little to reassure us that Uddevalla was even close to the productivity 
or quality standards set by Japanese producers. Berggren tells us that in 
September of 1992, Uddevalla was taking 36 hours to assemble a car and 
that its mid-1993 target of 25 hours seemed within reach. These results can 
be compared meaningfully, if only approximately, against the performance 
of other producers. Berggren protests that the IMVP data only covers a 
subset of assembly activities, but with the generous assistance of John Paul 
MacDuffie, we have been able to make the appropriate adjustments to both 
the IMVP averages and Berggren’s Uddevalla data.
The IMVP data needs to be adjusted to exclude salaried personnel, which 
were not included by Berggren, and welding and paint operations, which 
were not performed at Uddevalla. In the absence of further detailed infor-
mation, we have adjusted the IMVP data by allocating indirect labor hours 
to final assembly in proportion to the share of final assembly in the overall 
plant operations. The net result is that the IMVP averages must be reduced 
by a factor of 54 percent figure.3
The Uddevalla data must in turn be adjusted for the presence of exhaust and 
door subassembly operations (which were excluded from the IMVP data), 
for the Volvo 940’s relatively large size, and for its high option content. 
These adjustments were based on our estimates of Volvo production and on 
the worldwide IMVP sample averages. Together they reduce Uddevalla’s 
hours per car by 3.6. Following the IMVP methodology, we have further 
adjusted the Uddevalla data for total absenteeism, reducing their estimated 
hours per vehicle by a further 20 percent.4 The net result is that the adjusted 
Uddevalla hours per vehicle in September of 1992 was 25.9, and the target 
for 1993 was 17.1. These can be compared against a Japanese luxury pro-
ducer’s average of 16.9 hours deflated by 0.54, or 9.1 hours, and against 
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the correspondingly deflated European luxury segment’s average of 30.8 
hours and the European volume producer’s average of 19.2.5 One should 
note that the IMVP data are for 1989, and the performance of the Japanese 
and European competitors has certainly improved since then. While the 
comparison with the Japanese luxury segment may be a little unfair, since 
in 1989 it did not include cars as sophisticated as the Volvo 940, comparison 
with the European luxury segment is probably overly generous. The Euro-
pean luxury segment, after all, included Daimler-Benz and Jaguar, while 
Uddevalla’s product, in terms of product complexity, brought it closer to 
the volume rather than the luxury segment.
A similar distributing gap appears in the quality results. Berggren reports 
that the J.D. Power rating for Uddevalla’s products was 124 problems per 
100 vehicles in 1992. This can be compared to a score of 46 for the Lexus 
LS400 (the top-ranked car), and 82 for the NUMMI Corolla (along with 
the Toyota Corolla, the top ranked small car). In summary, we do not see 
a basis for believing that when Uddevalla was shut down, it was close to 
approaching the Japanese standard. (The Lexus LS400 further improved its 
score in 1994 to just 32 problems per 100 cars.)
Much of Berggren’s argument hinges on the dramatic improvements in 
productivity and quality that were achieved at Uddevalla since its opening 
and especially in the year preceding its closure. Our own evaluation supports 
this conclusion. The issue, however, is whether this impressive improve-
ment was a temporary development or a prelude to sustained high rates of 
growth in productivity and quality, based on rapid organizational learning. 
Berggren assumes the latter; although we are not so sure. Any new plant, 
even under traditional management, undergoes rapid organizational learning 
and productivity improvement in its initial stages, as workers and managers 
learn their jobs and routines and learn to work with one another. Uddevalla 
represented a new way of building cars and was surrounded by publicity. 
These circumstances were certain to have further accelerated these learning 
processes. Moreover, prior to the closure decision, plant personnel knew that 
they had only a short time to prove themselves. Thus, an enormous amount 
of ‘crisis learning’ took place as managers and workers alike, sought to 
identify and remove bottlenecks to productivity improvement. In talking 
with a number of these people, we were impressed with their determination 
and commitment to make Uddevalla work.
Strong initial start-up and crisis learning, however, do not insure that 
the organizational learning necessary for sustained productivity and qual-
ity improvement in day-to-day normal operations is in place. In a crisis, 
people break normal routines to learn and diffuse best practices. But in 
most organizations on a day-to-day basis, it is the normal work routine 
which structures and modulates the learning process. We can not assume 
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that Uddevalla could have sustained its rate of organizational learning and 
associated productivity and quality improvements in a mature operation. 
Indeed, it is just as plausible to argue that they would regress, since people 
typically return to their ‘normal’ routines when crises subside. Many of the 
learning activities in the design and start-up phase of Uddevalla were organ-
ized as independent projects staffed by personnel and external consultants 
engaged on a temporary basis. As Ellegård and associates acknowledge, 
hard-won knowledge can easily be subsequently lost to the organization in 
this situation.6 Therefore, we need to examine whether the mechanisms had 
been put in place to insure continued high rates of growth in productivity 
and quality.
Our doubts in this regard are based primarily on two issues that we believe 
were not sufficiently addressed by Christian Berggren. First, we continue 
to believe that standardized work is a precondition for sustained efficiency 
and quality improvement. One can not systematically improve, what one 
has not standardized and measured. Standardization is about disseminating 
best practices across units and levels. The Japanese contribution has been 
to think about standardization in this novel fashion and to decentralize the 
process of standardization and make it the workers’ responsibility.
In Swedish and in American industry, the term and indeed the very idea 
of standardization are stigmatized, as a result of the way it was used under 
traditional Taylorism. For example, if one looks at the treatment of stand-
ardization by a set of scholars closely involved in the Uddevalla develop-
ment, one sees it presented in a most negative light.7 Berggren addresses 
our concerns about the absence of standardized work by claiming that new 
procedures documents had been completed and that their introduction in 
the assembly teams started in late 1991. This would seem to be a salutary 
change, but it prompts a number of questions. What were the worker’s role 
in developing these documents and how would the workers be involved in 
implementing, maintaining, and improving these standards? What practices 
were put in place to identify and diffuse the most effective practices across 
the most relevant units? Unfortunately, Berggren is silent on such critical 
points, but they are at the heart of successful continuous improvement.
This leads us to another related concern. A major theme throughout the 
postwar history of the Swedish work reorganization movement has been 
a stress on the importance of autonomous work teams.8 In the case of the 
automotive industry, this interest grows in large part from the desire to turn 
short cycle work into long cycle work, as a remedy for the alienating effects 
of traditional auto assembly work. These driving forces in turn have naturally 
led researchers and those managers influenced by them to focus on individual 
and small group learning rather than organizational-wide learning.
These themes appear prominently in the work of a group of scholars 
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closely associated with the Uddevalla experiment. Their focus is on ‘natural 
group work’ which they see associated with long-cycle times.9 They stress 
the ‘holistic learning principle’ (helhetsinriktad lärandeprincip) but upon 
closer examination, the focus is clearly on learning within one’s particular 
natural group and insuring that this group has a broad view of the produc-
tion process. Their strategy for Uddevalla was first to create long-cycle 
parallel final assembly and to develop the rest of the production system 
(e.g., component procurement, subassemblies of kitted systems, and storage 
facilities), to support this approach.
While occasional references are made to learning across groups and lev-
els, this is not the primary focus. Rather, the emphasis is on the learning 
that goes on within autonomous work groups (autonom arbetsgrupp), as a 
solution to long-standing problems of worker motivation.
There is an emerging consensus, however, that many of the most fun-
damental roadblocks to improved productivity and quality are problems 
that require the cooperation of different groups within the production 
system. The conception of the autonomous work group, with its focus on 
the technical and administrative freedom of the group, does not adequately 
support the kind of organizational learning we believe to be essential for 
sustained productivity and quality improvement.10 As Berggren correctly 
notes, manufacturability is a key issue impacting final assembly time; yet 
manufacturability is achieved not just by engineers doing a better job but by 
intense structured iterative feedback between the different functional units in 
the organization. In looking at Berggren’s original treatment of Uddevalla, 
however, we see no indication that he, or those at Uddevalla, recognize 
that this is an important concern to be addressed. Instead, we see the usual 
focus on developing a long-cycle parallel production system with its implicit 
emphasis on expanding individual and small group learning.11
As Berggren and Sandberg note, the interesting question is whether these 
problems we have identified are intrinsic to the Uddevalla approach or were 
external elements that were rapidly being jettisoned as Uddevalla came to 
grips with real world pressures. Would Uddevalla managers and workers have 
come to accept the need to adopt standardized work as a basis for improve-
ment activities? Would they have come to downplay the role of autonomous 
work groups so that fuller and broader cooperative and learning could take 
place? And could these accommodations have been made without drastically 
revising the basic concepts of a parallel production flow that underlay the 
whole experiment? We do not know the answers to these questions though 
we have some strong doubts. Despite his claims to the contrary, we do not 
believe Christian Berggren knows that answers to these questions either. What 
we do know, and what we can all agree upon, is that it was a tragedy that the 
plant was closed and these questions will remain unanswered.
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Limits to innovation in work organization? 
An international comparison: 
Volvo Uddevalla and GM Saturn
Bob Hancké and Saul Rubinstein
In May 1993, in a small former shipyard town on the west coast of Sweden, 
Volvo closed its Uddevalla plant. The plant had become famous in its four 
years of existence because it radically abandoned the assembly line. Cars 
were made by highly skilled workers who, in autonomous teams of 8 to 
10, built an entire car. One month later on the other side of the Atlantic, in 
Spring Hill, a small town in the state of Tennessee, the Saturn Corporation 
added its third crew in order to utilize its full production capacity. Saturn 
is GM’s newest attempt to regain lost share in the small car market: in this 
attempt, the local parties are trying to reinvent management.
There are many differences between the two companies beside the stories 
of apparent failure and success that open the article. The national systems 
of industrial relations they are embedded in, the motives and antecedents 
to each, day-to-day operations and work organization, the market segment 
they produce for, and finally their size and respective places in their parent 
organization are very different.
Yet the differences between Saturn and Uddevalla obscure an important 
set of issues for both organizations that have to do with the relationship 
between each and its parent corporate and union environment. (For reasons 
of style, we will, despite Uddevalla’s demise, use the present tense for both 
throughout this paper.) First of all, they are relatively small operations in 
large corporations. Uddevalla is a final assembly plant in Sweden’s most 
important industrial enterprise, Volvo, while Saturn is a wholly owned 
corporation of General Motors. Second, both Uddevalla and Saturn are 
operating laboratories in the search for innovative alternatives to the tra-
ditional organization of production. And third, unions were, in both cases, 
critical to the conceptual, planning and design phases, and as a result, the 
experience of both organizations sheds new light on the issues of labor’s 
role in management.
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Not the differences, but the similarity is at the basis of the comparison in 
this paper. Our basic point is that the degree of congruence between, on the 
one hand, the organizations and their vision of workers and management 
and, on the other, the wider corporate and union environment and structure, 
is a crucial variable in the assessment of the innovative organization’s future 
(or, as in the case of Uddevalla, of its past): both the plant in Uddevalla and 
Saturn make a lot of sense economically, yet that alone does not guarantee 
their success within the overall organizational context in which they are 
embedded. This paper is a search for the other factors: how far can techno-
logical and organizational innovations go in such insular settings, and what 
role do institutions, in particular the wider corporate and industrial relations 
structure, play in these processes of innovation?
In this paper, we will use a synthesized version of the developments in Ud-
devalla, where the entire race has been run, as a way of suggesting questions 
about other innovative efforts in organizing production and work relations, 
specifically those at Saturn. The paper consists of three parts. The first part 
will lay out the terms of the debate on firm governance in manufacturing. 
In the second section, we will give a reinterpretation of the Uddevalla ex-
perience, followed by a discussion of the innovations at Saturn. The third 
and final section concludes by presenting a set of questions which we think 
follow from the analysis in this paper.
1. The social organization of car manufacturing
Ever since Henry Ford coupled the assembly line with exclusive manage-
ment control on the shopfloor, and thereby increased productivity (and thus 
wages), car factories all over the world have moved to adopt both these tech-
nical and social systems. ‘Fordism’ also gave us a particular mode of work 
organization and firm governance that divided car-building (and in its path 
many other industries as well) into two distinct sets of activities, separated 
by an impenetrable wall. Managers, according to that model, conceived of 
investment, products, process and tasks, while workers executed tasks and, 
at most, bargained over wage levels through their unions. (Dankbaar 1992; 
Jürgens et al. 1989; Katz 1985).
Especially after World War II, therefore, firm governance in mass car 
production has followed a relatively simple, straightforward and universal 
path in Europe, the US and to a lesser extent Japan: management, ‘the 
verb’, was also really a task for management, ‘the people’, not because 
of technology or some inherent natural division of labor, but as a result of 
the way the knowledge to produce a car was divided between workers and 
managers. Management, on the shop-floor embodied in the person of the 
industrial engineer, designed the tasks to balance the line – that is, they di-
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vided assembly up in small tasks in such a way that neither line nor workers 
would stand idle when the conveyor belt made its way through the factory 
and supervisors directed the workforce in order to efficiently coordinate 
those disparate tasks. Workers followed those orders, and that was where 
their responsibility stopped. World-wide, this was the predominant social 
organization of car manufacturing.
It was not until Japanese cars appeared on Western markets, first in the 
low-end segment and recently also in the luxury car segment, that the idea 
of alternatives to the Fordist division of authority was taken seriously for 
the first time. Whatever the particular form the argument took, they all built 
on different notions of the relationship between workers and managers (and 
of their responsibilities) than had prevailed in postwar mass-production. In-
stead of dividing the construction of a car into two different worlds – one of 
strategy, centered around conception and symbolized by control over invest-
ment – and the other of execution – with assembly tasks and wage-bargaining 
at its core – the Japanese tried to fuse the two by systematically integrating 
workers in production and design decisions. And instead of accentuating 
the social distance between workers and managers, the Japanese did just 
the opposite (Womack et al. 1990). Growing international competition has 
thrown into question the nature of authority structures under mass produc-
tion regimes. Workers – and in many cases unions as well – have suddenly 
come to be perceived as strategic assets in global competition, and those 
countries where they have been – as in German and Japanese industry – are 
suddenly regarded as models, if not to emulate, then at least to borrow from 
freely (Dertouzos et al. 1989; Turner 1991; Streeck 1992).
Yet for the most part, the empowerment of workers has, even in this new 
system – definite limits and, despite the tighter integration of workers’ 
knowledge into each step of the design and production process, manage-
ment still manages without too much interference from workers or unions. 
In fact, judging from most accounts of industrial reorganization, these 
authority structures remain intact, with the traditional lines of demarcation 
in the workplace easily accommodating changes in workplace organization 
such as teams or quality programs that push part of the responsibility down 
to the shopfloor. Workers’ participation has, in this new world, become an 
instrumental goal, and therefore limited to what is economically efficient.
We take issue with precisely this argument. Our primary aim in this 
contribution is to point out that serious alternatives to that traditional divi-
sion of authority exist. Uddevalla and Saturn provide such alternatives far 
beyond what is limited by a purely economic rationale, since they deal with 
power-sharing in decision-making and are part of a broader social agenda. 
Furthermore, the two cases we discuss here point out that such alternatives 
to the conventional social organization of car manufacturing exist under both 
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line and stationary manual assembly, and that it is viable for both relatively 
inexpensive, standardized smaller and up-scale customized larger cars. We 
depart from the dominant views, however, in our point that the existence 
and survival of such alternative efficient modes of organization cannot be 
accounted for solely in economic terms; in order to understand their evolu-
tion, politics has to be taken into account explicitly (Kochan et al. 1986; 
Sabel 1982; Piore & Sabel 1984).
Both organizations embody – or at least have the potential to embody – a 
sharp break with the logic of management prerogatives and union domains 
that has dominated all Western political economies for most of this century, 
but especially since World War II. In Uddevalla, that break is a logical 
consequence of a production system that turns the conventional logic of 
assembly-lines on its head by reintegrating small tasks in long cycles. In 
Saturn, it is a result of the involvement of the union in both organizational 
governance and the day-to-day management of operations. The salience 
of the comparative treatment in this paper resides exactly in the way both 
organizations differ from their corporate and union environments. We will 
discuss that point in the next section and then move on to a detailed analysis 
of the two cases.
2. Breaking with tradition: Saturn and Uddevalla
The path-breaking approach to industrial relations makes both organizations 
exceptions in their own corporations. Saturn breaks with many accepted 
practices in manufacturing management inside GM. Volvo Uddevalla took 
the Swedish micro-model of production by autonomous teams to its logi-
cal conclusion. But whereas Saturn marks a clear break from traditional 
industrial relations practices in the US, and is exceptional because of that, 
the plant in Uddevalla is much less of a radical departure from those institu-
tionalized facets of firm governance in Sweden and North-Western Europe 
more generally, in part because of the already extensive co-determination 
rights the unions have had in Volvo for many years. The relevance of the 
Swedish plant for this debate on firm governance is that it has taken us as far 
as we have ever been on the road toward work without supervision, where 
task conception and execution are again linked (many of the other chapters 
in this book cover this point in much more detail).
In Uddevalla, management as it has become known under the old Fordist 
structures, has all but disappeared. Self-managed teams deal with all or most 
of the former plant management functions: pacing, coordination, sequen-
cing, parts supply, quality control, etc. Management head count is – hardly 
a surprise – very low: 16 managers for a workforce of roughly 900. Direct 
supervision is even lower: one shop manager supervises more than 100 work-
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ers. Saturn is, as we will detail in the next section, the only car plant/firm 
that comes even close to this with a indirect/direct workers ratio of 1:50. 
Most plants operate at considerably tighter supervision levels of around 1:20. 
This compares very favorably with other car plants. Most GM operations, 
for example, have, on average, a supervisor-to-production-employee-ratio 
of 1:25;1 NUMMI (the GM-Toyota joint venture) operates at 1:182 and the 
Japanese US transplants operate at approximately 1:20.
Worker autonomy is also very high in Uddevalla, job content is rich and 
the structure of the assembly task itself invites workers to permanently 
challenge and rethink what they are doing and come up with better ways, 
suited to their individual needs. Coordination of assembly too has, to a large 
extent, been decentralized to the teams. Management, in short, primarily 
brings expertise to the process, and given the workers’ knowledge of their 
tasks, even that is highly dependent upon (and probably non-existent with-
out) tight collaboration between workers and engineers.
Saturn challenges the conventional management logic too, but from an 
entirely different angle than Uddevalla. Whereas in Uddevalla the nature 
of the production technology is such as to throw into question the need for 
separate management functions, in Saturn the challenge is rooted in an at-
tempt to reorganize and redistribute authority on the shopfloor. While the 
details will follow later, a preview will make this point clear in its general 
form. Throughout the Saturn Corporation, all elements of firm decision-
making involve a consensus process between workers, represented by their 
local union, and management. This includes among others strategic busi-
ness planning around product, process and quality, scheduling, suppliers, 
retailing – in short all functions that have traditionally been considered 
the exclusive domain of management. Further, the union has also taken on 
responsibility for co-managing operations by filling half of the line middle 
management positions with their own members. In Saturn, the labor union 
is defending workers’ interests while jointly governing and co-managing 
the business.
In the following sections, we will detail these points for both Uddevalla 
and Saturn. We will direct our attention to the role of the labor unions, 
because (a) while we care deeply about the positive contributions demo-
cratic labor institutions can make in our industrial organizations, we are 
concerned about the current state of organized labor in most Western po-
litical economies, and (b) because we believe that the unions hold the key 
to understanding the innovations in both unconventional organizations. We 
will conclude the two discussions, of Uddevalla first and then of Saturn, 
with a short section that reiterates the basic elements of the cases in terms 
of our central idea about the ‘politics of congruence’.
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2.1 Volvo Uddevalla: Beauty is its own reward
The plant in Uddevalla is special because it is a ‘Copernican revolution in 
car assembly’ (Berggren 1990). Rather than having many workers who, in 
task cycles of one to two minutes, assemble a minute part of a car, the Volvo 
940 that is produced in Uddevalla, is built one at a time by a small team of 
highly trained craftsmen, who have a knowledge of parts and their operation 
roughly comparable to a skilled car mechanic. Since the cars are built one 
at a time in small docks where they do not move during assembly, ultimate 
customization (and hence a price premium) is easily obtained.
Important to know is that the plant was a highly viable economic operation: 
productivity was very good and on a steep learning curve, capital costs, as 
expressed in basic investments and tool changes, were very low, quality and 
customization (and therefore the price of the Uddevalla cars) was very high, 
and the ‘social record’ of the plant, as expressed in, for instance, strains, 
stress and illnesses, was among the best in the world.3 Moreover, every car 
made in Uddevalla was a sold car. By the time the closure was announced, 
the plant built predominantly cars on order from the dealerships they had 
set up contacts with.
Despite the generally positive record, the plant closed in May 1993. What 
happened? Part of the explanation, we will argue, is indeed what others in 
this volume suggest: Volvo’s tremendous cash-flow problems and the belt-
tightening operation by Renault, combined with the sudden turnaround by 
Volvo corporate management with regards to their smaller innovative plants 
in Kalmar and Uddevalla. Volvo management thought that the rationalization 
which was necessitated by the squeeze on the European car market, could 
best be found in a concentration of productive capacity in the larger plants 
in Sweden and Belgium.4
Yet, while this explanation provides us with the structural background 
parameters, it does not allow us to appreciate the full story. Our treatment 
of the Uddevalla closure starts where the other stories come to an end, 
and tries to explain why the counterfactual ‘What if the unions had put up 
a fight to keep Uddevalla open?’ never occurred. Given the power of the 
unions in the Volvo firm as a whole, it is very likely that this would have 
created such a different configuration that Volvo would have been forced 
to re-evaluate its decision and simply look for other ways out of the crisis. 
In this counterfactual world the story might have been very different and 
Uddevalla’s closure may not have been as over determined as it is now. A 
different outcome was therefore possible and the key is to understand why 
that did not happen. Part of the answer is obviously to be found in the events 
surrounding the closure decision that others in this volume are considerably 
better-placed than we are to deal with; part, however, is also hidden in the 
role of the union in the Uddevalla project group in the mid-1980s.
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Metall project members, both from the Gothenburg union district and from 
the Stockholm central leadership, played an important role in the discussions 
that led toward Uddevalla. Initially their demands were rather conventional 
but, once they found their momentum, the union people in the project group 
pushed the project considerably into new areas.
However, while Metall people played such an important role, other is-
sues, at that point seemingly marginal to the project, were left untouched 
in the development process. The most important one of these, if judged 
by the final outcome, was the influence of the project group on corporate 
decisions. Throughout, there was no discussion of what cars to build in 
Uddevalla – originally the low-end 240 as well as the high-end 940 were to 
be built there; then that changed and, eventually only the most expensive 
model was built in Uddevalla. Similarly, there were no contacts with project 
groups that were working on a new Volvo car, the currently marketed 850, 
and existing models were never re-engineered to match the learning and 
production process at the Uddevalla plant. Also, from a reconstruction of 
the development process, it appears that strategic linkages between the 
Uddevalla union reps and the Volvo corporate board union reps (but this 
seems to be true to some extent for management as well), were virtually 
non-existent. All of this suggests that the Uddevalla project group – and 
the unionists in it – acted in an autonomous manner, detached from their 
parent organizations.5
Why did the union leave these and other strategic issues untouched? 
From interviews with the people involved, two sets of answers emerge, and 
both help us understand at least in part what happened. The first one is the 
‘official Metall story’. According to this view of things, any involvement 
with other issues was simply not deemed necessary at that time. The group 
concentrated on how to make a car, because, once in operation, it believed, 
production would be intrinsically so flexible that any changes in the de-
mand mix would be easy to meet. The other issues were, in this view, not a 
problem and if strategic issues became important, the co-determination law 
framework would provide the union with the resources it needed. The issues 
were never discussed, in other words, because they were no issues.
But unions do not always do what they say they do. That is the starting 
point of the second argument, which digs somewhat deeper, puts the first 
plausible but limited point in larger perspective, and complements it: internal 
union politics blocked the active participation of the local Uddevalla people 
into these other, non-traditional areas. In order to understand this, a short 
review into the structure of Swedish unions is necessary.
Swedish unions operate at three levels of the economy simultaneously: the 
national economy, the industrial branch and the individual firm/plant. (In the 
case of large corporations such as Volvo, there is a fourth level, the corporate, 
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inter-plant level.) Territorially, the unions have so-called ‘groups’, regional 
union bodies (districts), that consist of the plant/firm-level unions within 
one region, the so-called ‘workplace clubs’. (Kjellberg 1983 and 1992)
Inside the Gothenburg Metall union district – the regional union body 
that organizes the workers in the main Torslanda plant (ca. 10,000 work-
ers) and the small Uddevalla plant (ca. 1,000 workers) – there have always 
been two large camps with regards to Uddevalla. One side supported the 
project be-cause they were convinced about the necessity for the union to 
play an active role in shaping companies and work in Sweden. The other 
group, mainly consisting of more traditional unionists, were very good at 
the conventional type of union work, and therefore did not appreciate nor 
like the Uddevalla-type ventures into new fields, or understood what the 
union role would be in this new production and management system. This 
latter group was embodied in the Torslanda local president, who attempted 
to restrain the local union people involved in the Uddevalla project group 
several times, wanted to impose the 20 minute ceiling on the task cycle as 
the official union line, was unable to envision a car factory without lines, 
and denied the union people the authority to discuss other, wider-ranging 
strategic issues.
The reasons why the local union people were, in the end, able to push 
through their program, is a fine illustration of the role of surprises and con-
tingencies in the development of Uddevalla. Whereas the Torslanda Metall 
president was easily among the most important and powerful people in the 
union not only in Gothenburg but in all of Sweden, one of the Metall people 
in the project group was his ‘political party counterpart’, the chair of the 
SAP clubs in the Volvo concern (the Social-Democratic Party). He could and 
did use this position as an independent power basis in the struggle over the 
direction of Uddevalla and managed to prevail at least in terms of setting 
the signposts for the union’s participation in the project.6
As long as Volvo’s company results were good – and they were very good 
in the mid-1980s – the ‘defeat’ over Uddevalla was acceptable to even the 
hardest-nosed opponents of the project, in union as well as management 
circles. But when the situation soured, the old animosities resurfaced. The 
moment the general over capacity crisis in the European automobile indus-
try hit Volvo, however, the initial coziness was over and the real problems 
emerged. In 1988, a rift between different management factions had already 
become clear. Official unemployment in Sweden is currently some 9%-
factoring in those workers who are currently in training programs, more or 
less the average of unemployment in Europe and a straightforward disaster 
in a country that has known unemployment rates of 2–3% for most of the 
last thirty years.
Yet the trouble runs deeper than a management cycle. It starts with the 
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Renault-Volvo alliance in the mid-1980s. In the summer of 1992, a French 
consultant wrote, in a report to his government (Renault is, as of the day 
of this writing, still a Régie) that the deal with Volvo was bad for Renault 
and that Uddevalla was an especially troubling cost factor in the alliance.7 
Volvo also posted, in the same period that this report was made public, its 
second year of big losses, and the company’s situation kept getting worse: 
by the second half of 1992, Volvo was losing something of the order of 
10,000 Swedish Kronor (at that time around $2,500) on every car it sold. 
In the alliance with Volvo, Renault footed that bill.8
Renault thus forces Volvo to shrink. For a number of reasons, the Volvo 
plants outside Sweden are immune to calls for capacity reduction. The plant 
in Born, NL is a joint venture between Volvo, Mitsubishi and the Dutch state, 
and the Ghent plant in Belgium is not only the corporation’s flagship in 
terms of productivity and quality, but also too important in strategic terms, 
located in the heart of the EEC.9 Sweden is therefore the place where it will 
all happen. And here the old tension between the Uddevalla and the Torslanda 
local reappears. Neither of the two wants to lose their own members. Yet 
the Torslanda union is by far the biggest local in Volvo, and this position 
gives it the power to prevail over the smaller locals in the Volvo concern, 
especially over Uddevalla, which is technically in the same union district as 
Torslanda. A defensive coalition of Metall unionists in the Torslanda local, 
unhappy with Uddevalla anyway, who want to safeguard jobs in the plant 
in Gothenburg, and ‘traditionalists’ in management, who did not see the 
need for Uddevalla, emerged. The decision was made, and even a series of 
provocative opinion pieces from industrial sociologists and other experts 
in one of Sweden’s leading newspapers, Dagens Nyheter, in the spring of 
1993 on the plant closing was unable to change Volvo’s mind. ‘Dissident’ 
consultants, who offered their services to the union in case an alternative 
plan was drawn, were politely told that their services were not appreciated 
because the Volvo union agreed with the decision, and it was not up to the 
central union to meddle in local affairs anyway.10 The national union, the 
local, and management simply refused to discuss the issue in public, arguing 
that it was an internal Volvo affair.
Volvo’s crisis thus resuscitated long-standing divisions within both man-
agement and labor unions, and sealed Uddevalla’s fate. What mattered was 
not the plant’s performance – which management later admitted was not the 
primary reason for the closure – but the way it was never able to muster the 
political support it needed. And the reason it could never muster the support 
is in large part connected to its exceptional nature; that is one of the central 
causes for the tension between the locals in Torslanda and in Uddevalla. 
Both locals have vastly different ideas of what unions in the 1990s ought to 
look like, which explains why Uddevalla never had a broad political basis 
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inside the union (in Volvo, not among the staff in Stockholm). Once the 
circumstances had pitted one local against another, the stronger one won.
2.2 Saturn: GM’s New Prodigy
Today, only a few years after its initial launching, General Motor’s new 
Saturn Corporation is a remarkable success in the marketplace. The car 
is highly innovative in design and technology: Saturn uses a space frame, 
poly-mer panels, water based paint, an aluminum lost foam cast engine and 
trans-mission, and moving platforms carry and adjust the height of the ve-
hicles during assembly. Most remarkable, perhaps, is the record on quality. 
Two years after the first car came off the line, Saturn received higher ratings 
from consumers than any other U.S. domestic car line in initial vehicle qual-
ity, in satisfaction after one year of ownership, and in service.11 The hiring 
of a third crew in June 1993 allowed the plant to fully utilize its capacity. 
It also brought total employment to 8000, of which 6000 are members of 
the bargaining unit. While GM continues to close plants, an expansion of 
Saturn is being planned.
The United Auto Workers national union played a crucial role in the 
development of Saturn. Without the active participation of the UAW at the 
national level in the planning and design stages, Saturn in its present form 
could not have been created by GM on its own. In 1983, responding to a 
loss in market share, General Motors management and the UAW national 
union formed a joint labor-management committee to study the feasibility of 
building a small car in the United States of America under new production 
and employment relationships. After an international evaluation of world 
class manufacturing practices, the committee identified a set of principles 
for organizing Saturn:
• Treat all employees as fixed assets and invest heavily in their training 
and skill development;
• Organize based on groups, with self-managed work teams as the basic 
unit;
• Openly share information including financial data;
• Make decisions through consensus with the UAW as a full partner;
• Decision making authority will be focused at the level of the organiza-
tion where the necessary knowledge resides and where implementation 
will take place;
• Minimize job classifications;
• Union and management will jointly administer recruitment and selec-
tion. Seniority will not be the basis for selection;
• The technical and social organization will be integrated;
• The organization will require fewer full time UAW officials and labor 
relations personnel to administer the contract than would be required 
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in a GM organization of similar size;
• Compensation will include a contingent portion based on performance 
in quality, cost, delivery and value to the customer.12
In 1985 these principles were codified in a Memorandum of Agreement, 
which served as the first Saturn contract between the UAW and General 
Motors. The contract, however, differs significantly from the voluminous 
agreements traditionally negotiated between GM and the UAW. Only 28 
pages in length it is viewed as a ‘living agreement’ subject to modification 
by the parties as needs arise, with the focus on problem solving, shared 
decision-making and joint authority at its core.
Conflicts and grievances have not disappeared, but have been redefined 
as joint problems, to be solved through consensus rather than elaborated 
ad-vers arial procedures. By integrating workers’ knowledge and input, and 
the union’s authority into the process early on, problems can frequently be 
dealt with before they reach a level where the grievance procedure is the 
only way out.
Through the agreement the national union and GM established several 
levels of formal joint union-management committees. Committees or Deci-
sion Rings were created at each of the three plants – assembly, engine, and 
body. They were also organized across the entire manufacturing complex 
and at the strategic level of the Saturn corporation. These committees meet 
weekly and reach decisions by consensus. They deal with long and short 
term planning and ‘determine the resources needed by the Work Units (see 
below)’13 The strategic corporate-level joint labor-management committee
undertake(s) strategic business planning necessary to assure the long-
term viability of the enterprise, and will be responsive to the needs of the 
market place … It is charged with creating the environment, facilities, 
tools, education and support systems which will enable Saturn Members 
to perform their responsibilities.14
At the shop-floor, self-directed teams organize production. Unlike many 
other car plants, however, the teams (or Work Units, as they are called in 
Saturn) have considerable autonomy and responsibility. These ‘selfdirected’ 
teams organize production scheduling, are directly responsible for quality 
control, safety and health, equipment maintenance, budgeting, material and 
inventory control, training, and many other tasks that are typically the role 
of supervision in most of the auto industry.15
These teams or ‘Work Units’ have between 6 and 15 members, and they 
elect their own leaders who remain ‘working’ members of the team. Members 
rotate between all of the jobs in the team and receive extensive technical 
training as well as the skills needed to operate as a self-directed team. The 
first crew of production workers hired into Saturn had between 350 and 700 
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hours of training before they built a car. This already extensive commitment 
to training, which most likely makes Saturn workers on average among the 
most highly-trained in the high volume segment of the car industry, was 
expanded in 1991, when, during contract renewal talks the local union pro-
posed separating the risk and reward portions of the compensation and tying 
the risk portion to a training goal of five percent of total working hours (92 
hrs) per year for each employee.
The self-directed team structure has implications for task cycles. At the 
team’s discretion, the cycles vary anywhere between the one minute cycle 
that is the standard in the industry – in which every worker deals with one 
small set of tasks on every car – to considerably longer cycles, even up to 
six minutes – whereby one worker will finish all the jobs which his or her 
team is responsible for, then skips five cars and moves on to the first to 
begin a new cycle.
Teams interrelated by vicinity, sub-assembly or similar technology, are 
grouped together at a higher level in Modules. Usually, five to seven teams 
totalling approximately 100 members, constitute a module. Each module 
has two advisors who replace the supervisors in traditional GM plants. 
The module advisors’ task is to provide expertise, leadership and advice to 
the teams and therefore is the Saturn equivalent to what would be middle 
management in other plants.
While self-managed teams allow UAW team members significant control 
over their day-to-day operations, the original Saturn organizational design 
provided for UAW institutional involvement largely through off-line plan-
ning and information-sharing via the labor-management joint committees. 
However, as employees were hired and the union organized, local UAW 
officials recognized the need for more direct involvement in operational 
decision-making if the union was to fulfill the language in the agreement 
calling for ‘full participation’. Here Saturn, already far removed from the 
industry standard, broke even more new ground.
Perhaps the most significant is the ‘partnering’ of UAW members with 
their management counterparts in the middle management and staff or-
ganizations. Initiated by the local union leadership in 1988, by 1993, this 
in-volves over 375 jointly selected UAW members who are partnered full-
time with management in supervisory and operations middle management 
positions in all three plants. UAW members are also partnered in almost all 
off-line staff functions: maintenance, engineering, sales, service and mar-
keting, finance, industrial engineering, quality assurance, health and safety, 
training, organizational development, corporate communications, and prod-
uct and process development. ‘Partnering’ is an arrangement that goes much 
further than what is known in continental Europe, as co-determination. In 
Saturn, union partners share offices with their management counterparts and 
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participate equally in decision-making through a consensus process.
As a result, institutional union participation extends well beyond the 
off-line labor-management committees originally envisioned in the initial 
agreement. The union now participates ‘on-line’ in the day-to-day opera-
tional decision making. Management is, in Saturn, no longer simply a group 
of people occupying particular positions in the organization, but a set of 
functions and responsibilities shared by union represented employees with 
their non-represented partners. The local union at Saturn truly co-manages 
the business.
At the same time the local represents the stakes and equities of the work-
force. In its functions and structure, and independent of the union’s involve-
ment in management, local 1853 at Saturn is a workplace union as many other 
in the US, whose role it is to negotiate local issues and working conditions 
with management, resolve grievances. The union also has retained its abil-
ity to organize strikes if necessary. The difference with other unions is that 
most of the conflicts that surface – many more probabaly in Saturn than in 
other firms because of the high degree of workforce involvement in decision-
making – are resolved without recourse to the traditional union weapons. 
The local union also takes its role as an independent representative of the 
workforce very seriously. All the usual internal local participatory institu-
tions are in place in the Saturn local. But there is more. Yearly, the union 
conducts a member-to-member survey in which the (UAW) team leaders 
interview each member for 45 minutes on the issues, concerns and needs 
that they would like to see addressed by the union. Finally, local 1853 has 
sought to expand the representation of the union to all employees working 
in the Saturn complex, including outside contractual workers.
Despite Saturn’s impressive record of innovation and market success, 
strains do exist in the evolving partnership arrangements. As mentioned 
earlier, the national union played a critical role in Saturn’s creation and early 
development, joining with GM in the joint study team and articulating the 
principles for organization in the 1985 Memorandum of Agreement provid-
ing the enabling language and new contractual and employment relations. 
Yet, over the past few years the national’s involvement has been reduced. 
To some extent this is of course a natural development as the local parties 
take the initial contract language as a starting point for developing their own 
arrangements based on problems and needs as they arise. The partnering 
arrangements that lead in effect to co-management of the operation were 
perhaps the most dramatic example of local innovation in response to the 
changing needs of the corporation. Most of this was, as we suggested, not 
anticipated by the early work of GM and the national union.
However, the change in relationship between the local and the national 
union appears to be more than a natural evolution. In recent years the na-
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tional seems to view Saturn not so much as a model for the future, but as 
an experiment that is perhaps moving in the wrong direction. (Interestingly 
this also has been mirrored by some ambivalence on the part of GM man-
agement toward Saturn.)
Tension has occurred in other areas as well. In the summer of 1992, for 
instance, public disagreements between the local leadership and the national 
erupted over strike strategy employed by the national and directed against 
GM supplier plants which also supply Saturn. Strains also grew over the level 
of autonomy enjoyed by the local: in advance of the 1993 GM negotiations, 
UAW national leadership asked that the Saturn Agreement be reopened. To 
some observers, this indicated that the union would like to bring Saturn back 
in line with the national contract pattern.
Clearly the appropriate relationship between, on one hand, a local union 
that departs so much from tradition in order to jointly govern and co-man-
age an innovative organization, and the parent national union, on the other 
hand, which itself planted the seeds of this innovation, has not yet been 
fully worked out at Saturn. New methods and relationships for producing 
cars are necessary for GM and the UAW to survive in the global automotive 
industry. Some critics, both within the UAW and within GM, argue that if 
GM had put its investment in Saturn into older facilities, they too would 
be competitive now. Often people point to NUMMI, once among the worst 
plants in the US, today one of the best (see Adler & Cole in this volume), 
with the same workforce and in the same factory as before.
Yet Saturn can provide enormous return on its investment by capturing 
what it learned from its innovations, and transferring this knowledge back 
to GM and the UAW. To date, however, this potential and the opportunities 
it provides, is underrealized. The continuous development of best practice 
models of production and organization will depend on available resources, 
learning models, diffusion patterns and coordination.
The national union can play a critical role in all of these activities. 
Moreover, the national union can also serve as a protection against corporate 
whip-sawing, whereby one plant competes against another, thus provoking 
a regressive spiral as each tries to undercut the others.
However, the local union has gained power and influence through its in-
creased competence in strategic and operational areas, precisely the kind of 
expertise that is critically important to the success of modern high perform-
ance work systems. How the power of the union at Saturn is shared between 
the local and national will be one of the critical tests regarding Saturn’s future 
viability as an alternative to the traditional practices of GM and the UAW. 
Over the long run its performance will depend on finding the right mix of 
local autonomy, national coordination and mutual learning.
The Saturn partnership breaks not only with the organizational arrange-
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ments in other GM facilities organized by the UAW, but also with the rest 
of US industry which sharply separates the roles of labor and management. 
In its operation, the company thus explicitly challenges the logic of man-
agement prerogatives and union domains which has defined all postwar 
Western political economies. Investment (almost always the management 
of resources) was management’s business, the social repercussions that of 
the union. In Saturn, the traditional distinction between the concerns of 
management and those of the union, has been completely rethought.16
2.3 Comparing Saturn and Uddevalla
At first glance, Uddevalla and Saturn do not appear to share many charac-
teristics: they are located in different parts of the world, one is closed, the 
other increasingly growing, one built cars for the high end of the market, the 
other moderately priced mid-size cars. In short, the two are very different. 
Yet they share one important characteristic: both are, in their operating logic, 
exceptions with regard to their parent corporations because of the way they 
break with established patterns of firm governance. And this exceptional 
character is an important variable to keep in mind when evaluating both 
innovative organizations.
Uddevalla failed, we think, not because it was inefficient, or an incomplete 
plant, and not even because of a conservative management reflex in times of 
crisis. In our reading of the story, Uddevalla closed because it did not have 
a winning coalition that backed it. None of the social groups involved in the 
organization of manufacturing could tie their fate in an almost existential 
way to Uddevalla’s long-term success: not the managers, not the unions 
and not the workers.
The first group is permanently caught in a dilemma. A self-managed pro-
duction system that relies on the collective and individual skills of workers 
as in Uddevalla reduces the role of engineers and management in the control 
of production processes. However, this loss of control over the production 
process is off-set by the potential gains to the production system. Politics and 
economics thus collide, and there is, neither on economic nor on political 
grounds, reason to believe that the model which combines higher efficiency 
with a democratic redistribution of power and skills will prevail.
Labor unions have a related problem with this new production model. In 
recent years, we have witnessed a major re-assessment of the role that car and 
metal industry unions see for themselves in the organization of industry: in 
Sweden and Germany, for instance, they have in recent years drafted union 
platforms that demanded better jobs for teams of workers, and in which the 
labor unions would play a role in training the workers (Metall 1985; IG Met-
all 1991). Yet while such programmatic changes are important, the old order 
is still a vital point of reference. For in practice unions remain, in Sweden 
194
as much as in other countries, the defenders of the semi-skilled workers, 
until they know how to translate the new union programs systematically 
into practice. And here the problems of Uddevalla appear: the semi-skilled 
worker is exactly the group that disappeared in Uddevalla.
Moreover, despite the attempts by the Metalworkers and Autoworkers 
unions in Sweden, Europe and the US, to re-think their role in the economy, 
unions have not yet ventured very far into the new field of production or-
ganization. Whatever promise Uddevalla may have held for the labor move-
ment in the long run, its development was always blocked by the short-term 
uncertainties that it created, as it called into question a series of assumptions 
about the distribution of power and authority in the workplace upon which 
the postwar union model was built and that proves with amazing regularity 
how solidly entrenched it is.
The workers, then. It may be very hard to substantiate this, but there is 
some evidence and logic that suggests that workers only appreciate changes 
à la Uddevalla after they worked in them, and it is only then that their sup-
port can be mustered for these new forms of work organization, that are still 
distant. It is defiantly difficult, presumably impossible, to organize around 
the promise of reflective work and organization as in Uddevalla. With none 
of the strategic actors capable of linking their interests to the survival of the 
plant, Uddevalla’s fate was sealed.
How does this general point about the closure of Uddevalla inform us 
about Saturn? It forces us to see that economic success is only one variable 
in a giant equation. Saturn is very successful; so was Uddevalla. But GM and 
Volvo are having serious trouble surviving in today’s competitive global car 
industry. Uddevalla was safe as long as Volvo was successful. The plans for 
Uddevalla emerged when Volvo was among the most profitable car companies 
in the world, and were implemented in order to build more Volvos. Volvo’s 
crisis in the last four years, which at some point even culminated in merger 
plans with Renault (with a minority stake for Volvo), quickly exacted a victim: 
Uddevalla, the ‘swan among the ducks’, in Ellegård’s words.
GM and Saturn do not have the same relationship and any linear transposi-
tion of scenarios from one case to the next would be foolish. But the events 
that we analyzed for Uddevalla, combined with the information on Saturn 
should warn us – both the sympathetic observers and those actively involved 
– that in GM Saturn too, politics is an important variable in analyzing and 
understanding the plant’s performance, now and in the future.
3. Conclusion
The history of Uddevalla and the analysis of Saturn remind us that the 
economy and society are really two sides of the same coin, and inseparable. 
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In the economy, as we have tried to demonstrate, economics may determine 
a lot – but not everything. Economic organizations do not operate in a so-
cial and political vacuum: they are a vital part of their environment, just as 
their environment is found in every aspect of their operation. Saturn and 
Uddevalla are perfect illustrations of the interrelationship between politics 
and economics. They are both economically viable operations and embody, 
within the confines of their national systems of industrial relations, a bold 
new path towards combining economic democracy and economic perform-
ance; yet they are also so different from the rest of their corporate and union 
environment, that friction creeps up and emphasizes the differences between 
the new-born and the parent.
Their exceptional character resides in the way both organizations deal with 
the distribution of skills, authority and with the ideas of management and 
workers’ self-management. Today, in an era when the ‘human factor’, ex-
actly what makes Saturn and Uddevalla so exceptional, is almost continually 
rediscovered in manufacturing processes, this minor point suddenly takes 
on gigantic proportions. Because, as firms and plants experiment with new 
modes of social organization, politics and society are re-discovered as an 
intricate part of industrial processes, and as potential sources of conflict.
It is important, though, to understand that plants in big corporations such 
as the ones we discussed here invariably face a very peculiar kind of Catch-
22 situation: their existence depends in large measure on the resources the 
parent corporation is willing to pump into their development – and the 
farther removed from the standard in the parent organization, the higher 
the development costs. Yet exactly this makes them very vulnerable, since, 
almost by definition, they will differ in very important respects from the 
standards prevailing in the rest of the corporation that they are embedded 
in, while they are so dependent upon the resources of the latter. The tension 
between these innovative production islands and their parent corporations at 
the core of the analysis of this paper, is thus one of those implicit conflicts 
that are almost impossible to avoid, and therefore require careful manage-
ment. That is what makes this analysis relevant for other organizations as 
well: as more and more companies embark on new and bold paths toward 
competitiveness, and rediscover human resources and labor relations as 
strategic variables in this process, the way organizations are able to deal 
with corporate frictions of the kind we describe in this paper will become 
ever more important.
This suggests a number of questions, addressed directly at Saturn. What 
can an analysis of Uddevalla’s demise teach Saturn and General Motors 
about the appropriate mix of central coordination and local autonomy? How 
to keep the initiators in the corporate or national union engaged in on-going 
innovation? How should the local and national unions share power to allow 
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for the innovation, flexibility, responsiveness and ownership necessary for 
local co-management and joint governance, while at the same time ensuring 
coordinated policy, security, learning and diffusion of best practices at the 
national level? We think that a careful analysis of Uddevalla – and other 
innovative cases where they exist – will actually benefit the innovators in 
the American automobile industry, on the union as well as the management 
side. It may have been a different country, and (by now) a long time ago, 
but what happened in Uddevalla is still relevant.
Finally, we want to pre-empt accusations of naive optimism: however 
innovative, more democratic and efficient workplaces such as Saturn and 
Uddevalla are, many political and economic disparities that are removed 
from the world inside the factory, remain once we step outside. For, as the 
Uddevalla tragedy makes painfully clear, corporate management, not the 
workers, ultimately control group decision-making and its purse strings. 
Crucial corporate decisions, such as market and product strategy, remain far 
outside the reach of local management, labor unions and workers. In Ud-
devalla, such invisible disparities may not have mattered a lot in the initial 
stages and the growth phase of the project; however, as we discussed above, 
without a ‘special’ product, the plant was an obvious first victim of the cuts 
in Volvo. In the case of Saturn, product and marketing decisions are not 
made entirely independently either, but must still be coordinated with the 
larger GM corporate strategy. In sum, while within Saturn and Uddevalla 
decision-making has been decentralized and workers empowered far beyond 
what one accepts as the norm in the industry, key aspects remain beyond 
the reach of workers and unions.
This may ultimately well be the most profound weakness of the ‘experi-
mental’ islands: as long as their future is ultimately decided elsewhere, no 
one can ever be certain about their long-term viability. In the face of trag-
edies like Uddevalla, trade unionists looking for models of innovation can 
sometimes show some ambivalence in their allegiance to such changes.
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Notes
1. Data were gathered through interviews with GM Human Resource Management 
from the Saginaw and Inland Fisher Guide Divisions, December 1992.
2. Interview with Wilfred Wilms, UCLA, December 11, 1992.
3. The chapter by Christian Berggren provides more details; see also Berggren 
1994, and Adler and Cole 1994 for a discussion of the economic performance 
of the plant. The conclusion of this debate appears to be that Uddevalla was 
indeed probably sufficiently productive, but perhaps in the wrong sector: the 
car industry produces, after all, still primarily standardized products on a large 
scale.
4. See the chapters by Williams et al., Berggren and Sandberg in this volume.
198
 5. The chapter by Ellegård provides the background; see also  Ellegård 1989a and 
1989b.
 6. Most of this information on the internal union politics was gathered in the 
spring of 1993 during interviews with (central and local) Metall members who 
participated in the project group, local union people in Uddevalla and Uddevalla 
management.
 7. The Financial Times printed a short article on the report in the summer of 1992: 
Financial Times 9 July 1992.
 8. In December 1993, a coup in Volvo’s board ousted Pehr Gyllenhammar, the 
company president, and froze the merger plans. By early March 1994, the two 
companies were untangling the ties between them and the merger plans had 
definitely been aborted. The decision not to merge is rather irrelevant for the 
purposes of this paper, since the events we deal with here took place when the 
alliance between the two was very strong. There is, however, one detail worth 
mentioning. The same manager was responsible for Uddevalla’s closure and 
for the failed merger: Sören Gyll, the current president of the company.
 9. The chapter by Dankbaar gives details on the Dutch plant and the chapter by 
Huys on the plant in Belgium.
10. This was said with so many words by a leading Metall official in a reply to the 
criticism in the newspaper of LO, the blue-collar labor union confederation (see 
‘Metall går till motangrepp för kritiken om Uddevallafabriken’ (Metall starts a 
counteroffensive over the criticism on the Uddevalla factory) in LO-tidningen 
no 8, March 19, 1993)
11. JD Power 1992 Customer Satisfaction Index. Saturn Ranked highest among 
all US (transplants included) car lines and third overall behind Lexus and In-
finiti.
12. These principles can be found in the Memorandum of Agreement, published by 
the Saturn Corporation 1985.
13. Memorandum of Agreement, Saturn Corporation, 1985.
14. Memorandum of Agreement, Saturn Corporation, 1985.
15. Memorandum of Agreement, Saturn Corporation, 1985.
16. Saturn also has the potential to break new ground in law and public policy. The 
US Supreme Court (in NLRB v. Yeshiva University, 444 US 672, 1980) ruled 
in 1980 that employees doing managerial work were not covered under the 
National Labor Relations Act, and thus did not have rights to collective bargain-
ing and the protection of a labor union. The institutional arrangements created 
at Saturn by the members of the UAW local union and their non-represented 
partners call into question the adversarial assumptions behind labor relations 
in current law.
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Group work and the reception of  
Uddevalla in German car industry
Ulrich Jürgens
If the routine of the workman’s movement is broken he must inevitably 
call his brain into action to find the best means of bridging his troubles 
and must lose some time in devising and executing his unusual line 
of procedure … The minute division of labour allowed the worker to 
perform his unvaried operation with the least possible expenditure of 
will-power and hands with the least brain fatigue. (Horace L. Arnold, 
Fay L. Faurote: Ford Methods and the Ford Shops (1915), New York: 
Arno 1972, p. 275, p. 245)
1. At odds with MIT’s lean production message
The German as well as the Swedish variants of work organization were 
treated with harsh critique by the authors of the MIT study ‘The Machine 
that Changed the World’ (Womack et al, 1990; German edition 1991). Get 
rid of it the sooner the better, was the advice of the authors referring to 
what they regard as the base principle of the German and Swedish models: 
(neo-)craftmanship.
The MIT critique was very influential, indeed, in a change of directions 
which has taken place in the debate and implementation of new forms of 
work in the two countries. Up to the late 1980s these seemed to follow a 
specific national trajectory of work organization based on a tradition of 
jointness between labour and capital and responding to the specific labour 
market conditions. In Germany during the 1970s and 1980s the Swedish 
debate on new forms of work and, specifically, Volvo’s experiments with 
work organization in its Kalmar and Uddevalla plants were often referred 
to as a model for future oriented work structures. In the German production 
concept the skilled workers played a central role indeed. This characteristic 
element of the German model was highlighted by an account of a plant visit 
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made by the MIT authors. ‘When we visited this plant’, the authors recall,
… we didn’t have to go far to find the basic problem: a widespread 
conviction among managers and workers that they were craftsmen. At 
the end of the assembly line was an enormous rework and rectification 
area, where armies of technicians in white laboratory jackets labored to 
bring the finished vehicles up to the company’s fabled quality standard. 
We found that a third of the total effort involved in assembly occurred 
in this area. In other words, the German plant was spending more ef-
fort on fixing the problems it had just created than the Japanese plant 
required to make a nearly perfect car the first time. (Womack et al. 
1990, p. 90f.)
The Financial Times disclosed that this was a Mercedes-Benz plant (Done, 
1991). In the Swedish case the authors do not reveal the empirical basis of 
their negative evaluation. After a short description of the process layout at 
Uddevalla they conclude:
We are very sceptical that this form of organization can ever be as 
challenging or fulfilling as lean production. Simply bolting and screw-
ing together a large number of parts in a long cycle rather than a small 
number in a short cycle is a very limited vision of job enrichment. The 
real satisfaction presumably comes in reworking and adjusting every 
little part so that it fits properly. In the properly organized lean-produc-
tion system, this activity is totally unnecessary. (Womack et al. 1990, 
p. 102)
Here we find the same critique as in the case of Mercedes Benz’ plant. 
The Uddevalla system, even worse, is moving intentionally in the ‘wrong’ 
direction as it does not aim towards further automation, instead focusing 
on handcraft production:
Thus by the end of the century we expect that lean-assembly plants will 
be populated almost entirely by highly skilled problem solvers whose 
task will be to think continuously of ways to make the system run more 
smoothly and productively. The great flaw of neocraftmanship is that it 
will never reach this goal, since it aspires to go in the other direction, 
back toward an era of handcrafting as an end in itself. (op. cit.)
The authors did not pay any need to the differences in ‘craftmanship’ in 
Germany and Sweden. However, there is a considerable difference and this 
difference played an important role for the German reception of Uddeval-
la’s work organization.
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2. The shaping of the debate  
on new forms of work in Germany
The German debate on group work started in the 1970s. There were two 
different and partially contradictory driving forces. One was a government 
sponsored policy programme for the ‘humanization of work’ and corre-
sponding demands by the unions and the workers’ interests representations 
to improve working conditions. The other was the automation strategy of the 
companies which was developed by the end of the 1970s and materialized 
in the first half of the 1980s.
Within the framework of the ‘humanization of work’ programme several 
group work experiments were initiated. The main thrust of this programme, 
however, was on ergonomical aspects to reduce stress and strain at the 
workplace. With regard to assembly line work, the IG Metall successfully 
put forward the demand to rule out work cycle times below 1.5 minutes in 
some regional master agreements. The demand reflected a growing critique 
of paced fragmented work which spilled over from the shop-floor rebellion 
at the General Motors plant in Lordstown, USA, and of the debate on new 
forms of work in Sweden (cf. Kern 1979, p. 193ff.). The conviction became 
widespread in Germany that the days of the classical assembly line were 
coming to an end, and that alternative means to organize the work process 
had to be found.
A major driving force for this orientation were labour market considera-
tions. The government hat decided to end the policy of ‘guest worker’ im-
ports and thus companies could no longer count on a supply of labour willing 
to fill in jobs which were unattractive to Germans. And here the automation 
strategy came into play. A vision of future oriented work structures evolved 
where the direct production jobs became substituted by new technology and 
skilled labour taking over the task of running the high technology equip-
ment. This went along with a vision of ‘computer integrated manufacturing’ 
aiming at high degrees of automation even in areas like final assembly and 
small-batch production, where until then human labour had prevailed. The 
skilled worker was regarded as the key figure in the modernized plants and 
it was thought that high-tech work structures would again give Germany 
the competitive edge.
The notion of ‘skilled work’ has a clear meaning in the German context. 
It relates to the task profile of the ‘Facharbeiter’ who has completed a three-
and-a-half-years’ apprenticeship in the so-called ‘dual system’. During this 
time the apprentice stays half a week in a public school for vocational train-
ing and the rest of the week at the employer for on-the-job or off-the-job 
training. The apprentice has a temporary employment contract only, after 
finishing the apprenticeship it is up to the employer whether he or she will be 
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taken on as a regular employee. And it is an open question whether this will be 
a skilled worker’s job or not. Thus, a skilled worker could end up with a job 
classified as unskilled or semi-skilled i.e., on an assembly line. And indeed 
this was a growing tendency due to the ‘qualification offensive’ which began 
by the end of the 1970s. A broad policy consensus had emerged that every 
youth should have a right to enter an apprenticeship after finishing school. 
The demand for skilled work became less and less a determining factor for 
the companies’ intake of apprentices. But after finishing the apprenticeship, 
finding a skilled worker’s job became increasingly difficult. In order not 
to have to dismiss these young qualified workers they were offered jobs 
in direct production beneath their skills.1 But in view of future automation 
measures which were seen as the general trend, production management 
saw these employees as an asset which they tried to hoard.
As a consequence of this development, the share of ‘Facharbeiter’ among 
the direct production personnel increased from year to year. The skilled 
workers at the Mercedes-Benz plant mentioned in the MIT study, were an 
example of this development. Here the job of re-working and rectifying 
defects on the line is also classified as non-skilled work. But for reasons we 
have just cited, these jobs were filled by ‘Facharbeiter’ and because of their 
skill potentials production management probably was proud to point this out 
to the researchers. But the fact that these skilled workers were deployed on 
this job was not due to their perception as ‘craftsmen’s jobs’.
The main rationale to hoard Facharbeiter for non-skilled jobs at the begin-
ning of the 1980s was the perspective of further automation. Accordingly, 
the Anlagenführer (equipment controller) became the new paradigm of 
industrial work in the debate initiated by the sociologists Kern and Schu-
mann in their book called: ‘The End of the Division of Labour’ (1984).2 
The Anlagenführer is a person who ideally would be a Facharbeiter with 
further training for running high-tech production equipment and managing 
support work. The Anlagenführer also was at the centre of the new debate 
on group work in high-technology areas in the 1980s. The question here 
was how to deal with the remaining manual jobs in these areas such as fill-
ing magazines, taking off finished parts etc., jobs which were regarded as 
‘residual’ in regard to the trajectory of future automation and which were 
clearly dequalified compared to most of the jobs which were substituted by 
the automation. The equipment controller was regarded as the natural leader 
of a team responsible for running the equipment.3
The debate on group work or manual assembly jobs had come to a dead 
end by the beginning of the 1980s. One project inspired by the Swedish dis-
cussion and carried out in the context of humanization of work programme, 
particularly, contributed to scepticism towards group work on the side of 
management, as well as, the union. In this highly touted project, group work 
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was introduced in a section of assembly operations at Volkswagen’s engine 
plant in Salzgitter. The group work experiment started in 1975 involving 
28 workers in total. Four groups were assigned the task of carrying out the 
complete assembly of the engine. In contrast to the one-minute work cycle 
on the conventional assymbly line, work stations had been set up with a 
labour content of around 45 minutes per station (four stations per group). 
The groups were given additonal responsibility for material transport, engine 
testing, and repair. Job allocation and rotation schemes were to be decided 
by the groups. The groups could regulate their own internal affairs, they 
elected their own groups spokes(wo)men (Volkswagen/Technische Hochs-
chule Darmstadt/Eidgenössische Technische Hochschule Zürich 1980).
It turned out that the surrounding organization was not prepared to accept 
the change dynamics set free by this experiment. The self-assertiveness of 
the group speakers were regarded as threatening by the works council and 
shop steward (Vertrauensleute) system and management regarded demands 
for wage adjustments as threatening to its overall wage structure. In the end, 
the group work section was closed down in 1977. On the basis of economic 
data which were never published and remained controversal,4 the company 
argued that this kind of work organization may be suitable for low-volume, 
small-lot production but not for mass production. ‘Not suited for mass 
pro-duction’ hence became the standard argument against a transfer of the 
Swedish experiments into German car plants.
By the end of the 1980s, German car manufacturers seemed to follow a 
specific model for production organization. Table 1 summarizes the char-
acteristic traits in comparison to what might be called the ‘Swedish’ and 
the ‘Japanese’ models at least as they were referred to in the general debate 
about future oriented work structures.
At the center of the ‘German model’ is the skilled worker and a specific 
understanding of skilled work as a ‘profession’. This understanding includes 
several features: interest in the work, a willingness to accept comprehensive 
responsibility (also crossing over the borders of one’s own task area), and 
a large degree of self-regulation in carrying out the work. This model pre-
supposes a ‘qualification offensive’, above and beyond the direct company 
needs for skilled workers, which in turn is dependent on institutions and 
politics of vocational training. With this we are referring to the societal 
prerequisites for a specific form of labour regulation as they exist in the 
educational system of the Federal Republic of Germany. It is clear that the 
model of skilled-worker-centered work regulation is especially important 
for modern technology management. The general expectation is that future 
work structures will be characterized by qualified labour, uncoupled from 
the production cycle and the rhythm of the machines. Uncoupling work from 
the flow of production is the prerequisite for a type of labour with increased 
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Table 1: Models for production organization
Swedish
semi-skilled workers 
with high initial train-
ing (quasi-apprentice-
ship)
work totally uncoupled 
from the production 
cycle
wholistic tasks with 
long work cycles  
(> one hour) 
 
 
 
 
homogenous groups 
high partial autonomy 
for teams through proc-
ess layout 
de-hierarchization with 
elected speaker and 
self regulation of group 
affairs 
German
skilled worker de-
ployed on direct pro-
duction jobs after full 
apprenticeship
work (partially) uncou-
pled from the produc-
tion cycle
job enlargement with 
work cycles below one 
hour 
 
 
 
 
mixed teams of  
‘specialists’
little partial autonomy 
for teams through au-
tomation and module 
production
controversial role of 
group speaker/leader 
and of degree of self 
regulation 
possibilities for self-regulation and with increased responsibility, i.e. the 
‘Facharbeiter’. With this goes an enlargement and enrichment of the work 
content but clearly below the levels of the Swedish model. The future-ori-
ented concepts within the German model also aim at establishing production 
teams, but more in the sense of teams of ‘specialists’ of different pay and 
qualification levels. Teams have less leeway in organizing their work due to 
requirements of the technology and production control. Finally, the freedom 
of the teams to elect its speakers and self-regulate its own affairs appears 
more controversial between the social partners with different solutions at 
the various local sites.
Japanese
semi-skilled workers 
with generally high 
starting qualifications 
work tied to the pro-
duction cycle 
highly repetitive work; 
cycle times around 
one minute on the as-
sembly lines, around 
five minutes in the 
machining areas where 
multi-machine work is 
the norm
homogenous groups 
no partial autonomy 
for the teams through 
JIT design 
strong hierarchi-
cal structures, group 
leader appointed by 
management, no group 
self regulation
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The Japanese model also gives a central role to skilled labour, though not 
in the sense of the ‘Facharbeiter’ who has time-sovereignty in her or his 
work. Rather, ideal-typical for all Japanese models is self-regulation under 
the pressure of the assembly line and the production pace (for the more re-
cent development, particularly the case of Toyota’s new assembly plant in 
Kyushu; cf. Shimizu in this book). In the Japanese automobile industry, the 
work group is the starting point for the flexibilization of labour deployment 
and for the qualification of the workers. In stark contrast to the Swedish 
model, the teams have little autonomy in organizing the work process due 
to the just-in-time principle of production control and there is no democratic 
system of regulating teams internal affairs and of electing a team speaker.
3. Reception of Uddevalla
Against the background of the negative evaluation of the Swedish inspired 
group-work experiments in the 1970s (for other group-work experiments 
see Altmann et al., 1981), German observers were quite surprised when 
Volvo revealed its plans for Uddevalla. At that time, in the mid 1980s, the 
German trajectory towards new forms of work seemed to have reached its 
limit, however, and there was a new openness to new production concepts 
developed elsewhere. It had turned out that the automation strategy did not 
pay off economically. The downtime of the equipment was much higher 
and the model-mix/change-over flexibility lower than expected. It became 
clear that during the 1990s, at least for assembly operations, technology 
would not play the dominant role and, nolens volens, ‘human centered’ work 
organization had to receive more attention.
In fact, two different strategies had been followed by the German compa-
nies in restructuring assembly operations in the first half of the 1980s (cf. 
Jürgens, Malsch, Dohse 1993, p. 345ff.). One was the outright automation 
strategy with the most famous example of Volkswagen’s building 54 where 
about 30 % of final assembly operations were automated. The other strategy 
was based on the concept of modular production, aiming at a shortening 
of the main assembly line by creating subassembly areas where product 
modules were built and then transferred to the main line. Examples would 
be the subassembly of doors, of the instrument panel, of the wiring harness 
system, of transaxles etc. Preferably the modules taken off the main line 
would encompass those operations where the model mix had caused most 
problems in terms of differing labour content and line balancing. The new 
subassembly areas were seen as experimental ground for new forms of work 
organization in many cases. Thus for instance, at Opel’s Bochum plant a 
door and the instrument panel (cockpit) were assembled in a stationary lo-
cation with individual work cycles ranging from 15 minutes to 45 minutes. 
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After finishing the operation, automatically guided vehicles carried the part 
forward to the next stage. This process layout was regarded as well suited 
for group work and first approaches were made in this direction (cf. Jürgens 
et al., 1993, p. 362). In two respects parallels to the Swedish group work 
development could be seen: first, in the abolishment of the assembly line 
and the creation of stationary workplaces (some module areas, however, also 
were organized as assembly-line work) and second, in the lengthening of 
the work cycle. But lengthening the work cycle was not so much driven by 
humanization of work considerations as by the need to cope with model-mix 
variation. Thus the average length of the individual work cycle in the cockpit 
area at Opel Bochum’s plant was not much more than five minutes but the 
maximum (highest option content) cycle was more than 15 minutes.
By the mid-eighties, according to research carried out by the author on 
the introduction of new forms of work in the German car industry, produc-
tion planners believed that a further job enlargement and lengthening of the 
work cycle up to 15 minutes average was to be expected. In some cases the 
optimum was set a bit higher, but in general a labour content between 15 
and 45 minutes was regarded as feasible and desirable by the practitioners 
(Jürgens et al., 1993, p. 349). The increasing share of skilled workers among 
the direct production workers was seen as one factor which would make this 
lengthening possible and, for reasons of job satisfaction, also necessary.
There was no attempt to follow the Swedish trajectory towards full car as-
sembly with individual work cycles of two hours up to eight hours anywhere 
in the German car industry. In fact, the essence of the Uddevalla concept, 
the principles of ‘reflexive production’ (cf. the contributions of Ellegård, 
Engström, Medbo and Nilsson in this book; cf. also Ellegård et al., 1992) 
was not understood. There was a widespread consensus that work cycles 
of one to two minutes length and thus highly fragmented and repetetive 
work should be overcome in modern assembly plants. But the rationale of 
assessing work cycles was still the search of the optimum between routine 
and habituation on the one hand and motivational considerations of job 
challenge and meaningfulness on the other hand. The difference between 
the one minute cycle and the eight hour cycle was seen in terms of linear 
extension, not in terms of a paradigm shift.
Three aspects of the Uddevalla production concept were particularly 
highlighted when introduced into a German context:
1. The fact that a factory was designed to support group work explicitly 
and to do away with the assembly line process type altogether.
2. The wholistic work tasks and long individual work cycles and thus the 
attempt to make car assembly work meaningful to its workers again.
3. The long initial training of assembly line workers and thus the re-skill-
ing of assembly line work.
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(Budde and Muster, 1990; Auer and Riegler, 1988; Pornschlegel, 1990)
Other aspects were seen as a continuation of the principles of semi-au-
tonomous groups known from Kalmar already, even though the attempt to 
socially balance the composition of the group and measures to support the 
integration of women into production work received much attention.
The question of the length of the work cycle remained a ‘hot potato’ in 
the debate, especially the qualification target of enabling everybody to as-
semble a complete car. Budde and Muster stress the fact, in this context, 
that the work organization allows to flexibly adjust to different levels and 
speeds of individual qualification up from a minimum level of 120 minutes 
work content, which shall be reached by the initial 16-months-training pe-
riod. The initial training period of 16 months is seen as a kind of assembly 
work apprenticeship by Budde and Muster aiming ‘at a level of vocational 
qualification which is close if not already equal to the level of the skilled 
worker (‘Facharbeiter’)’ (Budde and Muster, 1990, p. 99). Pornschlegel 
makes a point of reservation here:
A qualification concept for passenger car assembly is quite remarkable 
and it is quite exemplary in its dynamic and participatory orientation. 
The level of skill formation attained through this concept, however, 
remains far below the standards for vocational training in the metal- 
and electronics industries at the Federal Republic of Germany … In 
so far the model Uddevalla remains in the realm of semi-skilled jobs. 
(Pornschlegel, 1990, p. 28)
In the fall of 1992 a union delegation from the southwest of Germany came 
to Sweden for a study of group work and this visit took them, of course, 
also to Uddevalla. The (unpublished) report points out that the target level 
of productivity had been reached and the average work cycle for a car and 
worker had reached almost two hours. 22 workers were able to assemble 
the complete car, among them two female workers. They were able to 
complete the car within 17 and 11 hours respectively. The report sees these 
achievements as evidence of the ‘productivity potential of this type of work 
organization’. After describing the training system and the opportunities of 
further training however, the remark is made: ‘Experience has shown, though 
that nobody has the confidence to master all tasks and only a few want to 
master the complete work content of car assembly. One should never forget 
that we are dealing here with semi-skilled workers who perform assembly 
operations with two hours of work content, a task profile beyond imagina-
tion in the German context.’
With no further comment the report states that in the meantime the deci-
sion to close Uddevalla had been made.
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4. Learning from Uddevalla
It was not by chance that the study group visiting Sweden in fall 1992 came 
from Baden-Württemberg. The seeds of the Uddevalla plant had taken roots 
especially in this region. The regional IG Metall in the early seventies had 
been the first to contest the assembly line principle and Mercedes Benz, the 
dominant car manufacturer of the region, obviously was prepared to follow 
a Swedish trajectory of work organization in its modernization programme 
in the latter half of the 1980s. Particularly for its new plant in Rastatt, for 
which planning began in early 1987 and which started production in early 
1992, Sweden was regarded as a model. The factory planning team was 
made up jointly of union and management representatives. Early sugges-
tions, mainly from the union side, to plan for a ‘line-free’ process were not 
fol-lowed further, however, a rather complex process layout was developed 
based on principles of modular production. The idea was to differentiate 
the process layout and work organization according to different job require-
ments. Operations which were most effective by model-mix variation, like 
interior trim, wiring harness installation etc., became stationary work places 
with individual work cycles ranging between 70 and 120 minutes; other 
trim operations were to be performed on moving assembly platforms, i.e. 
in a modified assembly line system where work cycles vary between 20 and 
25 minutes between the groups; for some operations of final assembly, like 
engine mounting, a shorter work cycle of around five minutes was planned. 
In this manner Rastatt reduced the reign of the assembly line considerably: 
the share of direct workers off-line on stationary work places was around 
42% in 1993. But still the assembly line remains in place for a large number 
of operations, even though in a quite modified form and with long work 
cycles. Thus refined different socio-technical principles of assembly work 
organization were combined in this plant. What is common is the imple-
mentation of group work as the principal form of work all over the plant 
with elected group spokes(wo)men.
Learning from Sweden obviously has influenced the production concept 
realized at Mercedes-Benz in Rastatt. The three essential innovations of 
Uddevalla, however, were not implemented. Neither was the assembly line 
abolished altogether, nor were work organization and qualification systems 
targeted at building complete cars by small work groups introduced. The 
concept of skilled assembly work is common to Rastatt and Uddevalla but 
has a different meaning: At Rastatt almost all assembly workers have the 
skilled-worker (‘Facharbeiter’) certificate in some metal related vocational 
trade, whereas at Uddevalla skill formation aimed at the requirements of 
assembly work specifically.
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The publication of the MIT auto study in German (‘Die Zweite Industrielle 
Revolution’) came as a shock and threatened to become an embarassment 
for the planners and protagonists of the Rastatt plant. Here were the best 
practice plants particularly in Japan, all of which had conventional assembly 
line organization with work cycles around and even below one minute and 
Uddevalla even was named as the manifestation of a wrong line of develop-
ment and a mistaken belief in craftmanship. Could the announcement of 
Uddevalla’s closure come as a surprise under these conditions? The scep-
tics and traditionalists among managers and unionists began to raise their 
voices. Had Rastatt, too, gone into the wrong direction? In April 1993 a 
joint management/union study group made another tour to Sweden to search 
for an answer. The (unpublished) report concludes somewhat consoled that 
the closure of Uddevalla/Kalmar was no decision against the Swedish type 
of group work. Continuation of the small assembly plants had become too 
expensive due the market situation and overcapacities, even though both 
plants were equal to Torslanda in terms of productivity and quality and 
had some additional advantages compared to the bigger plant. As a conse-
quence, it was stated that group work should remain a central element of 
the companies’ restructuring programme and a return to the old division of 
labour and work organization was ruled out; at the same time, continuous 
improvement principles following the model of Japanese plants should be 
intensified as a part of the group work particularly in optimizing the job 
content. The report stated that similar conclusions were arrived at Volvo’s 
management in regard to the restructuring the Torslanda plant.
Thus, did Uddevalla’s closure lead to no change of direction in Germany? 
One should not be mislead by the statement of continuity made above. Ud-
devalla’s closure has helped to shift the balance towards Japan-oriented 
concepts. The effects may be quite far-reaching. The implementation of lean 
production concepts is still in an early stage. Manifestations of the learning 
from Sweden are on the retreat in factory reality. Whereas for a decade and 
more, factory and work planners saw no future for the assembly lines and 
expected further advancements of job enrichment and enlargement, these ex-
pectations have changed fundamentally. Now we can observe a re-appraisal 
of the assembly line and the word is passed to rather roll-back cycle times, 
at least dampen the expectations of their enlargement. The assumption of 
a principally positive correlation between the length of the cycle time (job 
content) and productivity which seems to underlie the Uddevalla concept 
has become a focal point of critique. The curve has a different shape, argues 
R. Springer who is in charge of the area of work organization at Mercedes 
Benz: Productivity increases only to a certain point with the increase of 
job content. Beyond this point a further enrichment and enlargement of 
the job makes little economic sense, and from a certain point productivity 
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would drop even below the current level. Pointing at a hypothetical curve 
(see Figure 1) he states: ‘The section of the curve P1 to P2 describes the 
work-organizational scope for raising productivity from a given position 
(P1) to its optimum level (P2). In section P2–P3 of the curve the same pro-
ductivity level is reached, compared with the current position (P1), as in the 
section P1–P2. However, because job contents are larger here, higher wage 
costs and additional training costs are incurred, which, given that only the 
same productivity level is obtained as in P1–P2, makes it less economic. 
Any enrichment of job content beyond P3 leads, on the final analysis, to a 
decline in productivity to below the initial level and is thus to be avoided.’ 
(Springer, 1992, p. 59)
<Figure 1, Page 210, Part II, Jürgens>
Figure 1. Productivity of manual work with varying degrees of job enrich-
ment
Source: Springer, 1992, p.58
Most practitioners in the field of work organization in German companies 
would probably agree with the assumption of a productivity optimum some-
where on the curve and clearly not at the ‘complete car assembly’ end of it. 
The assumptions regarding the shape of the curve will vary depending on 
experience and beliefs, as well as on the size of the plant and the flexibility 
requirements of the production programme. Where do plant practitioners see 
the optimum for their trim and final assembly lines? The answer by a leading 
work planner of a German car manufacturer in a survey carried out by the 
author was ‘between three and five minutes’; for stationary workplaces in 
module areas the answer from another company was ‘around 20 minutes’, 
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relating to job enlargement. In the case of job enrichment wage considera-
tions play a major role: if the group is to rotate tasks the tendency is to keep 
a narrow range of qualification/pay levels within the group.
Summing up: It can be stated that the Swedish ‘new plants’ clearly had an 
influence on the German debate of new forms of work. There was never a real 
attempt to follow the full model, however, transfer considerations remained 
limited to certain aspects. Differences in scale of production output of Ger-
man assembly plants (with daily output volumes of around 1000 cars per day, 
even more than 3000 cars per day in the case of Volkswagen’s Wolfsburg 
plant) and, related to this, the stronger emphasis on automation measures 
are among the reasons for limiting the transfer of the Swedish concepts. The 
core of the Uddevalla concept, i.e. the principle of the complete car assembly 
by the group or even by individual workers, has never been embraced by 
work reformists in the German debate. There has been no awareness of the 
potential for continuous improvement which builds up in this kind of work 
environment. Taking into account that the product was not designed for this 
work organization and the rest of the company did not fully support nor 
understand the new concept, the improvements made at Uddevalla during 
its last year should impress anybody. After all, the investments in ‘human 
resources’ needed some time to bear fruit. Accounts of record performance 
of some groups and individuals in the plant showed the further potential 
for improvements. It is a process of improvement, however, which cannot 
be controlled by management. Company strategists and work planners in 
Germany as in Sweden obviously prefer a more controlled process to in-
crease performance level: A bird in the hand is worth two in the bush. The 
Japanese concepts seem to offer an alternative way to achieve a steady and 
continuous process of improvement that is easier to control by management, 
instead of a process in leaps and bounds with much individual variation and 
that is highly self-regulated by the shop-floor, as could have been expected 
at the Uddevalla plant, if it had survived.
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Notes
1. According to estimates at Mercedes Benz seven out of ten ‘Facharbeiter’ in the 
German Automobile Industry were assigned to jobs below their qualification 
level (Springer 1992, p.57)
2. In more recent publications, the Anlagenführer became renamed as ‘System-
regulierer’ (systems regulator). According to data of 1992 the share of systems 
regulators among production workers in German car companies was 8%; it was 
25% in press shops, 27% in machining operations, 6% in body shops and 1% 
in final assembly areas (Schumann et al. 1993, p. 17)
3. Similar concepts were discussed e.g., at Renault and Peugeot (Cohen et al., 
1986) and at FIAT (Camuffo and Volpato, 1994).
4.     At the end of the experiment one worker completed eight to ten engines per shift 
on the average, some workers even twelve engines. A study made by external 
consultants came to the conclusion that the group-assembly setup would pay off 
economically at a level of 120 to 150 engines to be completed by both groups 
per shift. Taking into account the continuous progress on the learning curve 
it could be expected that this level could easily be improved upon the groups 
in the future. In addition, the number of quality defects in the group area was 
significantly below those of the assembly line area.
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Part III
Volvo Car plants internationally 
and the alliance with Renault
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Volvo truck and bus in the UK:  
The clash of the Titans
Paul Thompson and Terry Wallace
Volvo has had a presence in the UK since 1958, with manufacturing interests 
in buses, trucks and industrial and marine engines. The company although 
importing commercial vehicles into the UK from 1967 had began large scale 
assembly operations of trucks and busses on the Irvine site in Scotland by 
1975. Their leverage in the UK commercial vehicle market was enhanced 
in 1988 by the acquisition of Leyland Bus, with its two assembly plants at 
Workington and Farrington, plus the latter’s component factory. The con-
tinuing decline in the UK bus market in the late 1980s meant that assembly 
of buses was concentrated on the Workington site by 1991, with Farrington 
now manufacturing components only. In late 1991 it was announced that the 
Workington site itself was to close with the Volvo B10M bus transferred back 
to the home base in Borås, while the Volvo B6 and Leyland Olympian was 
transferred to Irvine. With this latest rationalisation the Volvo commercial 
vehicle operation now has the two manufacturing sites at Irvine and Far-
rington plus a sales and marketing operation at Warwick.
The argument
This then is a bare outline of the history of Volvo truck and bus production in 
the UK. In this chapter we want to focus on the key moments of take-overs, 
transfers of production and plant closures. These will illustrate the issues of 
relevance to social scientists, for there are a number of crucial parallels in 
the UK with debates and events in Sweden. Shutting down Workington and 
its experiment in dock build and team working took place at about the same 
time as the announcement of the closure of the Kalmar and Uddevalla plants. 
Though the uproar that greeted the latter closures in the academic and news 
media within Scandinavia (Leijon and Löfström, 1993) was sadly lacking in 
the UK, the events and what led up to them do have significance.
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In the early days of the acquisition, Volvo set about fundamentally trans-
forming bus production in Workington from traditional flow line production 
to cell assembly and team working, based around the introduction of docks. 
In exporting innovative work organization, the company’s actions question 
Berggren’s (1990) judgement that there is no ‘Volvoism’ outside Sweden. 
But that referred primarily to the Belgian plant, with the UK operation rep-
resenting a tiny part of the story in his magnificent study of the company.1 
In this respect, our story is part of the wider picture. In closing Workington 
and relocating to Irvine, a plant which until recently had traditional flow 
line assembly and work organization, there are uncomfortable echoes of the 
decision to close Uddevalla and Kalmar.
From a relatively early stage we formed a judgement about company 
strategy that seems to have stood the test of events. Our argument, in con-
trast to some commentators (e.g., Auer and Riegler, 1990), was that Volvo 
has no intrinsic interest in innovative work organization or ‘good work’. 
Observation across the company’s range of plants in commercial vehicle 
production, reveals a heterogeneous stock of work organization practices. 
In our interviews at ten truck and bus division sites in the UK and Swe-
den, we heard considerable commitment to ‘good work’ philosophies and 
methods such as ‘its the natural way of working’ (Production Supervisor 
at Workington). On the other hand it was equally clear that ‘the market 
governs everything in this company’ (Finance Manager at Farrington) and 
‘decisions are based upon economics’(Production Manager at Workington). 
Volvo is a transnational company which constantly looks at and compares 
costs across plants, with those that are more efficient and produce better 
quality products getting the business.
Our view is that these two tendencies coincide in favour of innovative 
work design with respect to bus production and more recently truck produc-
tion in the UK, but not necessarily elsewhere. A brief overview of corporate 
responses to the changing nature of primary markets reveals that within 
Sweden itself, Kalmar and Uddevalla were attempts by Volvo to sustain 
and increase its share of specialist niche markets. Within its commercial 
vehicle division dock assembly techniques, originally experimented in the 
Gothenburg truck facility, were introduced into the purpose built Borås fac-
tory largely as a result of changes in the nature of the bus market. Although 
there is a high degree of equivalence within its European, South American 
and Australian bus plants; similar equivalence is missing from the four major 
truck outlets in Gothenburg, Gent, Dublin North Carolina and Irvine. The bus 
market itself is now so heterogeneous that single line assembly techniques 
have become unable to efficiently manufacture the high number of extras 
or special vehicles that many customers are now demanding.
219
This is increasingly becoming the case within the truck market, notwith-
standing the fact that there is still sufficient demand for standard vehicles 
in the US and Europe to make the use of flow line methods still applicable. 
Consequently, the Gent and Dublin factories, which produce respectively, 
‘FH’, ‘F and FL’ vehicles (Volvo’s standard truck models) and White trucks, 
face management opposition to the introduction of dock assembly tech-
niques. The depth and strength of the current recession in the commercial 
vehicle market has, however, forced companies such as Volvo to reassess 
its overall production strategy. They are now more then ever willing to take 
orders for ‘S’ or special vehicles. These vehicles tend to be concentrated 
in the Gothenburg and Irvine factories and consequently it is there that 
experiments with a mixture of line and dock assembly techniques are cur-
rently taking place.
However, we are not arguing for a mechanical ‘market rules’ perspec-
tive. The existence of a repertoire of work organization practices in Volvo 
and its particular divisions, means that they act as a resource for different 
individuals and groups to pursue their own ideologies and interests. There is 
thus a struggle in Volvo, an intra-company version of global ‘best practice’ 
in which the key actors within and between management, unions and work-
force, struggle to impose their conceptions of efficiency and equity. For 
example, at Irvine the introduction of dock build into its bus assembly unit, 
following the closure of Workington, is forcing senior managers within the 
plant to debate the applicability of the forms of production methods used in 
bus and, more interestingly in view of the Kalmar and Uddevalla closures, 
vice versa from truck to bus. This is then the current state of play. Through 
a series of ‘flashbacks’ of critical incidents, we will now reconstruct the 
events and issues in more detail.
The Leyland take-over: Workington vs. Farrington
The Volvo take-over of Leyland Bus was driven by four factors; the need 
to increase its production capacity; to take out its major UK competitor; to 
acquire a production facility in its largest market outside of Scandinavia; 
and finally, to have a bus production facility within the EC in the run-up 
to 1992. But, within a short time of the take-over, Volvo was faced with 
a number of harsh decisions based around the need to relieve the under-
capacity of ‘B10M’ production at Borås and the continuing decline of the 
UK bus market. The first of these demanded that one of the UK plants had 
to be transformed into a dock assembly facility, so as to facilitate transfer 
of orders around the company’s ‘chain’ of bus production. The second was 
that one of the assembly units should close and all production transferred 
to the remaining plant unit.
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As we indicated earlier, at the time of the acquisition Leyland had two 
major plants at Farrington and at Workington. The view of the executive 
directors of Leyland Bus was that by closing Workington they would be out 
of body building and they would be able to retain a headquarter’s facility at 
Farrington. But a major sticking point in this Leyland plan was the proposition 
for building B10Ms at Farrington on flow line. Consequently, Gothenburg 
argued for the closure of the assembly facility at Farrington and the transfer 
of production to Workington. The Swedish argument prevailed for a number 
of reasons, not least that the President of the bus corporation, Larserik Nils-
son, who had invested considerable political capital into the Leyland venture, 
wanted a UK plant which was the mirror image of Borås. This choice was 
not really surprising. Farrington’s old and inappropriately structured building 
with its BX chassis assembly shop based on pillars and sloping floor was 
ideally suited to flow line production, which made it impracticable to transfer 
vehicles laterally across the track. By comparison, Workington had a flat 
floor and was a large open plan building with a high ceiling. To all intents 
and purposes it was a structural clone of the Swedish plant.
However it was not only the structural similarities of the two plants which 
convinced Gothenburg to expand at Workington. The Farrington site has 
been in existence since 1913, manufacturing a range of commercial vehicles 
for civil and military applications. An engineering background and strength 
of craft unionism meant that it managed to retain a highly skilled and well 
organized blue collar workforce. In contrast, Workington was designed as 
the first high volume, mass produced assembly line factory with integral 
buses assembled through car production techniques. One of the underlying 
philosophies behind the plant was to do away with traditional engineering 
skills in an attempt to overcome some of the demarcation difficulties the 
company had experienced at the Farrington plant. In order to move into a 
greenfield site they felt they needed to recruit semi or unskilled labour as 
assembly operators.
The whole operation was effectively de-skilled from day one with a 
flexible workforce all on one rate of pay, with job rotation and a high 
emphasis on job training, with operators expected to learn other jobs 
as and when required. (Production Manager, Workington).
The skill profiles of the Workington and Borås workforce and the geo-
graphical location of the two plants therefore coincided. Both plants had 
a largely non-craft, flexible blue collar workforce compared to the largely 
craft-oriented workforce at Farrington. Both were built in the 1970s and 
recruited workers from local dying industry, textiles in Borås and steel in 
Workington, who were less steeped in the history of automotive production 
and perceived to be more amenable to learning new ways of working:
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The Workington plant has undergone so much change in the past and 
the people therefore are more receptive to change, there are no deeply 
entrenched working practices that there have perhaps been in the Ley-
land factory. I think to have introduced team working into the Leyland 
factory might have been a little more difficult (Finance Manager, Far-
rington).
Community and geographical factors also intervened. The Farrington fac-
tory was very much linked to the history of Leyland as a town and Leyland 
Motors. Workers at the Farrington plants still saw themselves very much as 
employees of Leyland Motors, even though the company had gone through a 
number of name changes over the past 25 or so years. The name of Leyland 
is also strongly linked to the town of Leyland with all the implications for 
company identity within the workforce. These links with the traditions of 
Leyland Motors either did not exist at Workington or were not as strong. 
Consequently, the process of ‘Volvoisation’ was less difficult to achieve 
with the Workington employees. This would have been less of an issue if 
Volvo had not wanted to introduce dock assembly techniques into its UK 
operation. It had to have a workforce more willing and able to adopt new 
techniques of production. A less solid connection to traditional patterns of 
work and a long standing fear of the eventual closure of the plant meant 
that Workington was more open to new ideas than perhaps the Farrington 
workforce. Managers also saw more straightforward similarities:
If you come to a big town or city it is difficult to run a factory there 
than in the countryside. If you compare Workington to Borås, Borås is 
a small town. not like Gothenburg which is a big city – 600 to 700,000 
people. The relation between the two places is different between the 
two cities. I think it is the same here. I can feel that as well. When 
you are in Preston it is a big city in the area, when you come up here, 
you have more people who are standing up for the industry. I think it 
is lower upsets here. people know each other more. (Swedish Plant 
Director, Workington)
But the similarities did not mean that production could be easily transferred. 
Producing another Borås at Workington was primarily a question of work 
organization.
Transfer of cell assembly
Though Volvo likes to distinguishes itself from its competitors through a 
perception of having an innovative and pioneering approach to manufactur-
ing, and one that can and should be exported, the transfer was based largely 
on market contingencies. It is clear that Volvo’s reaction to the fragmentation 
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of the bus market, the increasing emphasis on quality issues and continuing 
low volume production was to experiment with the dock build and teamwork 
philosophies.
Line production is OK when you have 10,000 similar vehicles, but 
not when you have different types every time and you have to build 
to customer orders. In heavy vehicles where you have low volumes, 
it is the system. I cannot see how we can build on a line. (Production 
Manager, Borås)
The original expectation was to completely abandon flow line production 
at the Workington plant and replace it with the cell assembly system across 
chassis and final assembly. They wanted to develop autonomous teams of 
between seven and fourteen workers each with a responsibility for a distinct 
stage in the assembly function. Responsibility for inspection and quality 
was to be in the hands of the teams, as was the allocation of tasks within 
the group. Employment was expected to increase by just under 10 per cent 
with increased production targets from 80 vehicles in the first year to 1,000 
per year after 10 years.
However, when embarking upon a complete redesign of production 
systems, experience gained from its car and bus plant in Sweden has con-
vinced Volvo that to attempt the installation of a theoretical system without 
modification to suit local conditions is not feasible. Above all else this 
involves a recognition of different knowledge systems existing in specific 
contexts. The knowledge system within, say, a workforce recruited from 
decaying industries such as mining, steel and agriculture, and operating a 
traditionally highly disciplined and task specific, semi-skilled environment; 
is immediately at odds with the a knowledge system able to comprehend 
the more democratic and self-responsible dock assembly system of Volvo. 
Such was the meeting of knowledge systems in 1988 at the Workington as-
sembly plant in West Cumbria. To have introduced a complete overhaul of 
the system at one go would have created more problems that it would have 
solved. The recognition of different knowledge systems meant that Volvo 
was prepared to introduce dock assembly on a incremental basis over a 
number of years.
In January 1990, a small team of operators travelled to Sweden to be 
trained in the working practices at Borås. The major focus of the training 
revolved around the introduction of team working within the Workington 
plant. The initial group of eight were to form the basis of the first assembly 
team. In June, a further six operators were sent over to Sweden and these 
two groups worked on chassis assembly at Workington, forming cells cover-
ing specific work areas. As others then drifted into the teams, they became 
fragmented and the dull state of the market limited the scope of training 
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to only those areas operatives were immediately involved in. So from the 
initial small team, who covered all assembly operations, the development 
of later cells saw them performing limited functions, with some operators 
only being able to carry out one or two of the full range of eight operating 
tasks. The idea was that those teams in those smaller areas would then build 
up as production volumes increased. Scale, therefore, in terms of number 
and size of teams, was very much dependent on volume throughput. The low 
volumes, 15 buses per week, slowed implementation of full cell assembly 
across the whole of the plant.
The ideal team for the co-ordinator was said to be somewhere between 
eight to ten. However of the original eight who went to Sweden, six were 
made redundant during a rationalization programme on the ‘last in, first out’ 
principle. In the early stages, the company was able to carefully select the 
workers who went on the training programme to Sweden, usually younger 
workers, and to weed out those they saw as ‘contaminated’ by traditional 
British working practices. In the latter stages of the plant’s life, the depressed 
state of the internal labour market meant that the teams had little choice 
regarding replacements on the next upturn in production. This meant that 
new recruits had little knowledge of how the system worked and they had 
to squeeze out one or two operatives, who although technically competent, 
found it difficult to shed the habits of production line working.
With these and other factors mediating the pace and character of change, 
it took from 1988 till 1992 for the production regime to change from tra-
ditional assembly line to dock build in chassis assembly. But the system in 
place in Workington was not exactly the same as that in Borås. Nor could 
it be with an inevitable degree of autonomy and mediation for the actors 
involved. At Workington, it was very much left to production engineers, 
managers, and supervisors in conjunction with selected team members 
from within the existing structure. These key personnel received extensive 
training on the philosophical, technical and production underpinnings of the 
system within the Borås plant. However, Workington personnel identified 
a number of problems which they thought they could rectify, drawing upon 
their own expertise. Although the philosophy of the two plants was the same, 
the lay-out and its technical organization was different, as was the ratio of 
sub-assembly to final assembly work.
Indeed, there is an understanding within Volvo that systems themselves 
are not static entities, but need to be constantly updated. One way of doing 
this is to locate production units within several discrete geographical loca-
tions and experiment with different inputs. The underlying philosophy in 
the export of ‘best practice’ is that one factory should not completely take 
on the aura of another because each factory has its own history, its own 
traditions, its own knowledge systems and its own people. This produces 
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a two-way system which has the effect of constantly pushing production 
systems to the limits of applicability by improving and developing them. 
This is, however, a strategy not without its problems. A basic knowledge 
of Newtonian physics reveals that for every force pushed in one direction 
there is an equal and opposite counterbalancing force in the other. In the 
case of Workington, sections of management and trade unions provided that 
counterbalancing force.
Among managers, there were doubts about the success of the arrangement 
in the long run. Those closely involved, notably the manager who had initial 
responsibility for training team members, tended to see the problem in terms 
of the lack of flexibility and imagination within some the company’s more 
traditional managers. He was concerned about the way the Swedish system 
had been ‘modified’ by UK managers to suit British conditions. To back 
this up, one operator joked that, ‘the best thing would be to lift the whole 
factory up and drop it into Sweden’.
Management resistance to change, although initially present in the chas-
sis division, was more widespread in the body division and perhaps did not 
have the wholehearted support of some seniors managers at the Farrington 
headquarters. In one interview, a senior manager in the firm hinted that he 
was sceptical as to the long term success of the project. He was afraid that 
the system would end up as a ‘half-baked’ mixture of British and Swed-
ish methods and was sceptical as to whether it would work successfully in 
the long run. However, most management resistance was eliminated early 
on either by bringing in new staff or by processes of conversion. With the 
appointment of Tommy Svensson as Production Director for the chassis 
division another Swedish manager commented that initially he:
… did not recognize Volvo here. Tommy brought the Volvo spirit to the 
chassis. In the chassis division there were some very strange things go-
ing on. It seemed that Volvo left Leyland business very much alone for a 
while, before Tommy came. Tommy started to work with the managers 
here before he came over. That was a major change. I don’t know how 
good they were before Tommy came, I have no idea. You can see now 
the difference between chassis and body, there is such a tremendous 
difference now. (Swedish Production Manager, Workington)
Turning to the unions, there is no doubt that the core of union organization 
in the plant was in the body division, with both the convenor and deputy 
convenor coming from within that section. The convenor was less than 
convinced of the effectiveness of dock build in the factory:
I have always said – we used to do the chassis on a line system and then 
they put in a dock system – I think we could have built them faster on 
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a line system. We have been doing them on a dock system and I think 
we could have done them without having to spend a lot of money on 
the system (TGWU Convenor).
This anti-dock feeling has its roots not in the system itself, but is largely 
a result of the separation of the plant into two divisions and the resulting 
proposed round of redundancies. It was generally accepted throughout the 
plant that it was overmanned with the body division been the focus for 
this excess of labour. The splitting of the plant into two divisions gave the 
company the legitimacy to concentrate its redundancy plans onto the body 
division, a tactic that was vigorously resisted by the unions. They argued 
that traditionally the plant organization had been ‘wall to wall’ which meant 
that redundancies were organised purely on a seniority principle.
The role of the convenor was also undermined by the split which led to 
him being excluded from any negotiations concerning the chassis employ-
ees. One manager commented on the unions that:
Because they were very sceptical, the comments were passed, ‘Oh you 
have been to Sweden, you have had head lifted off and your wires re-
arranged’. They did not believe it, they didn’t believe it could work … 
I think everything was treated with the inherent suspicion that the trade 
unions had had for a lot of years. They would not back off, they would 
not believe what they were told. To be perfectly honest I really do not 
think that they looked at it in that light at all. I don’t think there is any-
one here who looked in depth at team working. I think they simply saw 
it as another method of negotiating. The convenor has been to Sweden 
and he still doesn’t. He stills sees it as a negotiating issue. The problem 
is, that was has happened now is that chassis areas have developed, we 
have installed these new working methods, irrespective of the support 
of the union, we have now a larger and larger group who are prepared 
to do it and his power has been virtually almost undermined, he is not 
the force that he was 21/2 years ago (supervisor, Workington)
Though some in the plant actually went as far as citing the actions of the 
convenor and the shop steward’s committee as a factor behind the plant 
closure, this was not the view of senior management. Within the constraints 
of the existing limited volumes, Workington met its efficiency and quality 
targets. However, the continuing decline in the bus market and its effect on 
capacity meant that, irrespective of the plants success in becoming ‘Vol-
voised’, it was unable to survive as a stand alone unit. Eyes began to be 
cast northwards to the truck assembly unit in Scotland and the possibility 
of merging bus and truck production into one unit. But why choose Irvine, 
a plant that had more of an independent character, over Workington?
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Why Irvine?
The dominant argument in the company is that Irvine management had more 
of a competitive edge in their outlook and successful performance, plus the 
plant was considered to have a longer history as being a Volvo operation. 
Leyland plants, no matter how modern or successful, were still tinged with 
the ideology of failure. Workington was still effectively only a Complete 
Knock Down (CKD) operation and did not have the expertise in either out-
sourcing parts for Volvo products or being able to have full control over the 
‘bill of materials’, or the means by which vehicles were built. In other words 
Workington was overly dependent on Borås, whilst Irvine was a fully inde-
pendent unit able to design and organise its own production schedules.
It is also the case that the power base in the company had moved to the 
truck division. The truck and the bus companies merged in July of 1991, 
with the Headquarters of the company moving to Warwick and the com-
ponents part of the business put up for sale. In September, the final nail in 
the Workington coffin was the resignation of Larserik Nilsson. With this, 
the last champion of the Leyland operation had gone. The feeling of many 
managers in both the Leyland and Volvo operations was that he had made a 
bad judgement in buying it in the first place. In part this had been masked 
by the strength of Larserik’s leadership and the continuing success of Volvo 
in its other markets. However Volvo’s bus sales were now dropping off in all 
their other markets and this made the Leyland problem more visible given 
that the operation was no longer cushioned by the performance in the rest 
of the world. The new MD of Volvo Bus inherited a UK company whose 
performance was getting worse by the minute despite the organizational 
restructuring of the previous 12 months. The market was continuing to 
decline, losses were building up and Volvo Bus was having to concentrate 
more of its efforts into the UK at a time when volumes at Borås were also 
in decline. With Sweden having made an application to join the EC, they 
no longer needed an EC base. What is more, with the Renault alliance com-
ing into the picture some senior voices in Volvo were arguing for the RVI 
bus division to take over major responsibility for bus production outside of 
Scandinavia. The role of Leyland in that equation was no longer as relevant. 
At an executive group meeting in Gothenburg, in November of 1991, the 
decision to close Workington and shift production to Irvine was made. The 
announcement was later made on 5 December 1991. The decision was made 
without the knowledge of any managers at the Workington plant.
The merging of the truck and bus operations
However, as with the move into Workington, the merging of the truck and 
bus operations and the introduction of some form of dock build will not be 
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straightforward. To understand this, we have to recognise that the history 
of the Irvine plant is different from Workington in that it has always had 
some form of relationship with Volvo. In the late 1960s, Ailsa Trucks began 
importing Volvo trucks and although the business had quite a slow take off, 
within three years they were ready to invite Volvo to join them in a more 
formal partnership relationship. Originally situated at Barrhead, the com-
pany moved to its present location in Irvine in 1974, when they had begun 
the assembling of CKD kits imported from the Gothenburg truck plant. By 
1976 Volvo had become 100 per cent owners of the venture. In 1983, they 
took stock of themselves and accepted that they must become more of a 
truck builder than a CKD assembler. This lead to a total restructuring of the 
factory, extensive investment and goals of reducing build-time and improve 
productivity by at least 20 per cent.
This meant that they now considered themselves the functional equals of 
Volvo’s other two main truck plants in Gothenburg and Gent in Belgium.
We felt that the flexibility to have a factory in the market was very 
essential. We did not obviously want to run an operation that was not 
competitive with the other Volvo operations in Belgium and Sweden. 
So we set out to be as good or better than all the others. We set very 
strict targets and improvements in productivity. In international manu-
facturing one factory cannot perform worse than all the others, we have 
always had to be competitive. We strongly believe… that we became 
competitive within the Volvo family. (Former Managing Director, Volvo 
Truck)
This notion of family is an interesting one. Generally Volvo is a very orderly 
company with well defined targets. Not only does the notion of a Volvo fam-
ily involve national distinctions, it also involves divisional distinctions. In 
other words, there is no simple idea of what it is to be ‘Volvoised’, as the 
process in truck is something different to bus production. For example the 
goal of duplicating Borås all its facilities within the Workington plant was 
largely a result of the duplication of product ranges. Within truck, a more 
complex picture presents itself. Let us turn back for a moment to comments 
made by the former MD:
I like to think there is a special Volvo culture. Everybody is so proud of 
what they are doing and it is like a huge big family. I have the opportunity 
to know many European markets, you have that culture everywhere, 
but it is more nationalized. In Holland you the Dutch Volvo family, in 
Belgium, the Belgian Volvo family and so on.
There has, however, been a mixed reaction to the proposed introduction of 
dock build into Volvo’s three major truck assembly plants:
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To be honest the truck business is not suited to docks, our Belgian fac-
tory is very much against it, the people in Irvine are against it and in 
Gothenburg it is divided with the majority against it and about a third 
or a quarter for it (Swedish Production Manager, Workington).2
This is not strictly the case in Irvine, as opinion is now coming round to the 
idea of dock build. These reactions to team build are not so much expres-
sions of different national cultures, but a reaction to the changing nature of 
the product range being assembled in the different factories. As the truck 
Production Manager at Irvine commented:
No, I don’t think there is a single best way to build trucks. It depends 
very much on what you are building, what your volumes are. The Gent 
factory, they are building, relatively speaking, high volumes of similar 
vehicles therefore there is a benefit of a normal assembly track. I think 
we are building low volume, specialist vehicles with different equip-
ment, so something like dock assembly or approaching dock assembly 
is probably a better way of going. As I said earlier if you are trying to 
fit a lot of additional equipment and you have to move the vehicle every 
40 minutes this becomes complicated. I would like to see, if not a dock 
assembly for these vehicles, certainly a slower line move time to allow 
more time to do the work in that area. There is no one answer.
There is a feeling now in the plant that their traditional system of work-
ing has outgrown its usefulness and they are consequently in the middle 
of introducing the team concept throughout the factory. This has caused 
some problems for them, especially in the definition and role of the charge 
hand. Traditionally, the charge hand has been seen as part of management. 
Now renamed as team leader, there is confusion concerning the new role, 
as manager or as group member. This is largely the result of plant’s use of 
the charge hand in the past in a diagnostic rather than a disciplinary role. 
This had lead to one production manager asking, ‘what is the difference 
between a charge hand and a team leader’? There is also some tension as to 
the use of docks in the plant with the Production Manager of the bus divi-
sion arguing that the system they have introduced is a mixture of docks and 
lines. There is some evidence that we talking semantics here and what we 
have is a modified dock, which they have problems labelling as such. Their 
preferred solution in both bus and truck, is to have two lines, one slow for 
specials and one fast for standard vehicles, with a dock area for final assem-
bly and frame manufacture. What is clear is that the introduction of the bus 
has been a catalyst for change in the factory; change that is at the moment 
experimental. Managers we spoke to question the extent to which Kalmar 
and Uddevalla plants were successful and do not see their factory falling 
victim to the same fate. Their ultimate concern is to get the most efficient, 
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effective and profit-able plant possible. If this can be achieved with docks, 
that is fine. If not and the use of smaller lines in tandem with docks proves 
to be more effective, then that is the system that will be used.
Conclusion
If the above discussion had perhaps been about the Ford Motor Company, 
General Motors or Renault, one could forgive an audience for muttering 
‘so what’. But, because of Volvo’s international association with innovative 
work organization, what happens in the company carries a wider signifi-
cance, even in the UK. For example Peter Wickens (1993), the Personnel 
Director of Nissan UK, has recently pronounced on the ‘failure’ of the ex-
periments in Sweden indicated by the closures and what they mean for the 
triumph of lean production. What Volvo has actually done in the UK bus 
and truck industry is only a small piece in the overall picture. Yet the story 
appears to be a familiar one. Volvo transforms work organization at Work-
ington in a progressive direction, the plant meets its efficiency and quality 
targets in a shrinking market, is then closed and production is transferred 
to a more traditional plant.
The events appear less surprising if the analysis proceeds from the starting 
point used in this chapter; that for all their justifiable pride in manufacturing 
expertise, Volvo has no intrinsic interest in particular forms of work design. 
Rather, the repertoire and choices made reflect the company’s strategic 
response to shifting market conditions. There will be room to struggle over 
those choices, but the circumstances are not likely to get any easier in the 
short term. Commenting on the merger between Renault and Volvo, a senior 
Swedish Government official commented, ‘Ten years ago there would have 
been turmoil from the unions, but not these days’ (Guardian, 7 September 
1993). Although this reflects to some extent the changing nature of European 
trade unionism, it is also indicative of the gradual recognition by the unions 
that in Volvo, ‘there are no more sacred cows’ and that ‘remaining competi-
tive’ is the only way for Volvo to survive (Per Gyllenhammar, Guardian, 9 
September 1993).
Notes
1. However since late 1993 the Gent truck plant in Belgium has increased both 
its product range and of variants within these ranges. Consequently they  have 
begun to utilise dock production technology and team working for the assembly 
of low volume, highly specialised trucks.
2. Since we spoke to this Production Manager the Gent and Gothenburg factories 
have switched to a mixture of dock and flow line assembly, largely as a result 
of the changing requirements of the market.
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Volvo-Gent: a Japanese transplant  
in Belgium or beyond?
Rik Huys & Geert Van Hootegem
1. Belgium as a car-assembling nation
In international literature, Belgian car assembly usually escapes the attention 
of researchers. This may be due to the absence of a national car producer 
or the small size of the country. There are, however, several good reasons 
why this country deserves a closer look:
There is a long tradition of car manufacturing, starting back at the end 
of last century with national production plants like Minerva, Imperia and 
F.N., in addition to some foreign automobile constructors. Soon, however, 
the growing complexity and technological advancements in car produc-
tion demanded unaffordable investments from the small-scale Belgian car 
producers and caused their closure before World War II. After the war, car 
production was completely taken over by foreign investors.
Car manufacturing is of overwhelming importance for the national econ-
omy. Currently, five assembly plants containing welding, painting and final 
assembly divisions (with Ford having an additional steel-pressing division, 
wheel and shock absorption production units) are operating in Belgium. 
More precisely all are located in the Flemish region. With a total produc-
tion of 1,115,000 cars (Figure 1), Belgium is the largest car assembler per 
capita in the world (0,11/capita, compared to 0,07 for Japan or 0,05 for 
Germany and France).1
There is the good performance of the car manufacturers in Belgium, for 
which most of the plants are well known. Compared to the production in 
each plant, the market in Belgium is small2. Plants export around 95% of 
their production, and can as such not rely on the internal market in bad 
times. Of course good productivity is the main argument for any plant, but 
there is a continuous awareness in all Belgian assembly plants that it is the 
only card to play as decisions of major importance are taken in far away 
headquarters. 
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Figure 1. Production of automobile-industry in Belgium (1993)
Signs of this performance can be seen in the remarkable way Belgian car 
assembly plants passed the slump in the market during 1992–1993 relatively 
unscaved, without any significant loss of production or lay-offs. Moreover, 
two plants were able in recent years to attract the exclusive production of a 
new model (The 850 by Volvo-Gent and the Mondeo by Ford-Gent).3
While any of the five car assembly plants in Belgium has an interesting 
story, in looking for new forms of organization the biography of Volvo 
attracts attention. Compared to all other concerns present in Belgium, the 
Volvo-concern has a strong tradition of alternative work organization. It is 
also the only producer of luxury cars, which seem to be a more fertile ground 
for such alternatives. Looking from Sweden and with the wisdom of what 
has happened in the last couple of years (the assignment of the exclusive 
production of the 850 to Volvo-Gent, the success this model has proved to be 
in the market, and the closure of Kalmar and Uddevalla), one might wonder 
whether the fate of Kalmar and Uddevalla are linked to this plant. At least 
it looks ironical when at the same time as Volvo-Gent is struggling to meet 
the huge demand and producing at a current rate of 140,000 units / year in 
a plant build for 90,000 units, other Volvo plants are closed.
2. How Volvo got involved in Belgium
As was mentioned previously, car production was certainly not new in 
Belgium as the first Volvo-Amazone drove off the production line in 1965. 
Indeed, Volvo was the last of several car producers which found their way 
to Belgium. The decision by Volvo to erect an assembly plant in Belgium 
was made in the wake of the creation of the European Economic Community 
(EEC). As Volvo was hardly presented in this important potential market, 
it was vital for the company to set up its own production units in order to 
reinforce its position. Especially since custom duties were implemented 
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around the then six members which taxed imported cars at 22 percent. Al-
though the import of parts was also taxed by 14 percent, a Volvo production 
unit within the EEC could work under similar conditions as its European 
competitors.
Gent was chosen as a location in 1963, because the region was experienc-
ing a strong economic growth around the expanding port while at the same 
time provided an available labour force due to the decline in the traditional 
textile industry. But above all, the location is at the crossroads of the two 
main European highways (E40 to G.B. and Germany, E17 to the Netherlands 
and France), and at the port of Gent with a good maritime connection to 
Sweden.
Until 1972, the plant consisted of only a final assembly division. Because 
the number of vehicles grew rapidly, transportation costs, as well as repair 
costs, due to transportation of painted bodies soared. Therefore, the plant 
was extended with a welding and paint division. Although ironically, at 
this moment none of the five assembly plants in Belgium exports as many 
cars outside the EEC as Volvo-Gent, Belgium still represents an important 
foothold of Volvo within the EEC Not only did Volvo-Gent grow to be the 
biggest automobile plant of Volvo outside Sweden, Volvo’s presence in Gent 
was also expanded by a parts centre for distribution mainly to European 
countries (1973), a truck plant (1974), and more recently one of Volvo’s 
four marketing centres covering the marketing, sales and after-sales of all 
Volvo-automobiles in Western Europe (1990). All taken together Volvo 
actually employs over 5,000 people in Belgium.
3. How Volvo-Gent grew
In such a cyclical market as automobiles, the fate of the Volvo-Gent plant 
was not without down-turns. After the oil-crisis in 1973, production fell 
dramatically (figure 2). The newly introduced two-shifts production had to 
switch rapidly to one-shift again, with important lay-offs and social unrest. 
More recently production dropped steeply again (1990). This was not only 
due to the simultaneous phasing out the 740 and 950-five-doors models and 
phasing in of the 850-model. In an effort to limit stocks of unsold cars in a 
sloppy market, 24 days without production were introduced and the speed 
of the production line lowered. As such, no lay-offs were put through since 
all workers were needed in the newly constructed 850-production lines.
Gradually the Volvo-Gent plant evolved towards a more self-sustaining 
and autonomous enterprise. Soon after its opening the plant was expanded 
with a welding & painting division. This gives the location a more economi-
cally viable future, an advantage which was denied to Kalmar and Uddevalla. 
The original markets of the six EEC-countries were expanded to a worldwide 
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supply. With the introduction of the 850-model the plant has been given for 
the first time the exclusive production of a Volvo-model. It is also the first 
time the Gent plant had any involvement in the development of the car. 
Although even here the design was fully accomplished in Sweden and only 
the detailed design of parts and their testing could be discussed. Indeed, far 
from a lean design procedure, the final decision to produce the 850-model in 
Gent was only made in 1990! If only the choice of where to produce the car 
had been made earlier in the development, production-engineers of the plant 
concerned could have helped to control tuning and coordination problems 
between the development and production of a car.
At the other end of the product line, Volvo-Gent has thrown itself in to the 
distribution as well, despite some resistance of the central planning division 
in Sweden. In direct contact with importers, they are allowed to deviate up 
to three weeks before production from the planning Volvo-Gent receives 
from Sweden. Of course this requires that the plant be flexible. Therefore, 
the plant has an important and growing number of suppliers working on a 
JIT-basis, including some sequential suppliers.
As figure 2 shows, numbers from the past are fast becoming obsolete. 
Indeed during 1993 and continuing until this moment (March 1994), the 
plant is in an ongoing struggle to increase production without further in-
vestment in order to meet growing demand. Production in three shifts has 
been introduced in body & paint shops. Two-shift production in final as-
sembly could be maintained by several increases in linespeed. With a mere 
90 production-stop per day in body shop and 75 in paint-shop necessary for 
maintenance work, the plant has an actual production of 624 cars per week. 
However one final increase in linespeed is planned in April 1994 to reach 
a limit of 644 cars per week.
Such high capacity utilisation is not unusual in Belgian automobile plants, 
even when demand is low and plants close down frequently. Indeed, three 
of the four other assembly plants produce in three shifts, in each case exten-
ding over all production units. Plants have little output-flexibility upwards 
as overtime is legally restricted, heavily taxed and, considering the high 
un-employment, generally not accepted by unions. However plants enjoy 
great flexibility downwards as workers put on temporary unemployment 
are granted additional benefits. Although the cost of flexibility is hereby 
placed on the social security, this is generally accepted as a measure to 
divide available work.
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Figure 2. Number of workers and produced cars at Volvo-Gent (1965–1993).
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4. Production process and automation:  
a highly automated plant with some specific features
The body shop
Volvo-Gent consists of three units as most assembly plants do: body shop, 
paint shop and final assembly. But not only is there no steel-pressing divi-
sion, a large amount of spot & arcwelding is also carried out in Sweden and 
shipped to Gent. Although the data in Table 1 & 2 show no exceptionally 
high automation in the body shop, one must keep in mind that compared to 
other assembly plants, Volvo-Gent is a ‘small’ producer. Moreover several 
high-tech installations are introduced. Among others we mention the laser 
welding station for attachment of the roof and the automated detection and 
measurement in the course of the production process. All assembled floors 
are checked on the presence and position of studs, and at different stages 
three Perceptron-installations measure the welded body dimensionally by 
means of laser-beams. As such no 100%-inspection by man is needed until 
the end of the body shop.
Due to a specific build up of the body in which the front-end and inner & 
outer side-panels are assembled straight on the floor, these production steps 
have no large buffers towards the production process as is usual.
Table 1 
Degree of automation in body shop
	 Total	‘average’	 Gent	 Automation
 850-model  at Volvo-Gent
Spotwelds (number) 4045 2547 92%
Arc-Welding (mm) 8840 7342 56%
Table 2 
Number of robots in body shop
 Number of robots
Spotwelding 117
Arc-welding 8
Other (studwelding, hotmelt, Pasta …) 16
Total 141
The paint shop
Apart from several additional and specific coatings to sensitive areas, 
connected to the luxury car a Volvo is, Volvo-Gent has a largely classical 
paint shop. However, one should seek in vain for a separate topcoat repair 
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spraybooth. Indeed as the production line for the application of topcoat is 
doubled, the second line has an intake of new as well as repair bodies. In 
this way faulty topcoats are returned mercilessly.
Noteworthy is the adhesion of a protective plastic at the end of the paint 
shop on all horizontal parts of the body. This protects the body from damage 
throughout the further assembly operations as well as during transportation 
as the plastic remains on the car until delivery to the customer. Since most 
of the bodies are wrapped in this way, paint-repair after final assembly al-
ready shrunk considerably. In the near future all bodies should follow this 
treatment in the hope to abolish final paint repair completely.
The final assembly
Even in the final assembly, automation is high compared to other Belgian 
automobile plants. We refer to the automatic sealing and installation of 
windshield and backlite as well as the automatic engine assembly and 
rear suspension module lift. Specific is the complete preasembly of the 
drive train (engine, gearbox, front & rear axles), with fuel tank and fuel & 
breaktubes on a pallet. Where the lift of the motor and all mechanical op-
eration in the ‘chassis’ are usually carried out after the trim-operations, the 
‘wedding’ takes places here very soon after the entry in the final assembly 
area. This build up should increase quality, as almost no operations need 
to be executed overhead, and as this full preassembly can be tested before 
entering the body. Indeed thanks to a well thought out production process, 
automation of inspection, but mainly thanks to the containment of quality 
problems into the team, the repair-area is breathtakingly small, both in space 
and in manpower. A result which would undoubtedly raise applause from 
the IMVP-researches at MIT.
An area of automation which often escapes the attention of researchers is 
the body-transfert mechanisms. At Volvo-Gent the driven line hides a be-
wildering variety of transportation means, especially in the final assembly: 
ordinary body-skids on a chain, but also small AGV’s for preassemblies, 
high carriers, low carriers, palettes on a chain, fixtures on wheels in a track 
forming a loop… Some of these transfert means facilitate the implemen-
tation of alternative work design. But the available diversity present at 
Volvo-Gent should not disguise the fact that the whole process flow from 
body shop until the end of final assembly is on a driven line, and with a few 
exceptions one single line.
The choice to organize production on a single line raises questions. In 
the past, one easily assumed that a rigid line might be productive but costs 
inevitably in flexibility. In other words, a single line would be as such in-
compatible with a flexible production. This brings us to the main question 
we want to address in this article: how does Volvo-Gent manages to be a 
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flexible producer and at the same time be productive? Of course this is a 
dilemma to all car assemblers on a driven line, as are most. But as we want 
to show, Volvo-Gent is particularly well equiped to combine these two goals. 
In realising the leap forward from rigid to flexible mass production, both 
technological and organizational solutions are implemented.
5. A flexible production-process and a flexible workforce
Technical answers to the flexibility problem
In a sense the full potential of the available AGV’s on the production floor 
is not exploited as they operate in a single line. The use of carriers in body 
& paint shop is merely restricted to the transfer of bodies from one line to 
another. Only in the final assembly, part of the operations are executed on 
a carrier with additional ergonomical advantages. However this ‘expensive 
line’ remains more flexible as bodies can at several stages be taken out of 
the process-flow and routed off-line for further inspection and repair. The 
frequent use of carriers weakens the pressure in a rigid line to ‘move the 
metal’ irrespective of the quality. Furthermore it is at the same time a means 
of transportation and a potential buffer.
More flexibility is attained by postponing the complete identification 
of the body until its launch in the final assembly. Of course, production in 
the body shop is in accordance with a planned scedule, but the linkage to 
any specific order is reestablished after the paint shop. In this way isolated 
problems in the body & paint shops do not lead to a cancelling of the order, 
since any other similar body that is available can be used to fulfill the order 
eventually. As body specifications are less stringent this gives the body & 
paint shops more space to operate as is usual. Take for instance the colour 
batching in the paint shop. A fixed link of all bodies with specific orders 
poses any producer to the following classical dilemma: or not to disturb the 
process-flow and change colour with each passing body according to its 
specification (with the obvious disadvantage of spilling solvents and higher 
environmental pollution), or creating a large buffer to batch the bodies ac-
cording to their topcoat colour. Where no fixed coupling exists the paint shop 
can escape this dilemma and considering certain restrictions spray colours 
in batches as bodies pass by, irrespective of the order.
Of course such advantages are not without a cost. A late body identifica-
tion requires a large buffer between the paint shop and the final assembly. 
Volvo-Gent has indeed a very large ‘Random Access Bank’ with a capacity 
of 450 bodies, and thus potentially 450 choices. Although this buffer is also 
needed for bridging the difference in production time between the two units, 
it enables at the same time an elaborate balancing for operations in the final 
assembly. In this way idle time in the final assembly can be minimized as 
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varation in work content are limited. This softens the continuous collision 
of flexible production on the one hand, and a rigid line, on the other hand. 
A battle that seems to cause any foreman on the production floor headaches, 
and is a major source of quality problems.
A further advantage of this large bank, is the additional time it provides 
for preassemblies and external suppliers to produce parts in sequence. In-
deed, more than two hours before the physical launch of a body in the final 
assembly the sceduling is established. While other Belgian auto-assemblers 
manage to establish sequential supply for one part (usually seats), Volvo-
Gent has five major parts which are delivered in sequence by nearby plants. 
Again, as option variability seems to rise continuously, this softens another 
major problem for flexible production on a fixed line: how to provide this 
rigid production-system with the necessary parts for all variations that it 
has to swallow?
A flexible allocation of production workers
Of course the greatest potential flexibility remains with the available work-
force. Here Volvo-Gent reached considerable flexibility within the Belgian 
context.
Considering output flexibility, agreement was reached with the unions 
on the introduction of ‘flex-time’. In order to fulfill demand, one hour of 
overtime is possible on three days per week. This is restricted to the final 
assembly as the body & paint shops are already working in three shifts and 
have no further possibility to work overtime. But the flex-time agreement 
also provides the opportunity to work on Saturdays. Following the men-
tioned restrictions on overtime, these additional working hours are not paid 
as overtime but can be compensated on a later date. In practice all overtime 
during 1993, is currently being compensated for, through the additional 
recruitement of workers on a temporary basis, which allows production 
workers to take leaves.
The introduction of the three shift production system is also handled to the 
plants advantage, by using the nightshift as a flexible buffer. This concerns 
mainly the body shop in which the subassemblies produce at maximum 
capacity during two shifts, while at night, a reduced workforce take care of 
the additional output to reach the required output of the day. The allocation 
of this workforce depends on the technical losses each subassembly has oc-
cured during the day. Because subassemblies usually produce in overspeed 
compared to the main line as a safety net for breakdowns, this causes them 
to lay idle frequently if no disturbances occur. By employing the nightshift 
workforce in a flexible way, the up-time of subassemblies is maximized and 
at the same time the necessary manpower reduced, especially since these 
subassemblies are the most labour-intensive parts of the body shop.
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All production workers in the body & paint shops work on an 8-hours 
nightshift, although production stops during 90 minutes in body shop and 
75 minutes in paint shop. In this period production workers take on addi-
tional cleaning and maintenance tasks which is often carried out by external 
services.
This flexible allocation of the workforce is only possible if multitasking 
is practised. All producion workers in Volvo-Gent are members of so-called 
VEC-teams (Volvo Europe Car), consisting of around 10 workers and headed 
by a teamleader. Due to frequent increases in linespeed in the final assembly, 
this number has risen in some areas to 15 and even 20 workers. Generally, 
in the body & paint shops, all members of the team can be allocated to all 
jobs with frequent rotation among them. This frequency can be chosen by 
the team and varies from daily to three or four times per shift. In the final 
assembly teams are divided in two or three cells, each containing about 
five jobs in which workers rotate. As such workers can be allocated to all 
jobs within their cell, usually with complete rotation within a cell during 
a single shift.
It is important to stress that this rotation is more than doing ‘more of 
the same’. The variety of jobs over which is rotated is wider than usual, 
a consequence of the plants radical abolition of job classifications. While 
most Belgian car manufacturers have around four or five job classifications 
within the executive production workers, Volvo-Gent has only one. This is 
a unique result in Belgian car assembly, as a reduction in job classifications 
is a very sensitive area for unions.
To make this concrete by means of an example, let us focus on the auto-
mated lines in the body shop. Here part feeders, spotwelders, arc-welders, 
fitters, polishers, inspectors, on & off-line repair-man … are all members 
of teams and have the same job classification. There are no ‘fixed’ workers 
to any off these jobs as all members rotate within their team. More strik-
ingly, even robot operators are members of these teams and have the same 
job classification. While in three of the four other Belgian assembly plants 
these robot operators are indeed part of the production instead of the main-
tenance department, Volvo-Gent is the only one to assign them the same 
job classification. But the plant goes even a step further and expects robot 
operators to execute production tasks as well. For any robot operator job that 
has to be fulfilled, at least two production workers are able to do the job, 
usually with a weekly rotation between production and maintenace tasks. 
This gives the plant more flexibility to allocate manpower. Any unforeseen 
absentee, including robot operators, can be replaced. But more importantly, 
the production worker ‘switches’ instantly to a robotoperator in the case of 
a breakdown. While in a segmented workforce production workers stand 
idle in the case of a production halt, a flexible workforce can be used in 
machine-downtime as well as in up-time.
241
The willigness of robot operators to execute production work stems from 
the plant’s policy of ‘upgrading’. This means training of production workers 
as a robot operator, instead of a ‘downgrading’ policy in which maintenance 
workers are ripped of their special suit and told they have suddenly become 
production workers. In this last scenario, management can hardly hope that 
they would accept ‘ordinary’ production work as well.
This same story on flexible allocation is realised on many levels and 
forms a shift from a traditional and counterproductive division of labour. 
While having ‘fixed’ inspectors and ‘fixed’ repair-man weakens the qual-
ity-awareness of the production workers, producing good quality causes 
these specific jobs to be idle. Even worse, they have a personal interest 
in bad quality in fear of losing their job. Vice-versa having one single job 
classification for these jobs and having a multitasked workforce needs an 
investment in training but realises three goals in one stroke:
• quality-awareness is brought to the source of the problem
• allocation of manpower where it is needed (to repair if there is repair 
to be done, to production otherwise)
• getting the personal interest of the worker and the interest of the plant 
more in line
Multi-tasking or multi-trading?
The word ‘team’ means much more at Volvo-Gent than production workers 
who rotate frequently, however extensive this rotation may be. In 1987, man-
agement issued directives for an elaborate new work organization system: 
a VEC-team plan. Actual implementation on the production floor started in 
1989 and was very gradually worked out. This implementation is currently 
still very much underway.
Figure 3 illustrates the difference in work-organization on the production 
floor. In the past, one foreman backed by an instructor, supervised some 
60 to 70 operators who assembled parts at a driven line. In addition to the 
production department there were service departments, such as maintenance, 
quality and material handling which carried out both routine and specialist 
activities.
Now, all production workers still operate on a driven line, but are integrat-
ed in VEC-teams. The former assistant to the foreman has been decentralised 
to the team and plays a pivotal role as the team leader. He is not chosen by 
its members, but appointed from above after a long training and selection 
procedure. While most team leaders are former instructors, team members 
can be promoted to team leader as well. The team leader has to know all 
production-tasks within his team as he must be able to train team members 
and fill in for short periods. In practice he is not involved in production 
tasks, and he is no stand-by as special substitutes remain available under 
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each foreman (who has 2–3 team leaders under his supervision). In order 
to achieve maximum cooperation the team leader is not given disciplinary 
powers, these remain the competence of the foreman.
Together with his team the team leader is increasingly responsible for a 
wider range of tasks:
• checking the quality of its operations
• increasing overal effectiveness of the equipment
• repair of failures within the team
• education and training of its team members
• stand-in in case of absent team members
• set-up and implementation of the team balance
• implementation of prevention policy concerning labour-accidents, er-
gonomics and environment
• initiate the necessary amount of improvement proposals (in accordance 
with the plants suggestion scheme)
• preparing and leading the team meetings (30 minutes per fortnight)
Figure 3. The old and new (VEC-team) work organization (*)4
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Figure 4. Multi-trading in the body & paint shops, and in final assembly.
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While the team leader has a central role to play within the team, it is im-
portant to stress that the decentralization of tasks from staff departments do 
not stop here. As teams are also given additional tasks in quality assurance 
and maintenance the word ‘team’ must be understood as all team members, 
and not merely the team leader. This is a crucial distinction between the 
Japanese approach to teamwork (as can be seen at NUMMI), and the way 
in which some American or European producers work out their experiments 
with teamwork (as can be seen at Saturn).
With production work at a driven line and a cycle-time around 83 seconds 
in the final assembly and around 100 seconds in the body & paint shops, there 
are only two alternatives if this decentralization is seriously pursued.
• Either the production line is halted in the course of the shift to enable 
production workers to take on these additional tasks. This option costs 
capacity, and is with current demand unaffordable to Volvo-Gent.
• Or production workers are relieved from the line to carry out these ad-
ditional tasks. This option costs manpower, and is the option worked 
out at Volvo-Gent.
Every team is provided with an extra team member, the so-called Vec-team 
man (man is indeed the right word as no women are operating on the pro-
duction floor). He stands in for individual relief of all operators within the 
team. E.g., he relieves 12 operators during 30 minutes = 360', plus his own 
relief = 390'. This leaves 150' in an 8-hours shift during which he carries 
out the established checklist of maintenace and quality tasks. In body & 
paint shops this additional man is no ‘fixed’ person. As everyone is able to 
do all jobs within the team (with a limitation on the job of robot operator), 
everyone becomes by daily rotation the Vec-team man. In final assembly 
where production workers are only allocated to the jobs within their cell, 
the extra man is indeed a specifically assigned person who reliefs another 
production worker every day during an extra 1.5–2 hours during which he 
carries out these Vec-team tasks.
Thus the execution of these tasks is restricted to around two hours every 
two weeks for a single worker. But by extending these rotation systems to all 
production units, every production worker becomes aware of these quality 
and maintenance implications while carrying out production tasks.
These additional tasks are gradually implemented in each team in five steps. 
What these steps mean in general is illustrated by two pillars which are of 
primary importance for production workers, namely autonomous mainte-
nance and autonomous quality (figure 5). The time each team is allocated to 
implement each step is only loosely defined. In fact the team evaluates each 
step on a weekly basis, which consists of answering a number of questions. 
When a team reaches 80 out of 100 points, a screening committee is invited 
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to repete the evaluation. When the committee also gets to 80 points, the team 
may move on to the second step. Before proceeding to a subsequent step, 
the team must be able to retain its score on every former step. For each step 
the team is awarded with a green circle on its VEC-team board. Each step is 
accompanied by a considerable amount of training for all production workers 
(dependant on the actual content of the steps for the team, the whole imple-
mentation consists of 96 to 151 hours of training for a production operator, 
207 t o 282 hours for a machine-operator, and 307 to 405 hours of training for 
a team leader. A supporting factor is the low turn-over (a mere two percent 
in 1993) by which the investment in training is not lost.
<Figure 5, Page 245, Part III, Huys>
Figure 5. Steps of implementation of autonomous maintenance and autono-
mous quality.5
A thoroughly pursued decentralisation of the staff
At the end of stage 5 the Vec-team plan entails a massive shift of tasks from 
staff departments to the production floor. In this process the team is increas-
ingly supported directly by staff, who in their turn are brought increas-
ingly under the supervision of the production department. In most Belgian 
plants the decentralisation of quality-control, maintenance, engineering 
(and sometimes material handling) under the supervision of the respective 
unit-managers is common practice. In some cases the decentralisation of 
part of these specialised functions are brought under the hierarchy of lower 
production supervisors.
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Figure 6. Organizational structure of a foreman area.
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At Volvo-Gent, with the notable exception of material handling, this de-
centralisation goes much further. First of all many maintenace and quality-
control tasks are defunctionalised and integrated into the tasks of production 
workers. All first line maintenance, all 100 percent inspection and all on and 
off-line repair is fully transferred to the teams. Thus, walking through the 
plant, no specific functions other than production workers can be seen on 
the line. Furthermore indirect functions like the pool (workers who stand in 
for absentees), specialised quality-control, specialised maintenance (albeit 
functionally) are also brought under the supervision of the foreman. Even 
an engineer is assigned to every foreman, to work out what the VEC-team 
goals mean in practice for each team, give support to the teams in work-
ing out these goals, and to assist them in optimising work procedures and 
balancing. This assignment must be interpreted ‘physically’ as well, since 
the engineer leaves his office in the staff department, shares the room of 
the foreman on the production floor and becomes his colleague. At the end 
of stage 5 and with his help, the teams become quasi-autonomous and self-
sustaining small plants within the plant.
For illustration, let us return to our example in the body shop and look 
at how the very first area of the plant under the supervision of the foreman 
is organised.
6. Volvo-Gent: a hybrid plant
Much of what has been mentioned resembles what we know, or presume, 
about Japanese car assemblers:
• production workers operating on a driven line with a standardised work 
practice
• short work cycles coupled with frequent rotation
• the abolition of job classifications
• involvement of production workers in kaizen through a suggestion plan 
and team meetings
• enlarged responsibilities of first line supervisors
• decentralisation of the staff and bringing them under the ‘pressure’ of 
production
Indeed, it is no coincidence that Volvo-Gent in 1991 was awarded, as the first 
plant outside Japan, the prestiguous TPM-prize from the Japanese Institute 
for Plant Maintenance. However, the attempt at job enrichment probably 
goes further than what we know about the Japanese production system, and 
could be a legacy of Volvo’s historical experiments.
Viewed from this perspective, Volvo-Gent may seem a ‘traditional’ 
plant with an orthodox line assembly and a traditional work organization. 
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Yet using these measures, isn’t almost any (operating) car assembly plant 
traditional?
Looking from the Belgian perspective on the other hand, Volvo-Gent can 
be considered as a pioneering plant for other car assemblers. While concepts 
as Kalmar & Uddevalla are seen as an answer to a Swedish problem, be-
ing high turnover, high absenteism and recruitment problems due to high 
education and low unemployment, the goals as described in the VEC-team 
work organization are widely shared. However, due to a short-time approach 
resulting in uncoordinated and sometimes conflicting changes in work or-
ganization, the failure to pursue an aim throughout all its consequences, and 
a more conflictuous relationship with unions, they seem unable to actually 
implement these goals as successfully as Volvo-Gent.
If the perceived ‘specific’ Swedish reasons (at that time) were correct, 
there is currently no drive for car assemblers in Belgian to take these ex-
periments as a goal. If we take the example of Volvo-Gent in 1993, turnover 
was a mere 2 percent, absenteism due to illness 4 percent, and no recruit-
ment problems despite the recruitment of 227 new production workers on a 
permanent basis. If currently the pressures from the labour market are weak, 
the pressure for rationalisation to lean production are all the stronger. As 
such, both Volvo-Gent and Uddevalla may be proof of Volvo’s ability to 
adapt itself more swiftly and thoroughly to the changing environment.
Information for this article was obtained by a two week field work at Volvo-
Gent during February 1994. This consisted of observation and interviews, 
mainly with second line supervisors (section heads) of all the production 
steps in the plant.
Notes
1. Data on car production in Belgium are without ckd-activities. Car production 
in Japan in 1993 was at 8,497,000 / France 2,836,000 / Germany 3,753,000. 
Source: Automotive news: Market Data Book 1994, Detroit. However these data 
include production of kits send to other plants. The actual number of finished 
cars is considerably lower.
2. Registration of new cars in Belgium was at 465,000 in 1992.
3. Production of the 850 is planned to start at Torslanda (Sweden) during spring 
’94. Concerning the Mondeo, a second plant at Kansas produces the model for 
the American market since ’93.
4. Figure from Saey, E. (1991), ‘VEC-TEAM: a Volvo lean manufacturing system’, 
Volvo Cars Europe Industry, p.12.
5. Figure from Saey, E. (1991), ‘VEC-TEAM: a Volvo lean manufacturing system’, 
Volvo Cars Europe Industry, p.14.
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First DAF, then Volvo and now Mitsubishi
Continuous improvement in a Dutch automobile plant?
Ben Dankbaar
This chapter describes the development of (ideas about) work organiza-
tion in a Dutch automobile plant, that has changed from Dutch to Swedish 
ownership and later to co-ownership by a Japanese manufacturer. Two main 
questions are of interest in this context. First: did ownership by Volvo have 
an impact on the organization of work in the Dutch plant? More particularly: 
did Volvo management try to introduce the concepts it had developed in 
Sweden into its foreign operations? Second: what will be the impact of the 
ownership of Mitsubishi on the organization of work?
The chapter consists of five sections. The first section describes briefly 
the history of the plant, its products and its current size. A second section is 
devoted to the impact of Volvo on organizational thinking at the plant. The 
impact turns out to be limited. Nevertheless, there were some interesting 
organizational developments to be noted during the 1980s. These are briefly 
described in Section 3. These developments were inspired more by Japanese 
practices than by the Swedes. In a fourth section, we describe some more 
recent developments in organizational design at the plant, that have more 
similarity to the ‘Swedish model’, but are actually more inspired by Dutch 
socio-technical thinking. These developments have resulted in the introduc-
tion of so-called task-groups in production, which are themselves organized 
in semi-independent production units. A final section raises the question if 
these recent developments can be sustained under the new co-ownership of 
Mitsubishi. The latter firm is taking the lead in the design and organization 
of the new production lines that will be installed in 1994. Some early signals 
point to an interesting confrontation of ideas.
1. The Born plant: ownership and products
The only passenger car manufacturing plant of the Netherlands is located in 
Born, in the province of Limburg, the southern most part of the country that 
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drives a small wedge between Belgium and Germany. The plant was opened 
in 1968 by Queen Juliana. It was an important investment for a region that 
was suffering from unemployment because of the gradual closing of the coal 
mines. A substantial number of former miners was employed at the plant. 
Since then, labour relations at the plant have been influenced by a mixture 
of catholic paternalism and authoritarianism on the part of management, 
on the one side, and a kind of stubborn submissiveness on the part of the 
workers on the other side. As in most automobile assembly plants, four main 
activities can be distinguished: the press shop, where metal coils and sheets 
are being pressed into various shapes; the body shop, where metal parts are 
being welded together; the paint shop, where the body shells are painted; 
and the assembly line, where interior and exterior components are added. In 
addition to these four main work areas, there are some pre-assembly activi-
ties, like engine-dressing. Until recently, car seats were also assembled at the 
plant, but since the summer of 1993, seats have been supplied just-in-time 
directly to the line from a nearby plant of a French manufacturer.
1968–1972: Dutch government minority owner
The new plant was a major step in the expansion plans of the only Dutch 
manufacturer of the passenger car, DAF, still a family-owned and -man-
aged enterprise at that time. The production of passenger cars was moved 
from Eindhoven, where the headquarters were located, to Born, because the 
firm was running out of space and workers. In Limburg, only 60 kilometers 
away, an army of unemployed workers were waiting for the jobs. Of course, 
the government was willing to pay a substantial premium in support of the 
move. In exchange for its financial support, the government acquired a 25 
percent share in DAF.
DAF was founded by Hub van Doorne in 1928, as ‘Hub van Doorne’s 
Machinefabriek’.1 Initially it produced assembly tables and storage racks 
for Philips (also located in Eindhoven), but then switched to trailers. The 
name was changed into ‘Van Doorne’s Aanhangwagen Fabriek’ (DAF). Van 
Doorne was a productive inventor. In the mid-1930s he developed a system 
to turn 4-wheeled trucks into 6-wheeled all-terrain vehicles and received im-
portant orders from the Dutch Ministry of Defense. By 1940, DAF produ-ced 
almost exclusively trucks and armoured cars for the Ministry of Defense.
In 1948, the company was renamed ‘Van Doorne’s Automobielfabriek’ 
and received a 6 million guilder credit from the Dutch Bank for Recovery to 
start up production of commercial trucks. It was also helped by a temporary 
embargo on imports of trucks between 3 and 7 tons, imposed by the Dutch 
government. In 1951, DAF received a 175 million guilder defense order 
within the framework of Marshall Aid.
In the 1950s trucks and trailers remained the most important product 
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for DAF, but by 1958 it presented its first passenger car to the world. It 
incorporated a new invention by Hub van Doorne, the continuously vari-
able transmission ‘Variomatic’. DAF’s work force increased from 590 to 
4,500 between 1950 and 1960. In 1964, the 100,000th passenger car was 
manufactured. Production in the new plant took off quickly and doubled 
within five years to reach almost 100,000 in 1973.
1972–1975: Volvo minority owner
Meanwhile, DAF was split up in two separate entities: DAF Trucks BV and 
DAF Car BV, both owned 100 percent by DAF. The purpose of the separa-
tion was a change in the ownership situation. DAF needed additional funds 
to finance new expansion plans. Its size, although growing, was far too 
small compared to its competitors and it needed a partner. The Swedish car 
manufacturer Volvo came to the rescue. Volvo acquired a 33 percent share 
in DAF Car BV in 1972. It seemed a good idea at the time. Production at 
the DAF plant was expanding steadily, it had experience with relatively 
small cars that would nicely supplement the Volvo product line of larger 
and more expensive cars, and it was ideally located to serve as an entrance 
point to the Common Market.
1975–1981: Volvo majority owner
During the next year, the 1973 oil crisis hit the automobile industry with 
full force and DAF Car suffered badly. Production dropped to 70,000 in 
1974 and 61,600 in 1975. Market shares of the Dutch passenger car market 
dropped from almost 8 percent in 1968 to 4.5 percent in 1975. Volvo had to 
supply additional finance and in the process increased its ownership share to 
75 percent (1975). DAF Car BV was renamed Volvo Car BV. Soon after, all 
ties with DAF were severed. The remaining 25 percent share of Volvo Car 
BV was transferred to another state owned enterprise (DSM, the chemical 
enterprise that continued chemical operations that had started on the basis 
of coal mining).
1981–1991: Dutch government majority owner
However, the 1970s did not offer a friendly climate for a small car plant. 
In 1977, Dutch market shares fell below 2 percent and even lower in other 
European countries. The plant needed further financing in order to develop 
new products. Both the Dutch government and Volvo provided additional 
support. As a result Volvo’s ownership share decreased again to 55 percent 
in 1978. In spite of rising production and sales after 1977, the cash flow 
remained insufficient to cover development of new products. The second 
oil crisis of 1979/80 put an end to the upward trends. The additional aid 
given by the Dutch government in 1981, resulted in a change in ownership 
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once again. Volvo lost its majority ownership to the Dutch state and retained 
only 30 percent of the shares. The plant continued to manufacture cars under 
the Volvo brand name and relied on Volvo for some of its engineering and 
marketing functions.
Since 1991: equally shared ownership of Dutch government, 
Volvo and Mitsubishi
The 1980s and especially the second half of the decade were an era of growth, 
as new products were introduced and production came close to 150,000 
units. Nevertheless, the financial basis for the enterprise remained too nar-
row and the Dutch government was neither willing nor able (nor permitted 
on the basis of EC competition policies) to provide unlimited additional 
support. Together with Volvo, a new partner was searched for, and found: 
the Japanese manufacturer Mitsubishi. In the fall of 1991, an agreement was 
reached between the Dutch government and the two car manufacturers to 
share ownership of the car plant on an equal basis. It is also understood that 
the Dutch state will sell its remaining one third of the company to the other 
two owners before the end of the decade. Starting in 1995, Mitsubishi will 
make use of the plant to produce a new car for the European market, while 
Volvo will continue to use the plant to manufacture the current product as 
well as the follow-up model, that will be based on the same platform as 
the Mitsubishi. Total capacity will be expanded to 200,000 units, 100,000 
for each of the two partners. Until 1995, losses on current production (of 
the Volvo 400 series), will be carried by the Dutch State and Volvo Car 
Corporation on a 70:30 basis. Obviously, the name Volvo Car BV had to be 
changed. The enterprise is now called ‘Netherlands Car BV’, abbreviated to 
NedCar. The three owners have committed themselves to invest 2.1 billion 
guilders (700 million each) in the plant (i.e., for the development of the 
new model, including the production installations). This commitment also 
implied that the 600 jobs at the Engineering and Design department were 
also guaranteed until 1995.
Products
The original products of the plant were DAF’s original models: the DAF 33, 
44, and 55, all equipped with the Variomatic. When Volvo took over in 1972, 
the DAF 66 and a completely new model were already under development. 
After six years of development, in 1976, the new model was launched as 
the Volvo 340. With this product, the plant moved from the lowest market 
segment to the lower part of the medium segment. At first, the 340 didn’t 
sell very well, but after a change in pricing strategy and the introduction of 
various product variants, the 300-series began to sell quite well in the late 
1970s. Work on a follow-up model started almost immediately. The aim 
253
was to move further upwards in the market. This aim could be followed 
with greater energy after Volvo had lost its majority influence in 1981. The 
first model of the new 400-series became the Volvo 480, a small sports car, 
that clearly represented a major jump towards a higher market segment. 
It was launched in 1986, to be followed by a hatchback (440) and a sedan 
(460) in 1988 and 1989. Production of the 300 series, which continued to 
sell quite well throughout the 1980s, was discontinued in 1990. Currently, 
the plant’s engineering departments are working on the follow-up model 
in close cooperation with Mitsubishi. The new Volvo model and the new 
Mitsubishi model will be based on the same platform.
2. The impact of the Swedish model
Between 1975 and 1981, Volvo AB of Sweden was the majority owner of the 
plant in Born. In 1974, Volvo had opened its new plant in Kalmar, a widely 
acclaimed experiment in work organization and factory design, introducing 
stationary assembly places instead of the continuously moving assembly 
line. The Kalmar plant represented an important step in the development 
of what came to be called the ‘Swedish model’. The movement away from 
short-cycled assembly work is characteristic for this approach and has since 
inspired similar developments in other car plants, especially in Germany. 
However, none of the ideas and experiments that were current at Volvo in 
Sweden, were transferred to the Netherlands. In the history of the plant, 
this period is viewed by most insiders as a period of neglect by the owners. 
Products that were in the pipeline when Volvo took over, were introduced 
according to plan, but there seemed to be insufficient interest and no clear 
strategy as to the future of the plant and its products.
The lack of interest in transferring Swedish concepts of work organization 
to the Dutch plant may have various reasons. It may have been the result, 
as suggested, of the failure to take a strategic view of the investment in this 
plant and its products. This may have been compounded by the problems 
caused by the second oil crisis, when money to implement changes anywhere 
became quite scarce (in Sweden tax exemptions and other government 
subsidies may have played an important role). It also seems to indicate, 
however, that Volvo management considered its experiments in Kalmar as 
appropriate in the Swedish context, but not necessarily in other countries. 
This underlines that a dominant motive for the introduction of new produc-
tion concepts in Sweden was the situation on the labour market. Very low 
rates of unemployment and a well developed system of social security and 
job protection had led to high rates of absenteeism and personnel turnover. 
Improvements in the quality of work were viewed as a means to fight these 
phenomena and increase worker motivation. Lengthening the work cycle 
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was seen as the primary means of improving the quality of work. Apparently, 
there was little or no expectation that the new concepts would contribute to 
productivity in a situation where absenteeism and personnel turnover were 
less of a problem.
From 1986, Dutch management carried out some experiments with longer 
work cycles in the production of the Volvo 480. The 480 was produced on a 
separate assembly line in relatively low numbers. Some automated guided 
vehicles were introduced, which enabled workers to ride along with the 
bodies and carry out a series of assembly tasks, resulting in a lengthening 
of work cycles. Although the results in terms of labour productivity, as well 
as the quality of work were positive, the approach was not extended to the 
assembly processes for the rest of the 400 series. The costs of the automated 
guided vehicles were considered too high. There were also some tryouts in 
which complete bodies were assembled by a small team. Again, however, the 
necessary changes in layout and equipment were considered too expensive 
to be justified. Apart from these experiments, work cycles at the plant have 
been and continue to be between 30 and 60 seconds.
3. The New Style: Deming in the Netherlands
Things changed when Dutch management was released from the ties with 
Volvo in 1981. A new plant manager was appointed, Mr. André Deleye, who 
is a Belgian citizen. In the spring of 1982, he took the initiative for a major 
project to change the organization, quality and management style, which was 
called the ‘New Style’ project. The project had various purposes at the same 
time. Its first aim was to make a new start in the plant, that had undergone 
extensive rationalization measures in the previous year. In that sense, it was 
a conscious effort to create a new climate and a new culture in the enterprise. 
The second aim was to improve performance on all levels.
The ‘New Style’ project was inspired by press stories of the contributions 
of the American professor Deming to the successes of Japanese enterprises. 
Deleye visited the Nashua plant in Boston and came back with the convic-
tion that major improvements in quality were possible. Deming had already 
shown in the 1950s that 85 percent of the manufacturing mistakes were a 
result of faulty management. These mistakes were a result of mistakes in the 
systems and the organization that were the responsibility of management. 
They could be prevented by transferring more responsibility to operational 
levels, where the use of simple measuring techniques like statistical process 
control (SPC) would often be sufficient for dramatic improvements in qual-
ity. The application of such techniques by production personnel would in 
effect shorten feedback loops and eliminate the need for special inspectors. 
With this message of a less strict division of labour between work execution 
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and inspection, Deming had not been very successful in the United States, 
but very influential in Japan.
The main idea behind the ‘New Style’ project was to make better use of 
the capacities of the work force in order to increase flexibility, improve 
quality and lower costs. It took the form of a large number of improvement 
programmes (‘Management-Directed Programmes’) in all departments and 
involved training in various analytical tools, statistical techniques and qual-
ity thinking for all layers of personnel, starting with management. There 
was strong pressure on the various actors to succeed quickly. This may 
explain why the various improvement programmes emphasized short-term, 
technically-defined goals. Although the ‘New Style’ was launched with 
considerable emphasis on the need for a different style of management 
(based on the need to involve workers), the reality was that management 
changed very little, but the workers had the impression that they had to do 
more and work harder.
On top of that, latent tensions between the production people, on the one 
hand, and the ‘office guys’ on the other hand, came into the open. It should 
be mentioned here that all (advanced) product development and process 
engineering functions, the board of directors, and their staff are not located 
in Born, but 40 kilometers to the North in a glossy glass building, which 
has not helped to overcome the inherent barriers between these various 
functions.2 Internal criticism and evaluation led to a revision of the project 
in 1984, which was launched under the title MENS (More Elan New Style; 
mens = human in Dutch). The revised approach would give more attention 
to social aspects, i.e., to the quality of work and aspects of motivation. 
More attention was given to organizational matters, such as the need to shift 
responsibility to the people who were going to do the actual job. Projects 
also became less technical (also, because less money was available for 
investment in new gadgets).
The new approach implied more work for the heads of the various pro-
duction departments (press shop, body shop, paint shop and assembly). 
At the same time, the plant was preparing for the launch of new products. 
Obviously, the department heads would need support. More than that, they 
needed people who would function as their ‘New Style’ conscience and who 
would remind them constantly of the need to involve the work force and 
make use of this important resource. Consequently, for each department, the 
function of ‘mentor’ was created. Older experienced foremen were chosen 
to play this role. They were charged with drawing up annual action plans 
and had to oversee that all foremen would be trained in various techniques 
of process control.
The mentor idea turned out to be quite useful and still being utilized. The 
‘New Style’ project, however, slowly came to an end. Originally planned to 
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last until the end of 1985, there has never been an official announcement of 
its ending. The phrase ‘New Style’ was used less and less frequently. The 
idea was of course that after almost four years, the ‘New Style’ would have 
become the normal ‘Volvo Style’. In reality, it had taken four years before 
the ‘New Style’ became visible in new organizational arrangements like 
the new mentor function. In the meantime, workers had been confronted 
with a bewildering array of projects, training activities and also outside 
consultants, with very little change in the quality of work. Scepticism of 
the workers (and in fact of most of the production management), had grown 
immensely.
4. Work restructuring
In 1987, the plant management team took the initiative and presented the 
board of directors with a report on production policy. The report argued 
that a lot of attention had been given in the recent past to products, pro-
duction processes and human resources, but not to the structures of work 
that tie these things together. A new production policy would have to be 
developed that would define targets for which the individual departments 
could be held accountable. The plant management initiative coincided with 
comparable actions by the board of directors. The board was introducing a 
flatter organizational structure for the whole organization, aiming to move 
responsibility and accountability to lower levels. By eliminating the separate 
directorate for car operations (that had been organized as a separate divi-
sion), members of the board themselves became responsible for operations. 
The Car Division was split up in three sectors, each of which was led directly 
by a member of the board: business planning and control (BPC, including 
advanced engineering), technical operations (TO) and commercial opera-
tions (CO) (see figure 1). All production activities taking place in the plant 
in Born belonged to technical operations. Apart from production, technical 
operations also covered three other activities: product engineering, process 
engineering and supply (purchasing). Most of the personnel involved in 
these three activities were located in Helmond.
After extensive debate, the plant management initiative resulted in the 
introduction of so-called production units in the plant over the course of 
1989. This involved a considerable change in the composition of the manage-
ment team for the plant. Before the introduction of the unit organization, the 
management team consisted of the plant manager, the production manager 
and the managers of functional departments like quality assurance, manu-
facturing engineering, materials management and personnel. The heads of 
the individual production departments (press shop, body shop, paintshop and 
assembly lines), all reported to the production manager. In the new setup the 
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management team consisted of the managers of four production units (the 
four main production areas just mentioned) and the manager of a unit called 
‘location affairs’, responsible for various matters related to the plant as a 
whole. As far as possible, all of the functional departments were divided up 
over the four production units, which became self-sufficient in that respect. 
Every production unit received its own personnel, engineering, quality and 
finance/controlling functions. Maintenance had already been reporting to the 
production manager and was now further decentralized to the units. Some 
plant-level personnel and organization functions were maintained as a kind 
of staff functions to the plant manager (see figure 2).
Figure 1
258
<Figure 2, Page 258, Part III, Dankbaar>
Figure 2
Obviously, functional departments and their managers were losing some 
status (or were disappearing completely), in this setup, since they were 
moving ‘under’ production instead of having equal status. A large part of 
the debate on the new organization had been concerned with the question 
of all supportive tasks being moved to the production units or if some tasks 
should move to the other three parts of technical operations, i.e. to product 
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development, process development or supply. In the end, parts of materials 
management and manufacturing engineering went to supply and process 
development respectively.3
The managers of the production units, on the other hand, obviously had to 
be more than simply production managers. Whereas, the former heads of the 
production departments were responsible only for production, the new unit 
managers were responsible for the support functions as well. Depending on 
the unit, between 30 and 40 persons were employed on maintenance, engin-
eering and quality alone. Additionally, there were the persons involved in 
personnel, organization, management information and control. Each unit 
was composed of three production groups, covering clearly identifiable 
components or processes (in fact, after considerable reductions of the work 
force over the past few years the units consisted of only two production 
groups at the end of 1993, except for the assembly unit, which still had 
three). The heads of these production groups were each overseeing seven to 
eight area leaders. Each area leader was in turn responsible for two or three 
task groups of approximately 15 workers each. The size of a production unit 
could thus, vary quite substantially; at the end of 1993, the press shop unit 
employed approximately 300 people, while the unit assembly employed 
approximately 1,200 people (see figure 3).
The unit managers had a much larger range of responsibilities than or-
dinary production managers and had to shift responsibility for production 
further down the line. Obviously, the old heads of the production depart-
ments were not always the most likely candidates for the job of unit man-
ager. In fact, until recently, the unit managers had a head of manufacturing 
reporting to them, who was to oversee the production groups. The old ‘New 
Style’ mentor function was maintained for each unit as a support function 
to the unit manager. From the very beginning, a further decentralization of 
responsibilities was envisaged. In fact, the proposal for the unit structure 
had already included a proposal for further decentralization of responsibili-
ties towards the task groups on the shop floor. The new unit managers were 
charged with the introduction of creating such task groups.
The expression ‘task groups’ shows the influence of Dutch socio-technical 
thinking among the managers and staff participating in this reorganization 
process. The socio-technical tradition in the Netherlands is strongly based 
on systems analysis. It has developed and advocated a specific set of rules 
for redesign of organizations.4 These include shifting control and regula-
tion tasks to the lowest possible level in the organization, where the lowest 
level is usually not an individual but a ‘complete task’ (i.e., a technically 
and in time and space identifiable part of the production process), that is 
carried out by a group of workers. The general sense of the approach is cap-
tured aptly in the phrase: ‘simple organizations, complex jobs.’ The Dutch 
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socio-technical approach is critical of efforts to deal with an increasingly 
complex environment by means of ever increasing functional specialization. 
Instead, it argues that the ability of organizations to deal with complexity 
should be located in the flexibility of semi-autonomous work groups. One 
should note that improvements in the quality of work can be the result of 
redesigning the organization according to this approach, but it is not the 
prime purpose of the approach. The purpose is to create organizations which 
can function adequately and flexibly in a complex environment. Normally, 
the creation of semi-autonomous working groups in a production environ-
ment will lead to job rotation (multiskilling), and job enrichment (taking 
on self-regulatory tasks), but the Dutch socio-technical approach does not 
start from the premise that individual work cycles have to be lengthened. 
At the Born plant in 1989, socio-technical concepts like task groups were 
introduced by management mainly for two reasons: to enhance feelings of 
loyalty to work and to create a structure with more perspectives for change 
and continuous improvement.
Until the middle of 1990, the new unit managers were busy coming to 
grips with their new responsibilities. First pilots for the design of task groups 
were then started in the press shop and the paint shop (some experiments 
had already preceded these pilots in the press shop). Identification of ‘com-
plete tasks’ for the task groups was done by line management (head of the 
production group and the area leader) supported by the plant staff group for 
organizational development. Taking layout and equipment as given for the 
time being, complete tasks included not just an identifiable set of production 
tasks but also quality assurance, materials management5 and what are called 
Figure 3
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‘regulatory’ tasks. Once these tasks had been identified, manning levels and 
(on-the-job) training requirements had to be established. Between 1990 and 
1993, task groups were gradually introduced in all the production units. By 
the end of 1993, this process was nearly completed.6 A total of 140 groups 
had become operational.
In most task groups, coordination tasks are still the responsibility of the 
area leader. The aim is, however, to have coordinators who are working 
members of the group. Training programs have been set up for this purpose. 
By the end of 1993, some 40 working coordinators were available (but about 
300 are needed, if you want to have one in each shift). The ideal would be 
to have the task of coordinator rotate between all group members, but this 
obviously depends on the ability and willingness of the group members. 
The coordinator is the speaker for the group and contact for communica-
tion with other task groups. Each task group has a set of tasks consisting 
of approximately 10 production tasks and 12 indirect and regulatory tasks 
(e.g., quality control, materials supply, maintenance of tools, detailing pro-
duction schedules and work assignments, maintaining standard operating 
procedure forms, production statistics, planning of holidays, advisory role 
in the hiring of new personnel).7 Again, the ideal would be for all workers 
to have the ability to carry out all tasks (multiskilling), and rotate along 
different jobs. In practice, some workers may not be able to achieve that 
ideal. The result of multiskilling will be that workers will move to higher 
salary grades. In 1990, each worker was tied to one production task. Now, 
workers on average can handle five different tasks and the aim is to reach 
an average of seven in 1995. Similarly, production workers did no indirect 
tasks in 1990, in 1993 they did two on average and by 1995 the aim is to 
reach an average of six.8
The introduction of task groups received a mixed reception by the work 
force. On the one hand, there was a general distrust of new concepts based 
on past experiences. On the other hand, people were afraid that they would 
simply have to work harder and carry more responsibility without an ap-
propriate raise in pay levels. A survey carried out in the summer of 1993 (as 
a joint project of the Works Council and Plant Management), showed that a 
majority of the workers in task groups (68 percent) agrees that it wasn’t as 
bad as they expected, but even more (79 percent) underlined that the task 
groups were not yet functioning as they should. Although 83 percent of 
the workers said they were willing to make the task groups a success, the 
majority (52 percent) would prefer to go back to the old situation. The plant 
management has made it very clear, however, that they don’t want to return 
to the old work organization. They clearly see the task group organization as 
a way to achieve the considerable increases in productivity that have been 
agreed upon with the new owners of the plant and that need to be realized 
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by the end of 1994. In reaction to questions of the work force, data were 
published which showed that the share of workers in higher wage groups 
had increased markedly between the summers of 1992 and 1993. Basically, 
a kind of pay-for-knowledge system has been installed, although there is 
limited access to the highest grade, depending on the availability of posi-
tions. Workers who are unable to master enough tasks to enter a higher pay 
grade may in the future be rewarded for seniority.
More recently, and partly due to pressure from Japanese management 
(see below), the task groups have also been encouraged to engage in con-
tinuous improvement activities. As noted above, this was originally one of 
the aims of management in introducing task groups. A formal structure is 
being elaborated for the creation of project-oriented improvement groups 
in which task group members cooperate with production unit quality and 
engineering staff.
5. Mitsubishi takes over
For the future of the plant, Mitsubishi is obviously of crucial importance. 
The volume of production that Volvo could offer in the past was simply 
too low to guarantee survival. The cooperation between Renault and Volvo 
seemed to make the Dutch Volvo plant even less necessary, since it could 
be assumed that Renault would also have sufficient capacity to produce 
100,000 medium-sized Volvos. Now that the merger between Renault and 
Volvo has been called off, this specter of a complete loss of Volvo business 
seems less likely. On the other hand, the danger is still present that Volvo 
will not be able to survive as an independent passenger car manufacturer 
in the longer run. Volvo may have to find other partners, who may again 
question the need for a small plant in the Netherlands, unless of course the 
new partner is Mitsubishi.
The cooperation with Mitsubishi came about because Volvo could not af-
ford the plant and related product development costs and therefore needed 
to share the costs with another manufacturer. Dutch and Swedish product 
development staff are currently engaged in the final stages of development 
of the follow-up of the Volvo 400 series, which is based on the same plat-
form as the Mitsubishi model that will be produced in the plant starting in 
January of 1995. The success of this new car will be crucial to a continuing 
Swedish engagement in the plant. If the new car is not successful, Volvo 
will probably be forced to retreat to larger luxury models. In that case, Volvo 
would drop out of Nedcar at some point in the future. It is not unlikely that 
Mitsubishi has been anticipating this all along. It has followed a similar 
course in the United States, where it started a joint venture with Chrysler 
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and later took over Chrysler’s share. The Diamond-Star plant in the United 
States currently serves as a model for the Dutch plant.
Whatever will happen, it is clear that Mitsubishi has taken on a very active 
management role in the plant, more active than Volvo has ever been. Norio 
Takehara represents Mitsubishi on the board of directors and is responsible 
for process engineering. As such, he is not directly involved with current 
manufacturing practices, but the new production lines that will start in 1995, 
will reflect his views. Obviously, the changeover to the new line will be 
easier if these views are already implemented in current practice wherever 
this is possible. It is therefore understandable that Takehara set up his office 
in the Born plant and then moved the whole process engineering department 
from Helmond to Born. It is probably also the influence of the Japanese that 
forced the decision to move the board of directors and all corporate staff 
functions to the site of the plant. Only product engineering and design has 
stayed behind in the Helmond offices, facing a rather uncertain future. It is 
not clear that Nedcar staff will be involved in developing and designing a 
new series of cars following the generation that is currently being developed. 
Or at least not with the same intensity, that had been part of the deal made 
between Volvo, Mitsubishi and the Dutch government. The possibilities 
for them to carry out design and development for third parties are currently 
being investigated.
It is common knowledge that the Japanese car manufacturing system is 
highly efficient. Japanese management is naturally convinced of the ef-
fectiveness of its own methods. Dutch management is faced with Japanese 
managers who do not directly force them to change their ways, but who are 
quietly pushing their own solutions and do not take a great interest in Euro-
pean approaches (or more likely have no liberty to do so). In an influential 
study on the automobile industry, the Massachusetts Institute of Technol-
ogy (MIT) has introduced the expression ‘lean production’ to characterize 
the production system in the Japanese automobile industry. The production 
system is called ‘lean’ because it has cut away all the ‘fat’ in the factories. 
All waste has been eliminated and the result is a high level of productivity. 
The MIT study considers the Japanese production system as a new stage in 
the history of manufacturing, comparable to the introduction of methods of 
mass production by Henry Ford (the ‘Fordist’ system), in the early decades 
of this century. Characteristic of Ford is short-cycled work on the assembly 
line. Swedish alternatives to Ford’s system have focused on the lengthen-
ing of the work cycles. Japanese work on the assembly line, how-ever, has 
remained short cycled. This has led some observers to the conclusion that 
the Japanese approach is not an alternative to or a move beyond Fordism, 
but rather a kind of ‘super-Fordism’. There are some important differ-
ences, however, between the Japanese approach and Ford’s system. These 
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approaches both give more responsibility to production: responsibility for 
numbers, for quality, and for improvements. Whereas, the ‘Fordist’ approach 
was to take responsibilities away from production and to give it to special-
ized departments (e.g., for quality and maintenance), the Japanese gave 
line workers the responsibility for the quality of their products. In turn, the 
workers were given the possibility to stop the assembly line if they could 
not achieve required quality (e.g., because of faulty parts). All stocks of 
parts and buffers of product were systematically eliminated in order to make 
problems immediately visible. The most fundamental difference, however, 
is that production workers are also expected to contribute to the continuous 
improvement of the products and processes. They are expected to use every 
spare minute to think of possible improvements. Part of the improvement 
activities take place in special working groups called quality circles, where 
production people can interact with engineering and quality staff.
The idea of returning responsibility to production can also be found in the 
European socio-technical tradition. In the European tradition, it has been 
expressed by the notion of ‘autonomy’. The autonomy of working groups 
implies that they are responsible for the results of their activities (within the 
limits that technical and organizational requirements impose). Autonomous 
working groups have a certain measure of independence, that is at the same 
time the source of their responsibility. Sometimes, this autonomy is accentu-
ated by the presence of buffers, that separate the group from problems and 
interruptions in preceding or following production units. In the Japanese 
approach, this particular notion of autonomy is not present. There are no 
autonomous teams, because everything has been done to create an uninter-
rupted flow of product and all stocks and buffers have been eliminated. 
People in production are responsible for their own task and they assist 
each other if necessary. Western observers have called this ‘team work’, 
but it differs considerably from the team work in the European and North 
American socio-technical traditions. The Japanese notion of ‘team work’ 
refers to a sense of responsibility for the whole enterprise (‘Team Toyota’), 
and to mutual aid and off-line improvement activities. As a consequence, 
the Japanese have also shown little interest in relocating indirect and staff 
tasks to production units. In fact, this could be a point where Western 
manufacturers have a competitive edge over their Japanese rivals, as the 
administrative and staff functions of Japanese car manufacturers appear to 
be relatively inefficient.
Considering these different traditions, it doesn’t come as a surprise that 
Mitsubishi management found little value in the idea of production units 
as it had been developed at the Volvo plant. They preferred to return to an 
organization structured along functional lines. After considerable debate 
with the plant management, the production units were partly dismantled in 
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the spring of 1993. Further decisions will be made in the spring of 1994. 
All personnel functions, all finance/controlling functions9 and the larger 
engineering tasks (about half of the persons involved), have been taken away 
from the production units and returned to separate functionally specialized 
departments. What has remained with the units are some quality control and 
quality engineering functions, engineering tasks that are concerned with 
changes of the existing process (adaptations of purchased parts, changes in 
the product, adaptations of the layout), and maintenance. As we have seen, 
most of logistics had always remained a centralized function (under supply), 
and continues to be so.10 As a result of these changes, the unit managers 
had less staff to command (unit indirect functions diminished by at least 
50 percent). This also allowed for the elimination of the function of head 
manufacturing in the unit. The unit manager became directly responsible 
for the production groups in his unit. More indirect functions may disappear 
from the units in the future, depending on the performance of the plant.
This discussion about the role of functional departments and the value of 
semi-autonomous production units has not affected the introduction of task 
groups. Task groups are still the main mechanism by which management 
hopes to create motivation and support for increases in productivity. As 
mentioned before, the plant and its new owners have committed themselves 
to the achievement of considerable improvements in productivity towards 
1995. In early 1992, the plant management developed a preliminary ‘Im-
provement Plan’, that was presented to the employees in the summer of 1992. 
A more complete and updated version was presented in the summer of 1993 
under the title: ‘Continuous Improvement Plan 400’, setting improvement 
targets for the production units and for production as a whole in relation 
to current production (the Volvo 400 series). The plan will continue to be 
updated every six months.
By 1995, NedCar hopes to produce ‘twice the number of cars with the same 
number of people’. This aim was proclaimed after Mitsubishi had stepped 
in. Part of that increase in productivity will be reached by higher levels of 
automation. Part of it by working harder, and with more discipline. In an 
interview published in the plant newsletter in the summer of 1993, the plant 
manager complained that 15 to 20 percent of the workforce is still showing 
insufficient motivation. He makes it clear that improvement is expected; 
otherwise these people will have to leave the firm. Another sign of tightening 
discipline is a complete ban on smoking on the job. In the meantime, Take-
hara is quoted in the newspapers as saying that motivation is demonstrated 
by a willingness to stay a little longer on the job if necessary.11
Obviously, not all, nor even a majority of the required gains in produc-
tivity will be achieved by working harder. Apart from automation, a major 
contribution will have to come from the new design of the cars. It is reported 
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that one of the first impressions that visiting workers had of the Japanese 
production lines, was that all parts fitted much more easily than at home. 
This clearly is a result of close interaction between production and design 
and development, both at the stage of product development and later, after 
the product has gone into production. Starting in the fall of 1993, produc-
tion workers are going to Japan for visits of six to eight weeks in duration. 
They will be trained on the production lines that will later be installed in 
Born. Altogether, about 10 percent of the work force will receive training in 
Japan. Production managers (heads of production groups and area leaders) 
have also visited Japan and often returned with great enthusiasm for the 
idea of Kaizen (continuous improvement). Apparently, there is little reflec-
tion in Japan on the problems of launching and implementing improvement 
activities in an old plant with a sceptical work force in Europe. Manager 
enthusiasm, it would seem, can easily lead to disasters comparable to the 
‘New Style’ activities described above.
Conclusion
The history of the plant in Born is one of permanent change, if not permanent 
crisis. Volvo came as a saviour, when DAF could no longer support the plant. 
The Dutch state intervened, when Volvo showed insufficient interest. And 
now Mitsubishi has come to save the plant again. Continuous improvement 
in a Dutch automobile plant? Was Volvo better than DAF? Is Mitsubishi an 
improvement over Volvo? Useless questions for a plant that is struggling 
for survival. There is no choice. If this doesn’t work, nothing will.
Notes
1. For the following historic overview, extensive use has been made of the il-
luminating survey article by Greif and Meijer (1993). For the history of DAF 
Car BV, see also Van Diepen and Dankbaar (1990).
2. This situation is currently changing. The Helmond offices will be closed and 
all staff functions and engineering activities will move to Born.
3. The question if and what supply functions should be managed separately or 
controlled by production is subject to recurrent debate throughout the industry 
and different solutions are being practised.
4. The main rules for (re)design are:
a. First design the production structure and then the control structure;
b. The production structure has to be designed top down (from the perspective 
of the demands made on the organization); design aims at simplification 
by segmentation and parallelization, creating semi-autonomous organiza-
tional units;
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c. The control structure has to be designed bottom up (control functions should 
be located as low as possible in the organization);
d. Decisions on process technology should be made after the production 
structure has been decided;
e. The information system should be developed after the control system has 
been designed (in order to provide the information where it is needed to 
carry out control functions).
 5. Doubts about the ability of workers to do materials management tasks were 
effectively eliminated when it turned out that more than half of the workers 
had a personal computer at home.
 6. The process of introducing task groups has been greatly disturbed by the almost 
continuous need to reduce the workforce in view of the downturn of the Euro-
pean car markets since 1989. The creation of teams requires a minimal level of 
continuity in the composition of the teams as well as time for training.
 7. In most car factories there are areas where most workers have only limited 
capabilities. In the creation of task groups, such areas have consciously been 
incorporated into larger, more varied entities. This may limit the possibilities 
for job rotation, if workers are unable to learn additional tasks, but it prevents 
the creation of low capability, low motivation ghetto’s in the factory, with pos-
sibly severe impact on quality.
 8. It should be noted that these are averages and there is a large variation between 
the levels individual groups and workers have achieved.
 9. Finance and controlling tasks carried out by the production units included multi-
year planning and budgeting, periodic reporting, task analysis, management 
information and controlling.
10. Production schedules are developed by Supply on a day-to-day basis. Produc-
tion is only free to schedule the sequence of cars within the daily schedule.
11. Contrary to European practice, Japanese automobile plants have a gap of several 
hours between shifts. This gap is regularly used (without prior notification), 
to finish production according to plan, if the normal working time has been 
insufficient because of a breakdown of equipment.
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Missing the road: 
Working life at Volvo Nova Scotia1
L. Anders Sandberg
A Scandinavian king casts about for a handsome young prince worthy of 
the hand of his daughter, the beautiful Princess Asa, and finds two anxious 
suitors. To choose between them, he devises a contest that pits the suitors 
against one another in a race to build a castle. One contender uses cheap 
materials and mistreats and browbeats his workers in an effort to speed 
construction. The other, the valiant Prince Volund, opts for only the best of 
supplies and attracts skilled workers by offering excellent pay and working 
conditions, and even a medieval form of profit-sharing. Happily, Prince 
Volund is declared the winner of the contest, he and Asa marry, and, we 
expect, they live happily ever after. This tale was told in an advertisement 
appearing in major North American business journals and paid for by Volvo 
in 1984.2 Though perhaps tainted by the recent closures of the Kalmar and 
Uddevalla plants, the tale still conveys some of the hallmarks of the Volvo 
philosophy: quality in workmanship, product and work environment.3 But 
what happens when Volvo establishes operations in a peripheral region, in 
the economic hinterland of North America, namely, Nova Scotia, Canada? 
This paper tells the tale of Volvo’s automobile assembly plant in the cities 
of Dartmouth and Halifax, Nova Scotia, from 1963 to the present. The paper 
provides a brief description of Nova Scotia as a peripheral region and the 
concessions extended to Volvo over the years by various levels of govern-
ment. It then suggests that these conditions are also reflected in the work 
organization and labour climate of the plant. Here, in spite of the presence 
of a powerful national union and relatively high wages, Volvo has ‘missed 
the road’ of its official philosophy. Its strategy is more akin to ‘despotic 
Taylorism’, where ever-higher levels of work intensity are forced rather 
than negotiated.4
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The setting: Volvo in Nova Scotia
Nova Scotia is the third smallest province by population in Canada, with 
a history of economic underdevelopment, and staple production based on 
fishing, forestry, coal mining and crude steel-making. In the late 19th and 
early 20th centuries, the steel and coal industries boomed and militant union 
workers made substantial gains, only to see the regional economy collapse 
in the 1920s. Out-migration, high unemployment and declining labour mili-
tancy have since prevailed.5 By the late 1950s, its coal and steel industries 
were in a poor state, and various regional policies were developed by the 
federal and provincial governments to bring large transnational corporations 
to the province. Volvo was part of that development scheme. The Canadian 
federal government provided the trade inducements to attract and maintain 
Volvo in Nova Scotia.6 In the protectionist climate of the early 1960s, it 
permitted Volvo the duty-free importation of all components for assembly. 
The plant was set up as a so-called PKD (partly knocked down) assembly 
plant, where all components, even complete and painted car bodies (hence 
the term ‘partly’) were imported from Europe. In 1965, the Canada-United 
States Auto Pact was signed. This allowed the duty-free importation of auto 
parts to be assembled in Canada, provided the assembled cars contain sixty 
per cent Canadian content. Volvo was exempted from the latter requirement, 
with the expectation that forty per cent Canadian content be reached at 
some stage. But the company has been allowed to continue to import most 
material from Sweden in exchange for operating and employing Canadian 
workers in peripheral Nova Scotia. In 1988, 95 per cent of all assembly 
components for the 740 series Volvos came from overseas.7 Labour is clearly 
the most substantial Canadian content. But it is difficult to determine the 
amount because Volvo does not disclose the percentage of value added to 
its assembled cars in Canada.8 Volvo has clearly saved on the duty remis-
sions, though it claims profits are lessened by the extra expense of shipping 
components, as opposed to finished cars, to North America. The tariff on 
imported cars was 17.5 per cent in 1963 and 12.3 per cent in 1983. In 1988, 
it stood at 9.2 per cent.9
Assembly in Nova Scotia is but a drop in the bucket of Volvo’s global 
production. In 1963, 1,139 units were assembled in the province. In 1973, 
peak production was reached, at 13,000 units.10 Since then production has 
varied from about 7,000 to 12,500 annually; in 1990, 8,100 rolled off the 
line in Halifax while Volvo manufactured 376,100 cars globally.11 In 1994, 
24 units a day were assembled of the luxury 940 model, which amounts to 
less than 7,000 units annually. Exports to the United States have steadily 
in-creased as tariffs have come down. In 1988, the import duty on cars 
shipped to the United States stood at 9 per cent, down from 11 per cent a 
year earlier.12 In 1992, the import duty had been lowered to 2.5 per cent.13 
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Exports to the United States began in 1968, amounting to one third in 1983, 
and one half in 1988, of total production.14 In early 1994, almost all units 
were exported to the United States.
Provincial and local governments also provided locational incentives to 
Volvo. When a new provincial government took office in 1956, it created a 
crown corporation, Industrial Estates Limited (IEL), to solicit and provide 
incentives for transnational corporations to come to the province.15 IEL 
was instrumental to the coming of Volvo to the twin cities of Dartmouth 
and Halifax in 1963.16 Volvo’s initial operations were set up on a three-year 
lease in an abandoned sugar refinery on the Dartmouth side of Halifax Har-
bour. The lease was secured on favourable terms from IEL, and the city of 
Dartmouth contributed with municipal tax concessions.17 When the three-
year lease expired, Volvo was lured to a new site, Pier 9, on the Halifax 
waterfront with new tax concessions and a $1 million grant from IEL.18 In 
1987, a third plant, designed to assemble the newer and more complicated 
740 and 760 series, was built in the new Bayers Lake Industrial Park on the 
outskirts of Halifax, located conveniently next to railway lines providing 
access to the wider North American market. Volvo built this plant itself for 
$13.5 million, but enjoyed a new round of municipal tax concessions and 
the city’s promise to buy the plant, should Volvo decide to leave at any time 
after fifteen years of operation.
Volvo’s operations in Nova Scotia are clearly tiny and simple by world 
auto industry standards. But the plant means a lot to the local economy, as 
is evidenced by the measures taken by the federal, provincial and munici-
pal governments to attract and maintain the plant in Nova Scotia. Volvo 
has exploited its status frequently by threats of closures. These have been 
particularly common during labour disputes and the negotiations about 
concessions with municipal and provincial governments. Workers have 
continuously lived in a climate of uncertainty and, as one manager once put 
it, the notion that ‘the future of the Halifax operations will be influenced 
strongly by you and your way of keeping good order as well as contribution 
to the efficiency’.19
Technology, labour organization and work environment
Management’s account of the technological status, labour organization and 
work environment at the Volvo plant in Halifax conveys an unqualified 
success. Only two major legal strikes (1974 and 1988) have occurred at the 
plant. In a fairly typical statement, management describes the work force 
as exemplary, with low turn-over and absentee rates, and high quality rat-
ings for workmanship based on Volvo’s own standards.20 The most recent 
strike, management refers to as ‘gentlemanly’. Such scattered references 
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give the impression that the plant is ‘a little bit of Sweden in Canada’.21 A 
more detailed look at the plant produces a very different picture.
When first set up in 1963, the assembly process in Dartmouth consisted 
of two parallel lines, each 57 metres long, with 12 work stations on each. 
Line 1 was the trim line, where sealants, sound deadenings, compounds and 
body trim were installed. Heaters, dashboards with protective foam padding, 
headlining, fuel tanks, electrical fittings and steering gear were also fitted 
at this stage. At the end of the trim line, the bodies were picked up by an 
overhead conveyor and transferred to the final assembly area, which began 
with the ‘high line’. Here engines, rear axles, transmissions and suspension 
components were fitted into place and at the end the unit would be supported 
on its own wheels. The unit then rolled onto a ‘lift’ which lowered it to the 
normal working level for alignment, final assembly and inspection.22 The 
move to Halifax’s Pier 9 in 1967 changed very little in assembly technol-
ogy. The plant was bigger, but the assembly line remained the same, being 
shipped by truck and set up in Halifax during a 10 day break in produc-
tion. In time, some improvements were made. Some so-called tilt stations 
were introduced, which allowed workers to install components from the 
side rather than from under the units. More improvements were made at 
the new plant in the Bayers Lake Industrial Park in 1987. The tilt-stations 
were implemented on a full scale, the layout of the plant made wider, with 
windows all around and materials stacked vertically rather than horizontally 
(as in the old plants). The assembly-line was thus longer and S-shaped rather 
than U-shaped. Some robotics were employed to apply glue to and install 
windshields and to move and tilt the cars. The paint- and under-coating 
booths were isolated. Water-based paint was introduced and the fluid for 
the air conditioning system filled automatically. But it is, so one worker 
claims, still the same principle that applies. The cars are pulled by a chain 
(now located under the floor), some of the airtools from 1963 are still used, 
and workers still have to push the cars manually on the line (though there 
is a mechanism that give them a boost).
The work organization and labour climate have changed very little over 
the years. Top down management, along Taylorist lines, characterizes the 
division of labour within the plant. All work is organized by management. 
Supervisors or foremen oversee and control the work process. Jobs are 
defined meticulously and job positions are posted and assigned accord-
ing to seniority among the unionized workers. Job rotation only occurs on 
an informal and sporadic basis. Shop stewards, elected from among the 
unionized workers, receive complaints about job duties and assignments, 
and forward grievances to a shop committee. Two unions have represented 
the workers over the years: Local 720 of the United Auto Workers (UAW), 
an international union, from 1963 to 1985 and Local 720 of the Canadian 
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Auto Workers (CAW), a national union, from 1985 to the present. From the 
very beginning, the members have adhered to a solidaristic wage policy, 
arguing that it takes every worker’s participation to assemble a car. Though 
wage disparities have increased over time, they remain low. In 1993, the 
highest and lowest hourly rate was $18.18 and $17.63, respectively.23 The 
level of skill in the plant is relatively low and can easily be picked up. Job 
classifications vary and have a distinct pecking order. The least desirable 
jobs are on the assembly line, where the stress in ‘chasing cars’ is the most 
intense. The jobs off the line are the most desirable, such as subassembler, 
who prepares components for the assembly line, inspector, and adjuster. 
Some dirty and hard jobs are also desirable because they generate a lot of 
over-time work, something coveted by many workers.24
The labour climate was intially peaceful at the plant. Workers recall the 
first production manager at the Dartmouth plant as respectful and caring. 
‘He knew everybody by their first name and knew when somebody had been 
sick or had a baby’.25 In September 1963, the UAW and Volvo reached its 
first three-year agreement, ratified by 98 per cent of the workers. Though 
wages were not competitive with other Canadian auto assembly plants, the 
workers were promised ‘that when its production and new plant facilities 
reach a position comparable with the rest of the automotive industry in 
Canada, it is intended to be competitive in every way and treat its workers 
accordingly.’26 But the labour climate soon hardened, taking on the shape 
of despotic Taylorism. Management took several unilateral measures to cir-
cumvent the contractural agreements. On several occasions, it attempted to 
substitute seniority with ability and safety in assigning job duties.27 It intro-
duced additional and altered shifts in contravention of collective agreements 
and then used the extra workers hired as bargaining chips to have the shift 
changes stick.28 Supervisors were used to perform workers’ jobs.29 Workers 
were reprimanded and threatened with dismissals when failing to keep up 
with the assembly line.30 All warnings were recorded in writing and put in 
employees’ personal files.31 Work premises were too cold.32 Work stoppages 
were frequent as a result of supplies being delayed from Sweden.33 At least 
two wildcat strikes (and some near misses) were part of the industrial rela-
tions climate of the 1960s. Matters were not helped when a new manager 
was recruited from Ontario to, as one worker recalls, ‘teach those farmers 
and fishermen a lesson’. In 1969, the Union President wrote that the pro-
duction manager was ‘commonly known as Hitler and his foremen as little 
Hitlers or his SS men’.34 The workers believed firmly that management was 
trying to provoke a wildcat strike, something that would have resulted in 
heavy fines for the union.
The labour situation did not improve in the 1970s when the Volvo Corpo-
ration as a whole was in a difficult situation, both in producing a quality car 
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as well as in identifying a distinct market niche. The workforce nevertheless 
grew slowly to 1976. But then, in 1976, the workforce was reduced from 240 
to 160 employees.35 Only some workers were re-hired after this layoff.36 The 
plant also experienced temporary closures, such as in 1977, when it closed 
for ten weeks due to sagging sales.37. A 13-week strike in the summer of 
1974 tells part of the story of the issues contested during the 1970s. The main 
issues were wage parity with Ontario auto assembly plants (a long-standing 
demand) and voluntary overtime. ‘With lots of men to work overtime … I 
cannot understand why the company insists on compulsory overtime’, one 
union official stated. Management countered that compulsory overtime was 
necessary ‘to ensure that the plant remains in continuous operation’, but 
promised that overtime be limited to 8 hours per week and that no worker 
be scheduled for overtime two days in a row. After initial rejection by a 
small margin, a contract was approved by an 80 per cent majority of the 
workers. Some gains were made but the stand that ‘no compromise will be 
accepted’ on the overtime issue had to be abandoned.38 The over-time issue 
had a deeper political significance as well. Before 1974, as well as after 
(to the extent that it has been possible), workers have informally refused 
overtime work under contract negotiations, mainly to show support for its 
negotiators. Such action caused considerable friction during the contract 
negotiations in 1966 and 1969.39 The agreement of 1974 allowed manage-
ment more flexibility in assigning over-time work.
The problem of job assignments continued into the 1970s. It is well il-
lustrated by the strain put on shop stewards. In 1974, one shop steward 
resigned from the plant committee, feeling it was ‘no longer an effectively 
working body: grievances are dropped, delayed or forgotten for no apparent 
reason’.40 Another shop steward, upon resignation, felt that ‘the majority 
appear to see [him] as one to complain to and expect him to right all wrong 
immediately … a source of letting off their frustration without jeopardizing 
their image to the foreman or other Management officials’.41 At the time, one 
union official felt that the union, especially the shop stewards, had become 
whipping boys, blamed for everything that went wrong.42 Such friction was 
lessened by a reorganization of the shop steward system in the early 1980s. 
From a wider perspective, the friction within the union needs to be seen in 
the context of ‘despotic Taylorism’, and the divide-and-rule strategies that 
are often part of this system.
Increased work intensity has characterized work organization and work 
on the assembly line since the late 1970s. A new system was introduced 
for determining the time for each work cycle on the assembly line. The 
time clock gave way to time and motion studies, making no allowance for 
mistakes, individual worker differences (size, weight, height) or different 
qualities of movements. For some workers, with long distances to walk, 
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the intensity of work dimnished while for others, who were stationary, the 
intensity of work increased. On the whole, with subsequent adjustment, the 
new system had the effect of speeding up the work and adding stress. The 
previous ‘breathing space’ between work cycles which helped to relieve 
stress – and allowed the odd word to be exchanged by workers – disap-
peared. The duration of work cycles at the Dartmouth and Halifax plants have 
fluctuated widely over the years. The work cycles appear to be determined 
mainly by production and the number of workers employed rather than 
to factors relating to an optimal human-centred work environment. In the 
beginning years, the work cycles were long, because employment and pro-
duction was low. Then, in the mid-1970s, when peak production occurred, 
the work cycles were from 6 to 8 minutes long. In 1988, the work cycles 
were 13 minutes. In 1994, they had increased to 20 minutes. Management 
argued – following the Uddevalla model – that the longer cycle slows the 
assembly line, decreases stress and adds variety to the job task. The Volvo 
workers Halifax feel differently. When the Halifax plant built 60 cars per 
day, ‘it was a breeze’, more workers were employed, the time cycles were 
shorter and the job tasks easier to perform.43
Increase in work intensity and down-sizing are well illustrated by the move 
from the Pier 9 site to Bayers Lake Industrial Park in 1987. It resulted in 
two bitter strikes: a wildcat strike in 1987 joined in by most workers and 
a 5-week strike in 1988, where workers voted 111 to 1 in favour of strike 
action.44 The workers obtained some wage increases and the indexing of 
pensions. The persistent frustration relating to line speed and workload, 
however, were equally important in precipitating the strikes. Workers speak 
bitterly about the move to the new plant in 1987. One utility worker – who 
fills in for sick workers, relieves temporary absentees and helps to ease bot-
tlenecks on the production line and subassembly – felt that the assembly line 
was understaffed (‘a very tight ship was run’). Management tried to keep the 
assembly line moving, no matter what the cost in quality and human frustra-
tion, to reach the target of 36 cars per day. Utility workers spent 4–5 hours 
per night building parts (subassembly) for next day’s production. Quality 
suffered, absenteeism increased and the general frustration level mounted. 
The utility workers, much to their distress, had to fill in for absentees. Their 
compensation was low because of the solidaristic wage policy. This posed 
frustration among the utility workers who – in a stressful and labour-scarce 
work process – felt ‘suckered’ and exploited for having upgraded their 
skills. Quality controls became stricter and the level of tolerance for errors 
diminished at the new plant. They posed additional aggravation, as workers 
struggled to assemble the more complicated 760-models, which contained 
33 per cent more parts than the previous models.
All directives came from the top management during this difficult period. 
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One management representative who acknowledged the shortage of workers 
during the initial phase of the move to the new site in 1987, and who was 
then proven right by outside consultants, was summarily fired. The foremen 
had no authority and were of little help. The general feeling among the work-
ers was that there were too many foremen, and that ‘they had time on their 
hands’. The workers were always at fault. Planning and decision-making, 
as is a major characteristic of Taylorism, have continued to come from the 
top at the new plant. At one point, the location of time clocks was changed 
to facilitate supervision, but workers were inconvenienced because time-
clocks and work stations ended up at opposite sides of the plant. Routinely, 
new versions of cars were introduced on the line without workers being 
notified. Although training programs and operating and repair manuals for 
certain equipment were available free from manufacturers, these were not 
available to workers. Getting a union office at the new plant location (as 
the union had at Pier 9) was a two-year struggle at the new plant. At Volvo, 
‘a worker stays a worker’, states one worker. Another, who once worked 
with Swedish line workers and engineers at Torslanda, claims that Swedish 
workers ‘wouldn’t have anything to do with the interference and requests 
put on us here’. ‘There is no use trying’. ‘When we complain they say they 
will look into it but they never do’. The problem thus continues: ‘It’s like 
a time bomb ready to explode at any time’.
Hiring practices at the plant tell a similar story. It remains a closely guarded 
management prerogative, except for recalls of laid-off workers which follow 
the seniority principle.45 In 1988, the company received approximately 60 
applications per month.46 In the same year, however, a woman, Mary Ritchie, 
who had sought employment with Volvo since 1972, took the company to 
the Nova Scotia Human Rights Board of Inquiry, charging the company 
with gender discrimination in hiring. After two successful attempts by Volvo 
lawyers to delay the hearing, it took place in 1990. After half a day, Volvo 
settled privately with Ritchie. The company agreed to pay her $43,000 for 
general damages. It agreed to offer her the first available assembly-line job 
after receiving a two-year certificate from a community college in automo-
tive mechanics or auto body repair. It also agreed to embark on a policy of 
employing 15 per cent women, the national standard, once all male work-
ers from the recall list had been re-hired. Finally, the company agreed to 
display a scroll describing human rights in a public place at the plant.47 In 
spite of these apparent concessions, the company claimed victory, arguing 
that the settlement ‘sends a message to all employers that they can exercise 
their right to hire the best qualified applicant’.48 There are perhaps several 
explanations. The stipulation that Ritchie take a two-year training course 
is something that has not been required of any previous employee.49 Since 
1990, there has been very little opportunity for women to gain employment 
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at Volvo. In 1992, the workforce was reduced to 135 people as a ‘cost-cut-
ting’ measure, and the number of units assembled per year was reported at 
a low of 7,000.50 In 1994, 113 workers were employed. There are still (in 
April 1994) no women workers at the plant.51 Nor is there a scroll explain-
ing human rights displayed at the plant.
There are several reasons why Volvo workers in Nova Scotia stay in what 
appear to be less than satifying jobs. The wages are high by Nova Scotia 
standards. There is little else to do. The workers are relatively old and know 
few other skills; in 1988, the average age at the plant was 42 years. In 1994, 
the average age was close to 50 years. These are facts of which the workers 
are critically aware and constantly reminded by management.
Conclusion
The Volvo assembly plant in Nova Scotia is clearly an enclave factory, 
dependent on distant components for assembly and distant markets for 
ultimate sale. Concessions brought the plant to the province, and conces-
sions continue to keep it there. But there is no love lost between the local 
management and their workers. Under the official veil of harmony there 
is considerable frustration. The workers have little good to say about their 
employers.
How do we interpret this situation? Is it a mere reflection of the adversarial 
nature of Canadian management-labour relations? Do conditions in Nova 
Scotia necessitate a different mode of operation than in Sweden, given a 
peripheral location and tumbling tariffs? Is consultation with labour too 
costly in Nova Scotia? Is it more profitable to run an operation from the top 
down regardless of the resultant acrimony? Is local management pressured 
by Volvo headquarters to act as they do? Does the high unemployment rate 
invite tougher and less democratic working standards? Does the presence of 
a strong national union, which has helped workers to obtain near national 
standard wages, at about $18 per hour, necessitate despotic Taylorism in the 
work place? A squeeze on profits no doubt plays a role but not a determining 
one. Volvo Canada has had some hard years but so has the Volvo Corpora-
tion as a whole. In 1992, it declared a loss of $1.1 million. But the years 
1984 to 1989 were highly profitable, with net incomes ranging from $8–12 
million.52 In 1985, the profit of $12 million on $268 million of sales ‘gave 
Volvo the best return on invested capital of any major company in Canada, 
according to Financial Post 500 rankings’.53 The anwer is most likely to lie 
in the concessionary climate in which the Volvo assembly plant in Dartmouth 
and Halifax was conceived and then maintained. Such concessions are also 
expected from the work force, a work force which is instrumental in making 
the Nova Scotia plant most productive of all Volvo’s assembly plants. The 
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wider lesson of Volvo’s plant in Nova Scotia for work place reform is not 
promising. There are at least two plausible scenarios.
Within the last couple of months, Volvo management in Halifax has intro-
duced, but not implemented, a new program based on teamwork and quality 
control. It is based on teams working in four, and then being responsible 
for quality control as a group. This trend towards Toyotism is viewed with 
skepticism by many workers.54 Perhaps it is an effort to improve productivity 
and maintain the plant, in spite of the falling tariffs that brought Volvo to 
Nova Scotia in the first place. A second scenario is less promising for the 
future of the plant in Nova Scotia. In 2002, Volvo is free to abandon Halifax 
with a government guarantee to buy back the plant. By that time it is likely 
that tariffs will be close to zero. Moreover, the average age of the highly 
productive work force will be approaching 60 years, if no new workers are 
employed. There are no signs of the latter occurring today, in spite of the 
importance to train new workers for the long-term viability of the plant.55 
The implications of the Ritchie agreement for the employment of women 
and the training of workers generally at the plant suggest that Volvo has no 
intentions to employ new workers. The turn of the century, in other words, 
may be an opportune time to leave.
Volvo did not bring a ‘little bit of Sweden’ to Nova Scotia; instead, the 
company quickly adopted to and exploited the peripheral conditions of its 
new location. If there is a future for Volvo in Nova Scotia, this is likely to 
continue. If Prince Volund is in charge of Volvo’s operations in Nova Scotia, 
he will probably not gain his Princess but remain a bachelor to his grave. 
And, if Kalmar and Uddevalla are now at the end of the road, Halifax seems 
to have missed it altogether.56
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Volvo in Malaysia
Hing Ai Yun
Since its birth slightly over 100 years ago, developments taking place 
over the past one and a half decades can be said to be amongst the most 
dramatic in the whole history of the auto industry. The 1970s–1980s saw 
major restructuring of industry on a scale as big as ‘the pioneering efforts in 
mass production in the USA in the 1900s, or Europe’s introduction of sharp 
product differentiation in the 1950s, or Japan’s more recent innovations in 
production engineering management’ (Mortimer, 1987). The tortuous path 
traversed by the global automotive industry has indeed impacted differen-
tially on various regions around the world. The inception and growth of 
Malaysia’s auto industry is a case in point.
Malaysia’s auto industry: inception
When Malaysia began thinking seriously about the production of automo-
biles in the 1960s, it had intended to use this to spearhead its industrialization 
drive. As a first step, it announced in 1966 that high tariffs, stringent import 
licensing and quantitative restrictions would be imposed to encourage the 
establishment of local assembly plants. Meanwhile, the years between 1960s 
and 70s were the high point of European car expansion. (Womack et al., 
1990:44). With cheaper wages and new product features (like front-wheel 
drive, disc breaks, fuel injection and unitized bodies), the Europeans, after 
the Americans, had racked up success after success in foreign markets. 
It was only logical that a European company would be amongst the first 
assemblers to take advantage of Malaysia’s new tariff regime to establish 
plants locally. In effect, Swedish Motor Assemblies Sdn Bhd, a joint venture 
between AB Volvo and their local distributors Federal Auto Company Sdn 
Bhd (on a 50-50 basis) has the distinction of being the first assembly plant 
to be established in Malaysia. It is not coincidental that Volvo was the first. 
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In view of its very small population, Swedish relative to other European 
auto companies had to push hardest for exports to survive, chalking up 
between 80–90 percent of exports for 1986 (Malmberg, 1991). To keep its 
plants running all year round, Volvo had chosen to sell its winter production 
to countries with a different climatic regime. Additionally, to compete ef-
fectively, Volvo adopted the strategy of exporting only to countries without 
domestic production.
Since Malaysian automobile assembly companies were mainly established 
by major local distributors (in some cases through joint ventures with foreign 
automobile manufacturers) and in view of the fact that these distributors 
normally handle more than one brand, the assembly plants they established 
generally produce a wide range of models and brands under manufactur-
ing licenses. Moreover, the original limit set by consultants (numbering 
5–6), to ensure the maximum viability of plants in the country, could not 
be followed. Existing distributors were concentrated into the hands of the 
Chinese, so were the ownership of parts producers. In its push to redress the 
balance of economic power between the ethnic groups in Malaysia (which 
has a GNP of $38,614 million [all denominated in Malaysian $ equivalent 
to $0.4 US] and a population of 18 million comprising 62 percent Malays, 
30 percent Chinese) after the 1969 racial riots, the Malays had to be en-
couraged to participate in this new strategy for industrialisation. Thus the 
original number of six assembly plants set up in 1966–69, with the goal of 
progressive manufacture of component parts was later expanded to accom-
modate another five plants in 1977.
With a small market (Table 1 and 2), relatively large number of produc-
ers and an even larger range of models, the auto industry was operating 
under severe ‘diseconomies’ of scale. On top of this, mandatory local 
content increases (10 percent in 1972 to 35 percent in 1982), could not be 
implemented, partly due to the wide differentiation of parts and components 
which made it prohibitively expensive to produce parts locally. In 1980, the 
11 assemblers were producing 25 makes, 122 models and 212 variants. By 
1979, local content had averaged only 8 percent and was limited largely 
to tires, batteries, paint and filters (Malaysian Business 1 Dec 1984). One 
estimate noted in 1971 that ex-factory Malaysian prices exceeded British 
prices by as much as 22–52 percent (Lee 1971). Of course, part of the reason 
for not forcing the local content schedule was to accommodate the Asian 
complementation scheme, whereby, the manufacturing of parts would be 
parcelled out among member countries to maximize the utilization of plant 
capacity (Solidum and Seah, 1987).
Unfortunately, at that time the vehicle industry was not the only sector that 
was cumbersome and in need of a thorough restructuring. Indeed, the 1969 
riots made it clear that the production organization of the country required 
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a thorough shake-up to yield a return that can support a population growth 
rate of 3–4 percent per annum.
Reconstituting the auto industry
The first step towards rationalization of the national productive apparatus 
was to transfer ownership of matured factors of productions (comprised 
chiefly of plantations and mines), from foreign to local hands. Only the state 
with command over rich resources like petroleum could buy and also initiate 
new enterprises, especially in the nascent industrial sector. In this respect, 
the Heavy Industries Corporation Malaysia (HICOM), was set up in 1978 to 
undertake the implementation of heavy industrial projects. The State’s share 
in manufacturing value-added was estimated at around 24 percent, one of 
the highest ratio in the non-socialist world (UNIDO 1991:39).
The national car project (Proton), is a major component in HICOM’s thrust 
towards heavy industrialization. Proton was initiated in May of 1983, by the 
present Prime Minister and is a joint venture between HICOM (29 percent), 
the Ministry of Finance (18 percent), and Mitsubishi Motor Corporation (17 
percent), with the rest of the equity shared out with two other Malaysian 
institutions and the public. In a single stroke, it was hoped that with the 
establishment of Proton which costs $230 million, the problem of low Malay 
participation in the motor industry (State ownership is equated with Malay 
ownership), and the moribund state of the auto industry could be repaired. 
The Proton was extremely privileged, being exempted from the 40 per cent 
import tariff while taxes for other CKD – packs (completely knocked down) 
were at the same time increased three times, leading to the treasury losing 
$120 million in foregone import duties. Proton, therefore, had unbeatable 
prices. A 1300c.c Proton costs around $21,000 while competitors were re-
tailing for between $28,000 to $29,000. As a result, Proton’s market share 
shot up from 47 percent in 1986 to 73 percent in 1988. Three assemblers 
including Mitsubishi had to shut down. The others either reduced production 
or even shifted to part exporting. In short, 3,500 workers lost their jobs. 
Now, there are 10 assemblers producing 200 models.
The ethnic dimension of the rationalization process also filtered down to the 
level of the plant. Proton in 1988, employed 1,300 workers of whom 94 percent 
were Malays. They were not unionized. Few of the experienced workers laid-
off from the other plants (about half were Chinese), were hired. The experience 
of mass retrenchment served as an effective deterrant and disciplinary chain 
that immediately tempered the recalcitiant work force of the industry. On the 
part of the management, uncertainties involved in the whole restructuring 
exercise had bred such a sense of crisis and insecurity that they became even 
more authoritarian in handling the workers on the shopfloor.
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Swedish motor assemblies Sendirian Berhad (SMA)
The SMA was started in 1966 and in its first year of production in 1967, 
had an output of 11 units. From this small number, the company proceeded 
to expand production to a peak of 9989 units in 1974. From then on, the 
number of units produced declined steadily to a trough of 351 units in the 
1986 recession when the work force was down to 119 from a peak of 732 
in 1975 (See Figure 1 and 2). Out of the 26 years for which data is avail-
able, the company was producing a higher proportion of non-Volvo cars 
(contract assembly), for 11 years. Currently, the company’s production per 
day includes 8 units of Daihatsu (Delta), 5 vans, 3 Suzuki (2 models) 2 units 
of Volvo (Models 850 and 940). In 1992 (August), it employed around 450 
workers of which only about one-third can be described as skilled. Labour 
turnover at the plant is about 7 percent.
The labour process and work organization
Material department
This department is headed by a manager who is assisted by a foreman, sev-
eral charge hands and lower level ‘seniors’ who sit above the ‘handlers’, the 
numbers varying at different time periods. One charge hand is in charge of 
10–20 workers. 6 out of a total of 40–50 workers are involved in adminis-
trative work in this department.
On receipt of a new model, the foreman and the charge hand would dis-
cuss the details of work procedures. Once these have been established, the 
foreman would just issue the orders to the charge hand who would then pass 
on the information/directives to the seniors, who would then pass it down 
the line to the handlers.
In this section, the CKDs that arrive are opened up by the senior material 
checker with the help of handlers. These are then arranged according to 
station sequence found at the production line. The parts are sourced both 
locally and from foreign suppliers. Daihatsu parts come from Indonesian 
and Japan, whereas, parts for the Volvo 850 come from Sweden. Renault 
parts originate in France. Local components are made up of parts like glass, 
tires, exhaust and batteries. Due to the low volume of production, it has 
become more expensive to source locally. Local content level is still low, 
at 40 percent for Volvo and 10 percent for the Daihatsu. 
Production department
This is the largest department and covers several sub-divisions including:
1. Body Shop:
Welding Jig Area
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Metal Finishing
2. Paint Shop:
Electro Dipping
Underbody Spray
Sealing 
Colour Spray/Dry Sanding
Paint Rectification/Plastic Parts Spray
CBU/Paint Rectification
3. Final Assembly Line
4. Rectification 
Body Shop
About 60–70 workers are employed in the body shop. This department is 
divided into two sections whose details are provided below:
a) Jig Area: The metal panels of the bodies are placed in specialized jigs 
fixtures, manually assembled and spot welded to fuse specific sections 
of the panels together. Each spot weld is subject to continuous check-
ing. Volvo Sweden provides the designs and specifications for manu-
facturing the jigs. This, together with SPC (Statistical Process Control) 
combine to ensure that Volvo designated dimensions and tolerance are 
reached.
b) Metal Finish Line: The vehicle body is finish-welded here using arc 
welding and brass welding. Joints and welded parts are then grinded in 
special enclosed booths designed to reduce the noise level in the fac-
tory and to prevent metal dust pollution. Finally, doors, bonnets and 
boot-lids are bolted onto the body to specified tolerances, followed up 
by SPC.
In the Body Shop, workers are grouped according to the models they work 
on. Their numbers with corresponding car models are shown below.
Table 1 
Body Shop: Workers by Vehicle Model (1992)
 Jig Finishing
Vehicle Model No. of Workers No. of Workers
Volvo: 240 10 12
Volvo: 940 8
Renault 19 6
Suzuki 9 7
Daihatsu 13 4
Total 46 23
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Paint Shop
In this shop, the body first undergoes pre-treatment: the body is degreased, 
rinsed and zinc phosphated. It then is electrodipped (Cathodic Electro Dip 
process), to provide perfect penetration of the paint after which the body 
undergoes sealing. The body then proceeds to receive an intermediate coat-
ing which is then followed by manual spraying of the top coat by skilled 
painters. After passing through the topcoat oven it is inspected and any faults 
are then rectified. The paint shop employs about 70 workers.
Final Assembly Line
This part of the work process comprises several segments: The Trim Line, 
Body Drop, Final Line and Underbody Treatment. Here again, the workers 
are grouped according to vehicle model as shown below.
Table 2
Vehicle Model No. of Workers (Operators)
Volvo: 240 32
Volvo: 940 12
Renault 12
a) Sub total: 56
Daihatsu: Delta 27
Pick-up/Van 24
Suzuki 17
b) Sub total: 68
(a) and (b) each with one chargehand
Trim Line is where the vehicle body is manually fitted with head-lights, 
tail-lights, bumpers, mouldings, grills, windscreens, door-glasses etc. The 
material handling system is designed to minimize the number of components 
handled along the line to reduce damage to components and also to allow 
for more room in the working environment. At the end of the Trim Line, the 
body now passes through the Body Drop Section. Here, the body is ‘married’ 
to the engine, transmission, front to rear axles using a tilt device specially 
designed by Volvo to allow a 90 degree tilt which permits easier assembly 
and inspection of all under carriage work. The vehicle then passes onto the 
Final Line where seats, carpets, trim mouldings, batteries and other acces-
sories are fitted into the car. The carbon monoxide level is here checked 
to the minimum level required by legislation and before the car leaves the 
assembly plant, it receives a final rust protection treatment which involves 
spraying of anti-rust into the inside box and door sections of the car.
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Rectification
This is considered the last stage of the production line where defects and 
shortages are identified and rectified. Here again, workers are organized to 
work on specific models. 
No. of Workers Model
7 Volvo 240 and 940 
6 Daihatsu 
2 Suzuki 
3 Renault
They are managed by a supervisor, charge hand and leadmen.
To understand the way work is organized and managed in Malaysia, one 
has to take into account a few basic factors. First, is the country’s very 
recent shift to waged work as a major mode of economic organization. As 
recently as 1975, only slightly above half (55 percent), of the population 
were wage earners. Second, the country has been struggling hard to stave 
off foreign domination of its economy. Having succeeded in decreasing 
foreign share of the agricultural sector, it is now trying to balance the need 
for foreign capital and technology and national autonomy in its effort to 
industrialize. Third, is the fact that, the auto sector is one of the oldest in 
Malaysia’s manufacturing base. As such, we should expect it to possess more 
of the moribund vestiges of old industries. Capital restructuring is one big 
factor affecting the labour market and thus, is important in shaping worker 
behaviour in this sector.
In view of the remarks above, one can understand why jobs in the auto 
industry are therefore, generally specific, specialized, simplified, and highly 
routinized and labour intensive. New recruits are thus, easily absorbed onto 
the line with only a few days of on-the-job training. If a worker on the trim 
line has to fit the windscreen, that remains his job day-in-and-day-out until 
he gets shifted elsewhere to replace some absent colleague or gets promoted 
due to good/obedient behaviour. Job relationships are bureaucratic and 
hierarchical, with the foreman acting as the chief spokesman delivering 
managerial directives. This constitutes the primary and most common form 
of management – labour communication. Before the appointment of the cur-
rent personnel manager (acting), there appears to be very little interest in 
training or what is now designated as ‘human resource management’. 
It would appear that strict and tight supervision remains the primary 
tool ensuring that production proceeds smoothly. In this, the foreman 
constitutes the key. Using the leverage of overtime work (which brings in 
more than the normal rate of pay-one and half times), the foreman is able 
to get workers to toe the line by bestowing this ‘higher’ rate work on the 
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favoured/selected few. There is very little joint-consultation. However, 
spurred by the introduction and ‘successful’ implementation of the Proton 
project, SMA, like other auto assemblies will likely introduce new methods 
into its management style. In fact, the foreman on whom much depends but 
whose supervisory capabilities are widely recognized as conservative and 
deficient, has become the first target for a new regime of training recently 
initiated by the personnel manager.
In the past, hierarchical methods of management were justified on the 
grounds that workers were largely uneducated and irresponsible. The av-
erage level of education of the workers is lower secondary schooling of 
about eight years. A strong national union had successfully gained benefits 
and higher than average pay for its members. The monopolistic position 
of the assemblers, prior to Proton, had also strengthened the position of 
labour to such an extent that absenteeism and malingering has become a 
perennial problem of production. Part of the reason for this ‘undisciplined’ 
work behaviour could stem from the very routinized, nature of the work. 
In fact, certain sections with heavy, arduous and unpleasant work, like 
welding, paint shop, trim, final and body departments reported higher rates 
of absenteeism. However, after the industrial fallout and retrenchment of 
3,500 workers, labour problems have resolved themselves. With a trimmed 
work force, total productivity had even increased – reports one plant which 
prior to retrenchment had a work force of 800 people/workers producing 60 
units, but with a reduced force of 400 in 1990, reached an increased output 
of 70 per day!
Conclusion
The evolution of Malaysia’s auto industry was very much in tandem with 
on-going developments of the industry at the world level. Malaysia’s auto 
industry was initiated between 1966–69, in the form of joint ventures with 
European producers just when the European auto industry has reached its 
peak. Further down the road, when the world’s auto industries faced a major 
crisis due to intense pressure from the Japanese beginning in the 1970s, the 
Malaysian auto industry also faced cataclysmic losses that had put countless 
lives in disarray. The crisis of the Malaysian industry was further aggra-
vated by state induced effort at restructuring which had perforce to embrace 
Japanese technology and capital.
The SMA as one small player was carried along in this historical ebb and 
flow. And despite its fame as purveyor of hi-tech production technology and 
sophisticated management expertise, which were not reflected upon in its 
local plant, the SMA in ordinary times had been quite incapable of influenc-
ing the direction of the industry. More importantly, as its fate is shaped by 
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international, regional and local forces, the company must recognize the 
need for change on all sides and take reasonable steps to incorporate its 
work force to forge a stronger initiative for change. Within the local con-
text, rank and file workers and unions have relegated the leadership role to 
management. They desire that management should create the environment 
where workers can contribute to organizational goods. But management is 
hesitating to transform work relationships to a less hierarchical structure, 
one characterized by a higher level of trust than distrust is needed to help 
sustain mutual commitment to success.
This is particularly urgent in view of the state push for a second national 
car project (600cc) with Daihatsu. The relative success of the Proton export 
sales, localization programme (local content is 60 percent by 1990 with 125 
vendors supplying up to 80 percent of local components in 1993), and plans 
to assemble the car in Indonesia, Chile and Vietnam (Managing Director at 
AGM of Proton Vendors Association in April of 1994), will ensure the auto 
industry will be upgraded. Since the national auto market is too small and 
in view of the ASEAN complementation scheme, the larger assemblers have 
begun switching to becoming parts exporters. To survive these develop-
ments, existing assemblers must make good use of its resources, including 
its workers who are still holding back their productivity under conventional 
modes of hierarchial management. 
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Appendix
Worker Profile
Worker 1
Started work in 1974
Has 3 children age 9,5 and 2
Wife works in Toshiba, earns about $1,000/m.
Workers wage about $1,075/m.
Owns House and Car
Expenses for Car $200+/m.
Worker 2
Has worked for 10 years
Uses motorcycle, for transportation to work from home about 10 kilometres 
away
Spends $5 per day outside home (mainly at workplace)
Drinks $1
Lunch $2
Petrol $2
Household expenditure: $400–600
Wife does not work, has two children age 11 and 7 years
Worker 3
Worked in company for 5 years
Wage amounts to $650/m.
Deducts $300/m. for car
Rent costs $250/m.
Wife has worked in Bata Shoe Factory for 10 years. Earns little, about 
$500/m.
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The origins of team work at Renault
Michel Freyssenet
In 1991, Renault decided to adopt team work throughout its European facto-
ries, in the form of Elementary Work Units (EWUs) or Unités Elémentaires 
de Travail (UETs), before 1994. Team work is conceived of as polyvalent 
and multifunctional work undertaken by a team of 20 persons. The Unit is 
defined by the component, mechanism or subassembly that it makes. It is 
led (animé) by a Unit leader, who constitutes the first hierarchical level. It 
controls and analyses its own production parameters. It enters into buyer-
supplier relations with the other teams upon which it depends, upstream and 
downstream in the production process. What is expected from this form of 
work organization is an ability to react to problems, an improve-ment in the 
quality of products and of the functioning of machines, a greater flexibility 
of production, a development of competencies, an increased interest in work, 
and finally the modification of hierarchical relationships.
The definition of EWUs, and the decision to organize the factories ac-
cording to this mode, is explicitly inspired by the Japanese experience. Yet 
one would not understand the specific traits and meaning of the EWUs, the 
conditions under which they were adopted, and the difficulties surrounding 
their implementation, if one was not aware of the long maturation process 
of the team work idea in the company, of which they are the result. This 
process consisted of three phases. In the first place, it has its origins in the 
crisis of work at the end of the 1960s, and in the experiments at Volvo. 
Several experiments in ‘modular’ work were made at this time, even though 
this was opposed by elements within top management. These then served 
as the basis for thinking about original forms of team work in the factory 
areas that were automated after the late 1970s. These forms owe nothing 
to Japanese team work, which was unknown then. The success of some of 
them, the need to mobilize the entirety of the personnel, and the desire to 
offer career opportunities to all employees, led the company to consider 
spreading team work to all factory areas, whether or not automated. The 
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Japanese example, which was becoming better known in the second half of 
the 1980s, then arrived to legitimate and confirm this direction. It allowed 
Renault’s idea of team work to be enriched, without, however, causing the 
disappearance of those aspects born out of Renault’s own experiences. The 
theme of the enrichment of work remained, and constitutes one of the bases 
upon which fundamental agreement with the unions was reached, whereas 
it is absent from the original Japanese idea of team work.
1. The ‘crisis of work’ in the 1960s and the first experi-
ments with team work
The crisis of work first emerged at Renault in 1967, through conflicts that 
were often spectacular, and through growing absenteeism, high levels of 
turnover, and an increase in rectification work. Several types of solution 
to these conflicts were found, some immediate and others long term, some 
accepted by all and others contested.
The conflicts were ended on the basis of agreements dominated by wage 
payments, with no real discussion of the problems of work organization 
and work content which had set off the strikes. These agreements fitted in 
with the strategy followed by the company since 1955. The guarantee of 
increasing purchasing power constituted one of the foundations of the ‘so-
cial contract’ that Pierre Dreyfus, the second Managing Director (Président 
Directeur Général) of the Régie Nationale des Usines Renault concluded 
with the unions on 15th September 1955.1
A second type of response, included in the multisector agreements negoti-
ated nationally, was the reduction of working time2 and the development of 
continuous training. This solution corresponded closely to Pierre Dreyfus’ 
philosophy. He believed that the only compensation which could make it 
worth working at the assembly line or specialized machine (work which 
could never be different from what it was, that is to say economically superior 
but alienating for human beings) was the gradual reduction of working time 
and the development of training and learning activities, to allow employees 
to discover activities outside work that would permit their cultural and social 
development in a way that industry could never offer.
A third type of response, and the one that interests us, contradicted the 
view just discussed. Though supported by certain factory managers, it was 
not unanimously accepted by top management and was regarded with a 
degree of suspicion by the unions. It involved the transformation of the 
contents and the organization of work in ‘a framework of responding to 
the new expectations of man at work … a permanent requirement for the 
future of the company’.3
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Numerous forms of work organization were experimented with by certain 
factory managers: rotation between two or three positions, assembly of a 
complete mechanism by walking it down the assembly line, lengthening 
the work cycle by including preparation and rectification, working on work 
‘islands’, etc. Later, a company working group consisting of the Personnel 
Director and the Director of Work Study proposed: ‘not only to humanize 
technology, but also to explore new ways of organizing the factories and 
the design of equipment and buildings … [from the viewpoint] … of the 
degree of freedom and of initiative that would be allowed the personnel, 
of the utilization of its skills, and of the possibilities of working in teams’. 
Several new operations resulted from this: the assembly of a complete engine 
at a fixed position by one worker; four short assembly lines instead of one 
long line at the new assembly plant at Douai; the widespread adoption at 
the Le Mans factory of modular assembly of front and rear axles by three 
to five workers, organizing themselves, responsible for the whole assembly 
process as well as for watching over and maintaining the equipment, taking 
on responsibility for quality, undertaking rectification work and ensuring 
the cleanliness of machines and work spaces.
These experiments in the reform of work were also of interest to certain 
manufacturing managers, who were concerned with the difficulties of 
managing an increasingly diverse and varied output. Beyond the social at-
tractions, they saw in these forms of work the possibility of altering manu-
facturing schedules more easily and more cheaply.
The most radical and novel formula, that of the modules, was neverthe-
less a subject of controversy at the highest level. Pierre Dreyfus’ Assistant 
Managing Director, Christian Beullac, encouraged the experiments and 
suggested that an evaluation on financial grounds be undertaken. However, 
Dreyfus himself publicly declared that he did not see industrial solutions for 
the future in this kind of work, which he thought harkened back to artisan 
work. The work study departments were openly opposed. Taking account 
only of the theoretical times and manpower necessary in assembly work, 
they easily demonstrated that modular work was not financially viable.4
The experiments that had been set in motion did not end, however. They 
inspired the forms of work organization in the automated areas which were 
developed when the choice was made to automate as a response to the crises 
of work and of productivity. One of these experiments was particularly sig-
nificant, since it extended the application of the principles of modular work 
to machining, whereas this had previously appeared only to be applicable to 
assembly. A working group was established at Le Mans in 1975 to consider 
the possibility of introducing ‘production units’ into the machining areas 
that would be autonomous relative to upstream and downstream activities. It 
would be composed of various machines, grouped geographically, in which 
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the operators would be responsible for: running the machines, adjusting and 
changing tools, quality control, dealing with minor breakdowns, and main-
tenance. This formula was applied in three areas, though operators did not 
in fact undertake minor maintenance tasks or deal with minor breakdowns, 
and they remained under the supervision of a sub-foreman.5
Within this same type of solution one can classify the movement to 
improve working conditions and to ‘re-value’ manual work which was 
supported by the government of the time. It was also a continuation of the 
efforts made at Renault since the start of the 1960s to take account of work-
ing conditions when designing buildings, machines, and tooling.
The work study departments of the company opposed the modular solu-
tions and remained unconvinced of the value of expenditure on improving 
working conditions at work posts which, in their view, should have been 
eliminated as soon as possible. Their favoured solution to the crisis of work 
was a rapid movement towards automation that would permit the elimination 
of difficult and repetitive work and the development of guidance-surveil-
lance-maintenance functions, more attractive and more skilled. This is the 
path that would be taken up at the end of the 1970s.
The final response to the crisis of work was brought about by the long-run 
slow-down in economic growth and the rise of unemployment. There was a 
close correlation between the reduction of manpower at Renault, beginning 
in 1978, and a steady fall in absenteeism and turn-over. From this point on, 
the development of team work during the 1980s would not have its origins 
directly in the crisis of work; rather, in the demands of, and the problems 
posed by, the shift to the automation cum integration of production. At the 
same time, the social necessity of enriching the content of work and of of-
fering a career to unskilled workers would continue to be a constant and 
explicit theme of those who were taking the initiative of organizing team 
work in the automated factory areas, even though all signs of a refusal to 
work had disappeared.
2. The relaunch of team work in the automated areas
The installation of automated means of production in the machining, stamp-
ing, welding and painting areas, starting at the end of the 1970s, led to the 
relaunch of initiatives on, and further consideration of, team work, though 
now on a partly different basis.
The form chosen for the automation-cum-integration of machines in 
production lines had in effect altered the scope of work in the areas con-
cerned. Automation consisted of a significant technological leap and of 
the integration in a single line of the machines necessary to manufacture 
a component or subassembly. It involved both simple and complex opera-
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tions, partially or totally, leaving the operators to undertake tasks that were 
partial and heterogeneous. Regarding complex tasks, automation consisted 
of simplifying them and dividing them up; the repair of breakdowns espe-
cially. The machines and the production lines were equipped with automatic 
apparatuses that stopped them in the event of an anomaly, that located the 
incident in equally automatic fashion, and that involved ‘standard exchange’ 
of the failed component, fuller repairs being postponed to periods outside 
production.6
Three new problems were then posed: how to make these costly integrated 
lines function continuously so as to reduce their number and the period of 
their amortization; how to get the new mode of maintenance accepted; and 
how to divide up tasks, none of which occupied a person full time, and which, 
moreover, required different levels of competencies. These three problems 
raised questions about existing norms of work in the areas concerned. Pro-
duction workers previously had daily quotas to fulfil, giving them relative 
freedom to vary the pace of work. They had tasks that were relatively ho-
mogeneous, and were easy to classify according to their level of complexity. 
Maintenance workers could take the time necessary for in-depth diagnosis 
and repair of machines. The output of a defective machine could in fact be 
shifted to other machines, since they were not integrated into production 
lines. The new scope of work in the automated areas, as it was perceived 
at the time, was therefore to ensure: the continuous functioning of the ma-
chines despite absent personnel and rest breaks; the undertaking of tasks at 
different levels by the same persons; and the rapid repair of breakdowns so 
that production would be disrupted as little as possible.
The organizational solutions found for these three problems varied from 
one factory to another, indeed from one factory area to another.7 They ranged 
from a mixed group of production and maintenance workers responsible for 
the entire process of running and maintaining robotized welding machines, 
to homogeneous groups of former unskilled workers trained to undertake, in 
turn, the roles of feeding in inputs, operating installations, quality control, 
changing tools, primary maintenance and breakdown repair on automated 
machining lines.
These different formulae were no longer mere experiments, but could 
involve whole departments of a factory: machining, welding, stamping, etc. 
They did not, however, represent the implementation of an official strategy 
by the company, but rather the fruit of local initiatives by area or department 
managers. Time would have to pass before top management and the totality 
of the management of the company would realize and understand the scope 
and implications of these new ways of organizing work.
Paradoxically automation also played an important role as a result of its 
dysfunctions. Expected to bring productivity, flexibility and quality, during 
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the first half of the 1980s it caused numerous stoppages of production as 
well as quality problems. Numerous causes lie at the root of this unreliability 
and the slowness in rectifying it. They include: a lack of understanding of 
the daily problems of production on the part of the designers, a desire to 
pursue technological leaps and attain large improvements in a single step, 
and a mode of calculating the profitability of investments which favoured 
manpower reductions. They are joined by: a weakness of links between the 
factories and the central work study department at this period, an opaque-
ness and needless complexity in the first machines which hindered attempts 
to make them reliable, and the fact that design technicians and engineers 
less often came up through the factories by internal promotion than were 
recruited directly from the major engineering colleges (Ecoles d’Ingénieurs) 
or were highly qualified technicians. The active participation of those ac-
tually running the machines and the maintenance workers was therefore 
required to analyze the problems and to find the solutions. Team work and 
collaboration between production and maintenance consequently appeared 
as self-evident.
Since 1982, it has been possible to observe four forms of team work. The 
differences among them are related to the individual histories of the factory, 
indeed the particular factory area, where they first emerged, as well as to dif-
ferent understandings of the problems that automation was going to pose.
The first formula appeared at the Le Mans factory, which, as we have 
seen, introduced modular work for the assembly of certain mechanical 
components, and then developed team work in its machining areas. When 
automated lines were put in place, the management of the factory decided 
to apply this form of work organization systematically. Formerly unskilled 
workers were trained for four months to become ‘controllers’ of automated 
machine lines. To understand the change of process and of principles in 
comparison to the 1970s, it is useful to review the debates that took place 
at the time.
At the point when automated and integrated means of production were 
being installed for the launch of the R9 model, the Le Mans factory sought 
simultaneously to ‘push the skills of the operators even further’, to share 
the ‘extra amount of skill’ among the whole team rather than concentrate it 
on an individual, to sanction this change through creation of a new person-
nel classification, and to gain acceptance for a new norm of production: 
‘to benefit from these improvements by obtaining a formalized agreement 
that equipment should function continuously, even though this last aspect 
is not related to skill’.
Management therefore proposed to create a new category of production 
workers who would assure, as a team, the continuous functioning (despite 
absences of personnel, and minimizing stoppage times) of automated ma-
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chines. This would be achieved by dividing among themselves the roles of 
handling, loading and unloading, certain tasks that remained parcellized 
such as the trimming of castings, as well as the setting up and changing of 
tools, all the visual and physical controls, and certain maintenance tasks. 
Management estimated the skill coefficient of this kind of work to be 195 
points, which corresponded to ‘Second Level Professional’, a classifica-
tion which at the time did not exist in manufacturing departments, only in 
maintenance. Management wished to diffuse a wide technical knowledge 
(stamping, mechanical, assembly, casting) to the workers being promoted 
into this new category, so that if necessary they could be transferred from 
one department to another.
Discussions with the Central Personnel and Social Relations Directorate 
at Renault, the only body permitted to create a new classification, resulted 
in definitions of the competencies required and criteria for attributing the 
new classification. The necessary ‘level of general, technical and practical 
knowledge’ did not appear to the Directorate to have been demonstrated to 
the point that it would justify a classification of Second Level Professional. 
The Directorate feared that an overvaluation would later be challenged by 
those in other categories and used in their demands for reclassification.
Two solutions were discussed. Challenge would be impossible if the 
workers in the new category were authentically Second Level Professionals, 
possessing a real and recognized mechanical or electrical skill. However, 
it appeared to be difficult and costly to raise unskilled workers to this level 
of competence. It was also proposed to assign young maintenance profes-
sionals, who would have the required educational level, to the control of the 
automated units. Yet this seemed to present two difficulties: these profes-
sionals risked finding their work under-skilled relative to their competence 
and could therefore rapidly lose motivation; moreover unskilled workers 
would not have the chance of developing a career and would be massively 
affected by the reduction of manpower induced by automation.
The solution that was accepted was to recruit ‘controllers’ from among 
the unskilled workers, but to make access into this new category depend-
ent upon: prior success in psychological-technical tests; a theoretical and 
practical examination following a four month period of training; an accept-
ance of certain working conditions (continuous working, three eight hour 
shifts, new tasks, team working, etc.); and upon assignment to a specified 
piece of equipment.
This formula for team work was therefore the result of several consid-
erations: opportunities to a certain number of unskilled workers, the others 
obliged to see their posts eliminated as automation progressed;8 and the 
offer to these same workers of a professional classification, in exchange 
for accepting polyvalent work composed of tasks normally classified at 
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different levels and accepting that the production lines would function 
continuously.
The second formula, adopted in a robotized welding area, consisted of 
offering to maintenance workers (Professionals and Technicians) to become 
line controllers for a fixed period, and to agree to certain quality standards 
and a certain rate of downtime. The reversibility of this choice and the 
promise of more rapid promotion elicited volunteers. However, under pres-
sure from the production manager to repair breakdowns rapidly in order 
to achieve production targets and to avoid hold-ups, they were not able to 
truly exercise their competencies in this function by organizing themselves 
to make full repairs and to seek the fundamental causes of breakdowns in 
order to eliminate them. A separate maintenance group had to be retained.
The third formula also appeared in a robotized welding area, though this 
time in another factory. Production workers who carried out unskilled work, 
but who already possessed technical diplomas, were trained full time for a 
year, to be able to control and repair robotized installations. Organized into 
groups of five persons, without a leader, they were classified as equivalent 
to ‘Third level professionals’. It was not planned that maintenance workers 
would come to their aid.
The last formula was adopted in a third welding area, where maintenance, 
quality control and industrial engineering had been placed under the au-
thority of the head of department. Each robotized line was controlled by a 
mixed production-maintenance group, consisting of a technician, a leader, 
an elec-trician-mechanic, and three operators (former unskilled production 
workers, classified as ‘Second level professionals’ following their selection 
and a four month training period). The division of tasks among them was not 
rigid, and so the operators sometimes participated in in-depth breakdown 
repairs, even in modifications made by the technician and the electrician-
mechanic. This formula was by far the most original, and potentially the 
most far-reaching. It represented a good compromise between, on the one 
hand, the need to make repairs swiftly, and on the other hand, not postponing 
the search for the causes of problems and the activities necessary to make 
installations more reliable.
Renault discovered the wealth of initiatives that had been adopted in its 
various factories on the occasion of an initiative launched in 1983 by the top 
management, which was aimed at mobilizing all possible energies in order 
to deal with the deep crisis that had appeared. This initiative was called 
‘Industrial Restructuring and Social Dynamics’ (Mutations industrielles et 
dynamique sociale: MIDES). In announcing it, it was said that ‘the results 
of the firm are directly linked to its organization, to its management, to the 
prices and the quality of the products and services that it markets. Today, 
experience shows us that these parameters are mostly determined by work 
301
relations and by the quality of life within the firm’. Management proposed 
to ‘all those willing’ and to the trade unions to participate in a joint process 
of analysis and reflection regarding future technological, social, economic 
and commercial change.
This wide debate would most notably lead to the emergence of a number 
of new concepts at the level of the whole firm: the basic production unit (300 
persons), conceived as the basic cell of industrial activity and composed 
of sub-cells (8–10 persons); the idea of the ‘new function of the worker’; 
a structure for the firm allowing rapid circulation of information; training 
considered as an investment; and the idea that techniques should meet the 
aspirations and expectations of the personnel concerning the content of 
work …
The progress of this organized and round-table discussion on the problems 
and the future of the firm came to a halt with the 1984 financial crisis at 
Renault and the resignation of the Managing Director. All the same, the idea 
of team work, redefined on the basis of experience in the automated work 
areas, was beginning to convince those who were reticent about or opposed 
to modular work. It had became acceptable as soon as it was conceptually 
separated from a fundamental threat to flow-like production in the form of 
assembly lines or automated production lines.
3. The homogenization of different forms of team work 
and its diffusion beginning in the second half of the 1980s
Several factors played a role in the homogenization of different forms of 
team work and its diffusion. The ambitious labour force reduction goals 
adopted by management starting in 1985 were a first factor in favour of 
polyvalence, multi-functionality and team work, in as much as these al-
lowed the elimination of substitute workers, ‘setters’, quality-control staff 
and rectification workers, as well as a significant proportion of lower-level 
managers.
Integrated automation, when it spread to machining, stamping, welding 
and painting, and when it started to be applied in assembly, was a second 
factor favouring diffusion. At the same time, homogenization of the vari-
ous forms of team work that had emerged began. The homogeneous group 
of operators, former unskilled workers, taking it in turns to undertake the 
tasks and functions necessary for integrated production lines, became the 
model in the mechanical components factories. It could do this all the more 
easily since it revealed itself appropriate to the type of automation adopted. 
The simplification of tool setting, quality control, problem-spotting and 
rapid repair allowed these tasks to be confided to operators with only a 
few months training. In the robotized welding areas, the operating groups 
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formed only of maintenance workers disappeared, to be replaced by groups 
similar to those which were favoured in machining. The gap between the 
level of work that had to be done and the competencies of the workers was 
too wide. The formula of groups composed of former production workers 
with previous diplomas, and who were trained for a year to operate and 
maintain equipment, was not sufficient to obviate the need for intervention 
by maintenance workers. As for the most developed form, that of the mixed 
production-maintenance groups in the robotized welding shops, it came 
up against two problems. The first was the manpower reduction, brought 
about by the work to make the equipment more reliable that the groups had 
themselves undertaken. The lack of agreement with management to guar-
antee jobs provoked a growing reticence on the part of group members to 
continue their participation in these activities. At the same time, it became 
more difficult to undertake these activities. The pursuit of automation in 
the direction of automatic diagnosis for rapid repairs, coupled with the 
increasing opaqueness of the machines, made it still more difficult for the 
groups themselves to seek out and analyze the primary causes of events. 
Moreover, the groups were increasingly composed of operators who were 
formerly unskilled workers trained only to operate equipment and repair 
minor breakdowns.
The third factor was the adoption of a new industrial relations framework. 
Until 1984, Renault management had favoured the CGT trade union, which 
had the most members, in its relations with trade unions. With the crisis, 
the new management believed that this union constituted an obstacle to the 
resolution of the company’s problems. It decided to reduce the power and 
influence of the union and to negotiate with other trade unions. Following 
a period of tension and conflict related to redundancies and the elimination 
of jobs from 1985 to 1987, management simultaneously sought to promote 
a human resources policy as a strategic choice for the firm. Round-table 
management-union groups met at the end of 1988. Their discussions led to 
negotiations regarding skills, the management of working time, the organi-
zation of work, training, and internal mobility among skilled trades. Several 
agreements followed: notably an accord on skills in automated areas, and 
above all ‘the agreement for living’ (L’Accord à vivre), which defined the 
new principles for contractual relations between the firm and its employees. 
‘The agreement for living’ confirmed that Renault wanted to base its success 
in the competencies of its personnel and the relevance of its organization. A 
plan to give production workers new skills was created. The work team was 
viewed by the signatories to the various agreements as the framework for, 
and the means of, simultaneously advancing both the competencies of the 
workers and the results of the firm, including in the assembly line areas.
Automation of assembly had progressed further at Renault than at other 
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automobile producers,9 Japanese especially, but nevertheless assembly re-
mained mostly manual. The personnel managers who had supported modular 
work during the 1970s (though without being able to convince others) now 
consider that assembly line work is unavoidable for economic reasons, the 
success of the Japanese serving as proof. But they believe that the assembly 
line has undergone profound modifications which have changed its nature. 
The modularization of vehicles, the possibility of off-line sub-assembly of 
modules, the automation of the most awkward tasks, and the introduction of 
more ergonomic work stations have rendered it far more acceptable. Above 
all, team work, which adds quality control, management, and maintenance 
tasks together with a relative autonomy to the long-existing polyvalency of 
workers at Renault, should imply the partial elimination of the awkward, 
parcellized, and pure-execution character of work at the assembly line.10
The fourth factor was the adoption of ‘Total Quality’ by management. 
From 1987, quality became the core of Renault’s strategy. The Director of 
Quality became a member of the firm’s board. The Renault Quality Institute 
was established in 1988. Its objective was to provide training in the tools, 
techniques, and procedures of ‘Total Quality’. When the R19 model had 
been developed, the Director of Quality refused to sanction its launch, on 
the grounds that its quality was too low. This refusal came as a shock to the 
firm. It signified the need for profound changes in working methods and to 
man-agement at all levels. As far as the factories were concerned, the par-
ticipation of workers in the improvement of quality and of results required 
the development of an organizational form allowing them to join in this 
process and to be given responsibilities, as well as requiring redefinition of 
hierarchical relationships and of the roles of foremen. It was at this point 
that better knowledge of the Japanese experience led to an understanding 
that the work team was the organizational form that might encourage work-
ers to participate and to take on responsibilities.
So it was that the Elementary Work Units (EWUs) became the unifying 
and homogenizing organizational form for the team working on assembly 
lines or automated production lines which had first appeared in the 1970s, 
giving it a precise definition and precise economic and social goals.
Unit Leaders have a hierarchical responsibility and do not work on the 
line themselves. They are not workers like the others, as in the Swedish 
group or the Japanese team. The unit is relatively large, 20 persons, though 
this varies. The Unit Leader therefore spends time on personnel manage-
ment tasks.11
In the assembly areas, the work of the team involves Taylorized tasks on 
moving lines. The way that operations are divided up remains the respon-
sibility of the industrial engineering department, even if the workers are 
sometimes consulted; this is different from Japanese teams, which undertake 
304
their own line balancing activities. Workers are trained to be polyvalent, and 
are classified as first or second level ‘Production Professionals’ depending 
upon their ability to do the various jobs on the line and to take on a few 
associated functions. And yet, because of short cycle times, workers are 
not able to fulfil these functions, except for the self-regulation which con-
sists of declaring ‘my work is completed satisfactorily’. If workers notice 
a problem, they call for persons to intervene, whose responsibility it is to 
make the problem go away. These are the unit’s Technical Assistants, who 
are in charge of quality and tooling problems, of training for polyvalency, 
and of relationships with maintenance workers. The Unit Leaders are in 
charge of relationships with upstream and downstream production areas, 
following formal procedures, though they can start these off themselves. The 
units do not have budgetary objectives, nor their own budget. Evaluation of 
workers takes place annually by interview, and as necessary in cases where 
too many mistakes are being made. There is financial reward as a function 
of performance, which is calculated for the factory as a whole, within the 
framework of an annual agreement signed by the unions. Providing motiva-
tion is the job of the Unit Leader, via the presentation of statistics to the unit 
during breaks, and via teams that are formed to resolve urgent problems. 
Maintenance remains clearly distinct from production, so much so that it is 
sometimes organized into EWUs itself.
In the machining areas, in cases where machines are automated and work-
ers do not have to load and unload components at each cycle of the machine, 
workers can more easily take responsibility for maintenance tasks, though 
these are generally limited to cleaning, oiling, and to minor repairs when ma-
chines have stopped themselves automatically. Their activities correspond 
better to the definition of semi-skilled production workers than do those of 
assembly line workers. We still see some attempts to create a new concept, 
that of the exploitant, a worker who fuses maintenance and production tasks. 
But these remain limited, unofficial, and are very strongly resisted.
Conclusion
Team work emerged at Renault as an attempt to reform work, but it was 
opposed insofar as it threatened the basic industrial principles of decompo-
sition of work into additive operations and continuous flow of production. 
The enrichment of work and the development of a professional career for 
unskilled workers have nevertheless remained significant themes. As a result 
of the type of automation selected, new problems have become apparent: 
ensuring continuous functioning, organizing tasks which are heterogene-
ous and do not occupy people full time, and rapid breakdown repair. Team 
work was seen as permitting the introduction of these new norms of work 
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into the automated areas, as well as offering an enriched type of work and 
a career path for workers. The success of some of the organizational forms 
adopted, the Japanese experience, the need to mobilize the personnel to 
improve results, and the need to form new alliances with the unions led to 
the decision to spread team work to all factory areas, whether or not they are 
automated. In this process, the definition and the application of team work 
have led to the disappearance of the more audacious formulas adopted at 
the start of the 1980s, as much regarding the function of the team motivator 
[animateur] as regarding relations with maintenance.
While for Japanese automobile producers team work was and remains a 
means of getting employees to participate in improving productivity, qual-
ity and flexibility, rather than a means of responding to disaffection with 
industrial work (which is more the case today), at Renault, the theme of 
enriching work and offering a career path to workers remains one of the 
essential factors behind the choice of this form of work organization, even 
if other considerations and imperatives have arisen to embed it, redefine it 
and justify it for all.
The organizational and social dynamic which the EWUs are capable of 
engendering, and which some managers hope for, will nonetheless reach a 
limit. If it begins to threaten the basic industrial principles of additivity and 
linearity, and this ought to be the logical consequence of seeking the primary 
causes of the dysfunctionalities of sequential production,12 then it will open 
up a difficult debate within the firm, just as happened in the 1970s.
Translation from the French by Sybil H. Mair.
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Notes
 1. Michel Freyssenet, 1979, Division du travail et mobilisation quotidienne de la 
main-d’oeuvre:	les	cas	Renault	et	Fiat.CSU, Paris. 133p.
 2. Between 1968 and 1977, the length of the working week was reduced from 47 
hours 30 minutes to 39 hours 10 minutes for those working shifts and from 48 
hours to 40 hours for the other employees. 
 3. Renault-inter, no. 162, 25 Juin 1973, in Michel Freyssenet, op cit, pp.165–
166.
 4. Christophe Midler. 1980. L’organisation	du	travail	et	ses	déterminants.	Enjeux	
économiques	 et	 organisationnels	des	 réformes	de	 restructuration	des	 tâches	
dans le montage automobile. Thèse de 3ème cycle. Paris 1, pp.24–26. 
 5. Michel Freyssenet. 1984. Evolution	du	contenu	et	de	l’organisation	du	travail	
d’usinage. CSU, Paris. 84p.
 6. This form of automation was not the only one possible. However, its material 
form makes it difficult for workers or work groups to seek the fundamental 
causes of events or breakdowns in order to eliminate them, a formula which 
would be both financially worthwhile and ‘skilling’ (qualifiant) for the workers. 
Michel Freyssenet, 1992, ‘Processus et formes sociales d’automatisation. Le 
paradigme sociologique’ Sociologie du Travail no. 4, pp 469–496.
 7. Michel Freyssenet. 1984. ‘La requalification des opérateurs et la forme sociale 
actuelle d’automatisation’ Sociologie du Travail no. 4, pp.422–433. On weld-
ing shops set up later than this period, Christophe Midler, Florence Charue, 
1990, ‘Un processus d’apprentissage à la française: la robotisation des tôleries 
automobile’ Colloquium:	‘Organization	of	work	and	technology:	implications	
for	international	competitiveness’, Brussels, 31st May–1st June, 27p. 
 8. Recourse to maintenance workers to run automated lines would have required 
the hiring of workers in this category and an even greater and more rapid re-
duction in the number of unskilled production workers. The social context of 
this factory and the pointed problems of reclassification which that would have 
caused made this solution difficult. 
 9. The level of automation was estimated at 20 percent in 1992.
10. René Tijou, ‘La chaîne de montage: maillon faible de l’industrie de grande 
série?’ Gérer	et	comprendre. Annales des Mines, October 1991, pp. 79–82.
11. See Emmanuel Couvreur (1993). Comparaison du travail en groupe dans une 
usine Renault et dans une usine  Volvo. Document Renault. 30p.
12. Michel Freyssenet, 1994, ‘Volvo-Uddevalla, analyseur du fordisme et du toyo-
tisme’, Actes du GERPISA. Paris, March, no. 9.
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Fait accompli?
A Machiavellian interpretation of the Renault–Volvo merger
Karel Williams, Colin Haslam and Sukhdev Johal
… to maintain a balance between all the different stakeholders has … be-
come one of the major responsibilities of any manager or business leader 
in today’s world … (Pehr Gyllenhammar, People at Work, 1977)
… to enjoy continued good fortune, it is necessary to change with the 
times … (Niccolo Machiavelli, The Discourses, 1531)
Preface (June 1994)
This essay is different from the others in this volume because it reprints in 
abridged form a public interest report which was written in late September 
1993, when it appeared that the merger of Renault with Volvo’s automotive 
interests was a fait accompli. The authors of the report then questioned the 
logic of a merger which offered Renault control and subordinated Volvo 
automotive in a way which safeguarded the interests of Swedish capital 
and threatened Swedish jobs. The report was written as a political interven-
tion and it acted as a catalyst that helped to trigger a chain reaction; in the 
face of growing opposition from Volvo managers and Swedish investment 
funds, the merger plan was abandoned and its architect Per Gyllenhammar 
resigned. Since then, events have moved on apace in the company and the 
industry. The Volvo management has reversed the Gyllenhammer strategy 
of exiting autos and now promises to concentrate on its core auto business; 
while the BMW takeover of Rover represents the next instalment of preda-
tory restructuring in the European cars business.
The report is nevertheless of more than historical interest because, al-
though its positions are obsolete, its form of analysis remains relevant. The 
report’s analysis fused two key elements: classic Machiavellian political 
theory and modern business analysis of cost recovery and cost reduction 
based on financial, market and productive data. The Machiavellian concepts 
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of virtu, fortuna and occasione were important because they undermined the 
orthodox business school assumption that management can master events 
through strategy. The distinction between cost recovery and cost reduc-
tion was complementary, because the evidence showed that Volvo’s cost 
recovery had failed to generate the cash for new model development, just 
as Renault’s cost reduction had not created a robust company which could 
weather cyclical downturn. With or without the merger, further restructuring 
was therefore a cruel but necessary process in which the interests of worker 
stakeholders would be sacrificed.
Temporary good fortune has postponed the day of reckoning for Swedish 
workers. Volvo Car’s profits have staged a cyclical recovery as the sales 
success of the 850 loads the Swedish factories and a weak krona boosts the 
profitability of export sales. But the fundamentals analysed in this report 
have not changed and will reassert themselves when fortune changes. Volvo 
remains a small car company whose problems about financing new model 
development require more joint venture deals like the one with Mitsubishi 
which allows replacement of the 400 series. The Swedish social settlement 
makes Sweden an inherently high cost base for car production in a business 
which is rapidly going global. When fortune does change, Volvo’s workers 
cannot rely a second time on the investment funds and Volvo managers for 
whom opposition to the Renault merger was a way of unseating Gyllenham-
mar. In the lull before the next crisis, Swedish workers should therefore look 
to their trade unions and Swedish politicians should look to the European 
Union, which is the only institution that can put a floor under destructive 
social competition between social settlements.
If this preface summarises our position as of June 1994, the text which fol-
lows reprints our original report of September 1993 with only a few changes 
of tense and some minor cuts which were made to reduce length.
Introduction
Although the merger of Renault and Volvo’s automotive interests was sub-
ject to Swedish shareholder approval, when the two companies announced 
their plan in September 1993 they effectively presented the merger as a fait 
accompli. The French reaction was quietly triumphalist. Gerard Longuet, 
the French Minister of Industry claimed the merger was ‘an industrial 
event that comes once a decade’ (Guardian, 7 September 1993). Swedish 
reaction was more muted. Prime Minister Bildt, like the opposition Social 
Democrats, welcomed the merger as a development which would secure the 
future of motor manufacturing in Sweden. A Swedish investment banker 
observed that Volvo’s loss of independence was ‘regrettable but inevitable’ 
(Financial Times, 7th September 1994). Outside France and Sweden media 
311
commentators struggled to find an interpretation which would make sense of 
the merger. All agreed it was a result of the car wars which were making it 
increasingly difficult for struggling companies to make profits in an industry 
whose excess capacity feeds saturated and cyclical markets.
This report presents a hard interpretation argued within a Machiavellian 
framework, where the proposed merger is an opportunity (occasione) for 
two firms buffeted by fortune (fortuna) and lacking the ability (virtu) to 
master events in the cars business. It is an opportunity for both parties be-
cause their calculations are different: it strengthens Renault’s productionist 
commitment to its core business, while for Volvo the merger represents a 
further stage in the company’s metamorphosis into a diversified holding 
company driven by the imperatives of financial engineering. The irony of 
this development will not be lost in Sweden where Swedish capital once 
presented itself as the humane steward of the interests of the worker stake-
holder, and Volvo figured as a model for the future of work. Through merger 
Swedish capital would privilege its own interests and break its obligations 
to the workforce while Volvo becomes a post-industrial firm just like the 
Anglo American conglomerates.
We argue this case in two sections which separately address the key 
questions: why does the merger subordinate Volvo and what would happen 
after the merger?
1. What determines the form of the merger?
The first essential feature of the merger plan is that Volvo will be subordi-
nated as the junior partner. Renault will have a 65 per cent stake in the new 
combine against Volvo’s 35 per cent. Louis Schweitzer of Renault becomes 
chief executive of the combine whose headquarters will be at Boulogne 
Billancourt. Volvo has obtained no guarantees on the maintenance or loca-
tion of development, investment or production of major product lines. The 
second essential feature of the merger is that Renault will get the Volvo cars 
and trucks business through share exchange without paying any cash for 
them. Renault is doing much better than Ford and GM did when earlier in 
the cycle in 1989 they bought into Jaguar and Saab. Ford paid £1.56 billion 
when it bought out Jaguar’s shareholders. In the Saab deal, the Wallenbergs 
held back Scania trucks and offered GM a 50 per cent joint venture but on 
condition that GM injected $100 million, assumed responsibility for part 
of Saab’s debt of SEK 3 billion (£300 million), and provided new product 
(Financial Times, 16 December 1989).
Why is Volvo subordinated and how is Renault able to buy into Volvo 
without paying anything in cash? The answer is that in the period 1990-2, 
when the basis for the present merger was being established, Renault was 
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relatively strong and Volvo was relatively weak. In March 1993 Renault’s 
announced 1992 profits which had doubled to FF 5.7 bill.; in dramatic con-
trast Volvo AB returned record losses of SEK 4.75 billion (Financial Times, 
12 March 1993). Against this background, a Machiavellian logic determined 
the outcome because Volvo Group, the car and truck division of Volvo AB, 
was a weak company caught in a series of adverse power relations which 
delivered it into the hands of Renault.
For the MIT team that wrote The Machine that Changed the World (Wom-
ack et al. 1990), Volvo figures as an example of inefficient ‘neo-craft pro-
duction’. The book promotes the concept of lean production and explicitly 
singles out the Uddevalla plant for criticism. Back of envelope arithmetic is 
used to set up a vague (and irrelevant) hours to build comparison between the 
Uddevalla luxury car plant and Toyota Takaoka which produces the Corolla 
at 40 times the volume (Womack, 1991, pp. 100-3). Much the same line is 
taken in Adler and Cole’s (1993) Sloan Review article which makes another 
apples and pears comparison between Udevalla and the American NUMMI 
plant, a Toyota/GM joint venture. The condescension of posterity is already 
being brought to bear on Volvo’s two experiments in assembly without lines; 
in Personnel Management (May 1992), these experiments were dismissed 
(without evidence) as attempts to control absenteeism and labour turnover 
‘with little regard to the effect on production, costs and efficiency’.
The ‘humanisation of work’ has gone out of fashion just like modernist 
architecture. It is therefore important to make two points about Kalmar and 
Uddevalla. First and generally, assembly plant efficiency and inefficiency 
is not very important in the cars business because, as Womack admits, 
final assembly accounts on average for just 15% of the labour hours in a 
finished car. Second and more specifically, Kalmar and Uddevalla are not 
being closed because they are inefficient but because they are branch plants 
which are surplus to requirements in a firm which is producing at no more 
than two thirds of capacity. They are both low volume plants which have 
together produced less than 40,000 cars in recent years; the famous plant 
at Kalmar employs just 800 workers. Like any other retreating company, 
Volvo is closing branch plants so as to load the throughput down the lines 
of its central plant at Torslanda’ where less than 75,000 cars were made in 
1992 when it operated at less than half-capacity.
Against this background it is important to insist that Volvo is, in efficiency 
terms, an average firm whose record is no better and no worse than that 
of other European producers of specialist and luxury motor cars. All these 
firms through the 1980s pursued the same basic strategy of cost recovery 
(rather than cost reduction); the aim was to maintain or reposition their 
products in the upper middle market segments so that existing costs could be 
recovered. As a comparison with BMW shows (Tables 1 and 2), none of the 
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European players in this game managed high levels or sustained increases 
in productivity. BMW is the obvious point of reference, as the most closely 
comparable European specialist producer which is also widely believed to 
perform better than other specialists.
Table 1: Volvo car productivity
Year Output Employees Cars per Span 
   employee adjusted cpe
1981 289,700 25,400 11.41 2.9 
1982 317,000 27,950 11.34 3.4 
1983 365,000 28,700 12.72 4.4 
1984 387,000 31,000 12.48 4.6 
1985 392,700 32,250 12.18 4.4 
1986 419,500 32,850 12.77 4.5 
1987 418,600 34,050 12.29 3.9 
1988 400,900 34,100 11.76 3.4 
1989 405,600 34,750 11.67 2.9 
1990 359,600 33,550 10.72 2.8 
1991 309,300 30,400 10.17 2.7 
1992 303,800 28,453 10.68 2.2
Source: Volvo, Annual Report and Accounts, various years 
Note: Process span adjustment is obtained by deflating cars per employee 
using the value added/sales ratio as a proxy for process span.
Using the simple and intelligible cars per employee measure, Volvo’s 10–13 
cars per employee is better than that of BMW in every year since 1981. 
Even after adjusting for differences in the amount of each car built in-house 
by the two companies, Volvo performs better in seven of the eleven years 
between 1981 and 1991 and is more or less equal in three more; BMW only 
pulls ahead in years like 1981 and 1992 when Volvo’s output is cyclically 
depressed. In retrospect Volvo car management made a major mistake in 
hiring 8,500 extra workers in the upswing between 1981 and 1987, and as 
a result never managed better than 12.77 cars per employee at the peak in 
1986. But the broader record of Volvo Group does not suggest that this is an 
organisation which is unable to manage auto factories: the trucks division 
managed a 50 per cent increase in labour productivity over the 1980s.
Volvo’s misfortune was not productive incompetence, but limited space 
in the mid- market niches where Volvo traditionally sold its product, and 
where its sales are now increasingly blocked by better resourced German 
and Japanese competitors. These larger competitors can improve their 
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product ranges faster than Volvo which had to persevere with out-moded 
products like the old 300 and 200 series. In the late 1970s Volvo’s German 
competitors consolidated their dominant position in the only two national 
markets, Germany and the USA, which are large and affluent enough to sup-
port volume sales of luxury cars. Between 1974 and 1988 German luxury 
car output increased by 20 per cent and real sales turnover by 114 per cent 
(Auer, 1990) as VW moved its product up market while Benz and BMW 
found volume in the middle of the market. By the late 1980s, Volvo like 
all the non-German European specialists was caught between a rock and a 
hard place in the US market, as the Japanese moved up market with luxury 
ranges like Lexus and Infiniti which sold on price against the dominant 
German product. The Japanese effectively blocked any attempt to sell the 
400 in the United States and will make it increasingly difficult to charge 
premium prices for large Volvos.
In Volvo’s case the general problems about market space were com-
pounded by a narrow market spread. Volvo’s volume sales are concentrated 
in just three national markets (Table 3). Again the contrast with BMW is 
instructive because BMW builds strength with a strong specialist position 
in its large home market and a two per cent plus share of every other Euro-
pean car market. Volvo has only a small home market, whilst the UK and 
USA were the only export markets where the company succeeded in selling 
more than 50,000 cars a year at the height of the 1980s boom. Together with 
Sweden these markets accounted for 50-60 per cent of sales in the 1980s. 
Table 2: BMW car productivity
Year Output Employees Cars per Span 
   employee adjusted cpe
1981 351,545 39,777 8.8 3.4 
1982 378,769 40,738 9.3 3.5 
1983 420,994 43,169 9.8 3.6 
1984 431,995 44,692 9.7 3.5 
1985 445,223 46,814 9.4 3.2  
1986 446,438 50,719 8.8 3.1 
1987 461,340 54,861 8.4 2.8 
1988 484,120 56,981 8.5 2.7 
1989 511,476 57,087 8.9 2.8 
1990 519,660 59,544 8.6 2.8 
1991 553,230 61,617 9.1 2.6 
Source: BMW, Report and Accounts, various years 
Note: Process span adjustment is obtained by deflating the cars per em-
ployee by the value added to sales ratio as a proxy for process span. 
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The company has lost market share in each of them; the fall in the United 
States is particularly threatening since around one quarter of Volvo cars 
output was sold there in the 1980s.
Table 3: Volvo car registrations (1000’s units) by market
Year Sweden USA UK France Germany Italy Other
1981 49.9 67.5 44.5 9.2 13.9 15.6 89.1 
1982 57.3 69.7 51.3 10.3 12.9 15.1 100.4 
1983 62.1 91.8 60.9 14.1 14.6 21.1 100.4 
1984 62.4 93.4 59.5 15.8 14.4 21.1 120.4 
1985 71.2 109.8 60.5 17.7 14.3 17.5 101.8 
1986 64.5 114.3 69.6 19.1 14.3 16.4 121.3 
1987 72.4 101.8 70.5 18.9 17.5 15.8 121.7 
1988 74.6 94.9 79.8 17.7 16.8 15.3 101.8 
1989 66.6 97.8 82.8 15.9 17.0 14.2 111.3 
1990 47.6 93.0 66.3 11.5 18.4 23.5 99.3 
1991 37.8 65.3 46.1 8.1 20.6 21.1 110.2
Source: Volvo, Report and Accounts, various years
If Volvo’s market spread was too narrow, its model range was too broad 
for the strategy of cost recovery. Volvo is a relatively small car company 
making just 420,000 cars at the cyclical peak in 1986 and only 304,000 in 
1992. Such companies have characteristic problems about cost recovery, 
because they have to recover the expense of developing the next generation 
of models over relatively short production runs and therefore need to gener-
ate a large amount of cash per vehicle sold. In Volvo’s case, this problem is 
aggravated by the way in which Volvo’s output is spread over the medium, 
large and luxury classes: the 1992 output of 304,000 consisted of three en-
tirely different models, the 400, 850 and 900, which effectively do not share 
major mechanicals. The contrast with BMW is particularly telling: BMW 
is basically a two model firm where the 3 and 5 share major mechanicals, 
and the volume selling 3 alone generates sales of 300,000 each year. The 
typical Volvo model sells closer to 100,000, insufficient to generate enough 
free cash from each car sold to cover the cost of replacement every seven or 
eight years. Volvo Cars’s most recently developed model is the 850 which, 
including an all new power train factory, cost SEK 16.5 billion (Financial 
Times, 23 May 1991). Even if the 850’s successors could be developed more 
cheaply, the basic point remains: the arithmetic of cost recovery does not 
add up for Volvo.
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Table 4: Volvo car value added, labour share and cash flow 
Year Sales  Net  Value  Labour  Labour  Cash  
 revenue  income  added  costs  as % of  flow  
 SEK  as % of  SEK  SEK  value  per car  
 million  sales  million.  million  added  SEK
1981 13,569 1.5 3,532 2,519 71.3 2,280 
1982 18,109 2.4 5,490 3,371 61.4 6,684 
1983 26,262 4.8 9,210 3,960 43.0 14,383 
1984 30,304 6.6 11,119 4,831 43.5 16,232 
1985 33,956 7.1 12,389 5,476 44.2 17,604 
1986 35,956 6.6 12,649 5,844 46.2 16,224 
1987 38,523 4.7 12,093 6,376 52.7 13,664 
1988 39,462 3.7 11,542 6,695 58.0 12,092 
1989 42,944 2.1 10,856 7,452 68.6 8,396 
1990 39,433 (1.0) 9,595 8,713 90.8 2,455 
1991 36,079 (2.2) 8,104 8,442 104.2 (1,092) 
1992 44,598 (2.2) 7,517 7,906 105.2 (1,280)
Source: Volvo, Annual Report and Accounts
Notes:
(1) Labour cost and depreciation figures are imputed on the basis of the 
car operation’s share of employment and capital investment in Volvo 
Group (ie Volvo’s automotive division).
(2) Value added is obtained additively as the sum of labour costs and 
depreciation and net income.
(3) Cash flow is calculated by adding net income and depreciation.
The precarious fundamentals of the Volvo cars business were disguised 
for much of the 1980s because, like any weak car company, Volvo looked 
good on the cyclical upswing. Like Jaguar and Saab, Volvo made money 
as long as the American market boomed and the dollar exchange rate was 
favourable; in the boom years of 1983-6 Volvo got SEK 7-8.5 to the dollar 
on its American sales compared with 5-6 in most other years (International 
Financial Statistics Year Book, 1992). On the downswing, fundamentals 
reasserted themselves and financial results became quite dire. The imputed 
values given in table 4 are, in our view, accurate enough to illuminate the 
transition from feast to famine.
From 1983 to 1987, Volvo car managed a return on sales of 5-7 per cent. 
Labour’s share of value added was in the range of 45-55 per cent and, if 
we define cash flow as sales minus labour costs, the company gushed cash; 
in a good year like 1985, the company had a cash flow per unit of SEK 
17,600 ($ 2,060). In this exceptional period model replacement was not a 
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problem; the cash of the boom years covered the development expense of the 
400 and 850 models. But as boom turned to slump the cars business made 
losses. Labour’s share of value added always increases in car companies 
as sales fall, and in weak Volvo the increase was disastrous: in 1991 and 
1992 labour costs accounted for more than 100 per cent of the value added 
fund, leaving nothing over for depreciation, or any form of new investment 
in plant, tooling and development. Shedding labour, market recovery and 
improved exchange rates could probably restore labour’s share to the normal 
manufacturing level of 70 per cent, but that would be insufficient. This kind 
of normal share in years like 1981 or 1989 had yielded a cash flow of SEK 
3-8,000 which was inadequate to cover replacement expenditure. To cover 
development costs Volvo Car needed a labour share closer to 50 per cent 
and that was out of reach.
Volvo Car’s operating position could be righted but, given its inability 
to generate the cash for model replacement, the business was not self 
supporting; it needed a cash cross subsidy from elsewhere. But corporate 
reorganisation at the end of the 1980s had changed the relation between 
Volvo Group, of which cars was a part, and Volvo AB, the quoted parent 
company in which the public holds shares. By 1990, with divestment and 
corporate reorganisation, less than 15 per cent of Volvo Group’s sales rev-
enue was in non-auto activity: Volvo Group was effectively reduced to an 
automotive rump of cars and commercial vehicles which were affected by 
the same downturn as cars, so any cash cross-subsidy for cars would have 
to come from Volvo AB. After 1989, Volvo AB effectively functioned as a 
financial holding company with majority and minority stakes in a diverse 
range of businesses including oil, property, foodstuffs and pharmaceuticals 
as well as autos; 86 per cent of Volvo AB’s total assets currently consist of 
investments in shares. Volvo AB did not have a strong cash flow because 
it was simply a financial intermediary: all or more of the cash received as 
dividends from the subsidiaries and associates of Volvo AB was paid out as 
dividends to the shareholders of Volvo AB.
Whether by accident or design, Volvo’s corporate structure made cross-
subsidy very difficult and that left Volvo with the one option of selling a 
business which was not self-supporting. It was, from the beginning, a distress 
sale and Renault took full advantage of this fact. Thus the original share 
exchange of 1991 was not simply a paper for paper exchange but involved a 
large balancing cash adjustment payment from Volvo to Renault. According 
to the 1991 Volvo accounts (p. 41) the cash payment from Volvo to Renault 
was FF 5,887 million; thus Renault got an ‘engagement present’ of roughly 
£500 million in cash, a sum which would go a long way to covering the 
replacement cost of any model in the Volvo or Renault range. When the 
full merger was announced in September 1993, Renault got its dowry not 
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in cash but in the form of the balance of the Volvo heavy trucks business. 
This was a potentially stand alone business which was really worth having 
because it had a strong market position and a new heavy truck product line, 
whose development cost had been paid for so that it was not necessary to 
think about replacement investment for another decade.
If this seemed over-generous to Renault, the fact was that Volvo AB, as a 
distress seller, had no bargaining position because it could not walk away 
from the only buyer. At the same time Volvo hoped to win a risky longer 
term financial game, which will be analyzed more fully in the second section 
of this report. Through merger Volvo AB would swap a majority stake in its 
car and truck businesses for a minority stake in Renault Volvo. In financial 
terms, this would get Volvo off the hook of sole responsibility for its cash 
hungry auto business and leave it with a claim on anything which Renault 
might distribute to its shareholders. From a financial engineering point of 
view, there was also the prospect that, after privatisation, the Renault paper 
would be tradeable and Volvo AB would in this case have a variety of exit 
options.
Table 5, Sales price per unit (in FF) for various car companies
Year Renault VW Ford (UK) BMW
1990 53,478 91,581 90,708 146,985 
1991 53,283 79,307 95,105 143,507
Source: Renault, Company Report and Accounts (cars division)
Renault’s emergence first as Volvo’s ally, and then as senior partner in 
the merged combine, surprised many social scientists who tend to confuse 
the companies with their products. Renault’s cheap and cheerful small cars 
may lack the quality of the solid and dependable Volvo product but as a 
company Renault is much stronger. Of course, Renault’s concentration on 
small cheap motor cars raised problems. For example, Renault’s sales price 
per unit is no more than two thirds of that realised by VW or Ford (UK) 
and not much better than one third of BMW’s selling price To this extent, 
like other South European producers of small cars, Renault was trapped 
downmarket. To combat this Renault embarked on a strategy of cost reduc-
tion, taking out assembly labour hours and costs and pressing its suppliers 
to do the same.
Renault’s renaissance of the early 1990s owes everything to the aggres-
sion and intelligence with which it pursued these objectives. Renault claims 
a 50 per cent improvement in labour productivity between 1985 and 1991 
(Financial Times, 6 October 1991) and this claim is corroborated by table 
6 which shows how Renault built the same number of cars with an ever 
decreasing workforce.
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Table 6, Renault cars division vehicles per employee 
Year Cars Employees Cars per employee
1987 1,831,400 136,646 13.4 
1988 1,850,700 131,964 14.0 
1989 1,966,700 129,699 15.2 
1990 1,766,700 114,516 15.5 
1991 1,790,700 106,223 16.8
Source: Renault, Annual Report and Accounts, various years
The best efforts of car firms to reduce hours are regularly frustrated by 
market difficulties and cyclical declines in sales. Renault postponed this 
problem because the aggression it put into hours reduction was matched by 
the intelligence of its marketing effort, which ensured that its factories were 
steadily loaded with throughput. Besides being market leader in France with 
a steady 30 per cent share of a 2 million per year home market, Renault cur-
rently holds more than 5 per cent of every other European national market, 
including the UK. A significant indicator was its 5.4 per cent share of the 
German market in 1991 which made it that country’s leading importer.
Nonetheless all this effort had disappointing financial results. The causes 
and consequences of Renault’s poor financial performance will be analysed 
in section two; for the moment, all we need observe is that net income as 
a per cent of sales reached the respectable level of 5 per cent for only two 
years in 1988 and 1989 before collapsing to 0.7 per cent in 1990 and then 
rebounding to 3.2 per cent in 1992. But, after 1986, Renault did succeed in 
putting six consecutive years of losses behind it, including the record 1984 
loss of FF 12.6 bill. Renault’s managers were therefore free to consider the 
purchase of another car company provided the owners of that company did 
not want cash.
Table 7, Renault European sales and market share 
Year EC total market French market German market EC market 
 1000s units share % share % share %
1987 2,475 32.2 3.1 11.5 
1988 2,594 30.9 2.9 11.1 
1989 2,668 31.1 3.5 11.3 
1990 2,703 29.9 3.5 10.8 
1991 2,377 29.1 3.5 10.7
Source: Renault, Annual Report and Accounts, various years.
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The arguments for buying Volvo were productionist. The European volume 
cars business was, by general consent, ripe for rationalisation. None of the 
volume manufacturers could avoid losses in the cyclical downturns and the 
problem of excess capacity would be aggravated by increasing Japanese 
imports and transplant production. The European volume car business was 
also highly fragmented with twelve companies competing against each 
other. Against this background, any increase in size which did not weaken 
Renault financially was likely to improve Renault’s chances of survival. 
Furthermore, the Volvo brand name was recognised worldwide and had 
a unique reputation for safety and durability. Business school academics 
may debate the value of brands but they remain important in cars because 
consumers around the world are reluctant to buy large expensive cars which 
carry the badges of mass market car companies; Renault’s recently launched 
large car, the Safrane, is currently failing in the market place despite being 
advertised across Europe. This is the reality which Volkswagen recognises 
by developing the Audi brand and which the Japanese recognise by selling 
their luxury cars badged as Lexus, Infiniti and Accura.
It was initially hard to see how cash hungry Volvo Car could do anything 
but drain Renault’s financial resources. But, discussions about a common 
large car platform (codename P4) and shared mechanicals showed that, on 
this basis, Volvo’s requirement for development expenditure could be more 
or less halved and that Renault needed to spend little more than it would 
have had to do as an unsuccessful maker of large mass market cars. As long 
as Volvo car stood alone, its owners would need an impossibly low 50 per 
cent labour share of value added to cover replacement, but Renault could 
make a go of the same business on a shared development basis with a labour 
share of 70 per cent. There was a downside financial risk because the market 
for cars was saturated and unpredictably cyclical. But there was no risk of 
French loss of control through hostile takeover since Renault was currently 
nationalised and, even after privatisation, the French government intended 
to take a ‘golden share’ which would protect Renault management.
2. Where would Renault and Volvo go from here?
If the form of the merger had been determined by Volvo’s relative weakness 
and Renault’s apparent strength, by the time the merger was announced in 
September 1993 the relative position of the two companies had changed. 
In the previous month Volvo and Renault had announced their provisional 
results for the first half of 1993. Volvo ‘confounded market expectations’ 
when, instead of anticipated losses of SEK 500 million, Volvo AB reported 
a return to operating profit and an overall surplus of SEK 166 million ($20.5 
million) (Financial Times, 27 August 1993). Renault announced an 87 per 
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cent year on year drop in pre-tax profits to FF 730 million ($123.93 million) 
(Financial Times, 27 August 1993).
Volvo’s return to profit did not reflect any change in the productive fun-
damentals of its auto business: the 13,000 or 19 per cent reduction in the 
workforce since 1990 had been matched by a 15 per cent fall in sales. The 
miraculous recovery owed more to good luck and creative accounting. Volvo 
Group was benefiting from a temporary pause in replacement expenditure 
because the company had just completed development of a new heavy 
truck. A 25 per cent currency devaluation also brought a windfall gain of 
some SEK 200 million (Financial Times, 27 August 1993). And the deci-
sion to capitalise tooling costs brought a gain of SEK 400 million (Ibid.). 
As for Renault, that had suffered a real profits collapse which exposed its 
weakness; whatever the French managers had done, they had not created a 
robust company which was capable of withstanding the inevitable cyclical 
downturns. The underlying reason is relatively straightforward: Renault 
had taken labour hours out of its product over the 1980s but so had all its 
European competitors in the small cars business (Table 8).
The German industry represents the strategy of cost recovery and never 
manages much above a 10 per cent improvement on 1981 productivity 
levels. German success in the middle and top end of the market forces all 
the other producers into making smaller cheaper cars and these companies 
have no option but cost reduction through taking labour hours out. Unlike 
Germany (and Sweden), the other European countries all manage substan-
tial productivity gains, at least in the upswing. The French industry pulled 
the hours reduction trick but the Italian and Spanish industries, which also 
specialise in small cars, did even better. From Renault’s point of view as 
the major player in the French industry, and a minor player in the Spanish 
industry, the problem was that it had worked miracles but had not obtained 
any competitive advantage.
Table 8, Motor vehicles per employee (percent change on 1981)
Year Germany Spain France Italy UK
1981 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1982 4.86 23.49 7.90 5.00 10.16 
1983 5.88 25.81 13.07 19.26 25.37 
1984 1.62 28.13 8.92 25.38 18.04 
1985 8.71 35.38 13.54 29.56 32.14 
1986 9.52 40.71 23.51 42.27 32.71 
1987 8.89 44.67 32.15 44.88 40.11 
1988 9.25 49.69 37.08 49.14 44.47 
1989 12.76 52.35 41.82 50.55 46.99
Source: Eurostat
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Because Renault had no competitive advantage, its financial results were 
always mediocre. This point emerges very clearly from any analysis of the 
financial ratios in the (non consolidated) accounts of Regie Nationale which 
is Renault’s core operating business; the Regie accounts for nearly 70 per 
cent of total Renault sales and car sales account for around 75 per cent of 
the Regie’s turnover.
Table 9 covers the period when the financial benefits of productivity 
reduction should have been coming through. But, as a seller of small cheap 
cars, even in the two best years, 1988 and 1989, Renault did no better than 
realise FF 5,200 (about £500) per vehicle sold; in its heyday in the mid 
1980s Volvo could realise three times as much. ‘Small car, small profit’ was 
an industry adage of the 1960s; twenty years later Renault’s cash recovery 
still depended on its ability to shift large numbers of small cars. Worse still, 
Renault was conceding nominal wage increases in the late 1980s so that the 
financial benefits of head count reduction were very modest. Thus, only in 
two years, 1988 and 1989, did Renault succeed in getting labour’s share of 
value added below 70 per cent; the very modest fall in the Regie’s output 
after 1989 bounced the labour share back up above 70 per cent. This kind 
of variation suggests, and 1993 confirms, that a further output reduction of 
around 10–15 per cent would create real problems. In the mature cyclical 
car markets of Western Europe, peak to trough demand falls of 20 percent 
plus are the norm: thus Renault had not created a robust firm because it 
never achieved the financial ratios which would allow the firm to ride out 
an average European downturn.
Table 9: Regie Renault value added, labour’s share and cash flow
Year Income  Employ-  Value  Labour  Units  Cashflow  
 pre tax and  ment costs added share  1000s  per unit  
 deprctn    of VA vehicles FF 
 FF million     
1987 3,620 14,165 17,785 79.65 1,831 1,977 
1988 8,201 13,850 22,051 62.81 1,851 4,431 
1989 10,166 14,287 24,453 58.43 1,967 5,169 
1990 4,745 14,331 19,076 75.13 1,777 2,671 
1991 5,768 14,527 20,295 71.58 1,791 3,221
Source: Renault, Report and Accounts, various years
Notes:
(1) Value added is obtained additively by by summimg labour costs and 
depreciation and net income.
(2) Cash flow is calculated by adding net income and depreciation.
(3) Labour costs include wages and salaries.
323
By autumn 1993 Renault was in the middle of an average downturn; in the 
first eight months of 1993 the EC car market was 13 per cent down on the 
previous year. Renault’s output in the first six months of 1993 was 19 per 
cent down on the comparable period in 1992; we estimate that if this sales 
loss is sustained, labour’s share of value added will rise to 90 per cent in 
the Renault group and cash flow will be halved. Although Renault, hover-
ing around break even in the first half of 1993, was performing better than 
loss making competitors like VW, Ford of Europe or Fiat, the newly elected 
centre right French government has scheduled Renault for early privatisation 
which requires a track record of profits rather than the avoidance of loss. 
Renault is the most political of European car companies and knows it must 
please its new political masters by finding profit and, inter alia’ the quest 
for profit means turning the newly acquired brand into a winning business. 
The company that plans to take over Volvo auto is not a strong company 
but a desperate company.
At the press conference which launched the merger, it was claimed that the 
combined automotive operations could make savings of FF 30 billion (£3.4 
billion) before the year 2000 as a result of rationalisation and integration of 
overlapping activities. No doubt this figure was plucked from the air but it 
did express a truth because across large areas of their activity the merged 
companies have duplicate development teams, product lines, assembly 
facilities and supplier networks. By substituting one for two of everything, 
large savings could be made within seven years or so which is roughly 
equal to one product life cycle. The crucial question is whose development 
teams, product lines, assembly factories and supplier networks would bear 
the brunt of the adjustment.
Table 10: Hourly labour costs in Sweden and France (in SEK)
Year France Sweden
1980 45.8 66.6 
1983 69.7 83.6 
1986 74.6 113.7 
1989 83.9 143.7 
1991 96.5 169.4
Source: VDA
Volvo’s Swedish workers and the 10,000 employed by Volvo’s Swedish 
suppliers have reason to be fearful because the Swedish social settlement 
makes Sweden an unattractive high cost location for auto production. Swed-
ish workers in Volvo and its supplier factories receive high wages and work 
short hours. Table 10 presents basic data on motor industry employment 
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costs per hour in France and Sweden taken from the standard German VDA 
source. French hourly employment costs are broadly comparable with those 
paid in Italy or Britain but Swedish employment costs, in recent years, have 
been about 45 per cent higher.
If the Swedish social settlement imposes a large mark up for social welfare 
benefits, the burden of social charges is increased by the very short hours 
which are typically worked in the Swedish auto industry. Short hours mean 
more workers and more per capita social charges to deliver a given quantum 
of assembly or supplier factory labour. This problem arises one not because 
the standard working week is very short in Sweden but because the social 
welfare system offers an assortment of leave arrangements for responsibili-
ties such as parenting which are less provided for in other advanced capital-
ist countries. According to Riegler and Auer (1991, p. 234) Swedish blue 
collar workers in car and engine production actually worked an average of 
less than 1450 hours per year in the period from 1981 to 1986. Renault’s 
workers in France and Spain are on a standard year of around 1800 hours 
and most of those hours are actually worked.
The sale of Volvo’s automotive interests would thus presage a post modern 
attack on the Swedish social settlement. As a trans-national, Renault Volvo 
automotive would not need to demand wage cuts, provoke strikes and tough 
it out with the Swedish workforce; the combine could simply transfer its 
supply contracts and assembly work to other advanced countries with less 
generous social settlements, while Swedish workers go quietly into the dole 
queue which already includes 13 per cent of the workforce. One informed 
estimate by Kurt Syren of Gothenberg University predicts 10,000 job losses 
at Volvo and supplier factories within three years (Guardian, 7 September 
1993). Those who think this is alarmist should remember that since Jaguar 
was taken over by Ford employment has been more or less halved from 
11,700 at the end of 1990 to 6,500 at the end of 1992 (Financial Times, 28 
September 1993).
If the merger goes through, the job losses will not be a problem for 
Volvo AB’s managers who will have passed the auto business on so that it 
becomes Renault’s operating responsibility. At Volvo AB they will face the 
new and different problems of running a diversified investment trust; the 
sale of Volvo’s automotive interests to Renault in return for a paper claim 
on the earnings of the combine would complete Volvo’s transformation into 
a rentier holding company.
The sale of the Volvo auto business is a financial exercise in protecting 
the interests of Swedish capital. Volvo AB managers who planned the sale 
are imitating Lord Hanson and Jimmy Goldsmith, whose alchemy turns 
illiquid and low yielding capital assets into cash for reinvestment in as-
sets offering higher yields or capital gains. The merger would successfully 
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complete the first phase of this transformation. Before Renault came along 
Volvo had large amounts of capital tied up in auto factory assets that nobody 
wanted to buy for cash; worse still, the auto business offered no prospect 
of decent returns and was cash hungry. If the merger is completed, Volvo 
will have turned its assets into paper which gives it a shareholder’s claim 
on Renault’s earnings when Renault makes a profit without any downside 
risk because Volvo has no responsibility for Renault’s operating losses or 
cash requirement. The Renault paper which Volvo AB then holds may not 
of course offer a decent rate of return but, when or if Renault is privatised, 
the paper becomes tradeable. That opens up the prospect of a second phase 
of transformation whereby Volvo gets back to cash by selling its paper. On 
28 September company sources confirmed that, after the merger, Volvo AB 
would be free to sell all its holdings in Renault subject only to the condition 
that it did not sell the stake to a competitor of Renault.
Such a sale is made likely because Volvo AB’s financial portfolio includes 
too many low yielding problem investments. By 1994 its main interests will 
include its 35 per cent stake in Renault Volvo; 25–35 per cent of Pharmacia, 
the pharmaceuticals business of Procordia; a 100 per cent share of Branded 
Consumer Products, the consumer goods business of Pharmacia; and a rag 
bag of investments mainly in property and oil. The cash cows are Pharmacia 
and BCP both of which have a starry return on sales of 10 per cent. The 
problem investments include everything else because Renault Volvo will 
never generate half that return on sales and Volvo’s non-auto investments 
have generally performed badly. Volvo’s oil trading and investment sub-
sidiary Beijerinvest, for example, cost it money for most of the 1980s and 
Beijerinvest was in many ways the symbol of a decade long unsuccessful 
diversification strategy. The low yielding investments must now be replaced 
with higher yielding investments or, like any other unsuccessful investment 
trust, Volvo will trade at a discount to its net asset value and open itself to 
takeover and break up.
Renault and Volvo are both in their different ways changing with the 
times in the hope of enjoying continued good fortune. In both cases the 
new directions represent the triumph of 1990s hope over 1980s experience. 
Renault is the desperate productionist which must cut labour costs to right 
its financial ratios; it can only become robustly profitable in the 1990s if it 
succeeds in opening up an advantage over its competitors which eluded it 
in the 1980s. Volvo is the would be financial engineer which must pursue 
shareholder value more successfully than it did in the 1980s. At the end of 
the day the most likely outcome is that (more) workers will be unemployed 
and shareholders will be the poorer. ‘Sauve qui peut’ is the law of late capi-
talism as the privileged social settlement of a country like Sweden collapses 
under the burden of accumulating stresses which undermine responsible 
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management’s ability to balance the interests of the different stakeholders 
in the enterprise. Swedes may still believe their national form of capitalism 
is different but the merger plan tells a different story about the pressures 
which encourage mutation towards the Anglo-American form of dealing 
and financial engineering in the interests of capital.
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Japanese work policy:
Opportunity, challenge or threat?
Norbert Altmann
While the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) study of the auto-
motive industry (Womack et al., 1990) had the effect of stimulating discus-
sions of Japanese work policy, it also deprived these debates of a number 
of important aspects. The tenets of ‘lean production’ continued to generate 
equally lean debates while the picture provided by the ‘5 million dollar 
– 5 year study’ (as proclaimed on the book cover) succeeded in replacing 
Japanese reality. In view of the fierce competitive environment within the 
triad, the discussions on technology design, the organization of work and 
manpower utilization revolved almost exclusively around productivity is-
sues (‘half of everything’). The key issues discussed and pursued in Europe, 
namely the humane design of work and its productivity effects, as well as 
the democratic participation of employees in decision-making, were mar-
ginalized in this process. Even worse, however, was the fact that Japanese 
human resource management was not actually investigated, it was simply 
assumed to be superior to its Western counterparts. The consequences of 
lean production for employees and the resulting problems arising for the 
economy and society as a whole, as well as their repercussions on the indi-
vidual enterprises and their manufacturing practices, were only discussed 
to a very limited extent. The following section of my paper will be dealing 
with precisely these issues. In doing so, some detail is sacrificed in favour 
of outlining structures.1
1. The unavoidable point of departure:  
the lean production discussion
In Germany, as in many other countries, the summary of the MIT study 
rapidly achieved the status of a cult book in management, as well as, union 
circles. As the current debates on Japanese work policy are beset with a 
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number of serious problems arising from the interpretation of the MIT study, 
it is necessary to address this issue. A few examples should suffice:
1. The summary of the MIT study has been discussed as if it were an 
accurate depiction of Japanese work policy although this only applies 
to a very limited extent. The truth is that management perceptions are 
treated as reality.
2. The MIT study deals with the concrete characteristics of work organi-
zation in a circumscribed way, instead of presenting a comprehensive 
picture by considering the production process within the context of the 
economy as a whole.
3. There can be no doubt of the need to deal with productivity issues, which 
undeniably play a pivotal role in problems relating to the economy and 
industrial policies. The MIT study, however, turns a blind eye to the 
other side of the coin, namely the consequences for employees and the 
effect this has, in turn, on productivity.
4. The study also gives no consideration to the distinct forms of hierarchi-
cal and functional divisions of labour in Japan. This results in a false 
assessment of the actual forms of organization and respective measures 
prevailing in Japan (keyword: ‘integration of work’).
5. Accordingly, in the ongoing debates of lean production, the Japanese 
transplants are regarded as proof that Japanese management systems can 
be successfully transferred, although the American and English trans-
plants tend to document the very opposite. In fact, Japanese management 
systems presuppose general political, economic and social conditions 
that do not (as yet) exist in Germany or Sweden (such as the virtual 
absence of unions). They also engender consequences which meet with 
limited acceptance from an employee standpoint, and are therefore usu-
ally introduced only under specific labour market conditions (Berggren, 
1991, p. 42 or Garrahan and Stewart, 1992).
6. In the end, problems affecting employees, companies and societies which 
arise in conjunction with Japanese production modes (whether lean or 
not), such as the problems of just-in-time logistics, on-the-job-training, 
etc., should be viewed in their entirety. In Japan, lean production has not 
been and still is not a topic of debate, rather it is the ‘crisis of Japanese 
management’ that is discussed. One might infer that Sony’s ‘boss’ Akio 
Morita was merely concerned with allaying trade conflicts when he re-
marked that Japanese enterprises ‘do not pay their employees adequately 
for working hours that are too long’. However, there must be something 
more to it when he added that Japanese enterprises ‘accept frugal profit 
margins and appease their shareholders with meager dividends’. These 
comments have given rise to much debate among Japanese employers 
(Satori, 1992; Takeuchi, 1992; Morita, 1992, p. 8).
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All in all, it would be wise to submit the empirical foundation and the 
argumentation structure of the concept oft ‘lean production’ to a critical 
assessment. There is one basic assumption made by the MIT study that the 
author of this paper ascribes to, namely that a totally culturist interpretation 
cannot adequately deal with the question of transferring ‘lean production’ 
concepts to other countries. While cultural, national and social traditions 
may have varying effects on the design of work and work behavior, one 
thing is for certain: the basic features of a respective production mode are 
transferrable, provided that decisive functionally equivalent conditions are 
given and the ensuing consequences are accepted (or have to be accepted). 
Yet it appears that posing the problem in terms of a ‘question of transferral’ 
is fundamentally wrong. The question should be whether worldwide con-
verging rationalization strategies (as operational dimensions of productiv-
ity gains) are directed at similar or identical strategic goals. Also whether 
given the same strategic goals, but different social conditions and norms. 
other functionally equivalent ways of achieving these goals could be found 
without having to elevate a very specific management concept beset with 
problematic consequences to an ideology. This also raises the question of 
the transferability of ‘Volvoism’ or other forms of productive work organi-
zation (Sandberg, 1993).2
2. The social division of labour: the basis of work policy3
2.1 Work policy with a segmented workforce
The (various forms of) Japanese production are based on a distinctive divi-
sion of labour within society. This is manifested as a ‘segmented labour 
market’ which is a key precondition of work and personnel policies in 
Japan. Segmented means that there are considerable differences between 
employees with regard to their employment and social statuses and that their 
working conditions also vary to a great extent in all possible dimensions (for 
an overview see: Tokunaga, 1984; Ernst, 1986; Ernst, 1992).
In the industrial sector the core workers, the so-called ‘regular’ workers, 
account for a maximum of 20 to 25 percent of all employees. These work-
ers are recruited by the large scale and ‘large medium size,’ enterprises 
immediately after leaving school. (In addition there are also those smaller 
medium size companies who succeed in commanding a secure market 
position within the supply chain; in most cases as specialized firms). The 
core workers are the only workers who, in the long run, are able to rely on 
enjoying secure jobs, training opportunities, possibilities for promotion and 
rising income. This group consists almost exclusively of male employees 
(Tokunaga, 1984, p. 34).
The marginal workers consist mostly of female workers. This is generally 
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the case in mass production, although the automotive industry is an excep-
tion as very few women are employed on assembly lines, in contrast to 
supplier firms and subcontractors to the automotive industry. The group of 
marginal workers also comprises those female workers who were originally 
hired by large enterprises as ‘regular’ workers. This was under the implicit 
assumption that they would retire after marriage or the birth of their first 
child (with superiors exerting ‘gentle’ pressure in some cases), and who 
reenter the labour market years later as part-time or temporary workers. 
Apart from these groups, the marginal or ‘peripheral’ work force also con-
sists of those workers (male and female) in small subcontractor firms who 
sometimes work directly in the production plant of the large (automotive), 
enterprises and under their instructions (while remaining employees of the 
subcontracting firm). In addition there are seasonal workers and unskilled 
workers who change companies from time to time. These workers do not 
enjoy the opportunities held by the core workers. As their wages are lower, 
their employment security and working conditions are less favourable in 
many instances and their interest representation by unions is either very poor 
or non-existent. Moreover, they have very limited opportunities for further 
vocational training. (For an overview see: Chalmers, 1989; for detailed 
examples see Tamai, 1992). These marginal workers form the quantitative 
employment buffer for lean production.
During the eighties in Japan, due to the tight labour market, this segmen-
tation of workers had no effects on overall employment security, especially 
in the automotive industry. However, during the crises of the seventies, the 
segmented labour market allowed Japanese enterprises to flexibly adapt the 
number of employees (Ernst, 1988). In the current recession of 1992/93 the 
marginal workers are also used as a flexibility buffer (along with the prevail-
ing practice of cutting back over-time among all employee groups). In other 
words, the marginal workers, who form the largest employee group by far, are 
not treated as ‘fixed capital’ as the concept of lean manufacturing purports.
Marginal workers are one major component of the segmented labour 
market in Japan. We will now turn to a discussion of two main features of 
the segmented labour market: special forms of recruitment and so-called 
‘life long employment’.
1. The segmented labour market manifests itself in prevailing forms of 
recruitment. The large and renowned enterprises (i.e., the automobile manu-
facturers and their first tier suppliers) recruit almost exclusively high school 
or university graduates directly after finishing school. As a result they are 
without vocational or job-related training (that means in most cases after 
12 years of school, in one third of cases followed by two [female] or four 
[mainly male] year university programs). The decisive aspect here is the 
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fact that these workers are ‘clean slates’, so to speak, and can therefore be 
shaped and moulded to become readily integrated into a given corporate 
culture. These employees – at least the men – will join the group of core 
workers. The recruiting process, the efficiency of which has often been 
overestimated, is extremely selective. (For an example from the assembly 
area in the electrical sector see: Tokunaga and Altmann et al., 1991, p. 96). 
This highly selective procedure ensures that the large and powerful enter-
prises have choice access to a preselected manpower reservoir exhibiting 
homogeneous skills.
Toyota and Nissan formed their core work-force somewhat differently from 
other car companies. They also recruited junior high school graduates (at 
the age of 15), training them in the company school for an additional three 
years. After completing the company’s school, they were assigned jobs in 
either direct or indirect production. Those who were deployed to the direct 
production area were expected to become supervisors, while those who were 
deployed to the indirect production area became ‘skilled workers’ (mainte-
nance, tooling, inspection, and so on) by on-the-job-training. Both Toyota 
and Nissan recruit thousands of junior high school graduates every year.
Previously, the majority of large companies had such in-house schools, 
but in the 1960’s junior high school graduates increasingly began to seek 
high school degrees (‘Senior High School’). Many enterprises abandoned 
their policy of recruiting junior high school graduates and abolished the in-
house schools. Recently quite a few large firms began to establish in-house 
schools for high school rather than junior high school graduates. A typical 
example is the school at Mazda. Mazda discontinued its in-house school 
for junior high school graduates at the end of the 60’s, and at the end of the 
80’s founded the in-house ‘Mazda Technical College’ which recruits senior 
high school graduates for a two year training program.
It should be pointed out, that the car manufacturers in principle wanted to 
recruit only graduates right out of school. However, from 1959 to 1973, large 
Japanese car manufacturers were compelled to promote also the marginal 
work force (seasonal workers, temporary workers etc.) to core workers due 
to the shortage of young graduates on the external labour market. After the 
first oil crisis, the labour market became unfavourable for the workers and 
the car makers began to recruit their core workers exclusively from gradu-
ates fresh out of school (also from Senior High School). In the economic 
boom of the mid-80s, the workers again began to leave the car makers on a 
massive scale. Only then did the car companies once more reluctantly hire 
mid-career entrants as core workers.
Currently, changing attitudes to work have engendered increasing recruit-
ment problems, even for the large manufacturing enterprises, particularly 
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with regard to university graduates. Due to the poor working conditions, the 
automotive industry has a particularly unfavourable position. According to 
studies conducted by the Confederation of Japanese Automobile Workers’s 
Unions, a mere 4.5 percent of the automobile workers would recommend 
that their children choose a job in the automobile industry (Nomura 1992); 
among university graduates Toyota holds the 27th place on a list of the ‘most 
popular’ large enterprises (see a summary by Demes, 1992a, p. 484).
In comparison, smaller and less renowned enterprises – such as small and 
medium size companies in the supplier sector – have only limited access 
to better qualified individuals from the general school system at least in 
times of economic growth. Looking at this issue from the perspective of the 
‘marginal’ workers, there is no access to core worker status (or at best only 
access to less secure forms of core work with less scope for promotion and 
the poorer working conditions that are offered in the small and medium size 
company sector). Naturally, a lower social status is also tied to these jobs.
This segmentation caused by recruiting practices, results in long term 
effects. The internal corporate labour markets (for regular employees) basi-
cally remain closed, careers and deployments take place within the company 
and without any competition from the external labour market (with the 
exception of some specialists). In contrast, the labour markets of the small 
and medium size companies are open. Those who end up in these companies 
will have, at best, the opportunity for further training, promotion, and higher 
pay in this particular sector and will have to deal with competition from 
the external labour market, particularly from younger individuals. In spite 
of the need for skills in small and medium size companies (see 2.2) the op-
portunities for further vocational training are limited. Those skills acquired, 
however, will only be valid on the labour market for similar companies with 
similar (inferior) working conditions.
During the period of economic growth up to 1991 the automotive industry 
did provide some opportunities for entry from the external labour market in 
some cases even with core worker status. However, this development has 
been discontinued due to the current economic downturn.
2. Given the considerable structural manpower shortage (see 5.2), and the 
declining attractiveness of working in the automotive industry, the ques-
tion of employment security was not a pressing issue during the long phase 
of economic growth. In the meantime, however, changes are beginning to 
emerge. In any case, the so-called concept of ‘life long employment’ was 
always applied with considerable restrictions. This concept is by no means 
a Japanese ‘principle’ embedded in social or cultural convention or tradition 
(or even secured by collective agreements), its actual form arose out of the 
labour shortage of the post war years. It was intended to help the enterprises 
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secure their investments in training and the utilization of experienced em-
ployees (for literature see Ernst, 1986, p. 21, fn. 23). The conflicts arising 
in connection with (wage) demands made by younger workers with better 
(educational) credentials and the decreasing significance of work experience 
due to rising levels of automation and other factors, led to segmentation and 
had the effect of restricting life long employment to core worker groups. For 
older employees, their career was basically over at the age of 55 (further 
promotions were no longer possible even if the employee continued to work 
at the company – demotions were also not out of question). Currently, under 
pressure from the government, more and more employees are retained, with 
normal status, up to the age of approximately 60 years.4
During periods of recession core groups are retained if possible as ‘in-
house unemployed’, estimated at 1 million workers at the end of 1992 
(for large enterprises in all economic sectors: Handelsblatt 1993, no. 23), 
which tends to increase the pressure for the peripheral worker groups. 
‘Voluntary retirement’ of regular employees (known as ‘shoulder tapping’) 
is also expected to be put into effect if the need arises and is being made 
demonstratively public (The Daily Yomiuri, 1993), the increasing publicity 
of dismissal of managers in large companies is a hot topic of discussion in 
Japan at the moment.5
In the relationship between buyer and supplier companies a special as-
pect of achieving flexibility is becoming relevant for employment security, 
namely the transfer of (older and/or surplus) employees (primarily white 
collar employees) from buyer enterprises (large scale enterprises) to sup-
pliers (small and medium size companies). On the one hand this practice 
gives suppliers access to experience and skills that would not be available 
otherwise. On the other hand, in times of recession or in the case of ration-
alization measures carried out in the buyer enterprises, supplier companies 
are pressured to absorb workers who are not always adequately qualified 
or capable of fully meeting their needs. Naturally, this hampers the de-
pendent companies from carrying out independent personnel policies. This 
problem also arises when qualified, (older) employees are transferred who 
subsequently block the upward mobility paths for existing employees in the 
smaller and medium size companies. (Apart from the supplier chain, the 
same also holds true for transfers to various plants within corporations.) 
Permanent transfers, even regional ones (especially for white collar em-
ployees), usually entail less favourable working conditions for workers, as 
well as, negative social aspects (especially for families).
The lower the position a company occupies within the supplier pyramid 
which is also dependent upon the particular branch of the given supplier 
– the more such firms will be dependent on female part-time workers 
(and other workers holding insecure precarious positions, including family 
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members). This then makes it all the more difficult, or even impossible, 
to recruit more highly skilled (male) workers. ‘Part time’ female workers, 
who currently account for one seventh of all employees and whose numbers 
are increasing, are defined more by their status than their working hours. 
They receive lower wages than male workers or core workers and they do 
not incur any training costs. (In this context, it should be pointed out that 
these employees also have a twelve year education and could be trained 
in a short period of time). One must also consider that the term ‘part-time 
work’ does not mean half-time or something similar, but simply means less 
regular working hours than a full-time job. Therefore, these workers can 
serve as an excellent buffer.
Particularly in supplier firms, the demands for the legalization and regu-
lation of foreign workers are becoming increasingly vocal (although in the 
economy as a whole foreign workers play a minor role, they are indispensable 
for many suppliers, see JLB, 1992, p. 4).
2.2 Intensification of the division of labour through the type of training
The organization of training within Japanese companies increases the divi-
sion of labour, especially in direct manufacturing and assembly work.
1. In this context, training refers primarily to on-the-job-training. These 
measures are not oriented to providing broad basic training in the sense 
of ‘vocational’ training, nor are they a ‘practice oriented’ variation of 
systematic professional training. However, this on-the-job-training is also 
not, as is often assumed, training to become a ‘generalist’ (who, if selected 
by their superiors, may be given opportunities for advancement). Even in 
large scale Japanese enterprises, training is basically adaptation oriented, in 
other words, adaptation to current and specific company needs. At least for 
the large enterprises, the skills workers acquire have ‘enterprise-use-value’ 
but have no ‘labour market exchange value’ (Georg, 1990, p. 44). The time 
devoted to training measures is often overestimated for the shopfloor level 
(but also for higher hierarchical levels), whereby the factor of training 
‘clean slates’, i.e., training employees with a total lack of previous voca-
tional training must be considered. Training remains company-, process- or 
even machine-specific and is derived from experience rather than formal 
instruction. The chances employees are given to develop depend strongly 
on the respective forms of work organization and if the worker will remain 
employed within the (large scale) enterprise. It is, except for specialists, vir-
tually impossible for individuals to derive any substantial financial benefits 
from acquired skills (particularly in terms of a career) on the ‘open’ labour 
markets, since wage increases depend on seniority and in-house personnel 
evaluation (see 3.2).
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In certain cases training measures are carried out off-the-job. These cours-
es, which are available to core workers only, are usually of a very limited 
duration and are oriented to adaptation or promotion (see Demes, 1992b). 
Longer and more systematic training measures off-the-job are only available 
to a limited group of employees. This applies to workers performing repair 
and maintenance tasks not integrated into direct manufacturing work, or 
workers implementing new facilities who are earmarked for their operation 
at a later date, for example. (For a survey of training issues see: Dore and 
Sako, 1989; Münch and Eswein, 1992; Georg and Sattel, 1992).
2. Generally, the access to corporate further training measures depends on 
whether a worker belongs to the group of male core workers and on be-
ing chosen for such measures by his superiors. These measures, however, 
cannot be regarded as ‘further training’ in the sense of broadening basic 
qualifications, since they are also oriented to company and operational 
needs. The training measures are usually carried out by the company’s own 
skilled workers or specialists and not by instructors having undergone di-
dactic training. At the same time, these measures form the stepping stones 
of individual careers and are limited accordingly. Individual or company 
initiated private training activities outside of working hours are recorded 
in the personal evaluation (as an indication of motivation), yet are rarely 
taken into account in workplace deployment (Tokunaga and Altmann et al., 
1991, p. 149).
3. The ‘polyvalence’ claimed to be an important characteristic of lean 
production, i.e. versatile and multi- faceted skills as the basis for flexible 
manpower utilization is in reality more the competence to deal with tasks 
belonging to the same level of work requirements. In other words, a broader 
scope of skills but not higher ones. It is essential to understand that in Japan 
training in general takes place within the context of a rationalization strategy, 
based on a workplace and process design which follows the principle that the 
simplest work place or process is the best (‘simple is best’). It is also believed 
that all tasks should be standardized to the greatest extent possible until the 
next changes become necessary. This also holds true, for example, for the 
frequently quoted multi-unit tending or for the U-line organization: Apart 
from ensuring more intense utilization of employee performance by elimi-
nating system losses without dispensing with the highly Taylorized form of 
work, these concepts offer companies considerable flexibility benefits (by 
bundling or separating short cycle operations and altering manning levels). 
While such concepts do not translate into higher skills and qualifications for 
employees, they do entail considerable physical and mental stress.
The claims made by Japanese scientists (Koike and Inoki, 1990), but also 
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by their European colleagues (see Münch and Eswein, 1992, p. 152; Staudt 
and Rehbein, 1988, as examples of German publications) that Japanese work-
ers are highly skilled and command versatile skills thanks to a particularly 
efficient company training system must be refuted for the entire industrial 
sector and especially the automotive industry – at least for the shopfloor level 
(see Demes, 1992b; Demes and Jürgens, 1989; Tokunaga and Altmann et al., 
1991, p. 139; p. 178, for an example from the electrical industry).
4. On-the-job training has several organizational preconditions, including 
the explicit integration of training activities into the range of tasks to be 
performed by experienced workers so that these workers are not subject to 
additional burdens in performing their other work tasks, as well as, an ap-
propriate wage system. (The wage system is more or less independent of the 
workplace requirements and largely neutral in terms of work assignment; it 
is individually oriented and tends to be performance-related, whereby the 
term performance comprises individual and collective parameters as well 
as the demand for total work commitment (‘the entire person’)).6
Within the small supplier firms skilled work is frequently restricted to a 
few individuals, in many instances to owners working in their own firms. 
Due to time pressure and the lack of skilled personnel, as well as, the lack of 
government vocational training programs, it is virtually impossible to carry 
out extra training measures. Only the top tier suppliers receive support from 
buyer enterprises in the form of training and in such instances the respective 
measures are very specific and determined by current requirements.
One of the key preconditions ensuring that this system functions as a 
whole is the comprehensive twelve year school education that is not voca-
tionally oriented and of which 90 percent of the present school graduates 
have undergone. Although this educational system is not free of weak points, 
the significance of the discipline it imparts, its strong group focus and the 
competitive spirit instilled in the individual are remarkable elements, to 
consider as the background of work policy measures in Japan.
2.3 The organization of work and control of workers stabilize the division 
of labour
The concept of lean production defines company work organization as 
integrative (work tasks), open (in functional and hierarchical terms), decen-
tralized (units bearing responsibility) and codetermining and coresponsible 
(bottom-up decision processes, responsibility for quality). The MIT study, 
by the way, made little mention of these aspects and did not investigate them. 
It is doubtful, however, to what extent these concepts are actually put into 
practice. In Japan too, work processes are organized according to Tayloris-
tic principles; in their pursuit for more rationalization, industrial engineers 
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cooperate closely with direct superiors. Quality circles and improvement 
efforts routinely make use of work study methods – in other words, ‘the 
Japanese out-Taylor us all’ (Schonberger, 1982, p. 193). This holds true in 
spite of the fact that the organization of the manufacturing process as a whole 
deviates from Taylorism.7 In the following, we will only be dealing with 
group or team work (‘the heart’ of lean production, according to Womack 
et al., 1990, p. 99) and hierarchical structures as examples.
1. In Japan, task integration and team have a fundamentally different mean-
ing in terms of contents and concepts than in European discussions (and 
particularly those in Sweden and Germany); they involve different personnel 
policies and have different consequences for the effected workers.
In German debates the topic of ‘team work’ refers to the interaction be-
tween different team members with different training backgrounds (such 
as skilled workers and semiskilled workers), as well as, to the latitude for 
planning and taking action with regard to work content and scheduling, 
and the reduction of formal hierarchy (for an overview see Roth and Kohl, 
1988). Designing technical facilities, control systems and programmes so 
as to be compatible with team work is at least striven for (as evidenced in a 
number of assembly processes or manufacturing islands8. The participation 
of representatives of employee interests is also intended (in the manning of 
assembly groups, for example9).
Berggren called attention to special aspects of Swedish team work models 
such as the scope they give employees to take action, the reduction of hierar-
chical control and the unions’ influence on forms of organization (Berggren, 
1991, p. 302, p. 326); team work as ‘social compromise’ (1991, p. 327).
This elucidation of teamwork is important because the various points 
have nothing to do with ‘group work’ as it is practiced in manufacturing 
and assembly in Japan. Groups in these areas are defined in a highly formal 
manner, and are strictly oriented to certain sections of the manufacturing 
process (for example in the final assembly of automobiles; adjusting or 
mounting special parts in an assembly process in the electronics industry; 
certain machine groups in manufacturing). Perhaps the MIT study’s claims 
of the ‘widespread’ use of ‘team work’ in the automobile industry can be 
attributed to the existence of the ‘Hancho’ (Krafcik, 1988), a group leader 
without management responsibilities, who is more an assembly line leader, 
or ‘first’ man in the Western sense. A ‘Hancho’ is not to be confused with 
a team speaker (as at Volvo, for example) and he is naturally chosen by 
management, not electedby his colleagues. Japanese ‘work-groups’ have 
no scope for independent action, planning or scheduling and the individual 
work operations are highly standardized and strictly monitored. In processes 
with a higher degree of automation, the lack of decoupling from automatic 
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stations or machinery, results in tight integration into short cycle times in 
conjunction with high working speeds. The idea that workers can manage 
their own time (in German: ‘time sovereignty’) is an illusion, especially 
where Just-in-time organization is practiced.
In most cases, workers rotate only within a certain process area and by 
orders issued by superiors. The companies enjoy a very flexible utilization 
of manpower as the tasks have been levelled out so that the demands made 
on workers are more or less homogeneous, and low in the final assembly 
sector.
Tight manning levels are a basic principle. In view of the zero buffer and 
zero defect requirements, this results in massive social pressure within the 
group. Absentees put a burden on their colleagues. The low absenteeism 
rates have less to do with commitment or corporate loyalty than with the 
pressure exerted by colleagues and direct superiors.
As Jürgens aptly commented, ‘… it is doubtful … whether team work ex-
ists at all in Japanese plants’ (Jürgens, 1992a, p. 48; see also Jürgens, 1992b, 
p. 27), especially if one has the European concepts in mind.
Division of labour also exists between groups performing different func-
tions and with different skills. The so-called ‘integration’ of work tasks 
exists only at a low level of work requirements. In Japanese industrial 
mass production, those groups of specialists concerned with rationalization 
measures or ‘improvements’, or the implementation of new technologies or 
machinery, or difficult repair tasks generally operate as separate units. The 
assignment of tasks to these groups of more highly skilled workers fulfill-
ing functions that are not fixed, but are under strict control by superiors. In 
these groups, time pressure generates an internal division of labour ensuring 
that the varying skills and experience of the individual group members are 
optimally used under the given time constraints. Flexible manpower utiliza-
tion (in all group forms) tends to be more the result of process friction, the 
given product mix, or output volume than absenteeism.10
A highly developed personnel evaluation system which plays a decisive 
role in promotion and wages, effects Japanese group work; in the orientation 
to the group’s cooperative performance on the one hand, and competition 
between the members of the group on the otherhand (see 3.2).
We do not doubt the existence of a basic social orientation among the 
workers involved in group work, yet we do not view this orientation as 
being solely determined by cultural-historical factors, as a ‘typical Japa-
nese trait’. Rather educational and company personnel policy socialization 
measures strategically promote and sanction this orientation (see Eswein, 
1988). Within the existing social and economic structure this orientation also 
translates as measurable benefits to the individual (in terms of promotion 
or career development, for example).
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2. ‘Flat’ hierarchy is a word often heard in the discussions of lean produc-
tion (see the literature on team work). The German discussions are based 
on a long tradition, which is characterized – at the level of manufacturing 
and assembly work – by the so-called ‘Meister crisis’ (loss of function) on 
the one hand, and by a ‘return’ of direct management tasks to their ‘real’ 
function (i.e., personnel management), on the other hand. Recently, the 
drive for leaner organizations has resulted in attempts to eliminate ‘entire 
levels’ from hierarchical structures, although it remains unclear where the 
given functions (and the employees) will wind up, insofar as it is possible to 
integrate the functions into direct production work, the question of coping 
with these functions in terms of skills and their remuneration remain open. 
In this respect, the general conditions of ‘old’ industrial locations and plants 
(brown-fields) and new factories in non-industrial areas (green-fields), are 
naturally very different.
As a generalization, it can be stated that the management pyramid in 
Japan is anything but flat (in manufacturing and assembly processes, this 
pyramid frequently comprises, with the foreman, four or more steps). On 
the shopfloor, the number of supervisors is high, thereby ensuring very tight 
control. Management positions, especially foreman and Meister (Kumicho 
and Shunin, but not the Hancho), have all decision making power.11
To a very limited extent, considerations aimed at ‘flattening’ hierarchical 
structures are currently emerging in a number of leading enterprises such 
as Toyota, although their orientation is completely different from what is 
being discussed in Europe. These experimental concepts envisage individu-
als assuming a management position for a specific project over a limited 
period of time, while retaining their former social status and title (Nomura, 
1993, p. 43).
In general, however, the number of supervisors is comparatively high 
and there is a dense span of control. There are numerous and very subtle 
hierarchical levels. It must also be considered that some positions do not 
entail any management functions or rights, but represent formal promotions 
created in order to absorb some of the competitive pressure among the core 
employees. (The status positions with their respective titles, symbols and 
wage groups also serve to classify specialists and other employees with 
higher skills). Within the extremely authoritarian structures of Japanese 
companies, superiors fulfill more far reaching social functions than supervi-
sors in Western countries. In Japan for example, superiors exert influence 
on young workers’ parents, concern themselves with private affairs and ap-
ply pressure if necessary. They wield highly effective sanctions to this end, 
particularly those related to personnel evaluation (see below).
The frequently quoted bottom-up decisions play no role at all on the pro-
duction levels, and their role on higher, ‘white collar’ levels is very limited. 
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Participation in decision making processes is primarily geared to securing 
acceptance; it is virtually impossible to deviate from basic decisions that 
have been already made.
To summarize, on the ‘dual labour market’ the social division of labour 
is intensified by the differing opportunities of gaining access to training. 
This means the forms of work organization tend to stabilize this division of 
labour more than eliminating it.12
3. Work policy instruments:  
securing the integration and utilization of manpower
3.1 The improvement process enhances motivation  
and secures process stability
The improvement process is regarded as one of the key elements in the con-
cept of lean production. In it, aspects of rationalization policies and person-
nel policies converge in such a way, that the one can no longer be separated 
from the other. There are different perceptions and interpretations of the 
concept of ‘improvement’. The definition of ‘improvement’ ranges from the 
philosophy of production policy as a whole (‘Kaizen’; Imai, 1992) to more 
concrete terms denoting employee suggestion programmmes. ‘Continuous 
improvement process’ covers the concept in the most neutral way.
The authors of the MIT study refer to the ‘creative tension’ (Womack et 
al., p. 102) in which workers are placed (given the zero defect/zero buffer 
situation) in a production process that is susceptible to breakdown. Improve-
ment activities are primarily intended to smooth and facilitate the process 
and are measured solely in terms of productivity gains (and to a much lesser 
extent in terms of work safety). From this situation improvement activities 
certainly have the effect of stabilizing the ‘fragile’ work process divested 
of all personnel and material buffers in order to achieve the determined 
schedules, volume and quality demands. Improvements, however, only de-
fine new work and performance parameters, but do not create any new scope 
for employee action or reduce strain on the workers (until the next changes 
occur, operations are standardized and deviations not tolerated – this is a 
declared objective of Kaizen).
Particularly in mass production, Japanese middle management regards 
the special function of the improvement process on the shop floor level as 
primarily consisting of workers identifying flaws in the production process. 
Workers are not involved in solving such problems. In Japanese mass pro-
duction, anything that lies beyond the correction of minor issues is placed in 
the hands of specialists. Secondly, Japanese managers repeatedly point out 
the fact that participation in the improvement process plays a significant role 
in terms of motivation, while the rationalization effects actually achieved 
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are rather limited. Thirdly, the number of improvement suggestions brought 
forward by individual workers is an important factor in personnel evaluation 
(the target number of suggestions is actually specified).13
The improvement process is also characterized by a pronounced division 
of labour. This applies primarily to manufacturing workers and the lower 
level supervisors. Apart from the manufacturing workers there are also 
functionally separated groups of indirect workers in the manufacturing area 
(‘improvement teams’, ‘engineers on site’), whose main task is to carry 
out improvement measures in the sense of incremental rationalization and 
smoothing out of manufacturing sequences (in connection with the process 
of problem identification, not problem solving by production workers).
What are the consequences for the workers? On the one hand, they attain 
– through the productivity orientation of the entire system – continuously 
reduced standard times and increasingly ‘leaner’ work content with tighter 
manning levels. Financial premiums are minimal. Apart from recognition in 
the personnel evaluation, the most important effects of participating in the 
improvement process are the feeling of being heard and accepted. Thanks 
to this involvement, the workers experience that ‘the hierarchy’ reacts to 
their input – regardless of the concrete effects for them.
It should be kept in mind that the motivation behind the ‘continuous im-
provement process’ (‘CIP’) tool also includes the permanent monitoring of 
behaviour on the job and working attitudes. (This may make workers afraid 
of making mistakes which may hamper their creativity.) The identification 
of points of friction within the manufacturing process and their elimination 
by specialized rationalization experts results in a considerable intensifica-
tion of work. ‘Kaizen’ does not imply any ‘participation’ (or co-design or 
codetermination!) at the workplace; and finally Small Group Activities do 
not translate into significant training effects for the workers since the topics 
are handed down by superiors and the process is closely controlled.
Staff cutbacks, such as dismissals, which are the result of rationaliza-
tion suggestions, are very rare occurrences. It is the core workers that are 
the employees mainly involved in the improvement process, but naturally 
there are ‘abstract’ reductions in the total number of jobs, at least in times 
of economic growth.
There is one decisive organizational trend in Japanese work policies that 
I would like to call attention to and briefly summarize: It is not the much 
quoted integration of job tasks, the comprehensive scope of skills, or the 
continuous improvement process that secure process flows and their effi-
ciency. It is far more the cooperation between the different functional areas, 
skill levels and hierarchical levels that achieve this degree of efficiency. 
This involves, for example, the permanent contact maintained by ‘engineers’ 
(this term must be understood in the broadest sense), and technicians with 
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the production level and their willingness to ‘get their hands dirty’ if need 
be. Moreover, it is the existence of a multilayered and closely knit network 
of middle and lower level supervisors and specialists, capable of listening 
and reacting swiftly which secures the production flow. Thus, in Japanese 
manufacturing, a high division of labour does not necessarily imply that 
barriers are erected between different workers, functions and manufactur-
ing areas. There are many aspects of training and culturally determined 
socialization, as well as disciplinarian measures, which address this basic 
willingness to cooperate. Also, it should not be forgotten that this willing-
ness – or pressure – to cooperate has very definite effects on the personnel 
evaluation the individual worker receives.
3.2 Evaluation as the ‘heart’ of work policy
1. While the features of Japanese work policy we have outlined thus far are 
indeed key characteristics of lean production, a main instrument of control, 
sanctions (or incentives) of the Japanese personnel policy often is not ad-
equately represented in such discussions – that is the personnel evaluation 
system. If it holds true, as Womack et al. claim, that the ‘workteam is the 
heart’ of manufacturing activities, which I can neither confirm nor contest, 
then the personnel evaluation system is, in our analysis, the ‘heart’ of Ja-
panese personnel management.
Historically, the personnel evaluation system has played a pivotal role 
in the enterprise, in teams of both the interests of control on the part of 
the company as well as the interests of younger employees in the period of 
manpower shortages during the sixties14. The personnel evaluation system 
was initially used as a countermeasure to the prevailing ‘seniority wages’ 
that were oriented solely to the employee’s length of service. Accordingly 
this measure met with a great deal of acceptance from some workers, while 
it engendered conflicts with senior employees as both aspects (performance 
and period of service), retained their tense relationship with one another. 
The personnel evaluation system is certainly the strongest personnel policy 
instrument Japanese management commands.15
Presently personnel evaluation has considerable effects on the assign-
ment of jobs, individual careers and income. The criteria applied are highly 
differentiated and are often dealt with as ‘highly confidential’ in many 
enterprises (Special Enquête, 1988; Tokunaga and Altmann et al., 1991, 
p. 153; Demes, 1989a; Endo, 1991; 1992a). In spite of a number of cor-
rective mechanisms the personnel evaluation of workers by supervisors is 
systematically subjective. A considerable amount of effort is invested in this 
process which ‘… is reminiscent of the effort expended on work studies 
and workplace related performance profiles in Western companies’ (Demes, 
1989a, foreword by Jürgens).
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Here I would like to refer once again to Japanese group work, as the 
methods utilized in employee appraisal solve one of the central problems 
of these groups, namely generating cooperation, and ‘harmony’ while at the 
same time promoting individual competition among the workers within the 
group (an aspect we will not be dealing with in greater detail). As person-
nel evaluation is a continuous process and is partially oriented to potential 
individual performance in the long run and in part is closely related to short 
term productive performance (normally only applied to the core workers 
and enterprise internal), this rating is exceptionally important for the em-
ployees. This evaluation leaves an ineradicable imprint on further careers 
and thus, on the work and life situation. It also determines, amongst other 
factors, the (in some cases) considerable deviations in company-related and 
age-determined income increases.
2. In Japanese industry, wage systems exhibit a similar basic structure, while 
their individual, enterprise-specific forms deviate widely. In all instances, 
wage systems are very complex and closely linked with the employee ap-
praisal systems (Nomura, 1987; Takagi, 1987; Demes, 1989a; Tokunaga and 
Altmann et al., 1991, p. 187). Although seniority (period of service) plays 
an important role, especially for the core workers in large scale enterprises, 
the individual appraisal and performance rating is also of considerable sig-
nificance. Toyota’s wage system change of 1990 offers one example: Apart 
from the objective of achieving greater wage stability for the individual (by 
reducing the share deriving from productivity effects and introducing a fixed 
rate according to age) and establishing more transparency, the new concept 
tends to give more weight to individual performance than to collectively 
generated productivity (through competition between different groups or 
production ‘segments’; Nomura, 1993, p. 44).
In our present context one must also consider the wage difference between 
automotive manufacturers and suppliers and also within the supplier pyra-
mid, which is more pronounced in Japan than in other industrial nations. 
These differences, however, are less due to personnel evaluation systems, 
which are only rarely systematically applied in the case of second and 
third tier suppliers, as to other factors. Within Japan’s dual economy there 
are many factors determining wage differentiation that are relevant in this 
context (see Ernst and Laumer, 1989, p. 28) and exert negative effects on 
the workers in the supply companies. Within large scale companies male 
core workers receive better pay than the female marginal workers (at the 
ratio of about 2:1).16 A comparison of wages according to company size, and 
therefore, regarding workers’ income in supplier firms,17 also brings sizable 
differences to light. The widespread utilization of female and ‘de facto mar-
ginal’ male workers in small and medium size supplier firms as well as the 
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employment of older workers also plays a role. In enterprises that are end 
producers the wage increase based on the length of service comes to an end 
between age 55 and 60. However, in many cases such workers are transferred 
from these companies to dependent supplier companies. Moreover, due 
to the low retirement pensions and the period of time between retirement 
from a large scale enterprise and the first retirement pension payments,18 
there is a considerable amount of pressure for retiring employees to seek 
further, usually lower paid employment on the open labour markets. To a 
much greater extent than in other countries, individuals continue to work 
far beyond the age of 65 (JIL, 1992, p. 74).
Generally speaking there are considerable wage and income differences 
between individual employees due to the use of personnel evaluation sys-
tems when measured over the entire life working time.19 The slight company 
internal income differentiation between ‘normal’, male core workers and 
management level employees (approximately 1:2), which is so frequently 
stressed in the lean production concept, appears in a completely different 
light in a comparison by company size: There is an inverse ratio of up to 2:1 
and more, based on hourly wage, between the (core) manufacturing workers 
in large and those in small companies (see Yearbook, 1990, p. 116). Differ-
ences also exist between benefits such as health care, social facilities, etc.
3.3 Virtually unrestricted duration and flexibility of working hours
Long working hours are a well-known aspect of Japanese working life; in 
the automotive industry, the hours worked lie above the industry average 
and totalled an annual average of 2,291 effective working hours in 1990 
(Bosch, 1993). In producer companies this figure is not so much the result 
of standard daily working hours as it is the many hours of overtime work-
ers put in (1990:450 hours and more on the production level). This figure 
is possible due to the two to three hour ‘gaps’ between the first and second 
shift which are regularly filled by employees working overtime. In addition, 
many workers do not take their holidays (which are short by international 
comparison) and the rate of absenteeism is very low (all in all, Japanese 
workers take approximately half of the average annual holiday of 15 days; 
Yearbook, 1990, p. 268). Gerhard Bosch offers this concise summary of 
company working hours policy:
In spite of some minor differences, the working and operating hours 
adhered to by most Japanese automobile manufacturers are so similar, 
that it is legitimate to speak of a specifically Japanese type of time 
management: As the number of core workers is very limited, working 
hours must be continuously extended by overtime and beyond the col-
lectively agreed standard working time; in addition, overtime is also 
used to cope with fluctuating demand. Japanese production planning, 
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yet also the negative sanction mechanisms in personnel planning, reflect 
the fact that companies take unpaid work in the form of unclaimed holi-
days for granted. Absenteeism due to illness or accidents is completely 
compensated for in the individual’s holiday … Thus Japanese com-
panies are able to count on an attendance rate of approximately 95%. 
Even without overtime, operating periods of almost 4 000 hours per 
year are achieved, as manufacturing operations are only interrupted on 
paid holidays, but not on additional holidays … the intensity of worker 
performance (is) exceptionally high. Their flexibility … is remarkable. 
By drawing on overtime, manufacturing operations can be stepped up 
by 15 to 20% and more … (Bosch, 1993, p. 19).
Moreover, employees in smaller and medium size companies, and especially 
supplier firms, are subject to additional disadvantages. In small supplier 
firms of the automotive industry, working hours are 25 percent longer than 
in final assembly companies and in the large first tier supply companies 
(Handelsblatt, 3.2.92) in spite of the many part-time workers employed in 
such companies. This also shows that part time workers are defined more by 
their status than by their actual working hours. In addition, it can be assumed 
that a great deal of statistically unrecorded overtime occurs in small (fam-
ily-owned) companies.20 During periods of economic decline this situation 
may temporarily change, but the contrast between the buyer and supplier 
remains just as intense.
One of the consequences of long working hours in small and medium size 
supplier firms is the restricted opportunity for recruiting qualified employees 
from the labour market. Long working hours are one factor which makes such 
companies less attractive for highschool graduates and further aggravates 
labour shortages for small and medium sized firms. This is also increas-
ingly effecting the large automobile manufacturers. The production policies 
pursued by buyer companies (especially the demands for strict adherence 
to supply schedules and short term delivery of small batch sizes) forces the 
suppliers, despite staff shortages, to react to their customers’ fluctuating 
volume demands. This is handled particularly by extending working hours 
and overtime. As Japanese law permits very small companies to work more 
hours per week and there is no union organization in such firms, workers 
do not receive better pay for additional working hours. Naturally, this is 
also the case with the part-time workers who are generally paid according 
to a fixed hourly wage (the hourly wage is roughly one third of the hourly 
wage paid to core workers in buyer companies).
The only alternative to extending working hours, or maintaining the exist-
ing working time, would be the introduction of additional, manpower-saving 
automation, which is difficult for small companies to finance. Even in cases 
where this is possible, the implementation of such facilities would require 
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skilled workers which small firms cannot recruit from the labour market. It 
cannot be assumed that the reduction of long working hours that has been 
going on since 1991 with the onset of economic crisis, will actually be main-
tained once an economic recovery sets in. In the segmented Japanese labour 
market, economic growth will translate into greater working hour burdens 
for marginal worker groups and workers in supplier companies.
The ‘bufferless’ and synchronous integrational production entails a very 
tight link between the working hour structure in the buyer and supplier 
companies. Apart from supplier firms, the transport companies serving the 
supply network are also affected (see page 24). In this context, the conse-
quences for workers (shift work, weekend work, etc.), the topic of much 
discussion in Europe, must not be overlooked (see page 21)).
All in all it is evident that the comprehensive, almost unrestricted control 
that enterprises are able to exercise over working hours constitutes a decisive 
precondition for other work policy measures. The present recession demon-
strates the high flexibility arising from Japanese working time policies and 
raises doubts whether the targeted reduction of working hours throughout 
the entire economy (‘1800 hours’ per year) will actually be attained once 
economic growth resumes.
4. The representation of employee interests:  
no participation in the design of work
In Japan the representatives of employee interests are not involved in the 
technical-organizational design of work. These issues, at least up to now, 
have remained outside of the orientations and activities of Japanese unions, 
and this can be regarded as a basic condition of Japanese work policies.21 So 
far, the unions have neither attempted to influence the technical-organiza-
tional design of work nor developed independent work policy concepts. The 
‘Guidelines on Rationalization Policies’ developed by some large enterprise 
unions and by the union umbrella organizations (in the electrical and metal 
industries) in the eighties were solely oriented towards the protection of 
employees from potential rationalization effects and not at all with the co-
design of work. The guidelines have been applied, if at all, to a very limited 
degree in Japanese companies.
Only recently, under the pressure of increasingly intensive forms of work, 
decreasing corporate profits and trade conflicts22, and especially within 
the Japanese Automobile Workers’ Union (see Confederation of Japan Au-
tomobile Workers’ Union (eds.) 1992) massive criticism has been voiced 
regarding the prevailing working conditions. Moreover, new concepts have 
been formulated that address ecological and product related questions, the 
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problematic relationships between buyer and supplier companies and the 
issue of shorter working hours.
All of the union’s activities up to now have revolved around the formula-
tion of demands and not in concrete suggestions on work design. It is pos-
sible, however, that changing union attitudes, tentative at present, may gain 
further momentum to the extent that in the medium term it will no longer be 
possible to deal with Japanese rationalization strategies in major industries 
without considering employee interest representation. An indication in this 
direction is the activities of the Nissan union in response to the closing of 
the Zama plant in 1993.23
In discussions on industrial labour the term ‘participation’ has had, and 
will probably continue to have, an entirely different meaning and content 
than in a European context for some time to come. It must not be confused 
with union representation of employee interests, nor with worker participa-
tion in the design of the actual manufacturing process, aimed at securing 
individual and collective interests.
As already outlined in connection with the continuous improvement 
process, participation refers to including workers in a largely predecided 
consultation processes, aimed at obtaining personal acceptance. Small 
group activities, quality circles, various motivation and incentive methods, 
as well as the previously mentioned cooperation between functional areas 
and across hierarchical levels, will create the necessary ‘consensus’ (in the 
sense of acceptance, not compromise!) and motivation. However, the design 
of technology and organization and personnel policy questions, as basic is-
sues that could lead to codetermination rights, will not be up for debate. In 
Japan, there is a total absence of concepts relating to a ‘socially compatible’ 
design of work as discussed in Germany or as seen in the Swedish model. 
Workers regard given forms of rationalization and their effects as ‘natural’ 
(particularly the ‘typical’ jobs for female workers, for example). In this 
context one must consider that all of these factors have come about in a 
climate of strong economic growth and with the legitimation of providing 
a high degree of employment security.
While the company unions do not interfere with management decisions 
on work policies and rationalization issues, there are three areas in which 
the unions are active. To begin with, the unions play a role in negotiating 
the annual wage increases. In this context, the unions of large automobile 
manufacturers even try to exert a restraining influence on the company 
unions of supplier firms (insofar as such unions exist), so as not to endan-
ger the buyer company’s competitiveness and thus, the wages of its core 
workers (Nomura, 1989).
The second area of union interest pertains to working hours. While the 
unions of major manufacturing enterprises do not push for any relevant 
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reductions of working hours, they are active in achieving a slight shift from 
a decreasing number of collectively agreed standard working hours towards 
an increasing number of overtime working hours. This means they work for 
achieving higher wages by increasing the number of working hours with 
extra allowances (usually 30 percent). In the present recession, these modest 
union policies (working hour policies as wage policies) are achieving exactly 
the opposite of what was originally intended. As overtime is being cut back, 
workers are losing those allowances that made a major contribution to their 
income (in the automotive industry 25–30 percent in many cases; Bosch, 
1993). The last field of union activity focuses on health and work security 
measures and other material benefits. From the second tier on, most of these 
activities are absent in supplier companies.
This particular aspect of lean production as a form of work organization 
(‘of the 21st century’, according to Womack et al. 1990; p. 278), without 
the participation of elected and institutionalized representatives of em-
ployee interests and in the final instance without direct ‘participation’ at 
the workplace is not given adequate consideration in current discussions. 
One result is that in union discussions, in Germany for example, a number 
of misconceptions concerning Japanese labour market structures, team 
work, training and ‘participation’ in the continuous improvement process 
have also lead to the misconception of the existence of progressive forms 
of direct worker participation in Japanese industry. At least up to now, a 
work policy which is based on the absence of strong unions has not been 
a model for European work policies. The question that should be asked is, 
which functional equivalents for work policy measures can be found that 
achieve acceptable and necessary goals such as increased productivity, but 
do so in cooperation with the unions. To this end, the experience gained in 
Sweden and Germany offers ample points of departure.
5. Japanese work policy: consequences and problems
5.1 Human resource management remains limited
Japanese work policy, that mixture of rationalization and personnel policies, 
does not utilize labour, even in terms of productivity, as effectively as the 
MIT study and the ongoing discussions in Europe would suggest. To put it 
bluntly, Japanese human resource management wastes a large share of its 
labour potential.
To avoid any misunderstanding, I would like to emphasize that this basic 
assumption is by no means meant to infer that we should no longer take the 
question of competing with Japanese (automobile) industry as seriously as 
we have done so far. On the contrary, I would like to draw attention to the, 
as of yet, unused labour potential, waiting to be unleashed in Japan.
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1. Even in the large production companies (final assembly), Japanese forms 
of work organization do not succeed in allowing labour to unfold to its fullest 
extent. This applies for practically all female workers and other members 
of the marginal workforce. The assignment and utilization of core workers 
is largely characterized by the intensification of work and the extension of 
working hours in many areas. These are necessary preconditions for, and 
inevitable results of, Japanese manufacturing methods and work policies. 
Personnel policies are consciously and consistently geared to the principle 
of coping with friction arising in increasingly mechanized and automated 
(lean meaning ‘fragile’) processes, by ensuring the most comprehensive use 
of manpower possible, such as ‘allround utilization’ (Deutschmann, 1987), 
in a process specific perspective. Central to this approach, however, is not 
occupational skills, creativity or even participation, but much more the con-
trol over working time, the acceptance of work intensity, and the integration 
into the ‘philosophy’ of the corporation (or management).
2. One aspect of limited human resource management can be seen in the 
consequences Japanese manufacturing methods engender for employees 
in the supply industry. According to the concept of ‘lean’ production, the 
Japanese forms of supplier relations are a central condition for increasing 
productivity (Womack et al. 1990: p. 146). In lean production, buyer/supplier 
relations are characterized by ‘rational forms’ of coordination and coopera-
tion (which places a considerable strain on suppliers). Other interpretations 
assume the existence of a long term ‘partnership-oriented’ cooperation be-
tween buyers and suppliers (Sabel et al., 1991). The work policies pursued 
by the majority of the supply firms, however, is without question highly 
restricted or predetermined by their dependency on buyer companies. These 
Japanese forms of cooperation are not only based on a refined (lean) system 
of coordination and organization in the value added chain, but also depend 
on different labour and employment standards prevailing on the different 
supplier tiers. For example, these forms of cooperation draw on long work-
ing hours, low wages and ‘outsourcing’ of poor working conditions (see 
Demes, 1989b; Asanuma, 1988; Sakai, 1990; Ikeda, 1987; 1988). While 
the MIT study contests the above, it does not succeed in documenting the 
opposite case due to an inadequate consideration of personnel policy issues, 
especially the conditions in the supplier industry.
In Japan, the organization of work is based on the segmentation of the 
labour market and on the dual structure of the economy, both of which are 
totally underestimated in the West. The segmentation of the labour market 
brings with it a representation of employee interests divided both across 
companies and within companies, where it is oriented only to parts of the 
workforce (core workers). The divergence of working standards across the 
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value added chain which is associated with this system, is a necessary pre-
condition for Japanese production modes.
3. Japanese human resource management is also limited and sub-optimal in 
a macro-societal perspective. The almost complete exclusion of marginal 
and female workers from company training and personnel development 
measures and the lack of public vocational training measures naturally 
limits and segments potential supply from the labour market. The negative 
physical aspects of the way labour is used, such as long working hours, high 
working speed, etc., also prevents the full utilization of labour and most 
comprehensive extent; this holds particularly true in view of the increasing 
aging of Japanese society (see below). Thus, apart from the individual nega-
tive effects, there is the general loss of potential labour within society as a 
whole, which in turn has an especially strong effect on the weak companies 
within the supplier system.
4. In the general discussion on lean production, besides the MIT study, it is 
frequently overlooked that mechanization, automation and inter-company 
networks by means of information and communication technology, remain 
central objectives of Japanese rationalization strategies. There is a tendency 
to forget that the MIT study accredits considerable productivity gains to 
automation and product design geared to manufacturability (see The Boston 
Consulting Group Ltd., 1991). Moreover, it is frequently overlooked that 
criticism directed at the United States and Europe is not aimed at technol-
ogy and automation as such, but at forms of work organization that do not 
make adequate use of them. Personnel policy remains a dependent variable 
of rationalization policy, in which even in Japan, the potential of labour 
only plays a role for narrowly defined groups of the workforce. The authors 
of the MIT study reach the conclusion that there is a need for increasing 
automation so that ‘only’ the highly qualified problem solvers will be left 
(Womack et al. 1990: p. 102). The question remains open as to how large 
the share of workers eliminated in the process will be, and how productive 
such a system will be from a general economy perspective.
There are very few branches, such as the automotive industry and con-
sumer electronics, in which Japan’s productivity per employee is actually 
higher than in the United States and a number of European industrial nations 
(Dollar and Wolff, 1993; Handelsblatt, 16.10.1992). The average productiv-
ity per employee recorded in the Japanese economy is below that of Germany 
(see Deutscher Industrie- und Handelstag (DIHT), 1992).
By concentrating on fragile manufacturing concepts it is easy to lose 
sight of the Japanese manufacturing modes in their entirety. They are not 
‘best practice’ for two reasons: they entail a loss of individual and societal 
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working capacity in the long run and cannot be regarded as productive when 
viewed in the context of the economy as a whole.24
5.2 The repercussions of work policy for enterprises and society
In almost all instances, and especially in the case of the MIT study, the 
efficiency of Japanese personnel and rationalization strategies is assessed 
in individual production units and branches of the economy. Supported by 
frequently overrated assessments of the industrial policies of the Ministry of 
International Trade and Industry (MITI), sweeping statements on Japanese 
competitive strength are subsequently derived. In the process, the increas-
ingly manifest effects of Japanese work policies for the enterprise itself and 
for society are hardly considered.
As I mentioned earlier, the Japanese challenge to world markets should 
not be underestimated. What I would like to call attention to, however, is 
that the emerging discussion of ‘Japanese management’ in Japan itself, 
indicates that precisely those areas where work policy actually was ‘lean’, 
new developments are being undertaken or have to be undertaken.
1. Even during the current recession, the labour market situation and industri-
al working conditions pose considerable problems for companies recruiting 
personnel. The Japanese economy, and particularly the automotive industry 
and its suppliers, are confronted with a twofold, structural problem. (a) 
Given almost stagnating population growth and a strong rise in the ratio of 
elderly citizens in the total population, the share of the working age popula-
tion is decreasing to a greater extent than in other industrial nations (Japan In-
stitute of Labor (JIL), 1992: 10; Japan Productivity Center (JPC), 1992–93, 
p. 80). At the same time, the existing quantitative manpower reservoir has 
been largely exploited and working hours are extended almost to their limit 
(criticized, yet a still accepted practice). Working hours reduction are caused 
more by the recession than by altered work policies, and finally there is very 
limited availability of foreign workers (JLB, 1992, p. 4). This situation is 
closely linked (b) with the allocation problem: companies with physically 
demanding, dirty and dangerous work are met with less acceptance from 
younger and better qualified workers or university graduates (JLB, 1991a, 
p. 4, for example). The automotive industry has a particularly poor image 
in this respect, while the same also holds true for long working hours (see 
above 3.3). All the while, higher social status is an increasingly important 
factor for job seekers (White Paper, 1992, p. 40). Generally speaking and to 
somewhat oversimplify, one could say that current trends are leading away 
from the manufacturing industry in favor of the service sector and white-
collar jobs. This holds especially true for those employee groups who have 
been of particular significance to date for the rationalization process in the 
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automotive industry and its suppliers (graduates of technical disciplines or 
computer scientists, for example).
During growth phases, the ‘normal reactions’ of enterprises would have 
been to change wage forms and level, create openings for new employee 
groups from other companies, and utilize the flexibility buffer provided by 
marginal workers. However, in the present situation this is no longer pos-
sible in the automotive industry. There is increasing pressure on companies 
to improve working conditions, and especially to reduce working hours (for 
a summary see Demes, 1992a, p. 483). At present it is completely unknown 
whether the so-called ‘new factories’ (such as Nissan’s ‘Humane Land’ in 
Kyushu, and Toyota’s ‘worker friendly’ assembly hall at the Tahara plant), 
with their forms of organization departing from the lean production model 
as reported in the MIT study will ever prove to be successful. The new 
concepts are characterized by such features as a high degree of automa-
tion in the assembly area, consideration of ergonomic aspects (for the first 
time), longer work cycles, buffers and stocks, more space, and shift systems 
without overtime, etc., in conjunction with changes in wage and hierarchy 
structures (International Metal Workers’ Federation (IMF), 1992; Demes, 
1992a; Nomura, 1993). The decisions for these new work structures and 
the considerably higher investments they involve over traditional plants 
were made during the last growth phase. However, considering the existing 
recruiting problems and the basic structural labour market problems that lie 
behind them, and given their only modest improvement during the current 
recession, there will be some pressure to ensure the further development 
of such concepts. Labour saving rationalization measures (the top priority 
corporate measures in 1991, the last boom year; White Paper, 1992, p. 23; p. 
64), such as further automation, as well as, the pressure to improve working 
conditions will both have to increase in order to secure manpower recruitment 
for the manufacturing sector and ensure the loyalty of core workers in large 
enterprises. Demes even raises the question of so-called ‘Europeanization’ in 
his summary written for the volume by Tokunaga, Altmann and Demes, 1992. 
The traditionally comprehensive, allround utilization of labour in Japan has 
generated its own winds of change for the work policy of the future.
There are three other problem constellations in which work policies also 
play a causal role, which will be briefly outlined below:
2. At present there are considerable problems in the supplier sector, espe-
cially in companies below the first tier. In Japan, these small and medium 
size firms generally have very little potential for providing training, yet 
are subject to considerable pressure to carry out rationalization measures 
requiring skilled workers (as the required investment volume makes ra-
tionalization measures increasingly difficult, the number of bankruptcies 
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has risen accordingly, see Asahi Shimbun, 1992). Due to their working 
conditions, these suppliers already suffer from a shortage of skilled work-
ers, and the latter are also subject to marked stress (working hours) due to 
this shortage. This results in a vicious circle lending additional momentum 
to the recruiting problems of such firms. Training opportunities outside of 
the companies (by prefecture administrations, for example), are rare and 
workers whom are already putting in a great deal of overtime have difficulty 
attending off-the-job-courses. Personnel transfers from the buyer companies 
rarely reach down to the lower tier suppliers and the transfers from higher 
tier suppliers frequently fail to meet the labour demand. In any case, these 
transfers are more or less measures for shunting off older and less productive 
workers to deal with the recession. Demands for publicly funded vocational 
training measures are becoming increasingly vocal (White Paper, 1992, p. 
58; ISF-material). Most likely, the recruiting and training problems of the 
small and medium size companies will remain and generate friction and/or 
changes within the supplier system (for an overview see JLB, 1990, p. 5). 
Such problems are already in evidence in larger suppliers in connection with 
short development periods and the problems of recruiting R&D personnel 
and the stress these employees are subject to.
3. In the concept of lean production, as well as in discussions of competitive 
advantage, short model cycles and thus short development in general are 
regarded as essential. Particularly in the automotive industry and the buyer-
supplier chain, simultaneous engineering is viewed as a special strength of 
the Japanese way of linking rationalization and personnel policy (Womack 
et al. 1990, p. 112, 146; Clark and Fujimoto, 1992, p. 205). However, even 
suppliers with considerable R&D potential (large, direct suppliers), but espe-
cially the small and medium sized firms with limited potential, are presently 
incapable of coping with the short development cycles in terms of personnel, 
work organization and manufacturing technology (a complaint voiced by all 
of the Japanese suppliers we surveyed; ISF-material). The vicious circle of 
recruiting remains a problem. While R&D personnel are ‘hoarded’ by buyer 
companies as well as production engineers, technicians in the company’s 
service area are dismissed during recession periods. The segmented labour 
market makes it nonetheless difficult or even impossible for small and me-
dium size companies to recruit these individuals. As a result, the automo-
tive industry has already started to extend model cycle periods (from 4 to 
5 years at Nissan; the same also applies to the consumer electronics sector, 
where cycles had been cut down to periods of several months). The number 
of variants is also being reduced, while the products themselves are being 
simplified (in the electronics industry advertising refers to such products as 
‘easier to operate’).
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At the same time, discussion of these issues has gone beyond management 
circles to the public arena. The still existing working hour burdens stand 
in stark contradiction to the 5-year plan developed by the government, em-
ployers and unions to reduce working hours. According to this plan, which 
has already been delayed several times, 1800 working hours are aimed for 
by 1996. In addition, the MITI and the Ministry of Labour are pressing to 
address the wasteful use of resources (material and personnel resources) as-
sociated with short model cycles and give greater consideration to recycling 
issues. Even inter-company oriented work policy – i.e. the organization 
of the supplier system – is reaching the limits of what is viable in spite of 
productive methods such as simultaneous engineering. At the same time, 
the supplier system holds no more potential for further rationalization and 
cost reduction (according, for example, to the corporate report by Toyota, 
Handelsblatt, 15.12.1992).
The supplier system is subject to additional burdens arising in the con-
text of the highly praised, purported ‘partnership-based’ cooperation forms 
between manufacturers and their suppliers (in matters such as simultaneous 
engineering, know-how transfers, direct personnel cooperation, as well as 
increasing utilization of information technology, etc.). On the one hand, sup-
pliers are becoming increasingly transparent for buyers, on the other hand, 
the latter expect suppliers to diversify their customers. This is not only an 
attempt to reduce ‘responsibility’ for suppliers in times of crisis. Buyers are 
primarily interested in suppliers being exposed to international competition 
in order to draw on their enhanced rationalization and product know-how 
at a later date. The problem of how suppliers will be able to generate the 
necessary synergy effects in the R&D and rationalization process under the 
conditions of greater diversification and transparency is the topic of much 
discussion (ISF-material). The balance between autonomy and control, and 
thus the distribution of productivity gains throughout the value added chain 
(Bieber and Sauer, 1991; Sauer, 1992, p. 187) remains unsolved in Japan as 
elsewhere, with necessary consequences for employees in supplier firms.
4. The JIT system is regarded as the pivotal element of Japanese manufac-
turing methods in the automotive industry. At present, this concept has also 
reached its limits in several respects, including work policy (JLB, 1991b, 
p. 4). The fact that other branches (especially the wholesale/retail sector) 
have adopted JIT principles has placed such an enormous strain on under-
developed traffic infrastructures that reliable just-in-time deliveries can 
no longer be guaranteed. If the present developments progress in a linear 
manner, traffic will increase by an estimated 20 percent by the year 2000. 
Large assembly plants erected in remote regions, distant from metropolitan 
areas (in Kyushu, for example), as a response to the labour market situation, 
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naturally create longer delivery channels. It is being overlooked that it is 
precisely the jobs in the transport and haulage trade that are among those 
no longer meeting with acceptance (due to factors such as long and irregu-
lar working hours, night work and work on holidays, long absence from 
home, heavy physical work, poor working conditions and low wages; Japan 
Trucking Association 1991) and that this could have severe consequences. 
Given the further extension of the JIT system and considering the targeted 
reduction of working hours, the government estimates that between 800,000 
and one million drivers (an increase by 66 percent) will be required by the 
year 2000. A figure that the Japanese labour market cannot provide (Demes, 
1992a, p. 482). At the same time, the transport companies find themselves 
confronted with increasing economic problems such as: smaller loads, de-
mands for shorter delivery times, negative sanctions imposed in the event 
of delays, and rising personnel costs. All in all, these are burdens that the 
transport companies cannot or will not be able to cope with. Here too, The 
Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) and the Ministry of 
Transport are pressing for the introduction of new logistics concepts (even 
keeping stores) and especially the consideration of ecological aspects! This 
is another area in which inappropriately lean rationalization concepts have 
outstripped themselves, not least for personnel policy reasons.
In conclusion it would seem that Japanese work policy, integrating person-
nel policy and rationalization policy, perhaps have not reached their limits, 
but it is currently confronted with considerable problems in a number of 
respects. Reflections of alternative forms of work policies which achieve 
productivity gains and thereby enhance competitive strength, should not be 
blocked through a fixation with the past success of the Japanese automobile 
industry. Our brief look at the effects of Japanese work policy has revealed 
problems for workers, enterprises and society, which, in the end, will result 
in consequences for the production mode itself.
The unique challenge we are currently facing in Europe consists of meeting 
worldwide converging rationalization objectives by developing work poli-
cies that adequately cater to the needs of society and the economy, while at 
the same time providing more humane forms of work. In view of the prob-
lematic aspects of Japanese work policies, neither the social nor economic 
goals can be adequately met by limiting solutions to the European status 
quo, nor by merely seeking to catch up with the Japanese. In conclusion, 
one must consider the fact that Japan has a tremendous latent potential of 
labour capacity that has remained relatively underdeveloped thus far, but 
one which surely will be mobilized in the future.
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Notes
1. This papers refers to the mass production sector (not just the automotive in-
dustry) and to production and assembly work on the shop floor level, while 
omitting the white collar sectors (such as R&D, for example). Although it would 
be most desirable, the current paper does not differentiate between different 
industrial branches or enterprises. The supplier industry is only dealt with in 
terms of its basic structures. The text was completed in early 1992, therefore 
the consequences of the current economic downturn in Japan (1992/1993) are 
not discussed.
2. The following treatment is based on research of Japanese work policies con-
ducted at the Institute for Social Research, ISF Munich, since the beginning of 
the eighties and focusing especially on mass production (automotive industry, 
particularly the supplier industry, but also the electrical industry). These projects 
were conducted in connection with research on the automotive supplier industry 
in the FRG and theoretical work on ‘systemic rationalization’. Apart from the 
author, the team of researchers includes Daniel Bieber, Manfred Deiß, Volker 
Döhl, Dieter Sauer (Altmann and Sauer, 1989; Bieber and Sauer, 1991; Deiß 
and Döhl, 1992; Sauer, 1992; Altmann, 1992a; Tokunaga and Altmann et al., 
1991; Tokunaga, Altmann and Demes, 1992). gI would also like to thank Klaus 
Semlinger, who is investigating the same issues especially in the small size 
company sector, for his valuable insights, Pamela Meil (also from ISF) and 
Masami Nomura (University of Okayama, Japan), for their helpful comments. 
The literature referred to in the following is selective and consists mainly of 
publications from German speaking countries and associates of the ISF Mu-
nich.
3. The term ‘work policy’ denotes all of the design measures pertaining to person-
nel and rationalization policies (technological and organizational) affecting the 
regulation of work within companies, as well as, that of dependent companies 
(suppliers).
4. Naturally small and medium size supplier companies also seek to retain their 
employees, which results in peripheral workers also serving the firm for a long 
time. Due to the tight labour market, the repercussions for the company’s image 
and for reasons of social responsibility, Japanese companies try to avoid laying 
off employees. Concerns which are by no means so ‘typically Japanese’ as to 
be conspicuously absent in other industrial nations.
5. Above a certain hierarchical level, such managers can no longer be members 
of the (company) union and thus are not represented by the union.
6. It should be noted that there is no formal division between ‘employees’ and 
‘workers’ and therefore no division of the respective training forms. Naturally, 
‘white collar’ and ‘blue collar’ workers perform different functions, as well as 
treading different career paths, etc. While a certain scope for permeability is 
pre-served in principle, it is soon restricted by the way in which individuals 
enter the company, as well as by personnel evaluation and task assignment. In 
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the follow-ing we will not be dealing with these issues. In Japanese enterprises 
there is also no differentiation between ‘skilled’ and ‘semiskilled’, although in 
many large enterprises this is identical with the differences between male and 
female jobs.
 7. See Tokunaga and Altmann et al., 1991, chapters IV-VI; and Jürgens et al., 
1989, p. 39, with a different emphasis.
 8. An example is Mercedes-Benz Rastatt, see Automobil-Produktion, 1992, p. 
128; Springer, 1992; for Opel see Minssen et al., 1991; Gesterkamp, 1992.
 9. The company agreement Nr. 179 at Opel-Werke, 1991. 
10. Naturally, skilled team work is also to be found in other sectors, such as in 
machine building. Team work is primarily encountered where male workers 
are employed (core workers!). In these areas, teams are formed comprising 
members with different training backgrounds (with 2 and 3 year training, 
sometimes off-the-job training), as well as workers with differing amounts, but 
nevertheless company specific experience. In all processes organized according 
to line principles, and especially those with female workers, such teams do not 
exist.
11. See for mass production in general: Tokunaga and Altmann et al., 1991, p. 79 
and p. 123; Jürgens, 1992b, p. 28; and Clark, as early as 1979, p. 104.
12. In view of the social division of labor (and considering the additional relevance 
to the working time issue (see 3.3)) a paper dealing with the supplier system 
alone would be justified. The Japanese supplier system is a precondition for 
the work policies that exist in the automotive industry, as well as a work policy 
instrument in its own right which allows the buyer companies to shift problems 
of flexibility, loyalty and cost reduction, etc., to the supplier chain. In this con-
text, the work policy measures and limited scope for independent action in the 
supplier firms should also be investigated. For reasons of space, however, we 
will not be able to discuss these questions. The consequences for employees in 
supplier firms will be summarized at the end of this paper (see 5.1). 
13. There is a profusion of material available on this topic; on the one hand the 
comprehensive concept of ‘quality orientation’ is dealt with, which in turn is 
regarded as a Japanese ‘characteristic’. De facto, however, this concept was 
adopted as the result of work policies (introduced by American management 
consultants) and implemented by management circles in conjunction with 
strategic sales market policies. The available literature also discusses ‘quality 
circles’, a widely employed tool in Japan (Beriger, 1986). The practice and 
design of quality circles is conceptionally well known in the West, while its 
concrete aspects are largely unknown (Yahata, 1987). 
14. Personnel evaluation was first introduced in the twenties in the large companies. 
During the war, evaluation was discontinued in light of the very tight economic 
situation. Only after economic stabilization in the 50’s, personnel evaluation 
was once again intensified and further developed. 
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15. The powerful position of authority that direct supervisors hold over produc-
tion workers has been based in large part on the personnel evaluation system 
since the second half of the fifties (after the traditional ‘feudal’ structure of the 
prewar period fell under a great deal of criticism from management circles and 
the still powerful unions). As a result of rapid technological developments the 
‘new foreman’ was no longer integrated into a potentially militant union, as was 
the case following democratization in the early fifties; the new foreman was 
called on to fulfill more personnel policy functions, particularly in conjunction 
with the implementation of new manufacturing methods and new products. This 
involved employee training (for which the forman was prepared using mainly the 
American methods of ‘training within industry’) and the personnel evaluation 
system. This development was also advanced by management interests in curb-
ing union activities, or guiding them in a direction that would serve corporate 
interests (employee activity in unions is recorded in the evaluation - negatively 
if necessary - although not official (see a case study from the wholesale/retail 
sector reported by Endo, 1992b). 
16. In view of the overwhelming proportion of male workers, this factor does not 
play a decisive role in automobile companies.
17. The difference in wage costs between manufacturers and lower level suppliers, 
exhibits an average ratio of approximately 3:1, Handelsblatt, 3.2.92; for an 
overview see: Hirasawa, 1990. 
18. This period has become increasingly shorter over the last few years, and is an 
important issue of debate in social policy.
19. For an example from the electrical industry see Tokunaga and Altmann et al., 
1991, p. 192, p. 220.
20. See for example the detailed case studies by Tamai, 1992, p. 398; for informa-
tion on structures and an assessment of working time see Deutschmann, 1987; 
Altmann, 1992b; Bosch, 1993.
21. Japanese unions are enterprise unions. At present there are more than 70,000 
individual unions. Normally, only the core workers hold union membership, 
while the union organization and interest representation of the marginal workers 
is rudimentary at best. In many cases, medium size companies have no represen-
tation of employee interests, and small firms usually lack such representation 
altogether. In Japan the total percentage of workers organized in unions has 
dropped below 25%.
  As institutions and in terms of union personnel, the individual enterprise 
unions are autonomous bodies which can conclude collective agreements. The 
umbrella organizations, and their programs and guidelines (such as agreements 
on protection against rationalization) are of very limited relevance for the enter-
prise unions. (There is a great deal of literature on these issues, see references 
in Kawanishi 1992; I will quote only a few examples relating to my own work 
in this field: Tokunaga and Bergmann, 1984; Bergmann and Tokunaga, 1987; 
Bergmann, 1990; Tokunaga, Altmann and Demes 1992).
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22. Decreasing profits and trade conflicts are regarded as threats to future wage 
developments.
23. Nissan planned (June 1993) to reassign 1500 out of 4000 employees in Zama to 
other workplaces (for example, machine building), and to transfer 2500 to other 
plants. The majority of the employees are resisting the transfers. The company 
union is trying to assure that no one is dismissed (see also JLB, 1993).
24. In this context the question of the control systems governing industrial policies 
and market policies in Japan and their underlying strategies should be dealt 
with in more detail.
References
Altmann, N. (1992a), ‘Convergence of Rationalization – Divergence of Interest 
Representation’ in Tokunaga, S. et al. (eds.), New Impacts on Industrial Rela-
tions, iudicium, München.
— (1992b), ‘Arbeitszeitstrukturen in Japan’ in IG Metall (ed.), Fachtagung ‘Ar-
beitszeitfragen’, 20./21. Februar 1992 in Nürnberg, München.
Altmann, N.; Sauer, D. (eds.) (1989), Systemische Rationalisierung und Zuliefer-
industrie – Sozialwissenschaftliche Aspekte zwischenbetrieblicher Arbeit-
steilung, Campus Verlag, Frankfurt/New York.
Asahi Shimbun (1992), ‘Wenn die mittelständischen Unternehmen nicht wieder 
Tritt fassen …’ (Leitartikel), Asahi Shimbun Dahlem, No. 8, 24.5.
Asanuma, B. (1988), Japanese Manufacturer-Supplier Relationships in Interna-
tional Perspective – The Automobile Case, Working Paper No. 8 for the Con-
ference on ‘Japanese Corporate Organization and International Adjustment’, 
mimeographed, Canberra.
Automobil-Produktion (1992), Sonderheft Mercedes-Benz Modellfabrik Rastatt, 
July.
Berggren, Ch. (1991), Von Ford zu Volvo – Automobilherstellung in Schweden, 
Springer Verlag, Berlin/Heidelberg etc.
Bergmann, J. (1990), Rationalisierungsdynamik und Betriebsgemeinschaft, Rainer 
Hampp Verlag, München/Mering.
Bergmann, J.; Tokunaga, S. (eds.) (1987), Economic and Social Aspects of Indus-
trial Relations – A Comparison of the German and the Japanese Systems, 
Campus Verlag, Frankfurt/New York.
Beriger, P. (1986), Quality Circles und Kreativität, Haupt Verlag, Bern.
Betriebsvereinbarung, No. 179 der Opel-Werke zur Gruppenarbeit vom 4. April 
1991.
Bieber, D.; Sauer, D. (1991), ‘“Kontrolle ist gut! Ist Vertrauen besser? – ‘Auton-
omie’ und ‘Beherrschung’ in Abnehmer-Zulieferbeziehungen”’ in Mendius, 
H.G.; Wendeling-Schröder, U. (eds.), Zulieferer im Netz, Bund-Verlag, Köln.
Bosch, G. (1993), Arbeits- und Betriebszeiten in der japanischen Automobilindus-
trie, mimeographed, draft paper.
Chalmers, J.N. (1989), Industrial Relations in Japan – The Periphal Workforce, 
Routledge, London/New York.
362
Clark, R. (1979), The Japanese Company, Yale University Press, New Haven/
London.
Clark, K.B.; Fujimoto, T. (1992), Automobilentwicklung mit System, Campus 
Verlag, Frankfurt/New York.
Confederation of Japan Automobile Workers’ Unions (eds.), Japanese Automobile 
Industry in the Future (1992), mimeographed, place of publication unknown.
Deiß, M.; Döhl, V. (eds.) (1992), Vernetzte Produktion – Automobilzulieferer 
zwischen Kontrolle und Autonomie, Campus Verlag, Frankfurt/New York.
Demes, H. (1989a), Beförderung und Entlohnung in einem japanischen Auto-
mobilunternehmen – Eine Fallstudie, Veröffentlichungsreihe der Abteilung 
Regulierung von Arbeit, Science Center Berlin, Berlin.
— (1989b), ‘Die pyramidenförmige Struktur der japanischen Automobilindus-
trie und die Zusammenarbeit zwischen Endherstellern und Zulieferern’ in 
Altmann, N.; Sauer, D. (eds.), Systemische Rationalisierung und Zulieferin-
dustrie, Campus Verlag, Frankfurt/New York.
— (1992a), ‘The Japanese Production Mode as a Model for the 21st Century?’ in 
Tokunaga, S. et al. (eds.), New Impacts on Industrial Relations, iudicium, 
München.
— (1992b), ‘Qualifikationsentwicklung und Karriere in Japan’ in: Georg, W.; Sat-
tel, U. (eds.), Von Japan lernen? Deutscher Studienverlag, Weinheim.
Demes, H.; Jürgens, U. (1989), ‘Skill Formation in the Automobile Industry – A 
Comparison between West German, British, American and Japanese Enter-
prises’ in Blumenthal, T.; Logan, C.T. (eds.), Employer and Employee in 
Japan and Europe, The Humphrey Institute for Social Ecology, Employer 
and Employee in Japan and Europe – Conference Proceedings, Beer-Sheva.
Deutschmann, Ch. (1987), Arbeitszeit in Japan, Campus Verlag, Frankfurt/New 
York.
DIHT (Deutscher Industrie- und Handelstag) (ed.) (1992), Japanische Heraus-
forderung – Antworten der deutschen Wirtschaft, Bonn.
Dollar, D.; Wolff, E.N. (1993), Competitiveness, Convergence and International 
Specialisation, The MIT Press, Cambridge/Mass./London.
Dore, R.; Sako, M. (1989), How the Japanese Learn to Work, Routledge, London/
New York.
Endo, K. (1991), Satei (Personal Assessment) and Inter-Worker Competition in 
Japanese Firms, mimeographed, Yamagata.
— (1992a), ‘Japan – Wo sich Wohlverhalten bezahlt macht’, Die Mitbestimmung, 
No. 10.
— (1992b), Sex and Creed Discrimination under the Satei System in the Japanese 
Firm, mimeographed, Yamagata.
Ernst, A. (1988), Dauerbeschäftigung und Flexibilität in Japan – Beschäftigung-
spolitik japanischer Unternehmen in Rationalisierungs- und Krisenphasen, 
Campus Verlag, Frankfurt/New York.
— (1992), ‘The Changing Nature and Persistance of Dualism in the Japanese 
Labour Market’, IFO-DIGEST, Vol. 15, München, September.
363
Ernst, A., unter Mitarbeit von Herold, R. (1986), Japans langer Abschied von der 
Vollbeschäftigung – Arbeitsmarktstrukturen und Arbeitsmarktentwicklung, 
Mitteilungen des Instituts für Asienkunde No. 147, Hamburg.
Ernst, A.; Laumer, H. (1989), Struktur und Dynamik der mittelständischen Wirt-
schaft in Japan, Mitteilungen des Instituts für Asienkunde No. 170, Ham-
burg.
Eswein, M. (1988), Gemeinschaftserziehung in japanischen Betrieben, Peter Lang 
Verlag, Frankfurt/Bern etc.
Garrahan, Ph.; Stewart, P. (1992), The Nissan Enigma – Flexibility at Work in a 
Local Economy, Mansell, London.
Georg, W. (1990), ‘Berufliche Bildung und Qualifikation in Japan – Einschät-
zungen und Perspektiven aus deutscher Sicht’ in Deubner, Ch. et al. (eds.), 
Modell Japan? Frankfurt/New York.
Georg, W.; Sattel, U. (eds.) (1992), Von Japan lernen? Deutscher Studienverlag, 
Weinheim.
Gesterkamp, Th. (1992), ‘Interessenvertretung in einer Gruppenarbeitsstruktur 
– weniger “Wachhund” denn Problemlöser’, Die Mitbestimmung, No. 2.
Handelsblatt (1992), 3.2.
Handelsblatt (1992), 16.10.
Handelsblatt (1992), 15.12.
Handelsblatt (1993), No. 23.
Hirasawa, K. (1990), ‘Subcontracting System and Labour Conditions in Japan 
– Wage Differential Problem and Enterprise Size’, The Studies of Business 
and Industry, No. 7, The Research Institute of Commerce (ed.), Nihon Uni-
versity.
Ikeda, M. (1987), ‘Evolution of the Japanese Subcontracting System’, Trade-
scope, No. 7.
— (1988), ‘New Development of Japanese Pattern of Subcontracting System’, 
The Studies of Business and Industry, No. 5, The Research Institute of Com-
merce (ed.), Nihon University.
Imai, M. (1992), Kaizen, Random House, New York.
IMF (International Metal Workers’ Federation) (ed.) (1992), Toyota Motors To-
wards 2000 – Report for Workers and their Unions, mimeographed, Toyota 
City.
Japan Trucking Association, Inc. (1991), Survey on Labour Shortage in Truck 
Business, Tokyo.
JIL (The Japan Institute of Labour) (1992), Japanese Working Life Profile, Labour 
Statistics 1992-93, Tokyo.
JLB (Japan Labor Bulletin) (1990), Kanaya, S., ‘Small and Medium Enterprises 
– Changes and Possibilities’, Japan Labor Bulletin, No. 9.
JLB (1991a), Suwa, Y., ‘Do Young People Really Hate ‘Dirty, Dangerous and Dif-
ficult’ Jobs?’, Japan Labor Bulletin, No. 5.
JLB (1991b), Kameyama, N., ‘Recent Debate over Just-in-Time System’, Japan 
Labor Bulletin, No. 11.
JLB (1992), Inagami, T., (1992), ‘Gastarbeiter in Japanese Small Firms’, Japan 
Labor Bulletin, No. 3.
364
JLB (1993), Yahata, S., ‘Relocation Arising from the Gradual Close of Nissan’s 
Zama Plant Production Line’, Japan Labor Bulletin, No. 7.
JPC (Japan Productivity Centre) (1992/93), Practical Handbook of Productivity 
and Labour Statistics, Tokyo.
Jürgens, U. (1992a), ‘Ein schlankes Produktionssystem beseitigt jeden Spielraum 
– darum ist es schlank’, Die Mitbestimmung, No. 4, Vol. 38.
— (1992b), ‘Lean Production in Japan – Mythos und Realität’ in Hans-Böckler-
Stiftung et al. (eds.), Lean Production – Schlanke Produktion, Tagungsband, 
Düsseldorf.
Jürgens, U.; Malsch, Th.; Dohse, K. (1989), Moderne Zeiten in der Automobilfab-
rik – Strategien der Produktionsmodernisierung im Länder- und Konzernver-
gleich, Springer Verlag, Berlin/Heidelberg etc.
Kawanishi, H. (1992), Enterprise Unionism in Japan, Kegan Paul International, 
London/New York.
Koike, K.; Inoki, T. (1990), Skill Formation in Japan and South East Asia, Uni-
versity of Tokyo Press, Tokyo.
Krafcik, J.F. (1988), Methodolgy for Assembly Plant Performance Determination, 
IMVP Papers, October.
Minssen, H.; Howaldt, J.; Kopp,R. (1991), ‘Gruppenarbeit in der Automobilindus-
trie – Das Beispiel Opel Bochum’, WSI-Mitteilungen, No. 7.
Morita, A. (1992), ‘A Moment for Japanese Management’, Japan-Echo, No. 2, 
Vol. XIX.
Münch, J.; Eswein, M. (1992), Bildung, Qualifikation und Arbeit in Japan – My-
thos und Wirklichkeit, Erich Schmidt Verlag, Berlin.
Nomura, M. (1987), New Technology and Industrial Relations – The Japanese 
Case, mimeographed, Paris.
— (1989), ‘Beziehungen zwischen den Unternehmensgewerkschaften eines Au-
tomobilherstellers und seiner Teilezulieferer – Organisation und Aktivitäten 
von Gewerkschaften in der japanischen Automobilindustrie’ in Altmann, N.; 
Sauer, D. (eds.), Systemische Rationalisierung und Zulieferindustrie, Campus 
Verlag, Frankfurt/New York.
— (1993), ‘Farewell to ‘Toyotism’? – Recent Trend of a Japanese Automobile 
Company’, Actes du GERPISA, réseau international, No. 6, des réalites du 
Toyotisme, mimeographed.
Roth, S.; Kohl, H. (eds.) (1988), Perspektive: Gruppenarbeit, Bund Verlag, Köln.
Sabel, Ch.F.; Kern, H.; Herrigel, G. (1991), ‘Kooperative Produktion. Neue For-
men der Zusammenarbeit zwischen Endfertigern und Zulieferern in der Auto-
mobilindustrie und die Neuordnung der Firma’ in Mendius, H.G.; Wendeling-
Schröder, U. (eds.), Zulieferer im Netz, Bund Verlag, Köln.
Sakai, K. (1990), ‘The Feudal World of Japanese Manufacturing’, Harvard Busi-
ness Review, November/December.
Sandberg, A. (1993), ‘Volvo am Scheideweg’, Arbeit, No. 2, Vol. 2.
Satori, A. (1992), ‘Suche nach Harmonie’, WirtschaftsWoche No. 50, 4.12.
Sauer, D. (1992), ‘Auf dem Weg in die flexible Massenproduktion’ in Deiß, M.; 
Döhl, V. (eds.), Vernetzte Produktion, Campus Verlag, Frankfurt/New York.
365
Schonberger, R.J. (1982), Japanese Manufacturing Techniques, The Free Press/
Collier Macmillan Publishers, London.
Special Enquête 1988 (1988), ‘Jingi Koka Seido ha dou Unei sarate iruka’, 
Chingin Jitsumu (Lohnpraxis), No. 8, Vol. 599.
Springer, R. (1992), Gruppenarbeit – Anlässe, Ziele und aktueller Stand – Er-
fahrungsbericht aus der Mercedes-Benz AG, Vortrag auf dem Refa-Boden-
see-Forum, mimeographed.
Staudt, E.; Rehbein, M. (1988), Innovation durch Qualifikation, ed. Frankfurter 
Allgemeine Zeitung, Frankfurt 1988.
Takagi, I. (1987), ‘Determination of Wages in Japan’ in Bergmann, J.; Tokunaga, 
S. (eds.), Economic and Social Aspects of Industrial Relations, Campus Ver-
lag, Frankfurt/New York.
Takeuchi, Y. (1992), ‘Rethinking the Economic System’, Japan-Echo, No. 2, Vol. 
XIX.
Tamai, K. (1992), ‘Working Conditions in Small and Medium-sized Enterprises 
in Japan – The Case of Osaka’ in Tokunaga, S. et al. (eds.), New Impacts on 
Industrial Relations, iudicium, München.
The Boston Consulting Group Ltd. (1991), The Competitive Challenge Facing the 
EC Automotive Components Industry, paper prepared for the Commission of 
the EC, London.
The Daily Yomiuri (1993), Jan. 4.
Tokunaga, S. (1984), ‘The Structure of the Japanese Labour Market’ in Tokunaga, 
S.; Bergmann, J. (eds.), Industrial Relations in Transition, Tokyo University 
Press, Tokyo.
Tokunaga, S.; Altmann, N.; Demes, H. (eds.) (1992), New Impacts on Industrial 
Relations – Internationalization and Changing Production Strategies, Mon-
ographien aus dem Deutschen Institut für Japanstudien der Philipp-Franz-
von-Siebold-Stifung, Band 3, iudicium verlag, München.
Tokunaga, S.; Altmann, N.; Nomura, M.; Hiramoto, A. (1991), Japanisches 
Personalmanagement – ein anderer Weg? – Montagerationalisierung in der 
Elektroindustrie III, Campus Verlag, Frankfurt/New York.
Tokunaga, S.; Bergmann, J. (eds.) (1984), Industrial Relations in Transition – The 
Cases of Japan and the Federal Republic of Germany, Tokyo University 
Press, Tokyo.
White Paper on Labor 1992 (1992), The Japan Institute of Labor (ed.), Tokyo.
Womack, J.P.; Jones, D.T.; Roos, D. (1990), The Machine that Changed the 
World, Macmillan Publishing & Co., New York/Toronto etc.
Yahata, S. (1987), Gegenwärtiger Stand und Entwicklungperspektiven von Klein-
gruppenaktivitäten in japanischen Automobilunternehmen, WZB/IIVG-dis-
cussion papers 87–206, Berlin.
Yearbook of Labor Statistics 1990 (1991), Policy Planning and Research Depart-
ment, Minister’s Secretariat, Ministry of Labour, Japan (eds.), Tokyo.

367
Lean production in the automobile  
industry: Second thoughts
Dan Jonsson
1. Introduction
Recently, so-called lean production has been heavily promoted as the ul-
timate manufacturing method in automobile assembly, especially in the 
book entitled ‘The Machine that changed the world’ (Womack, Jones & 
Roos 1990; henceforth MCW). This book, based on the International Motor 
Vehicle Program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, is the first 
to reveal, according to the cover: ‘… How the Japanese have been able to 
move ahead of the rest of the world in the global auto war … Their secret 
weapon: a manufacturing method called lean production … What industry 
everywhere must learn about lean production to succeed in the 1990’s.’
The following citations, beginning on the first page of the first chapter 
– ‘The Industry of Industries in Transition’ – reflect the missionary zeal 
guiding the authors:
After World War I, Henry Ford and General Motors’ Alfred Sloan moved 
the world manufacture from centuries of craft production – led by Eu-
ropean firms – into the age of mass production. Largely as a result, the 
United States soon dominated the global economy.
After World War II, Eiji Toyoda and Taiichi Ohno at the Toyota Motor 
Company in Japan pioneered the concept of lean production. The rise of 
Japan to its current economic pre-eminence quickly followed, as other 
Japanese companies and industries copied this remarkable system. …
This book is an effort to ease the necessary transition from mass 
production to lean. By focusing on the global auto industry, we explain 
in simple, concrete terms what lean production is, where it came from, 
how it really works, and how it can be spread to all corners of the globe 
for everyone’s mutual benefit. (MCW, pp. 11–12)
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This is powerful rhetoric, but sweeping statements such as these can also 
evoke scepticism. In view of the strong impact this book has had on Western 
manufacturers, there seems to be a need for a dispassionate analysis of the 
logical structure and empirical validity of arguments presented therein. This 
chapter provides an explication and assessment of MCW’s main message 
relating to assembly plant practices.
2. An explicated causal model
The schematic causal model in figure 1 represents an explication of the 
complex of ideas in MCW that will be analysed below.
Figure 1. A schematic causal model explicating an important complex of 
ideas in ‘The Machine that changed the world’
Note that ‘lean production’ is a so-called intervening variable in the causal 
model, so if this production method is established in plants that are not nec-
essarily Japanese-managed, the same benefits with regard to ‘productivity’, 
‘product quality’ and ‘success’ should be expected there. This is in fact one 
of the main messages in MCW.
The causal model may be expressed in terms of the following theses:
(1) The assembly plant practice of Japanese automobile manufacturers 
differs significantly from that of Western manufacturers.
(2) Japanese automobile manufacturers achieve significantly higher pro-
ductivity than Western manufacturers.
(3) Japanese automobile manufacturers achieve significantly higher prod-
uct quality than Western manufacturers.
(4) Japanese automobile manufacturers are significantly more successful 
than Western manufacturers.
(5) Japanese automobile manufacturers achieve significantly higher pro-
ductivity and product quality than Western manufacturers mainly be-
cause the assembly plant practice of Japanese manufacturers differs 
significantly from that of Western manufacturers.
(6) Japanese automobile manufacturers are significantly more successful 
than Western manufacturers mainly because Japanese manufacturers 
achieve significantly higher productivity and product quality than 
Western manufacturers.
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Theses (1)–(5) are argued explicitly and forcefully in MCW, whereas thesis 
(6) constitutes an interpretation of an implicit message. Since statements 
similar to thesis (6) have been made by many journalists and managers 
obviously inspired by MCW, and also because the relevance of theses (2), 
(3) and (5) is largely based on the truth of thesis (6), there are good reasons 
to consider this thesis as well.
3. The state of the industry
In this section, two questions concerning theses (1)–(4) will be addressed, 
namely ‘What are the meanings of the key terms in these theses, and how 
are the key concepts measured?’ and ‘What is the evidence for these theses, 
and what is the evidence against?’
(1) The assembly plant practice of Japanese automobile manufacturers 
differs significantly from that of Western manufacturers.
Table 1 reflects different assembly plant practices in Western as compared 
to Japanese-managed plants; practices in MCW referred to as ‘mass produc-
tion’ and ‘lean production’, respectively.
Table 1 
Some indicators of assembly plant practises  
in Western and Japanese-managed plants (MCW, p. 92)
 Japanese Japanese American All Europe 
 in Japan in North in North 
  America America
Size of repair area 
(as % of assembly space) 4.1 4.9 12.9 14.4 
Inventories 
(days for 8 sample parts) 0.2 1.6 2.9 2.0 
% of work force in teams 69.3 71.3 17.3 0.6 
Job rotation 
(0 = none, 4 = frequent) 3.0 2.7 0.9 1.9 
Suggestions/employee 61.6 1.4 0.4 0.4 
Number of job classes 11.9 8.7 67.1 14.8 
Training of new production 
workers (hours) 380.3 370.0 46.4 173.3
The data in table 1 should not be accepted uncritically. For example, the 
team concept as used in Japan does not correspond to the concept of autono-
mous teams as used in Europe, so the differences with regard to team work 
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reported in table 1 should be interpreted with caution. Even if important 
differences between assembly plant practices do exist, some claims about 
these differences in MCW seem to be exaggerated – e.g. the claims that 
lean production is ‘an entirely new way of doing things’ (MCW, p. 47) and 
that the introduction of lean production constitutes ‘a revolutionary leap’ 
(MCW’s cover). Such statements disregard the fact that lean production has 
retained or even reinforced traditional elements such as the assembly line, 
short work cycles, standardised work methods and hierarchical organisation 
principles (Ellegård et al. 1992).
(2) Japanese automobile manufacturers achieve significantly higher 
productivity than Western manufacturers.
According to measurements made in the International Motor Vehicle Pro-
gram World Assembly Plant Survey, Japanese automobile manufacturers 
achieve remarkable productivity and product quality (see figure 2). Note 
that ‘assembly plant’ activities include welding and painting of car bodies 
as well as final assembly of automobiles.
Figure 2. Productivity and product quality achieved in assembly plants 
(MCW, p. 93)
The productivity figures reported in MCW have been widely cited. Unfortu-
nately, the way they have been presented and interpreted has often revealed 
an inadequate understanding of these figures. Several basic points concerning 
the meaning and measurement of productivity have often been overlooked.
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First, sufficient attention is not always paid to the fact that ‘productivity’ in 
MCW refers to assembly plant productivity. This concept encompasses only 
a small fraction of all value-adding activities in the automobile industry.
Second, the measurement of assembly plant productivity poses several 
problems and involves some dubious or at least debatable decisions.
It is important to note that the productivity figures reported are not based 
on the number of automobiles produced and the number of man-hours spent 
in the assembly plant as observed during some specific period or periods 
of time (e.g., one year or a random sample of shifts). Instead, productivity 
figures are based on a standardised number of automobiles produced by a 
standardised number of employees during a standard shift (Krafcik 1987, 
p. 18; Krafcik 1988, pp. 57–58).
As a consequence of this measurement approach, insufficient attention is 
paid to overtime. Unpaid ‘voluntary’ overtime, a common practice in Japan, 
is not included in the man-hour counts. Nor is paid overtime included, appar-
ently, since total working hours per shift are calculated from the (nominal) 
length of shifts and the (adjusted) number of workers in each shift (Krafcik 
1988, pp. 57–58).
Neglecting overtime may introduce a serious measurement bias in favour 
of Japanese manufacturers. As an illustration, visitors to the Toyota star 
plant in Takaoka, Japan reported an actual working week of 60 hours in 
1988, whereas the nominal working week was only 40 hours (Williams et 
al. 1992, p. 16).
Furthermore, the number of vehicles produced in a standard shift can be 
calculated by (1) dividing the number of minutes per shift by the stipulated 
number of minutes per work cycle for each assembly line and then adding 
the assembly-line capacities thus calculated, or (2) dividing the number of 
vehicles produced per year by the number of shifts per year. The first method 
(which presupposes that conventional line assembly is used) provides a 
measure of nominal production capacity, whereas the second method also 
reflects capacity utilisation. It is not clear which one, if any, of these methods 
that was used in the World Assembly Plant Survey.
An issue raised here concerns the relationship between productivity and 
capacity utilisation. Japanese assembly plants have attained high and stable 
levels of capacity utilisation; for example, the quarterly capacity utilisation 
in the motor vehicles and parts manufacturing sector as of 1991 varied from 
96 percent to 101 percent in Japan versus from 67 percent to 76 percent in 
the United States (Williams et al. 1992, p. 20). Since low capacity utilisa-
tion affects productivity negatively, there is again a risk of introducing a 
considerable bias in favour of Japanese automobile manufacturers.
It should also be noted that all employment figures used in the calculation 
of productivity measures were ‘based on the number of employees required 
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to operate, not the total roll-on’ (Krafcik 1988, p. 57), implying that em-
ployees required due to absenteeism were not included. Furthermore, only a 
subset of all activities performed in the assembly plants are included in the 
man-hour counts reported. This subset is designed to consist of activities 
performed in all plants, the purpose being to improve comparability between 
plants performing more or less assembly work in-house.
To further improve comparability, correction factors were used to com-
pensate for the effects of relief time, welding requirements, product size 
and equipment content. While such corrections are motivated, given the 
measurement approach, the choice of correction factors necessarily involves 
debatable decisions.
One concern, then, is whether the definitions and adjustments described 
above really permit fair comparisons between different assembly plants. 
Another concern is based on the fact that the man-hour counts reported in 
MCW are substantially lower than the gross assembly hours calculated by 
dividing the total hours of effort in the plant by the total number of cars 
produced there. In popular discussions of assembly plant productivity, the 
standardised net assembly hours reported in MCW are often interpreted as 
– and compared to – actual gross assembly hours. Specifically, fictitious 
man-hour counts from Japanese assembly plants have sometimes been com-
pared to actual man-hour counts from Western assembly plants, resulting in 
grossly exaggerated productivity differences.
(3) Japanese automobile manufacturers achieve significantly higher 
product quality than Western manufacturers.
Thesis (3) is supported by the product quality data reported in figure 2. 
However, the measures of product quality presented in MCW can be mis-
interpreted unless certain crucial aspects of the measurement procedure are 
born in mind.
First, product quality is measured by the number of defects, that is quality 
refers to deviations from a standard. The issue of the quality of automobiles 
that adhere to this standard is not addressed. Second, only those defects that 
can be attributed to work in the assembly plant are included, specifically 
water leaks, loose electrical connections, paint blemishes, sheet metal dam-
ages, misaligned exterior and interior parts, and squeaks and rattles (Krafcik 
1988, p. 74). ‘Product quality’ thus means assembly quality as measured 
by the number of assembly-plant-related defects, not product quality in a 
wider sense.
Third, the number of defects reported are based on North American 
customers’ responses to a mail questionnaire. While it is useful to obtain 
customers’ opinions, this procedure does also involve several problems. It 
should be noted that quality measures were obtained only for automobiles 
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sold in the United States and that the questionnaire response rate was very 
low, about 31 percent in 1990 (Armstrong 1991). In addition, psychologi-
cal factors will inevitably influence customers’ assessments of defects. For 
example, what is seen as a defect will probably differ depending on whether 
the automobile is a luxury car or a compact car, and the customer-dealer 
relationship is also likely to affect the number of defects reported.
(4) Japanese automobile manufacturers are significantly more success-
ful than Western manufacturers.
As shown in table 2, the Japanese share of world automobile production 
increased from about 1 percent in 1960 to about 25 percent in 1989, an 
extraordinary performance.
Table 2 
Japanese share of world automobile production (Lööf 1991, p. 2)
 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1989
World 
production 12 766 19 232 22 578 25 215 29 216 32 728 36 015 
Japanese 
production 165 696 3 179 4 568 7 038 7 647 9 042 
Share of 
world production 1.3% 3,6% 14.1% 18.1% 24,1% 26,9% 25,1%
In terms of profit margins, return on investments, dividends paid and similar 
measures of economic success, Japanese automobile manufacturers have not 
been equally successful as they have in terms of growth of market share, 
however (e.g., Helling 1991). This is hardly accidental. Japanese automobile 
manufacturers have pursued a long-term strategy, where they are willing to 
buy market shares in order to gain a strong market position. As they put it 
themselves: ‘First win, then profit’. This strategy has been stimulated by the 
keiretsu system, which provides for financial stability, and by the extended 
pay-off times for investments tolerated in Japan.
Second, even if ‘success’ is interpreted as ‘successful market perform-
ance’, some concerns remain. Note that the Japanese share of world auto-
mobile production has not shown an upward trend since 1980. A further 
sign that the tide may have turned is that Japanese companies have been 
significantly hit by the recent down-turn for the global automobile market, 
while the down-turns in 1969, 1975 and 1982 did not affect them to the 
same extent.
Such observations suggest that the factors explaining the fast growth of the 
Japanese automobile industry may have been present and effective mainly 
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during the 1960s and 1970s. It is not obvious that because of Japanese auto-
mobile manufacturers’ success yesterday, Western manufacturers should 
emulate tomorrow what the Japanese are doing today.
4. Determinants of assembly-plant productivity  
and assembly quality
Correlations thus exist between assembly plants’ national affiliation (Japa-
nese vs. Western) and their reported productivity, and also between national 
affiliation and reported assembly quality. These correlations are in MCW 
interpreted as evidence of causal relations as stated in thesis (5).
(5) Japanese automobile manufacturers achieve significantly higher 
productivity (i.e. assembly plant productivity) and product quality (i.e. 
assembly quality) than Western manufacturers mainly because the as-
sembly plant practice of Japanese manufacturers differs significantly 
from that of Western manufacturers.
As discussed in section 3, the reported correlations may be exaggerated 
due to measurement errors. In addition, it will be argued here that even if 
the correlations are accepted at face value they do not demonstrate causal-
ity. The main part of any productivity and quality advantage exhibited by 
Japanese-managed assembly plants is probably due to other factors than 
lean production understood as a manufacturing method.
Four types of factors that affect productivity and quality may be distin-
guished: ‘materials’, ‘machines’, ‘men’ and ‘methods’ (e.g., Krafcik 1988). 
The salient question is to what extent productivity and quality are affected by 
the first three of these factors and to what extent they are affected by the last 
factor, ‘methods’. This question is important because, to be specific, easy-to-
assemble cars (’materials’), extensive automation (’machines’) and skilled 
and hardworking employees (’men’) are not defining features of lean produc-
tion systems whereas a certain assembly plant practice (’methods’) is.
4.1 Assembly plant productivity
As noted in MCW (pp. 96–97), the ‘materials’ factor, which concerns the 
manufacturability of automobiles, is an important determinant of the number 
of man-hours required for assembly work. In spite of that, manufacturability 
was not taken into account when assessing assembly plant productivity, with 
the exception of a rather crude correction for automobile size as discussed 
above.
‘Answering the manufacturability question definitely is difficult’, say the 
authors of MCW in defence of this omission, ‘because we would have to 
perform what automobile manufacturers call a tear-down analysis on every 
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car being assembled in every plant we surveyed. Only then could we see how 
many parts the car has and how easily they can be assembled. This analysis 
would be staggeringly expensive and time-consuming.’ (MCW, p. 96)
This is not very convincing, though. Standard assembly times based on 
time-and-motion analysis are required in all line assembly plants in order 
to perform capacity calculations and line balancing. Therefore, it seems 
reasonable to believe that such data should have been rather easy to obtain 
for all plants in the study. As an alternative, or a complement, data extracted 
from product data bases can be used to estimate required assembly times. In 
a study by Engström (1983, p. B6:6), the number of parts to be assembled 
and the type of fasteners used were found to account for 85 percent of the 
variation in standard assembly times.
In the absence of more adequate data, MCW refers to two minor studies on 
manufacturability (p. 96). In one study, eight automobile companies ranked 
19 manufacturers according to the manufacturability of their products. The 
rankings agreed fairly well, and in terms of average rank the six Japanese 
manufacturers won positions 1, 2, 3, 5, 8 and 9. In another study, conducted 
by General Motors, it was estimated that 40 percent of the difference in 
productivity between one GM assembly plant and one Ford plant was due 
to a difference in manufacturability.
Second, a considerable part of the variation in productivity is due to some 
assembly plants being more automated than others (the ‘machines’ factor). 
While the actual assembly work is difficult to automate, the welding and 
painting of car bodies can be automated to a great extent. Fortunately, the 
degree of automation was assessed in the World Assembly Plant Study, and 
as expected automation proved to be related to productivity. Specifically, 
about one third of the variation in productivity could be accounted for by 
variation in the level of automation (MCW, p. 94).
Third, the work intensity and the qualifications of the employees (’men’) 
also affect productivity. Obviously, if operators work harder they will com-
plete the job in less time, and a more qualified worker will in general also do 
the job faster than a less qualified one if they work equally hard. If strong, 
healthy, tenacious, skilled and highly motivated workers are hired it is rea-
sonable to expect higher productivity irrespective of production methods.
Again, MCW reports no data that could be used to assess such effects. 
Some tentative conclusions can however be drawn from reports concerning 
Japanese assembly plants in North America and Europe, so-called trans-
plants. According to such reports (e.g. Fucini and Fucini 1990; Berggren, 
Björkman, and Hollander 1991), the work pace in these plants is quite high. 
More importantly, the recruitment of employees shows a clear pattern. As-
sembly plants have been established in regions with high unemployment, 
very competitive wages are offered, and a no lay-off ‘guarantee’ is issued. 
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As a result, each position in the plant attracted a large number of applicants 
who were subjected to an extensive screening and testing procedure. It may 
be argued that these plants would not have taken such trouble and accepted 
additional costs unless it had enabled them to recruit a labour force unusu-
ally willing and able to work hard and skilfully.
Also, Japanese-managed assembly plants are characterised by a minimal 
work-force (leading to much overtime work) and small variations in capac-
ity utilisation. As a result, workers’ idle time is minimised. As mentioned 
earlier, it is not clear whether the productivity measure used in the World 
Assembly Plant Study is biased by this effect.
Now, if (1) manufacturability accounts for a major part of the observed 
difference in assembly plant productivity between Japanese and Western 
manufacturers, (2) automation accounts for about one third and (3) factors 
such as workforce selection and work intensity account for a significant part 
of the difference, there is not much variation in assembly plant productiv-
ity that remains to be accounted for by the fourth factor, ‘methods’, which 
includes the lean production assembly plant practice.
In conclusion, there is not much real evidence presented in support of the 
thesis that superior Japanese assembly plant productivity is mainly due to 
some powerful, ingenuous ‘secret weapon’ manufacturing method practised 
in Japanese assembly plants. Correlation is no proof of causality, and there 
are other plausible, indeed rather obvious, explanations of a major part of 
the observed difference in assembly plant productivity.
4.2 Assembly quality
The same type of analysis as in the preceding subsection may be performed 
for assembly quality. There are reasons to expect that product design as well 
as component quality will affect assembly quality. Similarly, automation and 
skilled and well-motivated employees can be expected to improve assembly 
quality by reducing process variations.
Unfortunately, it is difficult to quantitatively assess the magnitude of these 
three types of contributions to assembly quality – they may be decisive, 
but they may also be of minor importance. Consequently, it is difficult to 
assess the contribution of the ‘methods’ factor. In any case, thesis (5) is not 
proved in MCW.
5. Effects of assembly plant productivity  
and assembly quality
As mentioned in the introduction, the following thesis fits in with those 
considered above and is also worth investigating.
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(6) Japanese automobile manufacturers are significantly more success-
ful in terms of market performance than Western manufacturers mainly 
because Japanese manufacturers achieve significantly higher productiv-
ity (i.e. assembly plant productivity) and product quality (i.e. assembly 
quality) than Western manufacturers.
The notion that assembly plant productivity and assembly quality are suf-
ficient to explain the market performance of automobile manufacturers 
neglects many other important factors. This becomes evident in asking the 
questions ‘What determines total production costs?’, ‘What determines 
customer-perceived product value?’ and ‘What factors in addition to total 
production costs and customer-perceived product value determine market 
performance?’
5.1 Total production costs
In the absence of a critical discussion of the relevance of the man-hour 
counts presented in MCW, readers are prompted to believe that the reported 
man-hour counts accurately reflect total production costs per automobile. 
For several reasons, this is not the case, even if it is assumed that man-hour 
counts do reflect assembly plant productivity accurately.
First, man-hours do not equate labour costs; man-hour reduction is a means 
rather than an end. As noted in section 4.1, man-hour counts may be reduced 
by raising wage levels, thereby making it possible to recruit an elite labour 
force. Such man-hour reductions will obviously not result in proportionate 
reductions of labour costs. Furthermore, reduced man-hour counts may 
also be achieved through measures that increase non-labour costs, e.g. the 
introduction of automatic equipment to replace manual labour.
Second, the labour costs in the assembly plants constitute only a small 
percentage of the total production costs. In a Swedish final assembly plant 
recently studied, the labour costs amounted to less than 10 percent of the 
costs for materials alone. Even though labour costs for welding and painting 
of bodies have to be added to this figure, the assembly plant labour costs’ 
share of the total production costs was in the vicinity of 5 percent. This means 
that even if labour costs in the assembly plant are reduced dramatically, 
the resulting total cost reduction will be marginal. The cost contribution of 
assembly plant man-hours is not sufficient to merit the amount of attention 
paid to them in MCW.
In a broader perspective, on the other hand, there are many significant 
elements of the total production costs that may have favoured Japanese 
automobile manufacturers. For example, (1) Japanese designers have ap-
parently required less time and resources to design new car models, (2) 
Japanese manufacturers seem to be have been able to obtain components 
more cheaply than Western manufacturers and (3) capital costs have been 
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low due to low interest rates and low inventory. Capital costs (as well as 
administrative overhead) have also been reduced by the high capacity uti-
lisation attained in Japanese assembly plants.
Especially during the 1960s and 1970s, the main expansion period for the 
Japanese automobile industry, lower domestic wages, particularly among 
suppliers, created a cost advantage. In 1990, labour costs per hour in the 
Japanese motor industry were 90 percent of those in the United States, but 
as late as 1980 Japanese labour costs were only 58 percent of those in the 
US (Williams et al. 1992, p. 33). In 1989, Japanese motor industry firms 
with less than 100 employees – a category where the lower echelons of 
suppliers are found – paid wages equal to only 53 percent of those in the 
largest firms (ibid., p. 34).
Ironically, statistical data suggest that the productivity in the Japanese 
motor vehicle industry was lower than that in the United States at least until 
the mid-1970s (ibid., p. 18), so thesis (6) does not explain why the Japanese 
share of world automobile production increased from 1.3 percent in 1960 
to 18.1 percent in 1975. Nor does thesis (6) explain why the Japanese share 
of world automobile production ceased to grow when assembly plant pro-
ductivity reached the level of excellence reported in MCW.
5.2 Customer-perceived product value
As noted above, ‘product quality’ as defined in MCW is measured in terms 
of defects attributable to the assembly process, i.e. assembly quality. While 
assembly quality is one determinant of customer-perceived product value, 
it is hardly a major one, for several reasons.
First, the quality of the assembled automobile derives not only from the 
assembly process but also from the quality of the components assembled. 
Japanese automobile manufacturers have a reputation of demanding high 
quality from suppliers. How much component quality contributes to over-all 
product quality is an important question; unfortunately, it is not discussed 
in MCW.
Second, the customer-perceived product value depends not only on ob-
jective product features but also on how these features match customers’ 
needs and preferences. Originally, Japanese automobiles were designed to 
appeal to customers that wanted small and cheap cars, then dependability 
became an important selling point, and lately stylish appearance and ample 
equipment have characterised Japanese-designed automobiles. Whether 
Japanese automobile manufacturers have been particularly successful in 
designing cars that match customers’ needs and preferences during each 
period is another important question not discussed in MCW.
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5.3 Market potential and market presence
Other important factors that affect market success are market potential, 
primarily the size and rate of growth of a market, and market presence, i.e. 
availability and customers’ awareness of products. Japanese automobile 
manufacturers have certainly been fortunate to possess a domestic market 
with great potential and weak presence of foreign competitors.
The Japanese automobile market is today second only to the North Ameri-
can market, and 45 percent of all automobiles produced in Japan were sold 
on the domestic market in 1991. It may be argued that the growth of world 
market share for the Japanese auto industry in part only reflects the phe-
nomenal growth of its sheltered domestic market. For example, the number 
of motor vehicles sold in Japan increased from some 200,000 in 1960 to 
about 7,000,000 in 1989.
The increased Japanese share of the world motor vehicle market of course 
also reflects an increased market share abroad. But again this successful 
market performance partly reflects market potential and market presences 
at home. In other words, profits generated at home but used for market in-
vestments abroad have contributed to the growth of market shares abroad 
(MCW, p. 208).
6. Conclusions
The main conclusion of my analysis may be stated in two parts:
• There do exist important differences between Japanese and Western 
automobile manufacturers with regard to economic success, product 
quality, productivity and assembly plant practice. These differences 
are, however, somewhat exaggerated and distorted in MCW. (They 
are even more exaggerated and distorted in the general debate on lean 
production.)
• Contrary to what is implied in MCW, the ‘lean production’ assembly 
plant practice does not have a decisive influence on assembly quality and 
assembly plant productivity; there are many other important contribut-
ing factors. Moreover, assembly quality and assembly plant productivity 
do not have a decisive influence on economic success (even if economic 
success is narrowly defined in terms of market performance); there are 
many other important contributing factors.
The last point can be clarified by comparing the simple causal model in 
figure 1 with the amended model in figure 3.
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Figure 3. An amended version of the original causal model 
(the shaded boxes are those included in figure 1)
From a scientific point of view, the oversimplified message about the virtues 
of lean production presented in MCW must be questioned and criticised in 
several respects. The presupposition that the factors that explain productiv-
ity, product quality and market performance today did also explain them 25 
years ago is historically naive. Procedures for measuring productivity and 
quality are incompletely documented, the validity and reliability of the meas-
ures is questionable, and the concepts measured have minor relevance. The 
causal interpretation of observed correlations is methodologically naive.
But it would also be naive to assume that the book’s impact outside the 
scientific community is determined by its level of scientific rigour and meth-
odological sophistication. The big and difficult decisions facing managers 
in the automobile industry today are potentially anxiety-arousing. Simple, 
forcefully stated diagnoses and prescriptions that relieve anxiety have great 
appeal in this situation, whereas a scientifically solid, carefully qualified 
analysis may fail to impress decision makers.
Unfortunately, MCW’s analysis of the Volvo Uddevalla and Kalmar plants 
seems to have been affected by this logic of persuasion. The Uddevalla plant 
is dismissed as ‘neocraftsmanship … almost certain to be uncompetitive with 
mass production, much less lean production’ with neither any empirical data 
nor any understanding of its mode of operation to support this conclusion. 
Elaborating on the ‘neocraftsmanship’ interpretation, the authors speculate 
that ‘[t]he real satisfaction presumably comes in reworking and adjusting 
every little part so that it fits properly’ (MCW, p. 102), as if standardised, 
interchangeable parts were not used in the Uddevalla plant! The Kalmar 
plant is also misrepresented: the statement that it ‘reintroduced craft tech-
niques by giving small groups of workers responsibility for assembling a 
whole vehicle’ (MCW, p. 47) is false. While a more careful assessment of 
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the Uddevalla and Kalmar plants would have made the message about lean 
production as the ultimate manufacturing method less compelling, it would 
simultaneously have made the story told more interesting and credible.
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Humanization of the production system 
and work at Toyota Motor Co and  
Toyota Motor Kyushu1
Koichi Shimizu
In the mid 1990s, when it appears that ‘lean production’ is being adopted by 
all automobile producers, Toyota has been reorganizing the very production 
system upon which ‘lean production’ is based.
After encountering a crisis of work during the late 1980s in the midst 
of Japan’s ‘bubble economy’, the management and the union at Toyota 
began to question the production system and the social relations of work in 
search of a radical way to tackle the problem of work that had been posed. 
The conclusion was that the principle of ‘just-in-time’ should not be ap-
plied to people. In modifying the organizational principles of production 
(just-in-time and autonomization, the latter meaning that machines switch 
themselves off automatically when a problem arises) and the management 
of work, and in developing a new conception of the assembly line and of 
team working, Toyota decided to humanize its production system to enrich 
work, thereby making work more attractive. It is clear that Toyota wants 
to create a new Toyotaism, far removed from the ‘factory of despair’ image 
presented by Satoshi Kamata in the early 1970s.
And yet, radical as it is, reorganization at Toyota is still influenced by the 
old Toyotaism. The new assembly line has only been installed at the fourth 
factory at Tahara. Moreover, it remains difficult for Toyota to make a clean 
break with its previous method of managing work, especially since this 
proved so effective as a means to mobilize and develop its human resources. 
On the other hand, the experiments currently being undertaken at Toyota 
Motor Kyushu, the new Toyota subsidiary in Kyushu, suggest a clean break 
with the old Toyotaism as far as the management of work is concerned. At 
this factory, a different concrete expression of the new Toyotaism can be 
observed, one which appears to reveal the future of Toyota.
In this chapter we will discuss the following points:
1. The crisis of work and its causes, which led Toyota to question its 
production system and its social relations of work.
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2. The problems of crisis of work that the management and the union 
discussed during 1990–1992, and the measures they decided to adopt.
3. The new assembly line and social relations of work that can be observed 
at Toyota Motor Kyushu.
1. The crisis of work and its causes
For the Japanese automobile producers, the crisis of work emerged during 
the ‘bubble economy’ period, especially around 1990. It was already latent, 
since there were external and internal causes already leading to a shortage of 
labour. Then the overheating of demand due to the ‘financial bubble’ played 
a catalytic role in the appearance of a crisis of work.2
In the first place, the labour market had become increasingly tighter, so 
much so that Toyota and the other automobile producers were faced with 
a problem of recruitment by the end of the 1980s. This was due in part to 
the shrinking of the working population, due in turn to the lower birth rate. 
It was also in part due to the fact that young high-school leavers who con-
stituted the labour force for Japanese industry were tending to avoid jobs 
characterized by the ‘3 Ks’ (Kitanaï, or dirty; Kitsuï, or difficult; Kiken, or 
dangerous), and were looking for employment in the service sector.
In the second place, the rate of turnover amongst young production work-
ers was high in the automobile industry because of the very nature of work 
on the assembly line, which was fragmented, monotonous, and repetitive. 
Even if recruitment targets were being met, the high turnover rate was threat-
ening to cause a shortage of labour. If that happened, production workers 
would be obliged to work long hours of overtime, all the more so as output 
was growing rapidly.
In the third place, and finally, the ‘financial bubble’ appeared to overheat 
the automobile market. Not only did output increase rapidly, but purchasers 
wanted top-of-the-range cars and a wide variety of choice. The producers 
were already tending to diversify their product range and increase the va-
riety of their models, and the ‘bubble economy’ accelerated this tendency. 
Yet the Japanese automobile producers did not possess sufficient capacity 
to respond fast enough, partly because they were unable to hire enough 
labour (due to the labour shortage), and partly because they had been try-
ing to introduce a ‘lean production’ system since the first oil crisis in the 
early 1970s. Accordingly, their employees (not just production workers but 
also engineers) were so overloaded that lead-times and replacement cycles 
had lengthened. While the producers were able to resort to the employment 
of temporary employees on a massive scale to reduce the labour shortage, 
this only led to a reduction of productive efficiency, since the temporary 
employees did not possess the abilities that were necessary even though 
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their salaries were very high compared to other employees of their age. 
Obliged thus to work long hours, employees became exhausted, and found 
themselves not so much paid considering their extra work load. There arose 
a certain disaffectedness amongst the hard core of the work force towards 
assembly line work.
The crisis of work which thus emerged found its root causes in structural 
change in the labour market, the nature of assembly line work, and Japa-
nese-style ‘lean production’. The behaviours of the automobile producers 
when confronted with this crisis of work were not, however, identical. 
Some producers decided to construct highly automated factories, such as 
the second Nissan factory in Kyushu in 1992, and the Mazda factory at 
Hofu in 1992. During this period Toyota also constructed its fourth factory 
at Tahara, opened in October 1991, which manufactures top-of-the-range 
Toyota models (Celsior, Lexus LS400, Crown-Majesta and Aristo GS300) on 
two assembly lines. However, Toyota put into practice a new conception of 
the assembly line, because it recognized that the cause of the crisis of work 
lay in its production system and its method of managing work.
The Toyota production system tended to intensify work, because it man-
aged productive efficiency in a way that was closely linked to the salary 
system.3 As the term ‘lean’ indicates, the objective of the Toyota production 
system was to reduce production costs. ‘Just-in-time’ production was one 
means (production without stocks), but management also managed costs 
scrupulously, especially variable costs, from upstream to downstream. As 
far as labour costs were concerned, its method of managing productive ef-
ficiency had as its goal the reduction of production times (Ko-Su-Teïgen) and 
the number of production workers (Sho-Jin-Ka) through the mobilization of 
employees towards improvement (Kaizen) of production tasks and proce-
dures. This management method was based upon payment for production.
Payment for production, which accounted for about 60 percent of the 
standard salary in the late 1980s, was the product of the basic salary and 
the coefficient of production remuneration (CPR). While the calculation of 
the CPR for each shift is complex, the factors included are the real time of 
production, the volume of production, and the standard time. In principle, a 
reduction in the real time of production and an increase in production volume 
have a positive impact on payment, and a reduction of standard time has 
a negative impact. In this system, it is necessary to reduce the real time of 
production in order to increase productive efficiency, and thereby payment 
for production, with a given standard time and production volume.
The management of productive efficiency is therefore focused on the real 
time of production (which is the product of working time and the number 
of production workers), and the standard time (which is the point of refer-
ence for measuring productive efficiency).4 In monitoring changes in the 
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productive efficiency of each shift, management imposes the factories to 
reduce the standard time and the number of production workers, and these 
become the norms for Kaizen activities. Thus a Kaizen-productivity-salary 
chain is established.
<Figure 1, Page 386, Part IV, Shimizu>
Figure 1. The relationship between kaizen, productivity and salary
Through Kaizen activities, the productive efficiency of each shift is in-
creased, so that its coefficient of productive efficiency (CEP) rises, which 
in turn brings higher payment for production. Once the CEP has passed a 
certain threshold, the standard time and the number of production workers 
in each shift will be reduced, and as a result its productive efficiency will 
be lowered since it has to function with fewer production workers. Each 
shift, or rather the section which manages this shift (a section manages two 
alternating shifts) will then attempt to increase its productive efficiency 
through Kaizen activities on production tasks and procedures, so as to 
increase its CEP.
This mechanism was able to function well over nearly forty years to in-
crease productivity and contain the growth in numbers of production workers 
because the following conditions were fulfilled:
1. Stable social relations of work based upon mutual trust between employ-
er and union (employees beneath section leaders are all unionized).5
2. Adequate training for supervisors in Kaizen activities, including meth-
ods of determining the standard task and the standard time.6
3. Creation of sound human relations in the factory, so that everybody 
participates in, or at least accepts, Kaizen (this is also one of the func-
tions of supervisors).
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4. The principle of sharing the benefits of Kaizen activities (system of 
payment for production); etc.
However, the outcome of this management system was that the factories 
worked with the minimum number of production workers and at a very fast 
pace. Their Kaizen activities led them to work increasingly faster and harder. 
This method of managing work can be interpreted as the application of ‘just-
in-time production’ principles to people. During the era of stable economic 
growth, the Toyota production system, managed according to this method, 
functioned so well that it was considered to be a model for post-Fordism. Not 
surprisingly, it provoked a high rate of turnover amongst younger workers, 
especially in the assembly factories.7 Nonetheless, a labour force could be 
assured, one way or another, until the second half of the 1980s.
The ‘bubble economy’ hit the Toyota production system hard, bringing the 
labour shortage to the surface. Having become too ‘lean’, and experienc-
ing recruitment difficulties, the production system was unable to respond 
to growing demand for products. To counter the labour shortage, Toyota 
hired temporary employees on a massive scale from 1987, so that they ac-
counted for 11.59 percent of production workers in 1991, the apogee of the 
‘bubble economy’.
<Figure 2, Page 387, Part IV, Shimizu>
Figure 2. Proportion of production workers who are temporary  
employees
Source: Toyota, Personnel Management Departement
Despite this policy, the crisis of work in the form of a shortage of labour 
could not be resolved. The massive entry of temporary employees with 
in-adequate abilities disturbed the organization of work, not to mention 
lowering productive efficiency. In the worst cases, there were groups of 
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workers (Kumi) of whom two thirds were temporary employees (according 
to the personnel management department). This forced their supervisors 
to work on the assembly line to help them rather than undertake their own 
functions. The result was increased overtime. Annual working hours in the 
production department increased from 2,224 hours in 1987 to 2,315 hours 
in 1990. Thus the labour shortage crisis was transformed into a crisis for 
the whole work force: the hard core of employees, including supervisors, 
were exhausted.
Facing up to the labour shortage and to the exhaustion of the whole work 
force, the management and the union at Toyota began to question the pro-
duction system and the method of managing work. They concluded that a 
radical resolution of the crisis of work could only be found in a reorganiza-
tion of the production system to make work more attractive, for they were in 
agreement that the cause of the labour shortage was the nature of assembly 
line work and the Toyotaist method of managing work.
<Figure 3, Page 388, Part IV, Shimizu>
Figure 3. Hours worked per year
Source: Toyota, Personnel Management Departement
2. The questioning, and the outlines of a new Toyotaism
In June 1990, in the midst of the crisis of work, union and management 
set up a committee to discuss ways to make factory work more attractive. 
Between 1990 and 1992, the committee discussed several problems which 
reached right to the heart of Toyotaism: 1) the management of productive 
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efficiency linked to the salary system, in particular to payment for produc-
tion; 2) personnel management methods to do with promotion, training and 
abilities; 3) uncomfortable working conditions that prevented older people 
or women from working; 4) the assembly line work in the assembly factories 
that lay at the root of the high turnover rate amongst younger employees.
Modifying the management of productive efficiency
Regarding the payment system and the management of costs, the committee 
questioned the method of managing costs, the system for evaluating pro-
ductive efficiency, and the determination of the standard time. The central 
problem in managing costs lay in the fact that it was too focused on the 
management of productive efficiency, unilaterally imposing the norm for 
Kaizen activities on the factories. What was needed, therefore, was to make 
it appear more rational to employees.
As has just been explained, the basis for the management of efficiency 
lay in the reduction of the number of workers, which was accomplished by 
Kaizen activities on production tasks and procedures. This in turn was based 
upon the ideas of ‘just-in-time’ and ‘autonomization’ (labour saving) which 
had been sustained and developed by T. Ohno. But the underlying cause of 
the crisis of work that Toyota was experiencing was precisely this system 
for managing productive efficiency. Therefore the idea of ‘just-in-time’ 
was questioned. ‘Just-in-time should not be applied to people’, according 
to a section leader at the Motomachi factory. ‘If the number of production 
workers is increased, productive efficiency will be lowered. But we should 
not think solely about productive efficiency’, according to the personnel 
management department. The implication is that the reduction in the number 
of production workers should not be pushed too far. In other words, ‘lean 
production’ should not be applied to production workers. Otherwise, work 
will continue to be detested by the younger generation and will continue to 
tire production workers and supervisors. Hence the committee proposed to 
modify the management of costs.
The practice had been to set labour cost objectives when a model was 
launched or updated, according to the best costs obtained in the past, while 
the cost of raw materials was set by estimates. To resolve this contradiction, 
the cost goal would now be set according to results achieved three months 
after model launch. Moreover, management had imposed the Kaizen norm 
uniformly, without taking the characteristics of the factories into considera-
tion. Henceforth, management would set Kaizen objectives taking into ac-
count objectives that the factories set for themselves voluntarily. Moreover, 
Kaizen objectives would be set for a year, instead of six months, since with 
six-month periods it was difficult to undertake Kaizen activities with long 
term impacts.8 Simultaneously, management promised to focus more on 
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trying to reduce the costs of raw materials, parts and components instead of 
compelling the factories to increase their productive efficiency. As a result, 
cost planning during the design phase becomes a more important way of 
lowering costs. Simply put, management has renounced its authoritarian and 
unilateral power to manage costs, and above all productive efficiency, and 
has given the factories autonomy in the pursuit of Kaizen activities. With 
this autonomy, however, comes more responsibility.
At the same time, the system of payment for production as a tool for 
managing productive efficiency has been made more rational. Under the 
old system, the coefficient of production remuneration (CPR) for the direct 
section was calculated according to a classification of every shift together. 
However, the productive efficiency of the more automated factories tends to 
be higher than that of the less automated factories such as assembly factories. 
To correct this imbalance, the calculation of the CPE is to be undertaken 
according to groups of homogeneous factories: a group for foundries, forges, 
stamping and sheet metal plants; a group for mechanical components; a 
group for body construction, painting and plastic moulding; and an assembly 
group. Henceforth, management is to evaluate the productive efficiency and 
the Kaizen efforts of each shift by group, taking the characteristics of the 
factories into account. Furthermore, management has reorganized direct and 
indirect sections to enable the factory as a whole can improve its produc-
tive efficiency. The two sections are thus regrouped into a single section 
‘P’ (plant).9 Now the productive efficiency of the whole factory is to be 
evaluated rather than that of the direct section. Accordingly, cooperation 
between the two sections has become more important.
Regarding the management of working time, in other words the number 
of production workers and the working hours per person, several modifica-
tions have been made. For the standard time in the assembly factories, only 
the time required to attach parts to the automobile body had been measured, 
but management now allows other factors to be taken into consideration, to 
make the process seem reasonable in the eyes of the production workers. 
Tasks undertaken by older or female production workers can also be taken 
into account in determining standard times. Moreover, with the lengthen-
ing of the initial training period, and the establishment of a new vocational 
training scheme (see below), employees who are taking part in them are 
excluded from the CPE calculation during their off-the-job training (their 
salary is of course still paid), for as long as their training lasts. Finally in 
respect of the management of working time, management and union are 
recommending to employees that they take all their paid holidays, so that 
the planned reduction in annual working hours is met.10 Simply put, the 
management of standard time and the length of working time have become 
less of a constraint and appear more reasonable to employees.
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Questioning personnel management: training and hierarchical position
In the area of personnel management there have been a number of modifica-
tions: initial training aimed at reducing the high rate of turnover amongst 
new recruits; a new vocational training scheme to broaden the abilities of 
production workers; a reorganization of the hierarchial positions of supervi-
sors; and changes to the system of obligatory renunciation of the functions 
for which a person is responsible at the age of 55.
To resolve the problem of the rate of turnover amongst new recruits, 
which reached 25 percent for the first time in 1990, in 1993 Toyota made 
modifications to their initial training. Formerly, new recruits were as-
signed to the factories as production workers after two weeks of training at 
company headquarters. Management has now eliminated this training and 
devolved it to the factories, at the same time making it longer: nine weeks 
in the stamping, sheet metal, body and assembly factories, six weeks in the 
others.11 Generally speaking, the factory gives new recruits two weeks of 
general training, then assigns them to their work area where they receive 
on-the-job training whilst undertaking half the tasks of production workers 
and rotating to different posts within the work area. Their first post will then 
be determined after training. It is too early to evaluate the results, but the 
prolongation of initial training appears to be having a favourable impact in 
reducing the rate of turnover. In the assembly factories, the rate of turnover 
has been reduced by 9 percent. The same effect can be seen in the factories 
which spread training over nine months, while turnover in the other factories 
has increased by 5 percent.
For production workers, the new vocational training scheme was intro-
duced in February 1991. Management allocates production workers to four 
levels (C, B, A and S) of vocational competence, according to the results 
of a test given after they have received off-the-job training followed by on-
the-job training. For production workers in the direct section, there are 40 
hours of off-the-job training for candidates at each level. For maintenance 
technicians, there are 280 hours of training for candidates at level C, 360 
hours at level B, and 460 hours at level A (there is not yet a level S). As an 
example, the case of production workers in assembly areas at the Motomachi 
factory can be examined. A level C production worker is able to undertake 
two or three tasks with a minimum seniority of two years; a person at level 
B is able to undertake tasks extending beyond those of his work team (Han), 
including repair, with a minimum seniority of five years; a person at level 
A is able to undertake tasks extending beyond those of his work group 
(Kumi), with a minimum seniority of ten years; finally, a person at level S, 
with more than fifteen years seniority, should be able to undertake every 
task in the assembly area, in other words be able to assemble a whole car 
by himself. In this way task rotation too is made systematic as a means of 
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implementing the new training. Toyota has adopted this training scheme for 
the following reasons:
1. The need to systematize abilities training for production workers which 
had previously been included in on-the-job training.
2. The need to broaden the skills and knowledge of production workers 
who only knew how to undertake limited tasks: there were no production 
workers who knew every task in their area (for instance, an operator in 
the stamping area might have known how to change dies better than his 
western counterpart, but he did not understand all the tasks involved in 
stamping).
3. The need to give opportunities for vocational training to produc-
tion workers who could not be promoted to supervisory posts where 
they would have received increasing training as they attained higher 
grades.
4. The need to give production workers training which would enable them 
to enjoy their work.
Thus, the goal of the new training is to give production workers ‘enjoy-
ment at work’ through greater recognition of their know-how concerning 
their work. While Toyota does not intend to introduce the Uddevalla model, 
there are certain resonances with this model. Certainly, the new vocational 
training scheme has been much welcomed by employees in the production 
department.
Toyota has also introduced minor modifications to the structure of hier-
archical positions and employee careers. As a result of mechanization and 
automation in areas outside assembly, during the 1980s there was an increase 
in the number of team leaders (Han-cho) without any subordinates, and in 
the number of group leaders (Kumi-cho) and sub-section leaders (Ko-cho) 
with few subordinates. To be a supervisor with no subordinates was demor-
alizing. Since at Toyota salary increases have traditionally been linked to 
hierarchical position-rank-post, the posts could not be eliminated. So Toyota 
has changed their status, respectively to expert (EX), senior expert (SX) 
and chief expert (CX), retaining the hierarchical position-rank that they had 
occupied. Henceforth, team leaders, group leaders and sub-section leaders 
are only to be found in assembly areas.
The system of obligatory renunciation of the functions for which a per-
son is responsible at age 55 has also been revised. The system has not been 
abandoned, but supervisors considered to have the required abilities and who 
wish to remain can continue to undertake their functions until they are 60, 
the age of retirement. Between March 1991 and August 1992, 60 percent of 
sub-section leaders concerned kept their posts, though only 12 percent of 
team leaders and group leaders kept theirs. Moreover, after the age of 55, 
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the same salary increases as for other employees are guaranteed, whereas 
they had been only half the average increase since 1982 (and had been zero 
prior to 1982). This of course is designed to provide a source of motivation 
for employees over 55 years old.
Improving working conditions, and a new concept for the assembly line
The committee decided to make investments to render the production system 
more humane and therefore make work more attractive. In fact, during the 
current long recessionary period, management has not reduced investments 
which are designed to improve the work place, even if investment in new 
capacity has been reduced. Symbolically speaking, the aim of this invest-
ment is to make the work place fit for older and female production workers: 
‘If older workers are unable to work there, it is the factory which is bad. It 
must therefore be changed so that they are able to work there’ (the director 
of the production design department). The assembly factories are examined 
below, since that is where Toyota encountered the crisis of work.
As far as the assembly line is concerned, the first step was taken at the 
Tsutsumi factory. The first of the final assembly lines was selected to be a 
model line. By dividing the line, which is more than a kilometre long, into 
four zones, and installing separate lines to prepare sub-assemblies (doors, 
engines, seats12), the factory is now able to maintain buffer stocks between 
the zones and between the assembly line and the preparation lines. The 
Table 1:  
Holders of vocational training certification, December 1st 1993.
Factories  Persons
 Level A Level B Level C
Headquarters  239 239
Motomachi  602 448
Kamigo  231 214
Takaoka  718 465
Miyoshi  145 81
Tsutsumi 9 732 711
Myochi  78 93
Shimoyama  166 108
Kinuura  93 165
Tahara  1,096 875
Others  750 1,156
Total  4,850 4,555
Source: Toyota: Personnel Management Department
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rationale is that it was believed that all the problems related to work were 
due to zero-stock production, or the rigid ‘just-in-time’ principle established 
by T. Ohno. This minor modification to an old factory is already being wel-
comed by the production workers. With buffer stocks, the work pace can be 
adjusted by line segment, so that the workers can even finish their allotted 
output before the set time (albeit only 10–15 minutes) while work on the 
adjacent, traditional assembly line continues.
Management is currently investing 500 million yen to modify the tradi-
tional assembly lines, 200 million yen to improve their working environ-
ments (mini-conveyors, lighting, etc.) and 1.1 billion yen to modify their 
processes (automation of the most arduous tasks, etc.).
However, the real innovation in the design of the final assembly line was 
created by the third division of the production technology department for the 
construction of the fourth Tahara factory.13 The assembly line is divided into a 
dozen mini-lines, and it is possible to keep buffer stocks between them. With 
wide rectangular platforms linked together in place of the normal conveyor, 
production workers are able to undertake their task while remaining on the 
platform and not having to walk along. Moreover, automation has been pushed 
as far as possible to eliminate tasks which are considered arduous from an 
ergonomic viewpoint (the level of arduousness of tasks has been quantified), 
and to resolve the labour shortage problem. With stocks between the mini-
lines, which was considered wrong by T. Ohno, each mini-line now possesses 
a relative autonomy and independence in terms of the management of produc-
tion. Productive efficiency has been increased, since if one mini-line has to 
be stopped because of a certain problem, the other lines continue production, 
and the line affected can catch them up later by increasing its work pace.
In terms of team work, four production workers form a work team which 
is responsible for a segment composed of a series of connected tasks (three 
or four tasks). The work team takes responsibility for the quality of its 
tasks, whereas on traditional lines, each person is responsible individually. 
Finally, some of the final quality control tasks have been transferred to the 
mini-lines (‘in-line control’: seven of the lines have a quality control post, 
and each has a rework post).
Table 2: Numbers of Supervisors and Experts in 1993
Hierarchical Rank  Supervisors  Experts Total
Senior Group Leader Kocho 1,400 CX 320 1,720
Group Leader Kumicho 3,920 SX 1,100 5,020
Team Leader Hancho 1,930 EX 9,580 11,510
Direct Workers     22,220
Source: Toyota, Personnel Management Department
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Thus the fourth Tahara factory, which is called a ‘factory for the man as 
“principal actor”’ was developed in order to bury the image of the ‘fac-
tory of despair’, in the words of its vice-manager. This new concept of the 
assembly line was to be developed even further in the construction of the 
Toyota Motor Kyushu factory.
But it remains difficult to make a clean break with the old Toyotaism
Simply put, Toyota is undertaking a humanization of its production system. 
But does the current reorganization spell a clean break with the old Toyota-
ism? It appears that Toyota’s goal is to give a more humane dimension to 
its production system and to its management methods. However, this does 
not imply that Toyota is throwing away everything that has been created in 
the past on the basis of the two ideas of ‘just-in-time’ and ‘autonomization’. 
What Toyota is doing currently is to correct the way these ideas are put into 
practice to make them more reasonable from the human viewpoint. Moreo-
ver, it is difficult for Toyota to make a clean break with the old Toyotaism. 
Without going into detail, the recent alterations to the salary system can 
be examined to show how difficult it is for the company to make a clean 
break with the past.
In April 1993 Toyota adopted a new salary system. The old salary system 
had already been modified in April 1990, with the introduction of payments 
corresponding to age and hierarchical position, each weighted at 10 percent 
of the standard salary. Correspondingly, the weight of the payment for pro-
duction was reduced from 60 to 40 percent, with the remaining 40 percent 
accounted for by the basic salary. However, the method of calculating the 
payment for production was not changed by these reforms. Moreover, a 
single system continued to be applied to all personnel. By contrast, in the 
new system, Toyota does not include payment for production in calculations 
for white collar employees and engineers (only employees in the Plant and 
Engineering sections now receive payment for production, which has been 
renamed ‘payment proportional to productivity’). Further, not only is the 
weight of this element in the salary reduced from 40 percent to 20 percent 
(the shares of payment accounted for by age and hierarchical position in 
the average standard salary now being 20 percent each), but the calculation 
method has also been modified: the CPR is no longer multiplied by the basic 
salary, but is applied to a payment grid linked to hierarchical position.
Hence payment for production is retained, under the pretext that its effect 
is to encourage production department employees to participate in Kaizen 
activities: it represents the salary system, in the sense that one is paid more 
to the extent that one puts effort into Kaizen activities aimed at increasing 
productive efficiency. This was precisely the goal of T. Ohno when he in-
troduced it at the start of the 1950s. While there has been a certain radical 
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reorganization of cost management and of the production system, Toyota 
remains a captive of its past. At Toyota Motor Kyushu, however, an entirely 
new system for managing work has been introduced.
3. A new Toyotaism at Toyota Motor Kyushu
Toyota Motor Kyushu is a subsidiary of Toyota which started production of 
the Mark II model in December 1992. Its relationship with Toyota is paral-
lel to that of Saturn with General Motors. Toyota Motor Kyushu, in other 
words, undertakes experiments that would be audacious for Toyota, which 
finds it difficult to sever its links with the past. What is most remarkable 
is that Toyota Motor Kyushu has not adopted the payment for production 
sys-tem,which means that it no longer manages productive efficiency in 
the same way as Toyota, and that employees are encouraged to undertake 
Kaizen activities by other means. In fact, there is not a policy of reducing 
the number of production workers in order to increase productive efficiency. 
Moreover, in further developing the concept behind the assembly line at the 
fourth Tahara factory, Toyota is giving team work a new dimension.
Salary and incentive
The salary system is very simple (the figures in parentheses are proportions 
of the average salary): Monthly salary = basic salary (60%) + salary related 
to hierarchical position (40)%
Since employees work in two successive shifts (6:00–14:50 and 15:05–
23:55) without overtime, there is no overtime payment. The basic salary is 
determined by the Sateï (evaluation), but mainly follows seniority and the 
cost of living, and is revised each April. The part corresponding to hierarchi-
cal position is basically determined by the hierarchical position of employ-
ees, which is revised by Sateï three years and five years after recruitment, 
then every two years. It is also revised each April, following the results of 
Satei and of negotiations between management and the union.
In the place of payment for production as a mean of giving incentives 
to workers, Toyota Motor Kyushu has introduced a new system called the 
‘Performance Incentive of Toyota Motor Kyushu’ (PIT) to encourage em-
ployees to produce, and to encourage Kaizen activities bearing upon costs, 
quality, and safety. This is done in order to stimulate an emulation between 
the sections (Ka) with the purpose of reducing the costs and assuring the 
quality. The evaluation of these activities is then reflected in an increase 
in the size of the bonus. For the first of these, the sum paid per employee 
amounted to 50,000 yen for the first six months of 1994.
These new systems have been introduced to avoid the negative effects of 
the payment for production system:
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The effect of the payment for production system is to push the work 
teams to increase their productivity. But if they are pushed too much, 
there will be negative impacts rather than positive impacts. (Quality 
control sub-section leader)
When we were discussing the problem of work at Toyota, the major 
problems were payment for production, which was suffocating us, and 
the principle of zero-stock production which forced supervisors to work 
on the assembly line and prevented them from undertaking their own 
functions. (Member of the general affairs department, former member 
of the executive committee of the Toyota union)
Thus, Toyota Motor Kyushu is trying to adopt a new incentive system 
through a new salary system, even as the management of Toyota does not 
dare to make a clean break with the system established by T. Ohno.
A new production system and a new way of working
The new assembly line at Toyota Motor Kyushu is a further development 
of the assembly lines of the fourth Tahara factory, but with less advanced 
automation, since in Kyushu the third division of the production technology 
department has concentrated upon technologies for semi-automation, taking 
into account profitability and the quality of the man–machine relationship. 
The new characteristics of this line are as follows (see Figure 4):
1. The platforms used (the same ones as at the fourth Tahara factory) are 
equipped with a base that can be adjusted for height, depending upon 
the height of the worker, so that production workers do not have to work 
in a difficult posture.
2. A working group is responsible for a mini-line, each of which has a 
quality control post so that the group can assure the quality of its prod-
ucts.
3. Moreover, with three car bodies before and after the mini-line, the group 
leader can regulate the work pace of his group; hence the organization 
of the work done by his group is based in his own abilities, whereas 
traditionally at Toyota it was based upon the abilities of the Kacho 
(section leader).
4. In this way more autonomy and more responsibility are devolved to 
the working group; the group can hold a 5 minute meeting in order to 
solve a problem or to make a Kaizen activity, by accelerating its work 
pace and accumulating 3 to 5 car bodies at the end of its mini-line.
5. Moreover, the assembly line is more efficient than the traditional line, 
since if one mini-line stops due to a problem, the others continue to 
function and the line affected can catch them up by accelerating its pace 
of work.
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While Toyota Motor Kyushu has not abandoned the principles of ‘just-in-
time’, which are supposedly being respected, it has relaxed the constraints 
imposed by T. Ohno in order to put in practice a more humane production 
system. In simple terms, the principle of ‘just-in-time’ is not being applied 
to people, while the idea of ‘autonomization’ is now being applied to people, 
and especially to so-called ‘team work’.
As far as ‘team work’ is concerned, it is the group leader who organ-
izes the task rotation in his group, taking into account the skill level of 
his workers. Through the task rotation a worker now learns all tasks in his 
group to become a professional worker in this segment. He can also move 
to another work group after having learned all tasks in his original group, 
in so far as he wishes to obtain a wider skill, and if his leader permits it. 
The groups in the assembly area include at least one woman, who receives 
the same salary as men of the same age, at least to start with (salaries will 
later vary, not by gender, but due to hierarchial position and Sateï). This 
is possible because the factory has become an acceptable place even for 
young women to work.
Moreover, Kaizen and suggestion activities too are undertaken by workers 
and work groups. The suggestion system was introduced in August 1993. 
Even though at Toyota the number of suggestions per person exceeds 20 per 
year, most of them only constitute ‘simple ideas’. At Toyota Motor Kyushu, 
by contrast, the worker has to spell out his idea in concrete form before 
presenting it as a suggestion. The QC circle activities are being launched in 
July 1994. A work group constitutes a QC circle with the task of solving the 
problems that occur in this group. To organize the activities for Kaizen, the 
work group holds a meeting, either after work in order to observe the tasks 
performed by the other shift, or during work, after having stopped the line, 
for 5 minutes in the case of an assembly area. The group leader is authorized 
to stop his mini-line whenever he wants, as long as the tasks of the other 
segments are not disrupted. This is possible since there is a buffer between 
the mini-lines. For the QC circle activities, each group sets up its own Kaizen 
goal proposed by its members, in general for a period of six months. After 
the sub-section leader, on the basis of his experience,14  has approved or 
modified the goal, it is approved by the section leader, who is authorized 
to make such decisions in the factory. Six months later the section leaders 
and the sub-section leaders jointly evaluate the degree to which the goals 
have been achieved. These activities are treated as a task, and the result of 
the activities will be reflected in the evaluation of the section’s activities, 
and subsequently in the size of bonus (cf. PIT mentioned above). As things 
stand currently, Kaizen activities appear also to constitute human relations 
activities. Members of the group can reinforce their ties in discussing a 
subject proposed by group members. This is all the more important since 
Toyota Motor Kyushu does not intend to introduce the same full human 
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Figure 4. The assembly line at Toyota Motor Kyushu where the Mark II 
model is made
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relations activities as at Toyota.15 If it is to undertake human relations 
activities, these are only to be within the factory and above all within the 
work group. Hence it is possible to avoid suffocating the entire life of the 
employees. What matters is to create a work place that is more humane and 
attractive for all employees.
In conclusion
With the depth of the current recession, the crisis of work would appear to 
be over. Surely Japanese companies are now talking in terms of overmanning 
and redundancies? Surely, sub-contractors which employ foreign workers 
are sending all or most of them back to their own countries? Is unemploy-
ment not disciplining Japanese employees? Certainly it is possible to observe 
signs of this. For this reason we do need to test Toyota’s seriousness. During 
the period of crisis of work, only Toyota dared to question its pro-duction 
system and its method of managing work, which were functioning so well 
that they were considered to be models for post-Fordism. It appears that 
Toyota was able to take seriously the crisis of work because even in the old 
Toyotaism, strongly marked by the personality of T. Ohno, Toyota consid-
ered the management of its human resources to be important, recognizing 
that they constituted the motor within the Toyota machine. In any case, 
Toyota has interpreted the crisis of work as a tendential phenomenon and 
has chosen a radical solution.
This questioning of the production system has finished by modifying 
the idea of ‘just-in-time’ and the management of productive efficiency: 
‘just-in-time should not be applied to people’, and ‘we should not think 
solely about productive efficiency’. Hence a humanization of the produc-
tion system and of work was launched. By investing massively to improve 
working conditions, by developing a new conception of the production line, 
by allowing segments of the line to keep buffer stocks, by making social 
relations of work more equitable and rational, Toyota has changed the rules 
of the game. For Toyota, ‘lean production’ appears to be the model of the 
past, because it placed too much pressure on people. The new strategy at 
Toyota is to give a more humane dimension to its production system but 
without hindering productivity; even if progress remains slow, and is held 
back by the old Toyotaism.
By contrast, Toyota Motor Kyushu seems to have detached itself from 
Toyotaism. In abandoning the management of productive efficiency cre-
ated by T. Ohno, it gives more autonomy and more responsibility to work 
groups thanks to the new assembly line. In organizing back-to-back shifts, 
it renders both overtime and night work impossible. A new boost is given 
to ‘team work’. Toyotaism thus appears to have entered a new era in which 
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it is possible to speak of ‘autonomization’ in its true sense, in other words, 
the ‘autonomization of people’. In the old Toyotaism, this word meant 
providing the machine with an apparatus which would stop it if there was 
an anomaly in its functioning, and the same idea was applied to production 
workers, who were supposed to stop the line when they experienced a prob-
lem. People were thus treated like machines, even if this was necessary to 
guarantee quality at each stage. In the new Toyotaism, people should have 
more ‘autonomy’ in their work at the same time as they should assume more 
responsibility.
The experiments at Toyota Motor Kyushu appear to be having an impact on 
Toyota itself. In February 1994, management and the union at Toyota began 
negotiations on the introduction of back-to-back shifts with neither overtime 
nor night work. This happened even though the union had categorically 
denied that it was possible when this author undertook interviews there in 
December 1992. Of course it would be difficult to install the new assembly 
line in the old factories, because they lack sufficient space. But the third 
division of the production technology department will come up with a new 
method of realizing the new concept.
Table 3: Toyota Motor Kyushu
Subsidiary established: February 8th 1991
Capital: 45 billion yen
Products: Mark II (medium class)
Production capacity: 200,000 units annually
Construction Start: April 25th 1991
Production Start: December 22nd 1992
Total Investment: 150 billion yen
Note: The level of automation is lower than at the 4th Tahara factory
Work force in 1993 May, one shift November, two shifts
Plastic plant 77 103
Unit plant 47 71
Stamping plant 61 103
Body plant 205 278
Paint plant 165 266
Assembly plant 395 795
Head office 200 250
Others 150 384
Total 1300 1970
Production per day 400 600
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In the current recession, the new factories are not profitable. The rate 
of capacity utilization at the fourth Tahara factory was only 50 percent in 
October 1993, while that at Toyota Motor Kyushu was about 75 percent in 
November 1993. And yet these factories do not want to become ‘factories of 
despair’, but ‘pleasant factories’. The new Toyotaism may be far removed 
from the Uddevalla model or the Kalmar model, and yet the attempts to 
escape from the fatalism of the assembly line and to give a more humane 
dimension to assembly work appear to be the shared preoccupations of these 
models even though different practical measures have been taken, not to 
mention the different sizes of the factories. But are there not differences 
in the methods used to humanize work between the Kalmar and Uddevalla 
factories? Despite the closure of the Volvo factories at Kalmar and Uddevalla 
it appears that the principles of the new industrial model are to be found 
in the humanization of work, and that the new Toyotaism may be seen as a 
leading model in the current situation (given the closure of the two Volvo 
factories) in terms of simultaneously creating productive efficiency and 
humanization of work; which is not, of course, to suppose that there is only 
one model for the future.
Notes
1. Translated from the French by Sybil H. Mair.
2. On the overall state of the Japanese automobile industry at the start of the 
1990s, see the well-known report of the JAW (1992), which characterized it as 
a ‘triple suffering’ in terms of exhaustion of employees, low profits, and trade 
conflicts (especially with the United States). 
3. On the detailed functioning of this system, see Shimizu (1994), which explains 
the relationship between the management of costs, the salary system (remunera-
tion for production), and Kaizen activities. 
4. To simplify, productive efficiency can be considered as the relationship between 
the standard time of production and the real time of production.
5. On the creation of these workplace relationships see Shimizu and Nomura 
(1993:32–36).
6. Toyota insists upon a special training for candidates for supervisory posts, 
in which they receive off-the-job training and on-the-job training in Kaizen 
methods, which are viewed as equivalent to the Toyota production system. 
7. According to the public affairs department, the turnover rate amongst new re-
cruits reached 20 percent in 1990. For production workers only, the turnover rate 
was reportedly higher still. According to the Toyota union, it was approximately 
25 percent around 1990. With reforms to working and living conditions, but also 
the introduction of a new first training scheme for these young em-ployees, the 
rate was halved in 1991.
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8. The Kaizen objective was even imposed on office and engineering activities, 
but here it has been replaced by supervision of overtime hours.
9. According to the personnel management department, the situation of the indirect 
section (maintenance) will vary according to factory, but the tendency will be 
for it to be integrated into the direct section. The goal is to broaden the skills of 
the production workers towards those of the maintenance technicians. There is 
currently a wide difference in skills between the two, due largely to differences 
in their training. 
10. In 1990, Toyota decided to reduce annual working hours by 300 hours between 
1991 and 1994. According to the personnel department, annual hours per person 
were 2,284 in 1989, 2,273 in 1990, 2,173 in 1991, 2,029 in 1992, and 1,915 
in 1993. According to the union, the rate of utilization of paid annual holidays 
was 70 percent in 1990 and 90 percent in 1992, and would be 100 percent in 
1993.
11. In the case of the assembly factory at Motomachi, the training is spread over 
nine months (in 1993, from April to December). While there is a general manual 
concerning initial training, the factories are authorized to organize it as they 
see fit. However, the Motomachi case is clearly exceptional.  
12. The line for preparing seats no longer exists, since they are now prepared by 
external suppliers. 
13. The fundamental concepts behind the fourth factory are: to manufacture top-
of-the-range and ecological automobiles but at a reasonable price, and with the 
most advanced technology; to attempt to motivate the employees by broadening 
their skills, with an emphasis on working in teams. 
14. The administrators, managements and supervisors at Toyota Motor Kyushu 
have volunteered to leave Toyota to work in Kyushu, which is their region of 
origin.
15. On the full range of human relations activities at Toyota, see Shimizu and 
Nomura 1993:46–48. 
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Recent developments at  
Toyota Motor Corporation: 
The emergence of a ‘Neo-Toyotism’?
Terje Grönning
Introduction
This chapter calls attention to some questions connected to the analysis of 
conditions within the Japanese auto industry.1 The point of departure derives 
from the observation that there are presently several developments within 
this industry and that there is a probable mismatch between the developing 
patterns and concepts developed within studies of the Japanese labour proc-
ess.2 Several significant organizational developments have occured, such 
as: the reorganization of the corporations, the reform of personnel manage-
ment institutions, internationalization and diversification. In addition, there 
is a discrepancy between the relatively medium-tech process depicted in 
the theories and the fact that some of the experiments now being proposed 
actually are relatively high-tech.
Indeed attention has been given to the question of possible trajectories 
for future developments within the Japanese auto industry (Kaneda, 1991; 
Nomura, 1992; Nomura, 1993; Fujita, 1994), or even within the auto industry 
at large (Winter, 1994). Kaneda identifies the key functional areas of the 
current ‘Toyota Production System’ as: quality, ability to deliver on time, 
and cost. This puts the mind set of industrial engineering and continuous 
local process improvements in focus. In Kaneda’s thesis of the coming 
agile production system, the key functions will in contrast be flexibility, 
service and amenity, and more far-reaching systemic improvements will con-
tinuously become necessary. In addition, the new system will among other 
things, according to Kaneda, require a reorganization of supplier companies, 
modularisation of production and networking (Kaneda, 1991: 252–253).
Nomura (1993) records some of the recent and observable changes oc-
curring within the Toyota Motor Corporation. He lists eleven areas of such 
changes, and these range from a flatter organisational structure to declara-
tion of new corporate policies (1993: 223). He analyses the developments 
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as being corporate reactions towards the potentially problematic areas 
within ‘toyotism’ that have surfaced during the current economic reces-
sion in Japan. But he questions whether there is evidence for the claiming 
that the method of continous process improvements has been fully usurped 
(Nomura, 1993: 229). He is however, like this author, interested in observ-
ing the labour market driven changes, and he thinks the most interesting 
area for further research is to question where the corporation in the future 
will seek its basis for competitiveness in the case of a situation where fac-
tors for competitiveness related to the labour market become weakened 
(Nomura, 1993: 231).
Fujita (1994) is also taking his point of departure in recent observable 
changes. He lists these as: various difficulties in maintaining the kind of ‘just 
in time’ system like the one that has been practiced thus far; difficulties in 
connection with recruitment; and changes in the organization of work due 
to higher levels of automation in final assembly (Fujita, 1994: 91–93). But 
he admits that further research is needed in order to be able to analyse the 
inter-relationship between these and other changes (Fujita, 1994: 95).
There is thus, a considerable interest in investigating the question of 
whether ‘toyotism’ itself is in the process of developing into a fundamentally 
different form of production organization. The time should soon be ripe for 
broader empirically and theoretically based reviews of conditions in Japan 
and thereby, provide material for discussions on the possible emergence of 
a ‘neo-toyotism’. Analysis of such developments is however, difficult, both 
from a theoretical and an empirical perspective. One such problem, is the dif-
ficulty of discerning between limited, short term counter-conjunctural cam-
paigns and more long ranging developments. Another, is the availability of 
data at the current stage. It should be pointed out that this paper is a tentative 
work, one which utilizes a specific case study of the largest manufacturer, 
Toyota Motor Corporation. The basic source is written materials for in-com-
pany use such as the company newspaper (Toyota Shinbun/Weekly Toyota) 
and supervisor bulletins. Additional information has been collected from 
public sources, such as newspapers and industry journals. The case study 
does moreover, concentrate on certain selected institutions and elements 
instead of making an attempt at presenting an encompassing analysis. The 
focus is also limited in the sense of being based mainly on announcements 
of corporate policies, not on a follow-up of actual implementations.
Within the borders of these methodological and thematical limitations, 
the study focuses on the following issue. There have been a number of 
policy announcements during recent years. Issues that have emerged as 
central within the policy discussions, concern the problem of how to im-
prove earning rates by implementing ‘a new production system’, implement 
more competitive personnel management reforms as well the need to handle 
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anticipated recruitment difficulties, changes in workforce composition, and 
changed perceptions among the current workforce.3
One may thus, detect a preoccupation with ‘productive’ investments and 
new forms for improving earning rates at the same time as labour market 
driven ‘non-productive’ investments seem to be necessary. The resulting 
strategy has turned out to be an increase of both ‘productive’ and ‘non-
productive’ investments accompanied by programmmes for stimulating 
increased efficiency.
1. Change in overall corporate strategy
This paper will mainly focus on certain labour market aspects of the way 
Toyota Motor Corporation management currently views its situation. But 
such selected aspects must be related to other attempts within the reorganiza-
tion strategy. In this section, I will offer an overview of the most significant 
of the policy changes. The description covers changes in overall corporate 
strategy, attempts at internationalization, measures for reorganizing the 
domestic basis, and measures towards achieving diversification.
1.1 Policy statements
Throughout the 1980s, Toyota has launched several propositions concerning 
what should be the corporation’s overall strategy in the future. After a peak 
in earnings in the fiscal period ending June 1985, huge decreases in earnings 
followed mainly due to a strengthening of the yen that began in late 1985. 
Toyota subsequently established a ‘Committee for Urgent Measures Against 
the High Yen’ (October, 1986). After assistance by an abrupt increase in 
domestic demand, earnings improved. There were however, continued ef-
forts for outlining a strategy that would secure high earning rates also in the 
future, and by the late 1980s the Toyota strategy had been drawn up in the 
form of stressing the need for pursuing the following three pillars in order 
to secure earnings in the future (cf. Miyazaki, 1994):
1. Development of a strategic pattern of activities overseas in order to 
emerge as an ‘international corporation’.
2. Reorganization of domestic production in order to ‘strengthen the do-
mestic basis’.
3. Strenghtening of new fields of activities in order to diversify.
These new priorities were further developed and conceptualized in the 
company’s new set of official policies declared in early 1992. The new 
policies replaced the ‘Toyota General Principles’ (Toyota Koryo) that had 
been in existence since 1935. The main theme of the new corporate policy 
was formulated as becoming ‘a corporate citizen that is being trusted by the 
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international community’. The three main areas for concentrating the efforts 
were identified as: internationalization, the environment problem, and ef-
ficient use of management resources. These priority areas were then further 
clarified in the form of seven paragraphs. Here are excerpts from them:
1. Strive to be a corporate citizen trusted by the international community 
by having open and fair corporate behaviour as the basis.
2. Strive for a more affluent society and a better world by making the 
supply of ‘green’ and safe products our mission.
3. Strive to supply products that are full of attractive features and thereby, 
respond to the demands from customers from all over the world through 
making efforts at research and development within the most advanced 
technology of various fields.
4. Contribute to the industrial economy by having our activities adapted 
to each country and each region they are localized in.
5. Create a company spirit where the individual’s creativity and the 
strength of teamwork is heightened to an optimal level.
6. Maintain a steady growth through efficient management on a global 
scale.
7. Achieve long term steady growth, co-existence and co-prosperity by 
conducting transactions on an open basis (Toyota Motor Corporation 
material dated 1992/Weekly Toyota, 1 January, 1993).
Apart from such policy statements at a rather abstract level, top management 
has occasionally gone into somewhat more detailed explanations mentioning 
specific target areas, such as, efforts for reconsidering the production sys-
tem. One occasion where such questions surfaced was in the 1993 new year 
announcement directed to the employees. Within the areas that were to be 
given priority in 1993 and onwards, the president singled out the ‘effective 
use of management resources’ as the most important field in the announce-
ment. This field included subjects such as, a reconsideration of the product 
lineup, reduction of direct material expenses, optimalization of investments 
in equipment, and development of a flexible production organization that 
connects to improved earning rates (Weekly Toyota, 1 January, 1993:1).
Moreover, Shoichiro Toyoda, chairman of the corporation since 1992, has 
in a recent article used the term ‘new production system’ when summing up 
various issues that the corporation is facing:
In the production shops … [we need to consider] the development of a 
‘new production system’ that is responsive to the reduction in the number 
of skilled persons and other changes in the quality of the workforce and 
that is responsive to a production formation that has taken on interna-
tional proportions. [We also need] to consider production shops where 
it is possible to feel attraction towards manufacturing and a sense of 
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fullfillment in connection with manufacturing, and there is a need to 
secure personnel within middle- and long range technologies (Toyoda, 
1993, his italics).
In this particular article, Toyoda does not offer further details as to what 
the ‘new production system’ should consist of, the nature of ‘the reduction 
in the number of skilled persons’, nor details on what kind of technologies 
constitute ‘middle- and long-range technologies’. But both these statements 
by Toyoda concerning a new production system, as well as, the earlier 
statements concerning an effective use of management resources may be 
juxtaposed with the way the production system thus far has functioned. The 
point of the production system has been to minimize manufacturing costs 
by eliminating wasteful elements within production (Ohno, 1988; Nomura, 
1993: 24). By minimizing manufacturing costs, it follows that the gap be-
tween manufacturing costs and turnover is likely to increase. Thereby, the 
corporation will see its earning rates steadily improved.
The policy statements and the Toyoda paper do however, reveal that the 
corporation has started to doubt the continued success of this production 
system. One factor behind such reflections is issues related to the product 
market. And the other factor is, as we will return to in further detail below, 
related to the labour market by way of ‘changes in the quality of the work-
force’ (Toyoda, 1993).
And when these are put together, the way of making an effective use 
of management resources will definitively have to take the form of a new 
kind of production system. The components of the new production system 
remains to be seen. However, as tentatively outlined by a previous manager 
in a Toyota Group company, the mechanisms for steadily maintaining a 
satisfactory gap between manufacturing costs and turnover will probably 
have to be thoroughly altered (Kaneda, 1991).
1.2 Internationalization
Activities for achieving internationalization have, both before and after the 
corporation went public with the strategy cited above, tended to be divided 
into two distinct trajectories. One is the transfer of production to regions 
with low cost levels in terms of labour wages etc., while the other trajectory 
consists of transfers to regions with high cost levels.
The former strategy has been pursued for years with the establishment of 
‘knock down’-production in countries such as South Africa (1962), Malaysia 
(1968), Portugal (1968), and so on. What is new within this low cost trajec-
tory is the transfer of larger chunks of parts production overseas and the 
construction of an integrated system for distributing the parts produced. Such 
a distribution system has been created in the low cost countries of East Asia 
and South-East Asia (Japan Auto Industry Survey, December 1992:3).
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The latter strategy consists of establishing partly or fully integrated as-
sembly plants in countries with high cost levels signifies a major innovation 
regarding measures for achieving internationalization. In the United States, 
the semi-integrated New United Motor Manufacturing Inc. (NUMMI), was 
established as a joint venture with General Motors in 1984. NUMMI was a 
semi-integrated facility in the sense that engines were not produced on site, 
but were shipped from Japan. The plant was followed by the completely 
integrated Toyota Motor Manufacturing U.S.A. Inc. in 1988.
In Canada, Toyota established a smaller plant (Toyota Motor Manufac-
turing Canada, in 1988), and more recently a plant in Britain has started 
production (1992).
1.3 Reorganization of the domestic basis
The activities for reorganizing the domestic basis include efforts concerning 
the structure and geographical location of the corporation itself. Diversi-
fication constitutes another area for activities. A third area is the changes 
in the production system and in organizational structures, i.e. the changes 
described in further detail in the main bulk of the paper.
The restructuring process started with the merger of Toyota Motor Corpo-
ration and Toyota Motor Sales in 1982. With this merger, the contures of a 
corporation with strong integration between production and sales emerged. 
On the production side, a parts plant was established in Hokkaido (with 
production start-up in 1992) along with a fully integrated assembly plant in 
Kyushu (with production start-up in 1993).4 The corporation thus emerged 
with a more dispersed production structure than previously.
The attempts at diversification may be summarized as follows. Diversi-
fication has occured mainly in the form of establishing separate divisions 
devoted to the development of new corporate target areas. Between 1984 
and 1991, a total of 19 companies with a total of approximately 4,530 em-
ployees were either invested in, acquired or newly established. Two of these 
companies were within aerospace, five were within communications, and six 
were within high-tech (Japan Auto Industry Survey, April 1993:4).
2. Changes in Toyota production organization since 1980
At first sight, the development of the production organization at Toyota 
Motor Corporation in the past decade consists of an increase in the number 
of models and the number of variants within each model produced. At the 
same time, there has been a decrease in the general changeover time between 
models. Product line has also been altered, with the addition of high value-
added luxury cars (Kojo Kanri, Plant Management, 1990:101). Moreover, 
these developments have come at a time when the company has moved from 
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a rather conservative stance when it comes to the use of advanced production 
technology to a strategy of increased automation levels.5
One should however, be cautious when analyzing these trends since there 
have recently been some scale-backs. The recent low conjuctures (and the 
completion of several major construction projects), may have resulted in a 
strategy of scaling back the levels of investments in high technology. The 
low conjunctures have also led to Toyota decreasing the number of variants 
offered, commonization of components, and increased lead time for new 
product development (Miyazaki, 1994). Also, with regards to automation 
levels within final assembly, another factor behind scale-backs may be the 
increased cost (as relative to the usefuleness and flexibility) of certain types 
of new technology, with the result that automation levels have remained 
lower than the 20–25 percent that were initially projected. In other words, 
automation activities within final assembly had to take into consideration 
their applicability and cost in addition to their labour saving capacity, claims 
that are not easy to fulfill within mixed model production (Automotive 
News, 26 October, 1992:14i).
It is thus, very difficult to outline general trends in Toyota strategies and 
to assess how much the recent scale-backs are a result of circumstances or 
a result of conscious deviations from long range strategies. Nevertheless, 
this section attempts to present an outline of main developments within 
production organization during the last decade or so.
2.1 Investments in facilities and equipment
Toyota investments in facilities and equipment during the second half of 
the 1980s, were fairly high when seen in comparison with the other auto 
corporations (Kitamura, 1990). Towards the end of the 1980s, the spend-
ing by Toyota, Nissan and Mazda showed significant increases, although 
Toyota’s spendings increased the most. These three companies incidentally 
spent the most because of major construction projects, with Nissan building 
a new plant in Kyushu and Mazda a new plant in Hofu. Toyota built a total 
of five new plants and two additional lines at an existing plant. Two of the 
new plants were in Toyota City. One of these was for the production of parts 
and equipment (Teiho plant, 1986), and the other was for the production 
of electronic control devices, sensors, and so on (Hirose plant, 1989). In 
addition, the plant in Tahara Town was enlarged with two additional lines 
(Tahara III, 1989, and Tahara IV, 1991), with the latter of these being the 
line within the corporation with the highest density of high technology 
(Automotive News, 25 January, 1993:23).
Toyota also initiated its plans for expanding production to other areas 
than Toyota City and Aichi-ken (Aichi Prefecture) during the latter half 
of the 1980s. A new plant in Hokkaido for producing various parts did, as 
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mentioned above, open in 1992, and the new plant for the production of 
upper-scale small-sized cars in Kyushu, started production in spring, 1993. 
Domestic Toyota production capacity was at the time calculated to produce 
approximately 4,800,000 vehicles by 1995, when final assembly by other 
companies within the Toyota Group was included in the figure.6
As for the most recent spending behaviour, Toyota and the other Toyota 
Group companies have been in the process of ending the large projects 
mentioned above. Also other companies like Nissan and Mazda have com-
pleted their projects, and figures for capital spending are showing huge 
reductions.7
2.2 The Tahara IV and the Kyushu plants
The Tahara IV plant is one of Toyota’s pilot projects when it comes to 
experimenting with the application of new types of machine technology 
and organizational innovations, according to a study by the auto industry 
survey firm Press & Data Service (PDS) International (1993:233). The main 
differences between the Toyota assembly plants with conventional produc-
tion processes and Tahara IV is that the former system ‘balances the need 
for mixed model production with the need to maintain high productivity 
through continuous flow of production’, while the latter has got ‘quality 
assurance’ and ‘improved working environment’ as priority areas, in addi-
tion to ‘maintaining high productivity’.
Some of the new machine technology and the new methods in use at Tahara 
may thus, be interpreted as meant for alleviating the possible contradiction 
between wanting improved quality and productivity levels simultaneously 
with an improved working environment. Such innovations include the use 
of automatically guided vehicles that have adjustable height and sideways 
movements, automated engine and chassis installation, and the making of 
parts of the assembly process ‘modular’. In the latter respect, the plant’s 
assembly process is only slightly less advanced than Mazda’s Hofu II, the 
industry leader in the field of modular assembly (Japan Auto Industry Sur-
vey, December 1992:12; PDS, 1993:234). The assembly process at Tahara 
IV has in its present state however, been found to be more costly than that 
of the conventional lines (PDS, 1993:234).
The scale of the Kyushu plant in southern Japan is 200,000 units a year. 
The investments in machine technology are, according to reports (Asahi 
Shinbun, 5 April, 1991; PDS, 1993:95; Nomura, 1992:9), concentrated on 
worker environment rather than on automating the final assembly process. 
The attitude towards automation has been described as resembling Toyota’s 
overall step-by-step attitude (PDS, 1993:95), and the most remarkable in-
novations are on several organizational solutions.
First of all, the shift system and the workforce composition are different 
413
from those at the other Toyota plants. While there are two shifts alternating 
weekly between a day shift and a night shift at the other plants, the Kyushu 
plant has got two shifts that run from about 06:00 AM to 03:15 PM and from 
about 04:15 PM to about 12:45 AM (PDS, 1993:94). In this way, the Kyushu 
plant circumvents the Japanese prohibition against letting women work 
in manufacturing during nights, and has in fact recruited female workers. 
Secondly, the organization of the production process is reported to contain 
certain production buffers within the production flow. This principle seems 
to fly in the face of a crucial principle within the overall Toyota Production 
System, in which stock-in-process constitutes an utmost evil in the form of 
waste (Ohno, 1988). Kyushu has however, allowed a certain amount of stock 
between its teams consisting of approximately 10 workers each. And these 
teams are then supposed to have a certain amount of autonomy concerning 
how to perform the tasks within the team (Asahi Shinbun, 5 April 1991).
Other Kyushu innovations include the way the plant was financed, estab-
lishment as a separate, incorporated company, and a slight departure from 
the JIT system, consisting in collecting bulk supplies from Aichi Prefecture 
suppliers for shipment to Kyushu.8
The experiments at the two plants of Tahara IV and Kyushu, exemplify 
several strategies at a corporate level. On the one hand, the changes are 
aimed at increased levels of productivity and efficiency. They do however, on 
the other hand, seem to be aimed at adjusting production in some degree to 
workforce needs and characteristics. For the Kyushu location, an additional 
feature supporting the second point includes the fact that a major part of 
the workforce at the previous production sites, did in fact migrate from the 
Kyushu region to central Japan (Oyama, 1985; Nohara and Fujita, 1989). 
By locating the new plant in this region, the corporation obviously aimed 
at reducing recruitment related problems.
2.3 On scale-backs
There have been some scale-backs when the present state of affairs is com-
pared to the original plans. The corporation did recently decide that it should 
deviate from the original five-year plan and reduce the size of investments 
by 20 percent. One Toyota manager has commented on the high cost of 
flexible machinery in the following way:
It is pressing our corporate earnings down. A few years ago, it cost 
20 million yen to replace one worker. Now it costs 35 million yen. 
We had to bring it down to 20 million (Automotive News, 26 October, 
1992:14i).9
In connection with the scale-backs, the corporation was thus, faced with the 
problem of deciding upon which areas to target for reductions. The corpora-
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tion has as mentioned in the intrduction, generally been dividing between 
two types of investments, ‘productive’ and non-productive’. According to 
one company official: ‘about half of the investments are of a type that do 
not lead to increased production’ (Nihon Keizai Shinbun, Japan Financial 
Times, 27 July, 1992).
The kind of investments included in this ‘non-productive’ category do 
however, include both R&D as well as ‘welfare and benefit programs in 
order to secure the recruitment of young workers’, and the corporation has 
reportedly found it ‘difficult to reduce’ the level of such investments (Nihon 
Keizai Shinbun, Japan Financial Times, 27 July, 1992).
3. Reform of personnel management institutions
In this section some primary personnel management reforms, concerning 
reform of the status system, the personnel assessment system, and the wage 
system will be presented in some detail. Thereafter, some other organiza-
tional changes and personnel management reforms will be treated somewhat 
superficially.
3.1 Reform of status system
The Toyota status system distinguishes between ranks and statuses. The 
latter corresponds to whether a person holds an administrative post or not, 
and to what level this post is situated. But, since there are ranks in addition 
to the statuses, the system allows for considerable flexibility in personnel 
management by accomodating rank promotions without actually promoting 
a person to an administrative post or to a status of a higher level. The persons 
belonging to a particular administrative level do not have to be of the same 
rank or grade. This is because the rank ladder and the status ladder are, in 
spite of being parallel, not strictly interconnected. Some in-company repre-
sentations of the rank and status ladder do in fact indicate the possiblity of a 
person in, for example, a group leader position being of either one of three 
different ranks (cf. Grønning 1992:174; Nomura, 1992:22). The system does 
in this way serve as a managerial tool for handling a workforce consisting of 
individuals with varying levels of skills and managerial potentiality under 
conditions where there are a restricted number of posts.
The present system is termed the ‘Job Ability Rank System’ (shokuno 
shikaku seido). It emerged from the ‘Job Level System’ (shokuso seido) 
which had been institutionalized in 1966. In 1987, however, the ‘Job Abil-
ity Rank System’ was instituted, and it was thorougly revised in 1989 and 
in 1991.
Although the new ‘Job Ability Rank System’ is no major break from the 
‘Job Level System’, the new system is considerably more sophisticated. In 
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addition, one of the innovations within several 1991 blue collar institutional 
reforms, the implementation of a system of ‘Special Competence Posts’ 
(senmon gino-shoku), signifies a development of the status system. Instead 
of just being promoted to a higher rank, the new institution of ‘Special Com-
petence Posts’ signifies that persons may actually be promoted to a higher 
status, even when they are not promoted to a specific administrative post.
Such special competence persons will, according to an announcement in 
the company paper, be allocated concrete, special tasks such as prototype 
related work, assistance at plants abroad, education, practical work that 
requires a wide range of experience, and so on. The system has also incor-
porated a flexible component in securing that persons in regular administra-
tive posts may, ‘when the need arises’, be rotated with special competence 
persons (Weekly Toyota, 1 February, 1991:2).
The implementation of such ‘Special Competence Posts’ may thus, turn 
out to be an interesting development. It is however, necessary to investi-
gate in future research for what reasons and to what extent the institution 
actually is being implemented. Subjects for such investigations include 
for example the question of whether the new institution simply is a project 
for handling the problem of having promotable persons within the current 
workforce without having available posts, or if it is an institution which 
will have an indispensable place within a particular form of future produc-
tion organization.10
3.2 Reform of the personnel assessment system
The personnel assessment system is the primary tool for placing workers in 
the different ranks and statuses. The system is also used in order to connect 
ranks and statuses with appropriate wages, as well as, in order to connect a 
promotable person with prepromotion education (Tanaka, 1982).
The most important developments concerning the personnel assessment 
system are as follows. Assessment, which was previously a holistic, ‘total’, 
assessment has been subdivided into two types: ability assessment and peri-
odic assessment (see Table 1). While ability assessment is annual, periodic 
assessment occurs semi annually.
Moreover, for the new periodic assessment, a person’s assessment results 
may range between 80 points and 120 points as compared to the 85–115 
range for the ability assessment and for the previous, holistic assessment 
system. Both the previous system and the new form of assessment are 
based on a zero-sum principle, i.e.; a system where 110 points awarded to 
an individual within a certain section means that another person may be 
awarded only 90 points. The increase in range for the new periodic assess-
ment means that differentiation between individuals may occur in a greater 
degree than before.
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1. Result of work
2. Attitude towards task
3. Safety
• March
• In principle, separately for each rank
Table 1. Personnel assessment system
Type, name 
of assessment 
Philosophy 
of assessment
Reflection of 
assessment
Scope of  
assessment
Assessment 
elements 
 
 
 
Assessment 
period 
Assessment 
time
Assessment 
group
Assessment 
rank
1. Ability assessment 2. Periodically assessment
Ass. for job 
ability wage
Ass. for sum-
mer bonus
Ass. for winter 
bonus
• Assessment of abilities displayed during 
period1
• Raise in base wage
• Promotion
• Ability 
wage2
• Summer 
bonus
• Winter 
bonus
85–115 80–120
1. Knowledge, experience
2. Supervising ability
3. Ability for KAIZEN, 
suggestion
4. Voicing opinion,  
affirmativeness
• Feb. 1 of previous year–Jan. 31 of 
present year
• Nov. 1 prev. 
year–Apr. 30 
pres. year
• May 1 
–Oct. 31
• October
• Total and relative assess-
ment while referring to 
each assessment element 
(5-ladder-ass.)
• Regulation according to 
average of departement/
assessment group
• Accumulative evaluation of 2 assessment 
elements (5-ladder ass.)
• Department/assessment group with regula-
tion finished within department
• Assessment of abilities 
possessed
Notes: This outline of the personnel assessment system applies for the 
manufacturing related personnel. (System for technical and office person-
nel is slightly different.)
1. Does not take into consideration ability, experience, etc. acquired outside the 
period.
2. Does not influence promotion.
Source: Reproduced from Toyota Motor Corporation in-company materi-
al, March 1989, pp 7–8 (outline of system except ‘scope of assassment’), 
and Toyota Motor Worker’s Union material, September 1989, p. 9 (‘scope 
of assessment’)
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Finally, we may detect from the new elements for consideration within 
assessment (Table 2), a focus on both the value of avoiding mistakes as well 
as on the value of taking initiative.
3.3 Reform of the wage system
In connection with the institutional reforms within personnel management, 
the wage system has also undergone major revisions:11
The reason for reforming the wage system is to clarify the element of 
‘getting rewarded if one makes an effort’.
1. A system where the deciding elements are clear and one which the 
employees will easily accept.
2. To wipe out attitudes giving priority to stability with the implementation 
of a system which can invite an attitude of continuously challenging 
goals.
3. A system which definitively can reflect an individual’s ability (Toyota 
Motor Corporation brochure dated March, 1990:1).
The concrete innovations do, when overtime pay is excepted from the de-
scription, mainly reduce the proportion of a person’s wages that is being 
determined by the efficiency of the group that the person belongs to. Instead, 
priority is given to individual efficiency and work attitude.
The new system has got the following components:
• ‘production allowance’, which reflects work group efficiency
  (40 percent)
• ‘base wage’, as reflected by ability assessment results (40 percent) 
• ‘age wage’ (10 percent)
• ‘job ability wage’, as reflected by periodic assessment results 
 (10 percent)
While the former system had the three components ‘base wage’, ‘production 
allowance’and ‘rank allowance’, the latter component is in the new system 
included in a component called ‘job ability wage’. It is noteworthy that 
although a component called ‘age wage’ has been identified as a separate 
entity that is entirely liberated from assessment results, this portion is a 
mere 10 percent of the total amount.
Besides these changes, the way of calculating efficiency has according to 
Nomura (1992:6–7) been altered or will be altered in the future. Efficiency 
rates will hereafter apply not only to production department employees, but 
also for maintenance and technical employees while measuring against a 
coefficient derived from a so called ‘standard time’. Females and older work-
ers will however, be allowed longer ‘standard time’ than young males.12
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Table 2. Elements for consideration in personnel assessment
1. Assessment elements for ability assessment
Special knowledge, 
techniques 
 
 
 
 
Ability for contrib-
uting to continuous 
improvement 
Ability to supervise 
and instruct 
Sense of responsi-
bility, cooperation
• Is able to handle work of great difficulty as well 
as taking care of numerous tasks and respond to 
sudden situations. In other words, has sufficient 
knowledge/techniques while having a profound 
understanding of the rules and regulations for 
safety and employment conditions. Is also fer-
vently involved in self education
• Is always problem oriented and participates 
whole-heartedly in activities for continuous im-
provement. Is also actively involved in offering 
opinions in the relevant situations.
• Shows the leadership necessary for his position. Is 
also good at supervising while understanding the 
feelings of his people.
• Has a strong sense of responsibility for his work 
and acts cooperatively while understanding the 
state of the company and the workplace.
• Is also, based on mutual trust between manage-
ment and labor, contributing to creating a pleasant 
workplace.
Results of work 
and activities for 
continuous im-
provement 
 
Attitude towards 
work
• Performed the day-to -day tasks accurately, was 
vigorously involved in solving difficult problems 
as well as showing concrete results in connection 
to activities for continuous improvement.
• Also showed concrete results in instructing/train-
ing his people in the planned way.
• Obeyed the various rules and regulations as well 
as the instructions and orders of his superiors. 
Was fully involved in his work and cherised team-
work. Did also show an effort in enabling commu-
nication between top and bottom.
2. Assessment elements for periodical assessment
Note: Applies for assessing sub-section leader and below. The various 
elements or the relative weight of elements may vary according to the 
rank of the assessee. 
Source: Toyota Motor Corporation in-company material, March 1990, p 3
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3.4 Some other reforms
The question of altering the corporation’s shift system surfaced in 1989 and 
in 1993. Toyota plants have, as mentioned above, normally operated with 
two-shift systems, with workers alternating weekly between day shift and 
night shift. Legislation and prejudice against female workers working nights 
meant that female hires were excluded under this system. With a system of 
two daytime shifts, both female workers and others reluctant about night 
shifts, could be attracted to work in the industry.
The 1989 labour and management committee discussed the goal of no 
more than 1,900 hours in total working hours for any employee. The plan 
that was discussed at that time would however, necessitate an additional 
6,000 workers, of which 3,000 should be new recruits while the labor out-
put of 3,000 workers should be secured through automation (Nihon Keizai 
Shimbun, Japan Financial Times, 29 July, 1992). The plan did in addition 
contain several suggestions on reform of how working hours were structured 
(Nomura, 1992:4).13
In the discussions of the 1993 committee, a new system was planned to 
be designed around the time slot between 6:00 A.M. and midnight, i.e. ca. 
18 hours. With such a time frame, there would however be several obstacles 
that would have to be resolved in order to make the system viable: the em-
ployees are used to the significant portion within their wages coming from 
overtime;14 parking lots would have to be enlarged; the system would have 
to be implemented simultaneously at all the plants since the new working 
hours would have to be coordinated with the suppliers; and so on (Chunichi 
Shinbun, 6 July, 1993).15 Moreover, such a system would mean that there is 
almost no room for overtime between the two shifts.
Concerning reforms specific to blue collar workers, the most comprehen-
sive reform was implemented in February, 1991. One of the innovations at 
this occasion was the start-up of a System for Education in Special Skills. 
This new education system implemented at this time is built upon the three 
parts of ‘competence in practical matters’, ‘basic competence’, and ‘special 
knowledge’. It is classified as a ‘challenge system’, meaning its objective 
is ‘that each and every employee may, through his work, improve his abili-
ties or feel where he stands’. There are four levels, and any worker with 
the certain amount of experience corresponding to one of the four levels 
may request the appropriate education (Weekly Toyota, 1 February, 1991:2). 
In addition, the 1991 blue collar reforms included the implementation of 
Special Competence Posts as reviewed above.
The organizational structure for white collar workers first underwent some 
fundamental changes in 1989. The changes consisted in altering the way of 
how to group the white collar workers. The previous pyramid-shaped or-
ganizational structure consisting of departments, sections and sub-sections 
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was altered with the introduction of ‘groups’ within departments instead 
of sections and sub-sections. The number of departments did remain about 
the same, but the number of ‘groups’ was only 633 as compared to the 758 
sections of previous times.16
In addition, another white collar reform was instituted in June, 1993. This 
consisted in allocating 20 percent of the male workers (ca 800 persons) into 
special teams. These teams should take care of ‘urgent issues’, while the 
remaining 80 percent performed the day-to-day tasks (Nikkan Kogyo Shin-
bun, Japan Industrial News, 11 June, 1993; Nihon Keizai Shinbun, Japan 
Financial Times, 11 June, 1993, Japan Auto Industry Survey, September, 
1993:3, 17).
The objective of this reform was thus to implement concrete measures that 
could contribute to the on-going efforts at organizational development. Not 
only are the persons assigned to the teams given the opportunity to devote 
themselves to the issues at hand. Another target for the reform was the work 
content for the portion of the workforce remaining with responsibility for the 
day-to-day tasks. This part of the reform aims at using the situation with de-
creased manpower levels to visualize work that is really necessary and work 
that is ‘not needed’ (Japan Auto Industry Survey, September, 1993:3).
Finally, a system for enhancing ‘re-recruiting’ to the new companies 
within the Toyota group has emerged. With the additional companies re-
sulting from the efforts at diversification, the Toyota Motor Corporation 
has gone to concrete measures for increasing mobility within the corporate 
group by recruiting people to the new companies from within the Toyota 
Motor Corporation itself (Toyota Shinbun, 3 August, 1990).
The two reforms of creating special teams and enhancing ‘re-recruit-
ment’ qualify for comments in the same vain as in connection with the 
presentation of Special Competence Posts above. This is to say that it is 
difficult to grasp the full meaning of these two reforms without conducting 
some further research where certain additional aspects of the two reforms 
are being investigated. For the special teams, it is possible to question 
whether the real significance of their implementation lies in concentrating 
particular workers in the special teams or in the effect on the workers with 
responsibility for the day-to-day tasks. A crucial question in connection to 
this is the question of what workers are being selected for the special teams. 
The character of this institution depends on whether the workers selected 
turn out to be the most outstanding workers, the workers that perform the 
poorest or if it is a com-bination of these two. Similar comments may be 
added in connection with the ‘re-recruitment’ process. It is in other words a 
question of what type of workers that Toyota Motor Corporation will ‘lose’ 
to the new companies.
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Conclusions
Toyota management has during recent years been preoccupied with how to 
handle an expected domestic worker shortage. Management has in addition 
been preoccupied with strategies for the improvement of the corporation’s 
earning structure. There is a possible contradiction between simultaneous 
improvement of earning rates and increases in ‘non-productive’ investments 
in order to respond to workforce needs and in order to attract new recruits. 
The two themes may be interpreted as standing in a contradictory position 
towards each other in the following sense. Adequate recruitment levels in 
the future may in many respects necessitate increased levels of ‘non-pro-
ductive’ investments. At the same time, a move towards strategies aimed at 
securing improved earning rates would perhaps favor as few non-productive 
investments as possible.
Regarding the way the workforce is being handled, there are within the 
developments reviewed here signs that management tries to retrieve with 
one hand what it gives out with the other. In order to secure recruitment 
or due to other reasons, management is considering concessions on certain 
areas. The workforce has already experienced, or will probably experience 
in the future, more responsive treatment in the form of e.g. more normalized 
working hours, a wage component reflecting age, and efficiency calculations 
taking into account sex and age of the employee. But more strict conditions 
are also evident, such as white collar worker rationalization, more frequent 
and more individualized personnel assessment, and company-wide calcula-
tions of efficiency rates. And it is especially noteworthy that indirect labor 
has become the specific target for rationalization measures and that this por-
tion of the workforce is undergoing changes towards structures resembling 
the principles previously employed within the production department (e.g. 
groupification of labor and provoking rationalization through the removal 
of workers).
It should however be noted that certain aspects of the refoms warrant 
further research in order to get a full picture of the recent events. Such as-
pects include the nature of the so called Special Competence Posts, special 
teams for white collar workers, and the ‘re-recruitment’ process within the 
enlarged corporate group.
It should also be noted that the labor market related reforms contain a 
number of other possible contradictions in addition to the basic contradiction 
suggested in this paper. In relation to the Toyota reforms we may discern 
possible contradictions such as the problem of how to create a new and 
ambitious production system under the condition of possible workforce 
shortage and a more heterogenous workforce than previously. And there is, 
as has become evident from the review of the more individualized assess-
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ment and wage systems, a possible contradiction between wanting both to 
strenghten ‘the individual’s creativity’ as well as maintaining traditional, 
Toyota-style teamwork.
In this paper, some of the most recent Toyota Motor Corporation activi-
ties have been presented and been tentatively compared to classical toyotist 
activities. Some of the activities may be characterized as varying from the 
previous institutions. Further research is however needed in order to become 
able to formulate the true extent of the changes in question. And further 
research is also needed if we want to follow the way of thinking about 
different forms of production organization as consisting of configurations 
ranging from supplier relations to in-company work organization. Regarding 
this last point, this paper offers far too little evidence. But some clues in 
this paper point to a possible future ‘neo-toyotist’ configuration consisting 
of at least the following characteristics: production and product develop-
ment is dispersed both in a domestic and international sense, in contrast to 
concentration to a single prefecture within Japan; products consist of a wide 
range of products in addition to vehicles; workforce is heterogenous (young 
and older males as well as even females) instead of homogenous (young 
males); production organization combines mixed model production and high 
technology instead of adapting conventional technology to mixed model 
production; production system is to some degree responsive to changes in 
workforce composition, but wants simultaneously to be responsive to market 
input; and the personnel management institutions are designed in order to 
enhance the creativity of individuals as well as being designed in order to 
enhance the ability to function within a context of groupified labor.
Notes
1. A prelimenary version of this paper was first presented at The 17th Nordic So-
ciology Congress, August 13-15 1993, Gaevle, Sweden, with the title ‘Aspects 
in Connection With the Introduction of New Technology in the Japanese Auto 
Industry: The Case of Toyota’. I am in the addition to comments at this confer-
ence indebted to Åke Sandberg, Cecilia Runnström and Katsuji Tsuji, who all 
took time to read through early versions of the manuscript. 
2. There is obviously a large number of such works, but cf. e.g. Cusumano, 1985; 
Oyama, 1985; Nohara and Fujita, 1989; Tsuji, 1989; Wood, 1989; Womack et al, 
1990; Elam, 1990; Totsuka and Hyodo, 1991; Helling, 1992; Grønning, 1992.
3. Changes concerning the latter point, i.e. changes in the current workforce’s 
perceptions and values, has already been documented (Jidosha Soren, 1990; 
Tsuji, 1994:275).
4. Toyota did also plan the establishment of a parts plant in the Tohoku region, but 
construction of this plant has, according to the auto industry survey institute 
PDS International (1993), been postponed. 
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 5. See Aichi Rodo Mondai Kenkyu-sho (1990:209) for figures on increases in 
automation level. 
 6. Toyo Keizai, Far Eastern Economics, 29 December, 1991. The prognosis was 
based on the figures for new plants and enlargement of existing plants (the 
Kyushu plant and a total capacity for the Tahara plant of 500.000 in the case of 
Toyota Motor Corporation itself as well as Kanto Auto Body’s Iwate plant to be 
constructed within 1993, 200,000 vehicles, and Toyota Auto Body’s Mie plant 
to be constructed within 1993, 80,000 vehicles) added to the 1989 production 
figures (2.244.000 for Toyota Motor and 1,732,000 for other Toyota Group 
companies). 
 7. The figures are, due to differences in when the respective fiscal years ended, 
not directly comparable. But in the fiscal year ending 30 June, 1993, Toyota 
registered a reduction of 20.5 percent (down to US$ 3.92 billion), Nissan a 15 
percent reduction (down to 1.58 billion, forecast based on fiscal year ending 
31 March, 1994), and Mazda a 37.2 percent decline (down to US$654 million, 
forecast based on fiscal year ending 31 March, 1994). The only company that 
was expected to increase their spendings in this period was Honda (Automotive 
News, 21 June, 1993:42).
 8. See PDS (1993:95) and Nikkan Jidosha Shinbun, Japan Automotive News (16 
April, 1991) for details on these aspects. 
 9. Another source states that ‘Toyota long maintained a strict policy requiring the 
elimination of one job for every 10 million yen invested in automation. More 
recently, however, it has begun to relax this constraint, allowing investments 
of yen 15-20 million to meet changing requirements, such as the demand for 
shorter working hours’ (PDS, 1993:232).
10. For the latter point, it is interesting to refer to the trajectories of future produc-
tion as proposed by Kaneda (1991). He suggests that in place of the small-scale 
suggestions that have been the back-bone of production organization so far, the 
new form of organization will require more system-oriented suggestions for 
incremental improvements, and hence a new type of workers who are able to 
submit such suggestions. Special Competence Posts may turn out to be one of 
the elements within such a scenario. 
11. It has been reported that wage system revisions were first implemented for the 
employees not being members of the union, i.e. those of section chief rank and 
above, in April, 1990, and that revisions for the remaining, unionized employees 
(ca. 63,000 employees) then followed in July, 1992 (Asahi Shinbun, 25 July, 
1992). 
12. Still another innovation is the introduction of different efficiency coefficients 
in casting, machining, body/painting/stamping, and assembly (Nomura, 1992:6-
7). 
13. Note that Toyota and other companies are anonymized in the papers by Nomura 
(1992), his colleagues (Totsuka and Hyodo, 1991), as well as another work being 
referred to in this paper (Nohara and Fujita, 1989), but that these publications 
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are being used as sources after having identified the corporations that are being 
described.  
14. Toyota workers did during the 1980s on an average consistently work ca. 20 
percent overtime (Aichi Rodo Mondai Kenkyu-sho, 1990:207).
15. Nomura (1992:9, 12) refers the details on the suggestions of the 1989 committee 
and explains that an experimental shift system consisting of three shift groups 
rotating two shifts commenced in January 1991 with a higher shift allowance 
(35 percent as compared to 25 percent previously) in order to compensate for 
reduced overtime income.
16. Cf. Miyazaki (1994) and Nomura (1992:2) for further details.
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Social preconditions for lean management 
and its further development
Paul Lillrank
The problem
Lean management was originally developed as an operational response to 
pressing strategic challenges. In the early 1960s the driving force behind of 
Japanese manufacturers’ management innovations was the threat from US 
mass manufacturers who were perceived to possess superior technology and 
unbeatable produced volumes. The challenge was to combine efficiency with 
flexibility, to compete not only in terms of cost but also in terms of qual-
ity, rapid model cycles and variety. For a few decades, Japanese managers 
focused on operationally oriented strategies, the build-up of organizational 
capabilities, such as Just-In-Time (JIT) logistics, Total Quality Management 
(TQM), and Lean Production, to achieve these goals.
Lean production requires a set of soft enablers, that is, social and organi-
zational conditions to match the inherent fragility of the just-in-time-sys-
tem. Working under lean management is difficult in two ways: it requires 
fast-paced work closely following standard operating procedures (SOP) 
and a continuous vigilance to improve the SOPs. Until recently, a ‘hardship 
mentality’ has prevailed in Japanese society. Memories of post-war poverty 
were vivid, social and family values encouraged hard and dedicated work. In 
such a society, hard work was more easily accepted than in a society where 
decades of wealth accumulation had softened attitudes towards work.
When pondering the future of lean management in the Japanese auto in-
dustry the key question is whether there have been any significant changes 
in the drivers and the social enablers of lean management.
External challenges can affect the lean system in two ways:
• changes in competition and market conditions can affect the economic 
drivers of the system; for example, if customers are no longer willing to 
pay for variety, some of the advantages of lean management are lost.
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• changes in society can affect the hegemony of hardship, as a new gen-
eration of affluent workers may refuse to put up with the demands of 
lean production.
Hard challenges to lean production
The current auto industry crisis has been well documented in the Japanese 
press. In short, the Japanese suffer from low and falling profits with the 
weakest players deeply in the red, overseas market shares are static or de-
clining, domestic demand is weak, overseas manufacturing operations are 
slow to break even and a number of product strategies have failed.
The low profitability can be explained by the following factors:
• the strong yen hurts export prices as well as volumes
• the variety wars are taking their toll: during the 1980s Japanese auto 
manufacturers competed with increasingly broad product lines and a 
wide variety of versions and options. While the lean factories could 
handle most of the proliferation, the white-collar sector mushroomed 
causing heavy non-manufacturing overhead burdens
• a number of models were over-engineered resulting in high prices rela-
tive to performance
• many foreign competitors have quickly learned to adopt lean produc-
tion.
In 1993, after four consecutive years of falling profits, the Japanese manu-
facturers look less like the management giants they were when The Machine 
That Changed The World was researched and written. The Japanese are fac-
ing problems and the Japanese style of management is not likely to survive 
the recession intact.
However, there is no reason to believe that the lean management system 
itself, as it operates in the factory, is the source of problems or the first 
candidate for radical reform.
A major part of the problem is that Toyota, as well as most other Japanese 
manufacturers, suffer from excessive bureaucracy at the head office which 
reduces profits. The strength lies in the factories, which work reasonably 
well as does the marketing. New product development and engineering, 
though renowned for their short development cycles, are not as effective as 
is commonly believed.
Another major challenge is that with the exchange rate approaching 100 
yen to the dollar, many parts manufacturers lose their competitiveness. 
The famed keiretsu supplier system is undergoing a structural change. The 
first-line system suppliers will strengthen their positions while the second 
and third-tier suppliers will either be forced to close down or move to 
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cheaper locations. The vertical ties keeping the supplier families together 
will loosen.
It appears that these problems can be solved with new strategies and a 
modification of the lean management system. Toyota and others are taking 
action: variety is cut, model cycles are becoming longer, inventory levels 
are optimized rather than minimized, new less engineered products, such 
as the new Mark II, are released, middle-management layers are eliminated 
and white-collar overtime forcefully cut. To put it simply, the solution is to 
apply lean production principles also to office work.
Soft challenges to lean production
Another challenge comes from changes in the Japanese society. The ultimate 
driver is increasing wealth that permits higher average education levels, al-
lows more leisure, fuels higher expectations, and creates jobs and careers in 
the service sector. In comparison to opportunities elsewhere, even well-paid 
manufacturing jobs become less attractive than before. During the economic 
boom (1987–1990) young graduates started to avoid the 3K -jobs (Kitanai, 
Kiken, Kitsui = Dirty, Dangerous, Demanding). There has been a lot of 
talk about the new generation of Japanese, the Shinjinrui (the new human 
race), that is said to lack all the virtues of their hard-working parents and 
constitutes a radical challenge to the old ideology.
Ironically, there is a hard component of this challenge: bowing to pres-
sure from their overseas trading partners, Japanese auto manufacturers have 
promised to cut their average annual working hours from 2 200 to 1 900 by 
the end of 1993. To the Japanese this is a major challenge, yet in comparison, 
VW’s Wolfsburg plant is set to go down to 1 500 hours.
In comparison with Europe, it should be noticed that the social welfare 
system is not changing, neither is there any significant official departure 
from the established ideology even though some of the rhetoric has softened. 
Consequently, whatever dissatisfaction is felt on the shopfloor, it will not 
show as increasing absenteeism or lack of cooperation, but rather as diffi-
culty in recruiting and high labour turnover. Until approximately mid-1992, 
Toyota suffered from a shortage of labour and high turnover. Thereafter the 
recession has halted new hires of temporary shift workers for the first time in 
14 years, and reduced the intake of university graduates by 10%. With most 
major companies reducing the intake of new graduates and letting middle-
managers go, the cozy assurance of life-time employment is disappearing 
and even the shinjinrui cannot be as picky as they used to be.
The recession is reinforcing the established order, much in the same way 
as the oil crisis twenty years ago abruptly closed the debate about whether 
Toyota should import immigrant labour to man its assembly lines. The hard 
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times are cooling down the labor market and deflating expectations, thereby 
slowing down the drivers of change.
The response
Toyota has been relatively quick to respond to challenges. In the following, 
the main lines of action are described.
From maximizing to optimizing: robust manufacturing systems
After the death of Taiichi Ohno, the crusade against work-in-progress (WIP) 
inventories has cooled down, and quite reasonably so. The waste reduction 
drive has reached its logical limits: the trade-off between inventory on 
one hand and fragility and stress on the other has been recognized. Now 
inventories are slightly increased to optimize the benefits and costs of lean 
management.
It is worth noticing that in this context stress is openly recognized as a 
major problem calling for more robust arrangements. However, Toyota of-
ficials – very much in line with the ideology – interpret stress not as arising 
from hard repetitive labor, but from the mental stress stemming from the 
notion that a small disturbance may cause the whole factory to come to a 
stop. This would obviously lead to production loss, a small erosion of the 
wealth base, and a loss of face and feelings of shame to those responsible. 
Toyota systematically uses shame as a stick to motivate middle managers. 
At the Tahara plant which produces the Lexus an extra final inspection 
called The Customer Satisfaction Line has been implemented to assure 
perfect quality. Whenever a defect is found, the origin of it is located and 
the inspector goes to the intercom and announces for everyone to hear that 
‘would Mr. Suzuki of XYZ section immediately come over, we have found 
a defect of yours …’!
Simultaneously, JIT deliveries have become problematic because trucks 
shuttling back and forth between assembly lines and parts manufacturers 
several times a day clog the notoriously weak road system in Japan. With 
increased use of foreign parts–purchased to relieve trade friction – and 
relocation of plants outside the Aichi prefecture, WIP inventories had to 
grow slightly, adding a bit of buffers to relieve mental stress. This has been 
prematurely interpreted as the end of JIT; more correct is to describe it as 
an adjustment, that comes at a time when the waste-minimization drive has 
reached its natural limits. A number of arrangements have been devised to 
cope with the problem: cooperative load sharing system, a parts distribution 
center with one to two days of inventory, and daily sea transports from Aichi 
to the new plant in Kyushu (Watanabe 1993).
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Coming out from the Aichi Prefecture
In 1990 Toyota announced it will break ‘the Monroe Doctrine of Aichi 
Prefecture’ and establish three new manufacturing locations in Japan: the 
Miyata plant in Kyushu for final assembly, and plants in Hokkaido and 
Tohoku for some key components. The reasons given for this radical break 
with tradition were the need to overcome labour shortage and to build better 
working environments, and to experiment with new concepts at greenfield 
sites (Watanabe 1993, 80).
The Miyata Plant, which came on stream in early 1993, is the prime ex-
perimental plant in work organization, production, and parts supply systems. 
It has an assembly capacity of 100,000 vehicles per annum with one shift. It 
is currently producing only one model, the Mark II, and expected to make, 
at most, only three similar passenger models in the near future. The pro-
duction of Mark II moved to Miyata from Motomachi, the first and oldest 
assembly plant that incorporated decades of continuous improvement. This 
move signifies a need for changes more radical than can be achieved with 
the traditional kaizen, continuous small-step improvement approach.
For obvious reasons the experimentation going on in Miyata is not well 
documented. Watanabe (1993) gives the following outline of measures la-
beled the ‘hito ni yasashii’ -line, meaning being nice to the people.
• Even at full capacity, only two shifts will be used (first shift 0600–1450; 
second shift 1550–2350).
• An increasing number of females will be hired, up to five percent of 
the workforce, but they may leave their shift 2200 to comply with the 
law restricting female night work.
• Use ‘easy’ lines for elderly workers and low-stress sub-assembly lines 
for part-time workers.
• Job sharing: two persons may share one job.
• Better welfare amenities such as locker rooms, showers, canteens; 
Toyota as a whole plans to invest 100 billion yen in amenities during 
the five-year period starting 1991.
It is recognized, however, that the ‘Hito ni Yasashii’-line will not solve the 
problems. In the long run, automation of simple manual labor is the key 
solution. In the short term, the key is how to plan and implement appropriate 
levels of automation so that it fits with other objectives.
The Miyata plant is less automated than Tahara. Very much in line with 
the established ideology, the managing director of Toyota, Mr. Yanogawa, 
made the following statement during the planning stage of the Miyata 
plant: ‘Planned full automation is expensive and resented by workers. We 
want to introduce simple, friendly automation. Then, after a while, workers 
will rack their brains and have fun figuring out new ways of automation. 
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 Kyushu will be a plant that is built on a continuous stream of ideas from 
the workers.’ (Nikkei Business 1992) In other words, Toyota has spent the 
past three decades involving workers in planning and implementation of JIT 
-manufacturing; now the challenge is to do the same with automation.
The lean office
The most serious challenge facing Toyota, and other Japanese manufactur-
ers, is to apply the lean principles in offices to streamline excessive admin-
istrative procedures.
The bad and worsening profitability of Japanese auto manufacturers can 
be partly explained by variety-based product strategies, resulting in short 
model cycles and a proliferation of parts, models and options. While the 
factories were able to handle the increased complexity, the offices were 
not: during the decade from 1982 to 1991, Toyota increased its blue-collar 
labor count by 18 percent to cope with a 20 percent increase in unit volume 
and a doubling of revenues, while the number of white collars increased 
45 percent. For every factory worker hired, 2.5 office workers were added. 
While production is continuously rationalized, staff functions and R&D 
are very wasteful. ‘If white collars can’t become lean, Toyota won’t be 
strong’, says Mr. Katsumi Ohnishi, Vice President at Toyota (Nikkei Busi-
ness 1.4.1993, p.13).
The famed lean product development is apparently not as efficient as be-
lieved. It has demonstrated its ability to get products out the door fast, but 
not cheaply. The new product development team leaders, the Shusha ‘super 
craftsmen’ began increasing the number of custom designed parts without 
consideration of synergy across models. In October 1992 engineering and 
R&D were radically revamped for the first time. Three major product de-
velopment clusters were created: FF (front engine, front drive), FR (front 
engine, rear drive) and CV (commercial vehicles). The aim is to increase 
the number of commonly used parts and designs within each cluster.
In production plants working hours have been reduced by 100 hours per 
year since 1991. In offices, despite calls for voluntary action, no results were 
achieved until in November and December 1992 white collar overtime was 
drastically reduced to zero despite massive protests from the employees.
Already in 1989 Toyota announced it will eliminate a layer of middle 
managers, the kacho (section chief) rank. Instead, flatter administrative 
hierarchies with only one level beneath the department manager (bucho), 
called Staff Leader, were created. The old multilayered hierarchy lives on 
as a competence scale, removed from the administrative hierarchy. Parallel 
hierarchies as such are nothing new. For example, blue collar workers in 
the Japanese steel industry have traditionally been ranked on an elaborated 
competence hierarchy with up to a dozen different levels. Reaching a cer-
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tain level formally qualifies for a position in the administrative hierarchy, 
such as a foreman, but does not guarantee it. Indeed, the system is similar 
to that found at most universities. A competence hierarchy consisting of 
undergraduates, graduates, Ph.D. candidates and post-doctoral students is 
well established but the administrative hierarchy with professors, heads of 
departments and deans is separate.
 The new Toyota system has apparently been slow to get rooted, as old 
habits die hard. However, the real significance of Toyota’s flatter hierarchy 
is that for the first time, white collar work is beginning to be subject to or-
ganizational reforms implemented in the blue collar sector already decades 
ago. The real challenge to both lean management and Japan’s future as a 
leading industrial nation is whether this will work.
Conclusions
In the early 1990s, during the closing years of the economic boom, it looked 
like Toyota would be facing the same problems that Volvo encountered some 
twenty years earlier. The question was whether Toyota would be forced to 
implement Kalmar/Uddevalla -types of solutions. At the time of writing, fall 
of 1993, the answer must be an emphatic no; at least not for the rest of the 
decade. External and internal forces will move Toyota to take a number of ac-
tions, but none of them lies in the direction the Swedish plants have taken.
The challenges facing Toyota are different: there is no welfare state 
eroding the willingness to work among those who remain on the payroll. 
Turnover among line workers can be handled as it always has been; the 
recession and increasing unemployment serve as a strong reminder to the 
Shinjinrui that wealth must constantly be recreated. Shorter working hours 
can be managed within the system – they may also be a blessing in disguise 
forcing the ideology to move a bit from glorifying hard work to valuing 
smart work. Labour shortage will ease as some production moves out from 
the Aichi prefecture – it is not a permanent solution, but should be satisfac-
tory for the rest of the decade. By the turn of the century, automation will 
have eroded a part of the problem.
The Toyota production system offers workable solutions to the problems 
of monotony and stress starting from its own premises. The challenge of 
automation will provide ample opportunities to creative problem solving 
involving line workers. While the Japanese have taken a page from the 
Swedish book in recognizing the need to ‘be nice to people’, it is only one, 
and a minor, solution to the problems. In a world where jiriki (self-reliance) 
and jishusei (internal motivation) are still accepted as hegemonistic values, 
management can throw the ball back to workers: ‘well, if you think this work 
is boring, then let’s figure out a way to automate it away’.
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The Japanese solution to the boredom and stress of mass assembly is to 
downplay the Taylorian distinction between thinking and doing without 
radically changing the formal organization and management prerogatives. 
On the factory floor, workers are requested to diligently follow standard 
operating procedures (SOP) while at the same time encouraged to actively 
participate in rethinking and improving the very same procedures. Organi-
zational arrangements, such as Quality Control Circles, suggestion systems, 
study groups, and quality audits are created to support this effort. While the 
workers are free to tinker with alternative solutions, the final decision to 
change a SOP is taken by the appropriate manager.
Formal organization is less important in Japan than in Sweden: continuous 
improvement can live side by side with a strict formal hierarchy. Mixing 
conformance to standard operating procedures with team-based improve-
ment activities of those same procedures, the Japanese can play with a wide 
range of possible solutions without radically changing the basic logic of 
production. Swedes are limited to playing with the formal organization of 
work because there is no tradition of informal mixing of improvement with 
following of rules.
Are the Japanese learning something from Sweden and Uddevalla? The 
Volvo experiments are certainly recognized, but in various ways. Morinobe 
(1989) uses Volvo as a warning example where you end up when pamper-
ing people.
Watanabe (1993) admits that Volvo has made significant progress in 
making work more humane. The Kalmar model could be an ideal factory 
system for producing high-margin, small volume cars. Honda is already do-
ing that very thing at its Tochigi Plant, where some 300 people are building 
25 NSX sports cars per month, each worker performing the tasks of 20 to 
30 traditional assembly line operators. It would be nice if all auto industry 
work could be organized like this, writes Watanabe, but unfortunately it is 
not feasible in the Japanese competitive context, and certainly not in the 
near future, when the overriding concern is to restore the profitability of 
the Japanese auto industry.
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Lean production
The Micro-Macro dimension,  
employment and the welfare state
Peter Auer
1. Introduction
Volvo’s Uddevalla Factory is unique in that its production system is 
not based on the assembly line principle … A majority of the Group’s 
production units are working with programs in the work-life area. The 
most far reaching approaches are applied in Volvo’s new plants … As a 
whole, these programs will increase the satisfaction employees derive 
from their jobs thereby resulting in more efficient operations (Volvo, 
1989, p. 12, p. 61).
The comprehensive rationalization programme that was initiated in 
1990 continued throughout 1992. The objective is to achieve cost-ef-
fective production with shorter lead times, higher quality and improved 
delivery reliabilty … the assembly plants in Uddevalla and Kalmar are 
being closed down … Since mid-1990 the number of employees has 
been reduced by approximately 6,500. Decisions regarding further re-
ductions in the number of employees were made in November of 1992. 
The substantial reductions in personnel have placed Volvo companies 
in situations that they have not dealt with earlier (Volvo, 1992, p. 12, 
p. 61).
Only three years interval separate these two statements. But, more than 
merely indicating the difference between announcements of a company in 
boom times and in bust times, the difference between these two statements 
indicates that a fundamental change has taken place in the organisation 
of production of a major car company, known for its human centred work 
organisation. A new model has emerged which shakes the foundations of 
industrial (and also service) production: lean forms of organisation replace 
traditional forms of organisation. Volvo, all in all a small player in the 
world automobile industry, does not stand alone in this change. All major 
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companies in Europe are presently engaged in large scale rationalisation 
to streamline their organisation and reduce their costs to arrive at ‘lean 
employment’.
Does this development also indicate that the humanized work organisa-
tion along the lines of an European, socio-technical model is incompatible 
with the rough world of ever increasing competitive pressure? Has the idea 
of the ‘fathers’ of the socio technical model (Trist and Bamforth, 1951; 
Thorsrud and Emery, 1964) that job satisfaction through new forms of 
work organisation is indeed a necessary condition for efficient production 
to be dismissed because of the new requirements of production in the face 
of Japanese competition? Although the authors of the now basic reference 
for ‘lean production’ Womack, Jones and Roos (1990) (hereafter WJR) 
contend that the lean world is ‘the best of all possible worlds’ and unites 
rationalisation and humanisation, the former seems – after a struggle of 
about 20 years – clearly have taken the lead over the latter and might even 
have won by knock-out, resulting in employment cuts of unknown dimen-
sions especially in countries like Sweden and Germany, known as the most 
advanced models of ‘welfare’ production, with high wage, employment and 
social security levels.
It has to be asked if there is an alternative to the lean approach and if 
there is still room for some ‘fat’ in production, despite all the pressures in 
the opposite direction. We think indeed that there is an economic (and not 
only social) rationale to retain some fat, which appears if one is to consider 
the impact of micro (company) decisions on the economy as a whole.
The following article is written not only from the perspective of organisa-
tional change itself, but also considers the linkages between organisational 
change and employment: a topic so far widely neglected in the literature on 
industrial sociology or industrial relations. However, in the understanding of 
the author, the consequences for employment of the present rationalisation 
strategies – which are not exclusive to the automotive industry – have to be 
questioned and solutions have to be found, which permit competitiveness 
without endangering the whole network of social protection of the advanced 
industrial countries.
This paper will provide a rough overview of present organisational change 
and discusses the links between internal and external adjustment of the 
workforce and the extent of (estimated) overmanning and manpower cuts. 
Differing workforce adjustment patterns in four European countries in the 
recent past as well as the institutional embeddedness of these adjustments 
will also be discussed. Finally, some ideas on how to combine reasonable 
lean organisation with reasonable employment levels are proposed.
439
2. Towards a new work organisation model
Few would deny that there is widespread change in the European automotive 
industry and that since the late 80s this change is, in one way or the other, 
influenced by Japanese practices. The book ‘The machine that changed 
the world’ by WJR is today a basic reference: It has had a large impact on 
management circles within the European automobile industry and illustrates 
the lead of the best practice Japanese firms opposed to the inferior position 
of leading European manufacturers in assembly productivity. Cooke (1993), 
shows the impact on Germany, where most major car companies bought 
‘thousand of copies’ for reference as ‘a bible for top management’.
However, changes are far from being introduced in an even manner. Take 
Volvo, where the work group has become an institution: There the situa-
tion varies from plant to plant: Uddevalla has dropped the assembly line 
principle, Kalmar has dropped the assembly line, but kept the principle of 
centrally paced sequential flow (before closure decision for capacity reasons 
were taken for both plants) and Torslanda and Ghent have kept assembly 
lines. Some producers have in some factories ‘doubled’ the assembly line 
with group working stations to assemble special vehicles (Mercedes Benz, 
Volkswagen and others). Three German manufacturers have established new 
factories (Opel and Volkswagen in the ex-GDR, Mercedes Benz in Rastatt), 
which have all introduced group work, JIT (just in time), and Kaizen (con-
tinuous improvements), in various forms. Mercedes has established one of 
the most modern final assembly plants in Rastatt which is also based on the 
now defunct Swedish experiences and where production organisation is a 
mixture of Uddevalla, Kalmar and local German technical approach with 
some Japanese ingredients.
The level of automation also varies with each manufacturer. With few ex-
ceptions manufacturers have automated their body shops so that body weld-
ing is nowadays an almost completely automatic process and differences 
between firms amount to a few percentage points in the degree of automation. 
More differences can be found in paint shops and especially in final assem-
bly, where still many barriers for automation do exist. Some manufacturers 
implemented automation of the final assembly for large series, such as Fiat 
for the Tipo and Volkswagen for the Golf. At the other end of the spectrum, 
Mercedes has, on the whole, stuck to manual assembly lines and is proud 
that it runs only one industrial robot at Rastatt. One finds today ‘automation 
islands’ in all final assembly plants, where tasks like body/motor marriage, 
seat, wheel and windshield fixing are carried out automatically. However, 
after attempts to maximise automation, today, a more careful approach is 
the rule, even in the newest Japanese Assembly plants.
Concerning operator autonomy, the number of layers of hierarchy, the 
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level of equipment flexibility and the amount of time equipment is used, 
a general rule is that production units become more responsible for costs 
and quality of their products, hierarchies are becoming flatter (even in 
the formerly very hierarchical french firms) equipment more flexible (as 
to allow simultaneous operations on different models or variants of cars) 
and shift systems are introduced everywhere to allow for intensive use of 
equipment. Also as far as the relationship between manufacturers and sup-
pliers is concerned, there are similarities in developments like the increase 
in outsourcing and globalisation of supply while reducing the number of 
‘first tier’ suppliers which will in future deliver whole ‘modulized’ systems 
(and arrange their own network of second and third tier suppliers). But in 
all these dimensions differences remain: sometimes hierarchies have only 
three layers, sometimes more. Sometimes far reaching cost accountancy is 
introduced at low levels of the organisation, sometimes it is not, in some 
European factories continuous shift work or night shifts are introduced, in 
others not. Some of the manufacturers will rely in the future on only a few 
main suppliers, some – while reducing their overall number – will cope with 
more (for example, Volkswagen will go from 950 to 100 while Mercedes 
will go from 1,100 to 550 and Ford from 900 to 600). Despite common 
trends and a fair degree of similarity in goals large differences have and 
will remain. Some of this differences have to do with production volume 
(e.g., the difference between high and low volume producers) some with 
the age of a factory (old sites vs. green field sites). Others have to do with 
the firm specific business cycle, the labour market situation (tight or loose) 
and industrial relations (changes depending for example on the bargaining 
power of the unions). In the final analysis, despite common trends and the 
introduction of such policies as ‘Just-in-time’, ‘Kaizen’, ‘Total Quality’, 
‘Group work’, ‘Profit (or Cost) centers’, ‘Outsourcing’, etc., there is still 
a fairly wide spectrum of different practices in work and production or-
ganisation across countries, companies and individual plants (Turner and 
Auer, 1992).
It might be one of the paradoxes of organisational change that unions 
turned work organisation changes into an important policy issue just when 
the ‘lean production’ concept made its successful entry in management. But 
it is clear that while unions do not oppose efficiency, their goals are different 
from that of management. For management, efficient production in a com-
petitive world remains the main goal, whereas unions have to fight also for 
the maintenance of the acquired rights of their constituencies. Because their 
constituencies are being endangered by the lean, cost reduction approach it 
might well be that the coalition between reformist management and unions 
in regard to work organisation which prevailed up to the early 90s (see Kern 
and Schumann, 1984; Auer and Riegler, 1990) will not survive in the era of 
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lean production if no solutions to the employment problem are found. The 
only chance for conflicts not arising overtly is the present vagueness of the 
concept of lean production under which, with some efforts, even former 
human centred work organisation concepts can be subsumed. The diversity 
of actual situations on the shop floors contribute to this vagueness and the 
fact that employment cuts caused by organisational change cannot be easily 
divided by those stemming from overcapacity, has also its impact.
However, despite all the differences, there is something in common to all 
European manufacturers and this is troublesome for workers and trade unions, 
as well as for those managers brought up in the cooperative and ‘humanisation 
of work’ spirit of change of the 80s. It is also disturbing for all those concerned 
with the problems of employment and unemployment: all manufacturers try 
to get leaner and try to reduce their costs. This places a tremendous amount 
of pressure on their major suppliers which will in turn direct this pressure 
towards their lower tier suppliers. This will lead to reductions in manpower 
levels everywhere, even if future demand will increase.
3. Internal and external adjustment: friends or foes?
The situation of the European automobile industry compared to the Japanese 
automobile industry seems to be that in Europe both internal adjustment 
through lean forms of organisation and external adjustments to reduce 
the labour force are required, whereas in Japan lean form of organisation 
match with lean levels of employment. In this context, it becomes more 
and more important that companies engage in what could be called ‘man-
aged redundancy’ policy. These policies comprise an array of measures 
of internal (internal transfers, internal training, short time work, etc.) and 
external adjustments (attrition, external transfers helped by company based 
placement units and training programmes, redundancy payments, early 
retirement schemes, etc.). They permit to lower workforce levels without 
disrupting totally ‘corporate cultures’ – important for having a motivated 
workforce, willing to be flexibly allocated to different tasks – and are 
already an important issue of bargaining which will gain in importance in 
the future. As workforce adjustment is not a new issue, the following chap-
ter looks at the ways in which it was managed in the past. Four countries 
with different patterns (Sweden, Germany, France and the UK), have been 
selected. Before a short presentation of the experiences of these countries, 
the issue of why employment security seems to be important for efficient 
production, is discussed.
3.1 Employment security and internal change
The cooperative attitude of Japanese employees and their labour unions 
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and their very strong identification with the destiny of their firm, are not 
conceded without certain things in return. The most important one is un-
doubtedly the employment security large firms in the automobile sector offer 
their employees, and the management of their internal labour markets, where 
salary (and promotion) is based on seniority and continuous training. The 
three pillars of Japanese management (employment for life, salary based on 
seniority – which goes together with training and evaluation – and enterprise 
labour unions, see Inagami, 1988) although now shaken by a prolonged 
recession, seem still to hold.
It is interesting to see how this trade-off between acceptance of internal 
adjustments, industrial peace, identification with corporate strategies and 
employment security, has spread to other national contexts through Japanese 
transplants or joint ventures.
The principle of trading greater internal flexibility for less external flex-
ibility, through greater employment security is one of the cornerstones of the 
Japanese ‘model’. However, as has been related by many authors, in Japan, 
external flexibility is ensured through less employment stability among 
smaller subcontractors, through inter-company transfers (shukko) mainly 
for older employees which often are a ‘functional equivalent’ to European 
type of early retirement provision. It is this ‘extended internal labor market’, 
including suppliers and helped by subsidised short-time work and train-
ing during economic downturns, which explains much of the employment 
system in Japanese plants (Inagami, 1988; Auer 1994). In Japan, clearly, 
internal adjustment is preferred to external adjustment.
If we look at employment development over a long period, we can see 
that, compared to other geographic regions, employment in the Japanese 
automobile industry including those subcontractors classified as belonging 
to the motor vehicle sector fluctuates much less than in the American au-
tomobile industry. Also employment increased until 1990, which contrasts 
with the experience in the two other regions (figure 1).
3.1.1 Internal management in a context of unstable employment?
Europe is, as we have already said, disadvantaged in relation to Japan: 
on the one hand, it will have to push through internal adjustment through 
changes in work organisation and the development of human resources, to 
face technological changes and catch up with the Japanese, and on the other 
hand, its workforce will have to ‘lose weight’ to achieve ‘leaner’ production. 
Yet in a lean organisation, technical and human faults are felt ‘on line’, and 
production becomes more fragile. Therefore, skilled labour is required, who 
are able to act quickly in case of failures and work without making errors. 
But if a major investment in personnel is made (and this is presently the 
case as further training is becoming increasingly important), while lean 
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production  leads to dismissals, a dilemma is reached: The commitment to 
and motivation for sustained qualitative internal adjustment seems to be 
easier, as the Japanese example shows, if there is a certain degree of employ-
ment security. Womack, Jones and Roos (1990) noted in their book that the 
hesitation to express your know-how and commit yourself ‘… would lead 
directly to catastrophe in the Ohno plant’ and that ‘the high work morale 
in the Takaoka plant was probably due to the fact that all workers had life 
employment in exchange for their commitment’ (1990, p. 58, 84).
If there is no development of the market to counterbalance the effects of 
rationalisation and such markets are yet not in sight, the European auto-
mobile industry will steer somewhere between Charybdis (massive layoffs 
– and have difficulties making internal changes and get trained labour), and 
Scylla (have too high labour costs and be disadvantaged in competition). In 
any case, it won’t be easy going. A substantial segment of industrial employ-
ment is concerned: aside from the automobile industry (manufacturers and 
equipment makers), which in 1992 represents more than 8 percent of all jobs 
in EEC manufacturing, there are other dependant sectors (repairs, insurance, 
shipping, etc.). It is estimated that 10 percent of total employment in the 
economies of the major car producing countries, is directly or indirectly 
associated with the automotive sector (CCFA, 1992; JAMA, 1993).
Figure 1
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3.2 The level of over-employment
The figures given are not reassuring and there is hardly a day without an-
nouncement of planned lay-offs by one of the automotive companies in 
Europe. Without additional outlets, and with a productivity similar to that 
of its Japanese counterpart, the European automobile industry can only con-
tinue to employ half its workforce (WJR, 1990). Mc Kinsey estimated that 
as many as 700,000 jobs could disappear in Europe in the coming years. The 
declarations made by European automobile executives for future employ-
ment levels are not optimistic either. There are, of course, many uncertain-
ties concerning the development of the market, and such uncertainties will 
increase with the opening of new markets in Eastern Europe, which have 
already (temporarily) spurred the German and French automobile industry. 
One should also remember that during the first oil crisis in 1973–74, massive 
layoffs were predicted, as well as the disappearance of many manufacturers 
in the then near future. But aside from the UK where more than 55 percent 
of all auto jobs (and more than 30 percent of production since 1974), were 
lost in 1991, the automobile industry weathered the storm quite well.
In fact, no one knows in which countries most of the layoffs will take 
place. Different sources come to different results: according to Morgan 
Stanley among European manufacturers, France and Italy – whose market 
share is said to be shrinking by roughly 3 percent, from now to 1995, to the 
benefit of the Japanese (+5 percent) – are more directly concerned, whereas 
Germany (VW, AUDI, Opel) should increase its market share for new cars 
by +1 percent by 1995. It is probable that the European countries whose 
automobile markets are the most protected against Japanese imports, i.e., 
Italy and France, will be the ones to suffer the most when the market opens 
after the year 2000. But all is dependant up on how ‘managed’ this trade 
will remain. A European Commission study (EEC, 1990) which measured 
the effects of European integration within 40 ‘sensitive’ economic sectors 
(taking foreign trade into account), showed that the automobile industries 
of Germany and Spain, and also to a lesser degree France, are in very good 
competitive positions, and that the United Kingdom, Italy, and the Nether-
lands are in bad positions (especially with relation to countries outside the 
EEC such as Japan). To this it must be added that manufacturers such as 
Volvo and Saab, which sell a large part of their output on the highly com-
petitive American market, suffered greatly from the Japanese competition 
in the top-of-the-line range there.
However, it seems that those countries which have had up to now very 
high employment levels, such as the German manufacturers are increasingly 
concerned by cuts in their workforce: All in all about 11 percent of all auto-
jobs disappeared in Germany in 1993. Observers judge this numbers to be 
insufficient and estimate that in Germany alone, suppliers and manufactur-
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ers together could loose as many as 200,000 to 300,000 jobs by 1995 (Die 
Zeit, No. 12, March 1993).
Where will jobs be cut: among manufacturers, among equipment mak-
ers, or both? Table 1 shows job distribution between equipment makers and 
manufacturers in 1987 and 1991.
Table 1 
Employment Distribution among Manufacturers and Suppliers  
(in percent of total)*
 Europe1) USA Japan
 1987 1991 1987 1991 1987 1991
with manufacturers 67.5 66.7 45.0 44.2 27.4 25.8 
with suppliers 32.5 33.3 55.0 55.8 72.6 74.2
* total = NACE 351 (construction and assembly of motor vehicles 
and engines and NACE 353 (production of motor vehicle parts and 
accessories) (US = Sic 3711 and 3714; Japan = SicJ 3111 and 3113) 
1) Germany, France, Italy, UK
Sources: VDA; US Department of Labor; Statistisches Bundesamt, Fach-
serie 4; own calculations.
The three regions of the triad show very different types of distribution 
between manufacturers and suppliers. In Japan (and to a lesser degree in 
the US) the majority of the workforce is working for suppliers, whereas in 
Europe most employees work with manufacturers. This distribution patterns 
are consistent with the degree of subcontracting which is much higher in a 
typical Japanese plant than in an European plant.
In all regions (Japan included), the trend is clear. As a share of total au-
tomative employment, employment of manufacturers is decreasing, whereas 
employment of suppliers is increasing. Especially in Europe, one can expect 
most job cuts by manufacturers, as the potential of subcontracting seems 
far from being exhausted. This does not mean that the jobs lost by manu-
facturers are simply transferred to suppliers, as the suppliers themselves are 
being pushed into hard rationalisation programmes to produce at low costs 
by their costumers. The distribution balance on the whole will be skewed 
towards supplier employment but still fewer jobs than before, at the end 
of the day.
3.3 Employment trends in Europe since 1974
Between 1978 and 1985 (the same number of years as those remaining 
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between now and the year 2000) 350,000 auto jobs were lost in countries 
which registered job losses during this period. This was higher than that of 
the European steel industry, which cut 265,000 jobs over the same period. 
This means that a fairly massive readjustment of the workforce is not a 
new phenomenon for the automobile industry or for European industry in 
general. But there are great contrasts between the different countries: the 
UK alone accounts for 57 percent of all job cuts in the automobile industry. 
Furthermore, aside from the quantitative aspect, over-employment was man-
aged differently in different European countries, which is explained by their 
different socio-economic models. The subsequent analysis of the different 
countries patterns of workforce adjustment, concerns primarly the period 
after the first ‘oil shock’ to just before the end of the recovery (1989).
3.4 Four different ways to adjust employment
We have plotted the different performances of four countries in chart 2. Two 
countries succeeded in creating jobs during the period, and two others suf-
fered job cuts. It seems clear that the need to adjust employment is primarely 
determined by economic development and the strength of the automobile 
branch in the world market. There is a relationship between production and 
employment (see figure 3), though this relationship is much looser in France 
and the UK, than in West Germany and Sweden.1 This shows that, while in 
the final analysis, management of the workforce is a function of production 
and the market, it also depends on employer, labour union and government 
strategies, i.e., the power balance in the system of industrial relations. Em-
ployment is a political as well as, an economic issue. Since the balance of 
power is governed by institutions such as the Labour Law (the regulation 
of employment protection: see Auer et al., 1992; Büchtemann and Meager, 
1991; Mosley, 1993), employment and training policies, etc., a filter exists 
between adjustment requirements determined by market changes and the 
actual adjustments. For economists of the pure neoclassical tradition, this 
is a distortion of market forces as employment should not be affected by 
social or political factors. For supporters of the ‘institutionalist’ approach, 
the intervention of the industrial relations system can provide a buffer 
against the abnormal functioning of the market and regulate employment 
levels more efficient as the market. For some authors, the existence of strong 
institutions makes it possible to implement post-Taylor or post-Fordist pro-
duction models, and is a prerequisite for economic growth, since strategies 
for mass-producing low-quality goods, requiring cheap unskilled labour 
are no longer adapted to the current expectations of consumers. Therefore, 
strong institutions support a ‘diversified quality production’ in a high skill, 
high wage economy (Streeck, 1991).
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Figure 2
3.4.1 ‘Neo-corporatist’ countries maintained a high level of employment
Up to very recently, there seems to be reason to believe Streecks arguments: 
chart 2 shows that employment has fared, up to the 90s, better in countries 
with ‘neo-corporatist’ type social relations and strong labour unions than in 
countries with more conflictual industrial relations and weak or weakened 
labour unions. Furthermore, the former increased their output fairly quickly 
after the two oil crises and took advantage of the subsequent recoveries by 
concentrating on the top-of-the-line range. This also holds true for indus-
try in general, and particularly for the steel industry, where they cut fewer 
jobs over a longer period than the two other countries, and production was 
redirected towards special steels (Semlinger, 1991; Riegler, 1992).
Germany and Sweden have strong labour unions and employers’ associa-
tions and a tradition of communicating between social partners at different 
levels, as a result of deals which include industrial peace clauses. Therefore, 
strikes are rare but can be serious and widespread, as during the struggle 
for a 35-hour work week in Germany. In both countries, the trend towards 
decentralisation in bargaining, although affecting the labour unions, has not 
weakened them to the same degree as in the UK or France, thanks to strong 
institutions at enterprise level. Employment is certainly not ‘guaranteed’, 
but it is protected by legislation against lay offs and agreements to counter 
the effects of rationalisation (Rationalisierungsschutzabkommen in West 
Germany). It must be said that large companies in the automobile industry 
have developed ‘internal labour markets’ with their own recruitment, career 
and redundancy rules, which come close to employment security for workers 
with unlimited employment contracts. Compared to France, they make less 
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use of fixed term contracts and temporary workers (Auer and Büchtemann, 
1990). But they do not ensure this ‘employment security’ alone: they are 
assisted, when needed, by measures financed in part by the government. In 
West Germany, short-time work was heavily used during drops in demand: in 
1974, 14.5 percent of workers in the automobile industry were on short-time 
work, and during the second oil crisis, the figure was 7 percent on average. 
Short-time work is used in Sweden along with subsidies for training on the 
site of employment during slow growth periods.
The Freezing of hiring and use of attrition make it possible to avoid lay 
offs. In the automobile industries of both countries, but more in Sweden 
than in Germany (where departing employees often receive severance pay: 
Aufhebungsverträge), adjustments were made easier thanks to a fairly high 
turnover (and therefore voluntary departures), even though there are fewer 
departures during economic slumps. The fairly high level of mobility and 
the return of activity enabled the renewal of personnel, but at the same time, 
underlined the tightness of local labour markets.
In both countries, though much more in West Germany than in Sweden, 
the early retirement solution (partially paid for by public funds) was used. 
In West Germany, where immigrant labour is laid off more than German 
labour, ‘expatriation grants’ together with facilities to recover pension funds, 
were proposed temporarily to immigrant workers who accepted to return to 
their home countries. For both countries, the decrease in work time has also 
supported employment: in Germany, the working week was significantly 
shortened through collective bargaining (37 hours by now and probably 35 
Figure 3
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hours in 1995). In Sweden, where the working week remains the same, for 
example, it is still 41 hours at Volvo, the numerous possibilities for legal 
absence (parental leave, training leave, etc.), have decreased the effective 
time worked to one of the lowest in Europe. Different shift systems have also 
been introduced in both countries which allow a longer use of equipment.
While there are many differences between the two countries, internal 
adjustments were favored over external adjustments, and there was job 
stability for a large ‘core’ of employees with substantial seniority, which is 
still encouraged by a solid ‘institutional environment’. This employment 
stability (relative because of turnover), was put to the test during the two oil 
crises but was not seriously threatened, and with the recovery up to the 90s, 
the lack of qualified labour sometimes became even more of a problem than 
ensuring employment stability. This has changed with the present recession 
together with changes towards the ‘lean’ company.
3.4.2 Market vs. State: employment adjustment in the UK and France
This ‘institutional environment’ is different in the UK and France who 
have more conflictual industrial relations, even if changes can currently 
be noted. True, there are major differences between the way the UK and 
France approach layoffs: France, with the help of the government, is a case 
of ‘managed exits’ with accompanying measures largely paid for by the 
public, while the UK is a case of neo-liberal market led adjustment.
Adjustment by the market. In the UK, after 1979, the very liberal policy of 
adjustments by the market became a key issue in the battle against what 
was considered an ineffective ‘over-manned’ industry and was also part of 
a strategy against labour unions and against certain institutional rules laid 
down earlier to protect jobs (such as the ‘guaranteed week’ agreements, 
a sort of short-time working scheme, which guaranteed employees in the 
automobile industry a certain number of paid hours of work per week ir-
respective of hours actually worked). Massive job cuts were, however, at 
the heart of the ‘liberal’ adjustment. Nevertheless, even in the UK lay offs 
are not without any compensation thanks to the legal protection in case of 
layoffs (Employment Protection Act), backed up by the law on severance 
pay (Redundancy Payment Act). Adjustments in the various automobile 
firms were therefore generally negotiated with the labour unions. The most 
widely used system is redundancy payments which were often increased by 
the firms. Almost all layoffs were ‘voluntary redundancies’, i.e., with the 
consent of the departing worker, and with higher severance pay than the 
statutory minimum payes in case of involuntary redundancies. But it has 
been observed that redundancy payments are the least protective measures, 
and a large part of workers who received these payments continue on to fill 
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the ranks of the long term unemployed (White, 1983; Rees and Thomas, 
1988). Early retirements were also used; they concerned approximately 20 
percent of all departures and are to a very large extent paid for by company 
pension funds (Campbell, 1992).
Some companies (British Leyland, Vauxhall, Ford) attempted retraining 
programs, which have led some authors to draw parallels between the Brit-
ish automobile industry employment market and the German concept of 
‘internal markets’ (Marsden et al., 1985).
However, the adjustment was carried out more rapidly (e.g., 130,000 job 
cuts in 1980/81 alone) and with less protection than in Germany, Sweden 
or France. This is obviously linked to the very different need to make ad-
justments due to very low productivity; during the 70’s, the labour unions 
practiced ‘labour hoarding’: their splintered organisation and attitude of 
opposition to change sometimes impeded the internal adjustments required. 
This has changed since, and there is a current renewal of industrial rela-
tions (e.g., single union deal, single status) coming from the transplants, 
which offer a certain degree of employment security for their employees. 
This renewal became widespread and is taken up by other companies (such 
as Rover) as well.
The government as an adjustment agency? In France, employment fared 
better during the 70s but job cuts increased after the second oil crisis. The 
management of job cuts has become a major issue. Despite the fact that the 
labour union membership rate is now the lowest of all European countries, 
labour unions are not powerless. The government, which plays a more 
important role in industrial relations and industrial modernisation than in 
the other countries, has made a fairly wide range of adjustment measures 
available to companies and individuals (such as short-time work, special 
in-plant placement, training and especially early retirement). It is true that 
the French automobile industry uses fixed term contracts and temporary 
employment more than other countries, to counterbalance swings in pro-
duction and the external adjustment policy is also based on the departure 
of immigrant workers. But more than in other countries it is reliant on ‘age 
measures’ (e.g., it has been estimated that the costs to the French state for 
early retirement at Peugeot SA alone, amounted to more than 2 billion francs 
over a ten-year period – Gerpisa, 1994). But this exit management, through 
the early retirement of older workers, was gradually slowed due to its cost 
to the government; the loss of experienced workers for the companies; and 
by efforts to introduce a system of preventive employment management 
and exit management based on training. In fact, the ‘retraining’ policy has 
become one of the key aspects of employment policy in the 80s (Villeval, 
1991; Ardenti and Vrain, 1988), which demonstrates the government’s wish 
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to support companies in their adjustment programmes without footing the 
entire bill. The relative weakness of labour unions, a gradual change of their 
policy towards more cooperative models, and a corporate strategy to improve 
‘out-placement’ using external labour market management tools financed 
in part by the government, have led to a relative consensus on the need to 
cut jobs to increase productivity in the face of competition.
3.5 Employment security, cooperation and internal change
Our initial hypothesis was that employment security, one of the aspects of 
the Japanese model, would make adapting to internal structural changes 
easier. It seems that in Sweden and Germany, during the 80s, the state of 
the market, the strength of labour unions and the institutional support of 
internal markets protected jobs, but did not stop external adjustments (be-
cause of a fairly high degree of labour mobility) when needed. They also 
made internal change easier, such as the introduction of new technologies, 
group work, work time flexibility and even ‘just in time’. However, the type 
of changes introduced were usually more ‘human centred’ as with the lean 
production concept. Even when systematic comparative data for ‘qualita-
tive’ internal adjustments are not available, many authors have shown how 
extensive the changes are in these two countries, sometimes introduced in 
different ways (Berggren, 1991; Turner and Auer, 1992; Auer and Riegler, 
1990). The familiar changes in work organisation at Volvo, as well as the 
introduction of group work and flexible hours to increase the operating time 
of equipment in German plants (Muster, 1988; Lehndorff, 1991), illustrate 
this fact. In comparison, difficulties are greater in other countries, such as 
those demonstrated by Pontusson (1991), in his comparison between Swe-
den and the UK. Other studies (Bouche et al., 1992) show the difficulties 
of modernisation in France as well.
4. Will yesterday’s strengths be tomorrow’s weaknesses?
The emergence of the Japanese production method and the recession has 
suddenly cast doubts, not only on the viability of the kind of European style 
organisational change (the Volvo approach but also the German style group 
work supported by the unions provides an illustration of European style ap-
proach) but also in general of the socio-economic model dominant mainly 
in ‘neo-corporatist’ European countries.
It is true that such European models of work organisation change, as at 
Uddevalla and Kalmar – considered as non viable by Womack, Jones and 
Roos – have been discontinued and production has been recentred at the 
bigger but traditionally organized plants in Torslanda and Gent. It is also 
true that managers at the Mercedes plant in Rastatt are worried, and might 
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ask themselves if they have engaged in the right solutions for the ‘most 
modern’ car plant in Europe. Put under pressure of delocalisation, unions 
have also accepted wage restraint there to attract production of the Mer-
cedes city car.
Furthermore, the high employment levels reached during the last upswing 
in the German and Swedish automobile industry have been questioned and 
have already been substantially lowered.
However, beyond what can be seen as normal adjustment in economic 
troughs, it seems that it is the whole socio-economic model with its labour 
law regulations, high wage levels and substantial social benefits (and as-
sorted wage and non-wage costs), which was only possible to develop 
because of strong and participative unions and compromise oriented man-
agement, is now blamed to be part of the problem rather than being part of 
the solution, thus putting a question mark on Streeck’s thesis of institutional 
superiority of these systems.
Put under pressure in an era of supply side economics, deregulation and 
decentralization, globalized markets, renewed power of employers, the 
traditional ‘neo-coporatist’ countries seem to be disadvantaged in relation 
to more market-oriented economies because of their assumed rigidities. On 
the other hand, these models have already changed to a substantial degree 
without scrapping all the socio-economic foundations on which they are 
based. And, as the recent bargaining agreement at Volkswagen has shown, 
there seems to be a potential for innovative solutions even in such large 
‘neo-corporatist’ firms known for the power of their unions. And also the 
‘employment oriented’ collective bargaining arrangements in the German 
metal and chemical industries (providing for working time cuts in order 
to maintain jobs) show this potential for (bargained) change. Institutional 
resilience in the face of change is certainly a feature of the German model 
(see Turner, 1993; Thelen 1993; Auer 1994) and institutional stability might 
also be seen as an advantage in a time of many changes as it makes behaviour 
of the actors more predictable and ‘path dependent’. And the institutional 
weaknesses (e.g., the training systems, industrial relations, etc.) of the two 
other countries have given way to a large body of literature which one should 
not neglect. In any case, it is certainly too early yet to judge which of the 
‘models’ will be the most viable in the long run: those which have come 
near to (im)perfect markets or those with an institutional ‘filter’ providing 
for bargained and cushioned change.
Even if countries react differently to the present organisational change 
(e.g., different way of socialising the risk of becoming unemployed) a threat 
is posed to all the economies of the developed world. All have to cope with 
shrinking employment levels not only in industry but also in certain parts 
of the service sector (such as banking and insurance) and most notably also 
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in the public service sector where up to now employment was created. At 
least two scenarios are possible (neither of which most become reality): the 
worst case market driven and the less worse socio-economic scenario.
4.1 The worst case scenario
The defenders of lean production believe that lean organisation will lead 
to low costs, low prices, will spur demand and increase market shares and 
will eventually become the weapon to defend European markets against 
the Japanese. They contend that in any case, if one does not engage in cost 
efficient lean ways of organisation, one will simply disappear from the 
market altogether. Employment and production will also be lost totally. In 
that view, lean production is necessary in order to survive. It is difficult to 
argue against this.
Yet, if we were to add all our factors cited above together, the developed 
economies engaging in lean organisation on a large scale (not only in the 
automobile industry) could face important problems which are difficult to 
overcome. It will be increasingly hard to find regular replacement jobs for 
those displaced by structural (also organisational) change. But lean employ-
ment levels pose also the problem of financing the welfare state: at a certain 
point, low employment levels might not any more provide a sufficient base 
for taxation.
Seen from an employment point of view and in a micro-macro link per-
spective, the present changes towards ‘lean’ production and organisation in 
large sectors of the economy might produce the end of the ‘fat years’ in the 
economy. ‘Lean’ organisational change might be a remedy for individual 
firms, but on the macro level, it could also be a cause for the deterioration 
of the economic and social climate in general. More than just a bitter pill 
to swallow with promising health, the remedy could be poisonous or even 
kill the patient. Lean production in Europe means cost reduction (Cooke, 
1993), and cost reduction means basically ‘lean employment’
But the lean approach promotes also a fundamental change in how big 
corporations are run. Until recently, many corporations were in fact socio-
economic entities which integrated economic and social responsibilities. 
But these responsibilities were embedded in a system that benefited all: the 
employed benefited because of industrial peace and employment security 
and high wage levels, while the employers benefited because of the main-
tenance or expansion of demand. Public budgets financed from tax revenue 
based on (high) wages served to provide the unemployed with benefits and 
active labour market policy measures, as well as replacement incomes in 
the form of retirement benefits or social assistance.
In the European ‘lean’ world of cost (and employment) reduction, there 
is not many space left for social responsability. This could mean that either 
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the employment and poverty problem is individualised or the state has to 
take over (e.g., through unemployment benefits and labour market policies) 
while the tax base is shrinking.
Even on a micro-economic level, a catch-22 situation could develop: or-
ganisational change needs the motivation of workers and their acceptance 
of flexible allocation across functions. In exchange some trade offs have to 
be offered in order to have not only short-term commitment which might 
also be reached by the fear of job loss, but also sustained commitment and 
a cooperative attitude of workers. One could argue that the simple threat of 
job loss is enough to get all the commitment that one needs and that the stick 
‘employment uncertainty’ is a much better instrument of discipline than the 
carrot ‘employment security’. But as has been shown, even firms not bound 
to give employment security by a strong labour legislation (e.g., in the US) 
tend to assure it (Mosley, 1993). It was also demonstrated that tenure and 
training correlate positively and that a trained workforce is an undisputed 
asset for firms. From a more theoretical perspective, Williamson (1985) 
arguments imply that transaction costs (screening, hiring, training, etc.) tend 
to be higher in labour markets with a high degree of external flexibility. 
This leads to the conclusion that employment security beside being socially 
desirable has also economic benefits. And as far as flexibility for adjustment 
is concerned, labour markets characterised by employment stability have 
institutional ‘puffers’ which authorise them to make the necessary adjust-
ment (e.g., employment maintenance measures such as short-time work or 
adjustment measures such as early retirement).
Today, many European manufacturers have to battle on two fronts: they 
have to recieve consent from their workers for far reaching internal changes 
but cannot offer employment security anymore. They must consequently 
find either new ways of employment maintenance (like work sharing) or 
ways to ‘socially cushion’ exits from the labour markets.
Of course, it is always tempting in times of recession to engage in worst-
case-scenarios much like the ‘technology as a job killer argument’, or more 
directly linked to the automobile industry, the pessimistic predictions of the 
first International Motor Vehicle Programme of the MIT (the one preced-
ing the ‘Machine that changed the world’). The programme forecasted the 
disappearance of many major automobile producers (Altshuler, 1984).
Far from behaving as ‘lean organisation Luddites’, we think it is important 
to point out the fact that it is today the combination of different elements 
(lean organisation, high mass unemployment, depleted public funds, slow 
employment growth in the service sector, etc.) which give alarmist argu-
ments some legitimacy.
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4.2 What can be done: a socio-economic scenario
It seems unrealistic to assume that the employment levels reached in the 
automotive industry in countries like Sweden or Germany can be maintained. 
Jobs will be lost, as is the usual case during phases of structural change. In 
that respect, instability is the only stability we can really be sure of.
However, the automotive industry, as well as other industries, should not 
push for a total cost reduction approach and the leanest of all worlds. Instead 
of a maximum in leanness, which might lead internally to fragile organisa-
tions and externally to a downward spiral in the economies, an optimum 
in leanness is required. Acceptance of some ‘slack’ in the production flow 
as well as in the labour force might be functional for organisational and 
economic ‘safety’ alike. Just as a second break fluid circuit in cars (or a 
reserve computer system in airplanes) is functional for traffic safety while 
being ‘redundant’. In general, one has to ask if some ‘redundancies’ in the 
production systems (such as puffers, reserve equipment and reserve labour 
and/or skills) which from a cost perspective are considered wasteful and not 
a necessity maintain in fact production flows (see Grabher, 1994).
It might even be better to pay for products a little bit more (add if you 
wish a ‘fat production premium’), but be aware that the organisation and 
the entire economy benefits from it. A biproduct of such a ‘welfare’ price 
approach is a high level of employment, high wages, a high standard of 
social protection (all supporting demand for goods and services) and sound 
‘humane’ work organisation, which enhances the quality of life.
This does not mean that one should strive for inefficiency, but for gradual 
adjustment to a reasonable level of efficiency, one which leaves room for 
some ‘waste’. Again, this is not argued solely on social grounds, but in 
socio-economic terms.
In a totally competitive world, such a gradual adjustment seems impos-
sible, as some players might get lean and displace those who are less lean. 
Therefore, a corollary for a reasonably efficient economy is not to engage in 
a totally competitive world. This of course cannot be done on a national level 
alone but requires cooperation between countries and a sort of bargained or 
‘managed trade’. This managed trade could simply consist in the regulation 
of at least minimum standards of social protection, working life or envi-
ronmental standards which must be fulfilled by all producer countries. This 
would also help to prevent one country from ‘hoovering’ over production 
and jobs from another country by social or environmental dumping.
In view of the Japanese advances this socio-economic approach might 
be interpreted as leading to the death of all other producers. And yet, even 
Japan will have to change in the coming years under pressure from new 
generations, which are not the ‘worker bees’ their fathers were. Japanese 
manufacturers adapt their leanest systems to new social demands (Nomura, 
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1993). Some social adjustments will be needed in this system, which will 
bring it closer to the European and American automobile industries. In 
Japan (e.g., Toyotas newest plant), some elements of the European model 
are integrated, where instead of targeting at a maximum in leanness, they 
are reintroducing such ‘wastes’ as puffers between work stations, thereby 
reducing negative consequences for production flows and worker’s health. 
These developments show that there is indeed a possibility for change which 
integrates the economic as well as the social dimension.
It is clear, however, that the maintenance (in the European case) or the 
reintroduction (in the Japanese case) of some ‘fat’ in production and the 
economy in general is firmly opposed by those who want to introduce lean 
production. Therefore some additional remarks have to be made. Our ar-
gument is that if lean forms of organisation are adopted to any significant 
extent, their macro-economic consequences will threaten – by complex ef-
fects in the economic process – the foundations of the economy itself. This 
has to do with micro-macro link questions and also with supply and demand 
factors. To give a very simple example: in an isolated supply side micro-
economic view, high wages are a cost factor which affect competitiveness 
and destroy jobs. In a demand side macro-economic view, high wages are 
a benefit to the economy. This is because they spur demand and production 
and contribute, all other things remaining equal, to the creation of jobs. The 
dilemma cannot be solved by relying on isolated policies for either side, but 
by a combined supply/demand and micro/macro policy. The fear is that lean 
production is just such an isolated supply side micro-economic mechanism, 
which does not take into account demand aspects (more jobs equal more 
purchasing power, less public deficits, etc.).
However, in a time of rising unemployment, one has also to question 
the notion of full employment, as it seems that full employment (full-time 
jobs with long working hours), can not longer be provided by the advanced 
industrial countries, and a new more flexible definition for full employment 
has to be found. Some authors argue that the message of lean ways to or-
ganize production is a positive one: more wealth can be produced with less 
human labour. Despite all the alarmist scenarios of future labour markets, 
productivity advances make the ‘cake’ of wealth constantly bigger. It is the 
cake of work which is shrinking. Yet if one is to engage in work sharing on 
a large scale, one could distribute smaller slices of the work cake to more 
people while maintaining or often increasing the wealth cake. This scenario 
of large scale job sharing to overcome the employment crisis is today be-
lieved by a growing number of authors (e.g., Aznar, 1993; Gorz, 1986). It 
is also applied (not as a clear cut strategy, however) through extending the 
share of part-time jobs, work time reductions and leave (training, sabbati-
cals) schemes. Even if work sharing is only one of the possible solutions 
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for the present employment crisis, it is worth trying it. And one should not 
forget that new social demands have always been important driving forces 
for economic development.
Note
1. Regression coefficients show that over the whole period around 75 percent of 
the variation in production is ‘explained’ by employment variation in Germany 
and 60 percent in Sweden, but only 10 percent in France and 20 percent in 
the UK. In other words: production and employment is much closer linked in 
Germany and Sweden than in the UK and France. Productivity (production per 
head) has strongly increased in the UK and also in France, and has been rather 
stable in Germany, while it has decreased in Sweden till 1991. It is on the rise 
in all countries since 1991.
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